Using Regional Variation in Wages to Measure the Effects of the Federal Minimum Wage

David Card


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USING REGIONAL VARIATION IN WAGES TO MEASURE
THE EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE

DAVID CARD*

The imposition of a national minimum wage standard provides a
natural experiment in which the “treatment effect” varies across states
depending on the fraction of workers initially earning less than the new
minimum. The author exploits this fact to evaluate the effect of the
April 1990 increase in the federal minimum wage on teenagers' wages,
employment, and school enrollment. Comparisons of grouped and
individual state data confirm that the rise in the minimum wage
increased teenagers’ wages. There is no evidence of corresponding
losses in teenage employment or changes in teenage school enrollment.

One of the traditional criticisms of a
federal minimum wage policy is that
it imposes a higher relative wage floor in
regions with lower average wages (see
Stigler 1946:360–61). An appropriate
minimum wage for New Jersey, for exam-
ple, may have devastating labor market
consequences in Mississippi.¹ From an
evaluation perspective, however, a uni-
form minimum wage is an under-appreci-
ated asset. A rise in the federal minimum
wage will typically affect a larger fraction
of workers in some states than in others.
This variation provides a simple natural
experiment for measuring the effect of
legislated wage floors, with a “treatment
effect” that varies across states depending
on the fraction of workers initially earning
less than the new minimum.

This paper examines the experiences
following the April 1990 rise in the federal
minimum wage to evaluate the effects of
minimum wages on the teenage labor
market. In 1989, one-quarter of all 16–19-
year-olds earned between $3.35 per hour
(the existing federal minimum rate) and
$3.80 per hour (the new minimum).
Across states, however, this fraction varied
from under 10% in New England and
California to over 50% in many southern
states. Much of this variation is attribut-
able to the presence of state-specific wage
floors above the federal rate. In the late
1980s many states responded to the
decade-long freeze in the federal mini-
mum wage by raising their own minimum
rates above $3.35 per hour. These state-
specific wage floors created remarkable
geographic dispersion in teenage wage
rates, setting the stage for the empirical
analysis reported here.

Minimum Wage Statutes in
1989–90

The federal minimum wage increased
to $3.35 per hour in January 1981 and
remained frozen throughout the 1980s.
By the close of the decade, cumulative inflation had eroded the purchasing power of the minimum wage to its lowest level since January 1950. The decline in the real value of the federal minimum wage prompted state legislatures and wage boards to respond with state-specific minimum rates above the federal standard. The first of these higher minimums arose in the New England states—Maine ($3.45 effective January 1985), Massachusetts and Rhode Island (both $3.55 effective July 1986), New Hampshire ($3.45 effective January 1987), and Connecticut ($3.75 effective October 1987). By 1989 a total of 16 states and the District of Columbia had wage floors above $3.35.

Political pressure for an increase in the federal minimum wage culminated in March 1989 with passage of a House resolution to raise the minimum to $4.55 over three years. A similar bill passed the Senate but was vetoed by the President. A bill providing for smaller wage increases and a liberalized youth subminimum was introduced in November 1989 and passed into law with Presidential support. This bill raised the minimum wage in two steps—to $3.80 on April 1, 1990, and to $4.25 on April 1, 1991—and set a training minimum equal to 85% of the regular minimum wage for employees aged 16–19.

Other provisions of the federal minimum wage were modified only slightly by the April 1990 law. The tip credit, which allows employees to credit a portion of their tips toward the minimum, was raised from 40% to 45%. Consequently, the federal minimum wage for tipped employees rose from $2.01 to $2.09 per hour. Exemptions for smaller businesses were also expanded and simplified. Previously, retail and service enterprises with an annual sales volume of less than $250,000 were exempt from coverage. This threshold was raised to $500,000 and extended to all industries.

The Effect on Teenagers: An Overview

Because teenagers are typically at the bottom of the earnings distribution, and because a large fraction of low-paid workers are teenagers, the minimum wage literature has concentrated on the youth labor market (see the chapters of the Minimum Wage Study Commission [1981] and the review article by Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen [1982]). Simple models of the teenage labor market predict varying responses to the rise in the federal minimum wage, depending on the fraction of workers initially earning below the new rate. (See Welch [1976] for a thorough overview.) Examination of the interstate patterns of wage and employment growth for teenagers between 1989 and 1990 provides a credible test of the proposition that changes in teenage labor market outcomes reflect changes in the minimum wage, rather than other factors that coincided with the law.

Table 1 presents some descriptive information on teenagers taken from the monthly files of the Current Population Survey (CPS) in 1989 and 1990. Each month, individuals in the two "outgoing rotation groups" of the survey are asked to provide summary information on earnings and hours on their main job (if they have one). The data in Table 1 and throughout this paper are based on the responses for this 1/4 sample of the CPS. To facilitate a comparison of the periods

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2 Using the Consumer Price Index for all items, the real federal minimum wage in January 1950 was $4.08 (in 1990 dollars). It ranged between $3.64 (in 1954) and $6.00 (in 1968). Its value in 1989 was $3.53.

3 The widespread setting of state minimum wages above the federal rate was unprecedented. For example, Cullen (1960) observed that the federal minimum wage had served as a ceiling for state-specific minimum rates during the period from 1940 to 1960.

4 See Bureau of National Affairs (undated, 91:1415–22).

5 A similar evaluation methodology figured prominently in many early studies of minimum wage laws (see especially Lester 1965:518–23), but that approach has been largely supplanted in the recent literature by aggregate time-series studies (for example, Welch 1976; Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen 1982, 1983; Wellington 1991).
Table 1. Characteristics of Teenagers and Teenage Workers, 1989 and 1990.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>April–December 1989</th>
<th>April–December 1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Workers</td>
<td>$&lt;3.35$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Percent of All</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Percent of Workers</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Female (%)</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Nonwhite (%)</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Hispanic (%)</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Educ $&lt; 12$ (%)</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Age 16–17 (%)</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Enrolled in School</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Hours/Week</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Avg. Wage ($/hr.)</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>2.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Including Tips and Commissions:

| 11. Av. Wage ($/hr.)              | 4.77               | 3.06    | 3.61       | 5.41         | 4.99               | 3.04    | 3.67        | 5.24         |
| 12. Weekly Wage ($/week)          | 134.3              | 69.5    | 82.2       | 161.0        | 137.8              | 70.7    | 79.7        | 147.2        |
| 13. Percent Reporting Tips > 0   | 11.0               | 24.5    | 12.2       | 9.8          | 11.5               | 28.2    | 13.3        | 10.9         |

Industry Distribution:

| 14. Agriculture                   | 4.2                | 6.0     | 2.2        | 3.4          | 4.4                | 8.9     | 2.5         | 3.3          |
| 15. Retail Trade                  | 50.1               | 49.5    | 68.4       | 45.2         | 50.0               | 48.0    | 63.5        | 50.1         |
| 16. Service                       | 26.2               | 35.8    | 22.6       | 25.9         | 27.0               | 37.9    | 27.2        | 26.1         |
| 17. Sample Size                   | 18,511             | 9,205   | 674        | 2,326        | 5,735              | 18,549  | 8,625       | 499          | 653          | 7,049        |

Notes: Data are taken from 1989 and 1990 monthly Current Population Survey files (outgoing rotation groups for April–December of each year). “All Workers” include unpaid and self-employed workers. Workers in specified wage ranges exclude self-employed workers and those with allocated hourly or weekly earnings. The wage measure in row 10 is based on straight-time wages of hourly rated workers. Wage in row 11 includes pro-rated tips and commissions for hourly rated workers.

before and after the rise in the minimum wage, the samples include only the April–December surveys of each year.

The first and sixth columns of Table 1 present data for all teenagers, and the remaining columns pertain to employed teenagers and those with hourly wages in specified intervals. The U.S. teenage population includes a high fraction of nonwhites (20%) and Hispanics (10%); the respective proportions of the working population are lower. Employed teenagers also tend to be older and have more years of completed education than nonworking teenagers. A majority of teenagers (56.5%) report that they are "attending or enrolled in high school, college, or university." A slightly lower fraction (48%) report that their main activity during the survey week was "in school." These fractions must be interpreted carefully, since school attendance rates vary over the year. During 1989 the average fraction of teenagers enrolled in school varied from 77% in April to 14% in July and August.

The CPS collects hourly wage information for individuals who are paid by the hour (93% of teenagers) and usual weekly earnings for other workers. The wage measure presented in row 10 of Table 1

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6 The construction of the wage variable is explained below.
MINIMUM WAGES: CARD (I)

and used to define the columns of the table is the reported wage for hourly rated workers and the ratio of usual weekly earnings to usual weekly hours for other workers. By this "straight-time" wage measure, teenage workers earned an average of $4.61 per hour in 1989, compared to an average of $10.10 for all workers in the United States. Seven percent of teenagers earned less than the federal minimum wage of $3.35 per hour, 24% earned from $3.35 to $4.24 per hour, and 64% earned $3.80 per hour or more. Another 5% either were self-employed, worked without pay, or failed to report earnings information.7

One difficulty with the wage measure in row 10 is that some workers who report being paid by the hour also receive tips or commissions. This practice is especially widespread in retail trade, where over one-half of the teenagers are employed (see row 15 of the table). For hourly rated workers the CPS also collects usual weekly earnings including regular tips and commissions. This information can be used to construct an estimate of average weekly tips and an alternative measure of hourly wages. The average level of wages including pro-rated tips (in row 11 of Table 1) is 3% higher than the average based on straight-time earnings, reflecting the addition of tips and commissions for just over 10% of teenage workers.8

The characteristics of teenagers with "straight-time" earnings less than the minimum wage are presented in the third column of Table 1. There are various explanations for subminimum pay, including noncoverage (for tipped employees in retail trade and full-time students under the student subminimum),9 employer noncompliance, and measurement error. Examination of the wage distribution of teenagers earning less than $3.35 shows a substantial spike (21% of workers) near the tipped minimum of $2.01 per hour, suggesting that many subminimum-wage workers are exempt from the $3.35 standard. This is further confirmed by the higher incidence of tip income among subminimum wage teenagers: 25% of subminimum wage earners report strictly positive tip income, versus 11% overall. When hourly wages are calculated including tip income, 19% of workers with straight-time pay less than $3.35 have effective wages above the minimum wage. Even including usual tip income, however, a substantial number of teenagers reported subminimum wages in 1989.

Employer noncompliance may partly explain this finding. Compared with other teenagers, subminimum wage workers are more likely to work in agriculture and household services, where noncompliance may be higher. Another factor is the relatively high fraction of subminimum wage workers who report being paid by the week or month, rather than by the hour (25%, versus 7% of all working teenagers). Some salaried workers are legally exempt from the minimum wage, and others may have over-reported their usual weekly hours, leading to a downward bias in their imputed hourly wage.

The next column of Table 1 presents the characteristics of teenagers reporting hourly wages of $3.35 to $3.79 in 1989. For simplicity, I refer to this group as "affected workers," since a rise in the minimum wage is most likely to affect employees of complying firms in the covered sector who previously earned less than the new rate. Affected teenagers are

7 The Census Bureau allocates responses for individuals who do not answer the earnings questions in the CPS (about 3% of teenage workers). To avoid measurement error, I do not use the earnings data for these individuals.

8 To avoid problems posed by measurement error, I set the wage including tips equal to the reported straight-time hourly wage unless the difference between average weekly earnings including tips and the product of the straight-time wage and usual weekly hours is positive. The average wage measures in Table 1 also exclude individuals with reported or imputed wages less than $1 per hour or greater than $20 per hour.

9 Under the pre-1989 law, employers in retail trade, agriculture, and higher education were permitted to pay full-time students a subminimum wage 15% below the regular rate. The available evidence suggests that use of this exemption was relatively modest. Freeman, Gray, and Ichniowski (1981) estimate that only 3% of student hours in the late 1970s (when the minimum was relatively high) were worked under the subminimum provisions.
more likely to be enrolled in school than those with either higher or lower wages, and they are also more likely to be employed in retail trade. Some 40% of affected workers report an hourly wage exactly equal to the 1989 minimum wage. Their wage distribution shows additional spikes at $3.50 and $3.75, with an average of $3.49 per hour.

The five right-hand columns of Table 1 present corresponding information for 1990. Teenagers as a whole reported slightly higher enrollment rates during April–December of 1990 than in the same months of 1989. The teenage employment rate, on the other hand, fell by 2.5 percentage points. For comparison, the annual average teenage employment rates for 1989 and 1990 (published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) were 47.5% and 45.4%. Thus, the employment data for April to December reflect a slightly larger downturn than the annual averages.

The teenage wage distribution also shifted between 1989 and 1990, with a sharp reduction in the fraction of workers earning $3.35–$3.79 per hour (from 24.4% to 7.4%) and a mean increase of 5%. A comparison of the 1989 and 1990 distributions shows the elimination of the previous spike at $3.35 per hour and the emergence of a new spike at $3.80. Interestingly, there was only a slight reduction in the fraction of teenagers reporting wages (exclusive of tips) under $3.35.

Although these patterns are suggestive of the effect of the new minimum wage law, it is worthwhile to analyze the aggregate change in teenage employment between 1989 and 1990. Much of the existing literature has used the correlation between minimum wages and aggregate teenage employment to infer the effect of the law. As noted in Table 1, teenage employment fell between 1989 and 1990. Part of this decline is clearly attributable to the 1990 recession, which began in mid-year. The youth labor market is highly cyclical, and the onset of a recession would be expected to lower teenage employment by several percentage points.

Before turning to a regional analysis of the effects of the increased federal minimum wage, it is worthwhile to analyze the aggregate change in teenage employment between 1989 and 1990. Much of the existing literature has used the correlation between minimum wages and aggregate teenage employment to infer the effect of the law. As noted in Table 1, teenage employment fell between 1989 and 1990. Part of this decline is clearly attributable to the 1990 recession, which began in mid-year. The youth labor market is highly cyclical, and the onset of a recession would be expected to lower teenage employment by several percentage points.

The regression is estimated with data for 1975–89. The fitted equation is

\[
\text{Teen Employment} = \text{Constant} - 0.86 \cdot \text{Trend} + 2.17 \cdot \text{Overall Employment Rate},
\]

with an \(R^2\) of 0.99.
1990 rate, however, was about 0.6% lower than expected. Although it may be tempting to attribute this discrepancy to the effect of the increased minimum wage, it should be noted that the real minimum wage was relatively high in 1976, 1979, and 1981, and then trended down throughout the late 1980s with little apparent effect on employment.\footnote{If the prediction equation is re-estimated including the logarithm of the real value of the federal minimum wage (deflated by the Consumer Price Index), the estimated minimum wage coefficient is $-2.5$, with a standard error of 1.7. This coefficient implies that a 10% increase in the minimum wage will reduce teenage employment by 0.25%—a smaller effect than is usually estimated in the literature. See Wellington (1991) for some recent estimates.}

A Grouped Analysis

The nationwide data in Table 1 and Figure 1 conceal considerable interstate variation in the distribution of teenage wages prior to the rise in the federal minimum wage. This wide variation suggests two complementary approaches to analyzing the effect of the 1990 increase in the minimum wage. The first is to aggregate states into groups with similar fractions of affected workers in 1989. This approach generates relatively large sample sizes in each group, permitting a quarterly analysis along the lines of Figure 1. A second approach is to use all the states and pool the months before and after April 1990 for each state. I first present the grouped analysis, then turn to a state-by-state analysis.

Figure 3 plots the fraction of workers earning $3.35–3.79 by quarter for three groups of states: states with under 20% of teenage workers earning $3.35–3.79 in 1989 (“high-wage states”); states with over 40% of teenage workers earning $3.35–3.79 in 1989 (“low-wage states”); and all other states (“medium-wage states”). The high-wage group contains 16 states, most of which had passed state-specific minimum wages above $3.35 per hour (all of New England, New York, New Jersey, Minnesota, Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia,
Figure 2. Actual and Predicted Teenage Employment-Population Rate, 1975–1990.

Nevada, Washington, California, Alaska, and Hawaii). The low-wage group contains 11 southern and mountain states (West Virginia, South Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Montana, Wyoming, New Mexico) plus North Dakota and South Dakota. The medium-wage group includes the remaining 22 states.

As expected, the impact of the 1990 minimum wage law is concentrated among the low- and medium-wage states. Both state groups show a sharp decline in the fraction of teenagers earning $3.35–$3.79 per hour after April 1, 1990. By the end of 1990, the fractions of teenagers earning $3.35 to $3.79 per hour were remarkably similar across states.

Table 2 presents quarterly averages of teenage wages and employment rates by state group, along with their sampling errors and the differences in the outcomes between corresponding quarters of 1989 and 1990. Assuming that underlying labor market trends were the same in the three groups of states, one way to estimate the effect of the federal minimum wage is to compare outcomes in 1990 to outcomes for the same quarter in 1989, and then to compare these differences across the three groups of states. To facilitate this comparison, the bottom row of the table gives the average differences between the second, third, and fourth quarters of 1989 and 1990.

Looking first at earnings, the high-wage states show an average 4% wage gain between 1989 and 1990, with no evidence of an accelerated trend after 1990-I (that is, after the increase in the minimum wage). Average wages in the low- and medium-wage states, on the other hand, show a noticeable upsurge in 1990-II. Comparing the last three quarters of 1989 and 1990 across the three groups, the data in Table 2 suggest that the rise in the federal minimum wage increased average teenage wages by 2% in the medium-wage states and by 6% in the low-wage states.
As a benchmark, it is useful to compare these estimated effects to the wage gains implied by a naive model in which the only effect of the minimum wage is to raise the earnings of affected workers up to the new minimum. Such a model will tend to underestimate the wage gains if there are significant disemployment effects of the rise in the minimum wage, or if the increase in the minimum wage “spills over” to higher-wage workers. In low-wage states the fraction of affected workers fell from over 50% in 1989 to 10% in 1990-IV. Ignoring any disemployment or spillover effects, the predicted effect of the increased federal minimum on average wages in the low-wage states is then 0.40 times the average percentage increase for a wage earner who moves from the affected wage range to the new minimum wage. As shown in Table 1, the average wage of affected workers was $3.49 per hour. An increase to $3.80 is therefore equivalent to a 9% wage increase. Thus, if the only effect of the minimum wage is to increase the earnings of workers in the $3.35–3.79 range up to $3.80, the predicted wage impact in the low-wage states is 3.6%. A similar calculation for the medium-wage states implies a 2.1% wage impact. These benchmarks provide a close approximation to the observed wage gain in the medium-wage states but significantly under-predict the wage gain in low-wage states.

The right-hand columns of Table 2 present teenage employment-population rates by state group and quarter. One obvious aspect of these data is the seasonal pattern of employment, which shows a peak in the third quarter and a trough in the first. It is also interesting to note that teenage employment increased in all three groups of states between 1990-I and 1990-II, although employment rates were

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13 See Grossman (1983) for an earlier analysis of this spillover hypothesis.
Table 2. Mean Log Wages and Employment Rates in Three Groups of States.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Group</th>
<th>Mean Log Wages</th>
<th>Employment Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low-</td>
<td>Medium-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wage</td>
<td>Wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>1.33 (0.01)</td>
<td>1.41 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>1.33 (0.01)</td>
<td>1.42 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>1.35 (0.01)</td>
<td>1.43 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>1.37 (0.02)</td>
<td>1.44 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>1.38 (0.02)</td>
<td>1.44 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>1.45 (0.01)</td>
<td>1.48 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>1.43 (0.02)</td>
<td>1.48 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>1.47 (0.02)</td>
<td>1.50 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Change from 1989 to Same Quarter of 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low-</th>
<th>Medium-</th>
<th>High-</th>
<th>Low-</th>
<th>Medium-</th>
<th>High-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)</td>
<td>3.9 (2.0)</td>
<td>1.1 (1.3)</td>
<td>-2.3 (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>0.12 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.01)</td>
<td>6.2 (2.1)</td>
<td>-0.8 (1.3)</td>
<td>0.4 (1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>0.08 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.01)</td>
<td>-2.8 (2.1)</td>
<td>-4.9 (1.3)</td>
<td>-3.0 (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>0.10 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>-7.0 (2.1)</td>
<td>-2.4 (1.3)</td>
<td>-5.6 (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>0.10 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.01)</td>
<td>-1.2 (1.2)</td>
<td>-2.7 (0.8)</td>
<td>-2.7 (0.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The low-wage group includes states with more than 40% of teens earning $3.35–3.79 per hour in 1989; the high-wage group includes states with less than 20% of teens earning $3.35–3.79 per hour in 1989; and the medium-wage group includes all other states.

Uniformly lower in 1990 than in 1989. The quarterly differences in the lower panel indicate that teenage employment fell by more in the high-wage states than in the low-wage states. Averaged over the last three quarters of each year, teenage employment growth was 1.5% higher in the low-wage states than in the high-wage states (standard error = 1.5%), with no difference between the medium-wage and high-wage states.

Ignoring other sources of relative teenage employment growth, the data in Table 2 suggest that the rise in the federal minimum wage increased teenage employment in the low-wage states, with no measurable effect in the medium-wage states. The effect in low-wage states is the opposite of the prediction from conventional models of the teenage labor market. One explanation for this finding is interstate variation in the timing and severity of the 1990 downturn. In fact, there is some evidence of a stronger downturn in the initially high-wage states and a more moderate recession in the low-wage states. Between the last three quarters of 1989 and 1990 the employment-population ratio for all workers grew by 0.45 percentage points in the low-wage states, fell by 0.01 points in the medium-wage states, and fell by 0.23 points in the high-wage states. These differences can potentially explain at
least some of the differences in teenage employment growth among the three state groups.

To investigate this question more formally, I fit a regression model to the quarterly teenage employment rates in the three state groups, including group-specific intercepts, quarterly dummies, the overall employment rate for the state-group and quarter, and group-specific dummies measuring the change in teenage employment after 1990-1 (that is, after the increase in the minimum wage). The estimated employment effects in the post-increase period are $-2.5\%$ for the low-wage states, $-2.7\%$ for the medium-wage states, and $-2.6\%$ for the high-wage states. These estimates suggest that differences in the strength of the aggregate labor market can potentially explain almost all of the intergroup variation in teenage employment growth between the last three quarters of 1989 and 1990. Accounting for aggregate factors, however, there is no indication of an adverse employment effect in the low-wage states, where the increase in the federal minimum wage raised teenage wages by 6%.

### An Analysis by State

An alternative to the grouping strategy used in Table 2 and Figure 3 is to treat each state as a separate observation, and to correlate changes in employment, wages, and other outcomes with the fraction of affected workers in the state. Owing to the relatively small numbers of observations for many states, I have not analyzed quarterly data by state. Rather, I have aggregated data for the last three quarters of 1989 and 1990 for each state. Comparisons between 1989 and 1990 allow a "pre/post" comparison of the effect of the increase in the federal minimum wage on April 1, 1990. The data for

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14 The model is estimated on data for 1989 and 1990. The implied elasticity of the teenage employment rate with respect to the overall employment rate is 1.70 (with a standard error of 0.83).
the two years are drawn from the same months and therefore are unaffected by any systematic seasonal effects.

Figure 4 illustrates the interstate correlation between the fraction of teenagers earning $3.35–$3.79 per hour in 1989 and the increase in mean log wages between 1989 and 1990. The estimated regression model corresponding to the figure is presented in the first column of Table 3. The estimated slope is 0.15, somewhat higher than the benchmark effect (.088) predicted by assuming that the rise in the minimum wage simply raised the wages of those in the affected wage range to $3.80 per hour. As suggested by the figure, the estimated regression coefficient is fairly precise: variation in the fraction of affected workers in 1989 explains a respectable 30% of the interstate variation in wage growth between 1989 and 1990.

Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 introduce two alternative “macro-level” labor market indicators into the wage change equation. These are the change in the overall employment-population rate in the state between 1989 and 1990, and the corresponding change in the overall unemployment rate. Both variables are based on state-level averages published in the Bureau of Labor Statistics' "Geographic Profiles of Employment and Unemployment." Changes in overall employment or unemployment rates help to control for any state-specific labor demand shocks that may be correlated with the fraction of affected workers. As it happens, neither of these variables is very highly correlated with the growth rate of teenage wages, and their inclusion hardly affects the model.

Figure 5 plots state-level observations on the change in the teenage employment pop-

(Estimated Standard Errors in Parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Equations for Change in Mean Log Wage:</th>
<th>Equations for Change in Teen Employment-Population Ratio:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Fraction of Affected Teens</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emp./Pop. Ratio</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Change in Overall Employment-Pop. Ratio</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Change in Overall Employment-Pop. Ratio</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Change in Mean Log Teenage Wage</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. R-squared</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Estimated on a sample of 51 state observations. Regressions are weighted by average CPS extract sizes for teenage workers in each state. All regressions include an unrestricted constant. The mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable in columns 1–3 are 0.0571 and 0.0417; the mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable in columns 4–9 are −0.0225 and 0.0361.

* In columns 7–9, the change in mean log is instrumented by the fraction of teenage workers earning $3.35–3.79 in 1989.

The implied employment demand elasticities are uniformly small. When the

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16 One potential issue in the estimation of standard errors for the models in Table 4 is the presence of systematic correlation between the residuals of nearby states. This “spatial correlation” will tend to lead to understated standard errors. As a rough check, I computed the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics for the residuals. If the states are sorted by region, this computation provides a test for spatial correlation. The DW statistics for both the wage and employment models are very close to 2, giving no evidence of spatial correlation.
overall employment-population ratio is included as a control variable (column 8), the estimated elasticity is negative but close to 0. Without controlling for overall labor market conditions (column 7) or using the overall unemployment rate as a control (column 9), the estimated elasticity is positive but close to 0. As suggested by the grouped analysis in Table 2, there is no evidence of a significant disemployment effect of the federal minimum wage.

The analysis in Table 3 can be extended in several directions. One extension is to model the dynamic structure of employment growth. Another is to consider more general measures of the impact of the federal minimum wage on state-specific wage changes. Both issues are addressed by the estimates in Table 4.

The first 4 columns of Table 4 report reduced-form employment growth regressions that include lagged values of the dependent variable. For simplicity, I have only reported models that include the overall employment-population ratio; models that include the aggregate unemployment rate as an alternative control variable yield similar conclusions. The estimates in column 1 suggest that the lagged employment growth exerts a significant negative effect on current growth. This pattern is consistent with an underlying second-order autoregressive model of teenage employment at the state level. In column 2 I include the lagged value of the overall employment change. Controlling for the contemporaneous aggregate employment change and the lagged dependent variable, this variable has a small and statistically insignificant coefficient. In both specifications the coefficient of the fraction of affected teenage wage earners (in row 1) is small and insignificantly different from 0.

One potential difficulty with the estimated models in columns 1 and 2 is the presence of measurement error in the lagged dependent variable. Random sampling errors in the state-specific teenage employment rate will tend to create a negative bias in the estimated coefficient of the lagged teenage employment growth rate. To check for the magnitude of this bias, column 3 presents a model in which the lagged dependent variable is instrumented by the lagged change in the overall employment-population ratio. The results of this exercise suggest the bias is small enough to be safely ignored.

Although labor demand shocks affecting teenage employment in a state are likely to be captured by the overall employment rate in the state, it is possible that other regional shocks may also play a role. To test this hypothesis, in column 4 of Table 4 I present a model that includes the change in the overall employment rate for nine different regions of the country. The addition of this variable lowers the coefficient on the state-specific employment rate, although the regional employment change is not itself statistically significant. The coefficient of the fraction of affected wage earners also falls slightly (to $-0.003$).

Columns 5–9 of Table 4 present instrumental variables estimates of the state-specific teenage employment demand equation, allowing for an effect of the lagged dependent variable. These models differ by the choice of variable(s) used as instruments for the change in teenage wages. Following the specifications of Table 3, columns 5 and 6 present models that use the fraction of teenagers earning $3.35–3.79 per hour in 1989 to instrument the wage change. In columns 7–9 I use three alternative measures of the wage impact of the federal minimum. The model in column 7 uses the fraction of teenagers earning exactly $3.35 per hour in 1989 to instrument the wage change. In columns 7–9 I use three alternative measures of the wage impact of the federal minimum. The model in column 7 uses the fraction of teenagers earning exactly $3.35 per hour in 1989. The model in column 8 uses both the fraction of teenagers at the old minimum wage and the fraction in the affected wage range. Finally, the model in column 9 uses the fraction of teenagers earning less than $3.35 and the fraction earning $3.35–3.79 per hour in 1989.
### Table 4. Estimated Regression Equations for State-Average Changes in the Employment Rate of Teenagers, 1989–1990. (Estimated Standard Errors in Parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Reduced-Form Employment Equations</th>
<th>Structural Employment Demand Equations^b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS (1)</td>
<td>OLS (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS (3)</td>
<td>OLS (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV^a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS (5)</td>
<td>OLS (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS (7)</td>
<td>OLS (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS (9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Fraction of Affected Teens</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Change in Overall Emp./Pop. Ratio</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Lagged Change in Teen Emp./Pop. Rate</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Lagged Change in Overall Emp./Pop. Rate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Change in Regional Emp./Pop. Rate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.49)</td>
<td>(1.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Change in Mean Log Teenage Wage</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. R-squared</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: See note to Table 3. In all columns the dependent variable is the change in the state-average teenage employment rate from 1989 to 1990 (April–December only).

^a In column 3 the lagged change in the teenage employment-population ratio is instrumented by the lagged change in the overall employment-population ratio.

^b The change in mean log teenage wage is endogenous. In columns 5 and 6 the instrument is the fraction of teenagers in the state earning $3.35–3.79 per hour in 1989; in column 7 the instrument is the fraction earning $3.35 per hour in 1989; in column 8 the instruments are the fractions earning exactly $3.35 and $3.35–3.79 per hour in 1989; and in column 9 the instruments are the fractions earning less than $3.35 per hour and $3.35–3.79 per hour in 1989.

Regardless of specification, the models suggest negligible wage elasticities, although the estimated standard errors are large enough that one cannot rule out a small negative employment demand elasticity.

The results in Table 3 and 4 suggest that interstate differences in teenage employment growth between 1989 and 1990 were unrelated to the state-specific wage impact of the federal minimum wage increase. Another closely monitored outcome for teenagers is the fraction enrolled in school. A standard hypothesis in the literature is that increases in the minimum wage will increase school enrollment. (See, for example, Ehrenberg and Marcus 1980.) This prediction, however, is based on the assumption that increases in the minimum wage reduce teenage employment opportunities. In light of the results in Tables 3 and 4, it is interesting to correlate interstate changes in enrollment with differences in the wage effect of the federal minimum wage.

To abstract from the seasonal pattern of school enrollment, I used CPS data for September–December of 1989 and 1990 to construct state-specific estimates of the change in the fraction of teenagers enrolled in school (either full- or part-time). In the United States as a whole, the fraction of teenagers enrolled in school during September–December rose from 73.7% in 1989 to 74.6% in 1990. Across states, changes in enrollment are negatively correlated with changes in employment rates (the correlation is −0.19, with a probability value of 0.18). I then fit a simple regression model for the change in enrollment as a function of the change in the overall employment rate in the state and the fraction of teenagers in the affected wage range in 1989. The coefficient of the overall employment change variable is −0.46 (with a standard error of 0.77), suggesting that enrollment growth was faster (although not significantly so) in states that experienced bigger employment reductions between 1989 and 1990. The coefficient of the fraction affected variable is −0.003 (with a standard error
of 0.05), implying that changes in enrollment were essentially unrelated to the potential wage impact of the rise in the federal minimum wage. As with the employment results, there is no evidence of a connection between teenage school enrollment and the minimum wage.

Conclusion

I have used the experiences generated by the April 1990 rise in the federal minimum wage to measure the effects of the minimum wage on teenagers. The imposition of a national wage standard sets up a very useful natural experiment in which the “treatment effect” in any particular state depends on the fraction of workers initially earning less than the new minimum. By the end of the 1980s, interstate dispersion in teenage wages was remarkable. Many states had already passed state-specific minimum wages above the new federal standard. The fraction of teenagers potentially affected by the rise in the minimum wage ranged from under 5% in some New England and West Coast states to over 50% in some southern states.

The 1990 law raised the minimum wage by 13%. Estimates in the previous literature (Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen 1982) suggest that this increase would lower aggregate teenage employment by 1 to 4 percentage points. More important, however, these employment losses should have been concentrated in low-wage states, providing a test of the hypothesis that the changes are attributable to the minimum wage.

Comparisons of grouped and individual state data confirm that the rise in the minimum wage raised average teenage wages. The wage gains were as big as or slightly bigger than the increases predicted by assuming that individuals earning less than the new minimum rate had their wages “topped up” to the new standard. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the rise in the minimum wage significantly lowered teenage employment rates or altered school enrollment patterns. These findings, although at odds with conventional predictions, are consistent with the earlier “case study” literature (Lester 1960) and with the findings of two recent studies using a similar methodology: my study of the 1988 California minimum wage law, and Katz and Krueger’s study of the effects of the recent federal minimum wage increases on the fast-food industry in Texas (both in this issue).

REFERENCES


MINIMUM WAGES: CARD (I)


