Macroeconomic and Financial Policies Before and After the Crisis

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My charge in this paper is to analyze the roles of monetary, fiscal and regulatory policies in the run-up, midst, and aftermath of the crisis. This focus directs attention to the following questions:

- How important in the genesis of the crisis were lax supervision and regulation of financial institutions, perverse incentives in financial markets, the stance of monetary and fiscal policies, and global imbalances?
- What explains variations in the policy response across countries?
- Should we re-think the efficacy of the policy response in light of the problems that developed subsequently in Europe and elsewhere?

My focus is on the G20 countries. The crisis also had a powerful impact on other, generally poorer economies whose experience is certainly deserving of attention. But, then, a single paper can’t cover everything.

1. Financial Policies in the Run-Up to the Crisis

It has become fashionable, even commonplace, to blame outside factors for the crisis in the United States. Alan Greenspan has argued that the crisis had its roots in the end of the Cold War. Others have attributed the crisis to the rise of China, which unbalanced global markets by significantly augmenting the global labor supply with workers with an inordinate inclination to save (Bernanke 2010).

While factors such as these may have played an enabling or compounding role, the root causes of the crisis, in my view, lay at home, in the United States. Those root causes were an ideology of market fundamentalism and the policies flowing from it. The idea that markets get it right and governments only get in the way, what I refer to here as market fundamentalism, is a powerful current in American thought. That ideology was dealt a blow by the Great Depression, which forged a consensus that markets are intrinsically unstable and require strong oversight. But historical memory does not last forever, and by the 1970s the generation that lived through the 1930s had begun to pass. Even before the Reagan revolution, American anti-regulationist ideology had reasserted itself, and the policy pendulum had begun to swing in the other direction with the removal of Regulation Q ceilings on interest on the deposits and the elimination of regulatory restrictions on stock brokers’ commissions. The Reagan Administration pushed the deregulatory envelope, albeit more in the nonfinancial than the financial sphere. In the second half of the 1990s the Clinton Administration and Greenspan Fed then rejected proposals for regulating financial derivatives. This was followed after the turn of the century by Bush policies weakening oversight of the financial-services industry and limiting the resources provided the overseers.

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1 Prepared for the East-West Center/KDI Conference on the Global Economic Crisis, Honolulu, 19-20 August. Thanks to Gisela Rua for help with the figures.
2 See IMF (2009).
3 Which in his view changed the geopolitical and economic balance (Greenspan 2010).
4 Like any capsule description, this one doesn’t cover anything. I attempt to provide a fuller analysis below.
The upshot was a situation where mortgage brokers were allowed to originate subprime mortgages in the absence of meaningful regulatory oversight. Banks were permitted to minimize costly capital cushions and raise leverage to dangerous heights. They were allowed to further economize on the need for capital by shopping for ratings on complex derivative instruments concocted from those subprime mortgages. They were able to enhance those ratings further by wrapping the resulting securities in credit default swaps obtained from lightly regulated and poorly capitalized nonbank financial firms like the American International Group. None of this was socially-redeeming business practice, as we now appreciate. But the temptation was irresistible given the heads-I-win-tails-you-lose structure of executive compensation and absence of adequate regulatory oversight.

Given their inadequate resources, it is not surprising that the Securities and Exchange Commission and other regulators were unable to detect even blatant frauds like Harry Madoff and Kenneth Starr, much less sophisticated efforts at regulatory arbitrage like Lehman Brothers’ Repo 105 transactions. There is a perennial “bloodhounds and greyhounds problem” in financial markets: the highly-incented private greyhounds run very fast, and the regulatory bloodhounds attempting to stay on their trail strain to keep up. This imbalance is especially pronounced in periods like the recent decade when financial structures and practices are changing rapidly. But it doesn’t help to put the bloodhounds on a starvation diet.

The limited resources with which the regulators were provided encouraged them to acquiesce in the privatization of their supervisory and regulatory functions. Where they had once placed bank assets into buckets by risk and set capital requirements accordingly, they now allowed banks to rely on their own models to gauge risk and capital adequacy. Where banks lacked models, the regulators allowed them and their customers to use letter grades assigned to their securities by the rating agencies.

Both practices were problematic. Banks had obvious incentive to tweak their models to limit the estimated likelihood of a significant loss on their portfolios, since this limited the capital they had to hold and elevated their profits. If it also heightened the risk of failure, well, that was someone else’s problem. That their models of the returns on and covariances of complex derivative securities were estimated on short spans of data covering only periods when, inter alia, housing prices were going up was similarly not of concern. The mathematization of risk-management protocols derived from finance-theoretic tools encouraged false confidence in these practices. The fact the models were based on restrictive assumptions – necessarily in order to make them tractable – was easily forgotten. That they were linear representations of a nonlinear world was dismissed as of second-order importance.

The rating agencies were no better. Advising an originator on how to structure an instrument so as to secure an investment-grade rating and then rating the same security bred conflicts of interest. The agencies allowed themselves to be played off against one another by issuers shopping for ratings. Market participants alarmed by these practices had nowhere to turn given the entry barrier posed by the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization status conferred by the SEC and required in order for credit ratings to be used for regulatory purposes. Asian readers will no doubt feel a sense of shadenfreude about all this scorn being heaped on the rating agencies. Their grim self-satisfaction may recede, however, when they ask themselves exactly what the alternative is for issuing ratings and setting capital requirements.

2. Glass-Steagall and the GSAs

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5 The financial advisor, not the former solicitor general.
6 The failure to detect and correct the Madoff fraud is recounted in Markopolos (2010).
7 After their own experience in 1997-8.
8 Random assignment of customers to rating agencies by a clearing house as recommended by Senator Al Franken and antiquated Basel I style rules?
At this point is necessary to say something about a set of more specialized issues, starting with the elimination of the Glass-Steagall restrictions on mixing commercial and investment banking. It is fashionable to question whether the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act revoking the last vestiges of Glass-Steagall had much to do with the crisis. Gramm-Leach-Bliley was itself a response to the fact that banks had long since discovered ways around Glass-Steagall. And it was investment banks already specialized in the origination and distribution of complex securities, not deposit-taking commercial banks freed up by the elimination of Glass-Steagall, that played the central role in originating and distributing complex mortgage-related securities, had the highest levels of leverage, and took the hardest fall.

In fact the role of Gramm-Leach-Bliley was still significant, if subtler in its effects. Together with the regulatory arbitrage that contributed to their demise, the removal of the Glass-Steagall restrictions intensified the competition between the commercial and investment bank subsectors. It allowed commercial banks with preferential access to funding courtesy of FDIC insurance on their deposits to move into activities that had traditionally been the preserve of the investment banks. The latter responded by taking on more risk in the effort to maintain their customary return on capital. The explosive growth of leverage and excessive reliance on short-term funding that were two weak links in the financial chain reflected these competitive dynamics.

Another U.S. policy pointed to by some critics is explicit and implicit subsidies for homeownership and, thereby, for housing finance, which encouraged the dubious mortgage-related financial activities implicated in the crisis. Out of the American ideal of the Jeffersonian farmer (the idea that American political and social values rested on the bedrock that every early adult, or at least every white male adult, owned his own farm) grew the notion that a man’s home, even if mortgaged to the hilt, was his castle. The housing crisis of the 1930s led to the creation of the government-sponsored Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), which purchased FHA-financed mortgages and financed its activities by selling quasi-government-guaranteed long-term bonds to insurance companies and pension funds. In the 1960s Fannie was cloned to create Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac as a way of enhancing the financing capacity of the GSAs while limiting the direct burden on the federal budget. Fannie and Freddie were exempted from state and local taxes and received a line of credit from the U.S. Treasury. By the 1990s they were borrowing directly on capital markets to finance activities that included not just purchasing mortgages but also packaging them into residential-mortgage-backed securities. This was the raw material used by J.P. Morgan and others to construct collateralized debt obligations.

In 1992 the ironically-named Federal Housing Enterprise Safety and Soundness Act then encouraged Fannie and Freddie to expand their operations, which they did by obtaining regulatory authorization to hold less capital than other financial institutions. Freddie and Fannie were mandated to devote additional resources to low-income housing. By 2000, as a result, the share of low-income-housing related underwriting activities in their new investments had reached 50 per cent. The Bush Administration pushed the mandate up to 54 per cent in 2004. The Community Investment Act of 1977, enforced more vigorously in the 1990s than before, required commercial banks to similarly channel more mortgage finance to low-income households – as Rajan (2010, p.36) puts it with black humor, “to find creative ways of getting people who could not afford homes into them.” This political encouragement and the incentives it created, it is argued, fostered the growth of the subprime mortgage market at the epicenter of the crisis.

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9 In 1999.
10 Starting with Bear Stearns.
11 Can you say “proprietary trading?”
12 In principle, it also would have been possible to return capital to the shareholders – to downsize the firm – but this would have been less rewarding both financially and in terms of ego gratification for their CEOs.
Political pressure mixed with financial innovation is a toxic brew. But the story of the financial crisis as an unintended consequence of a policy of subsidizing low-income housing lends itself to exaggeration. For one thing, the subprime lending boom was overwhelmingly underwritten by nonbank lenders not subject to the Community Reinvestment Act or by banks lending outside of their own community assessment areas. For another, there is the fact that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were least active in the 2005-7 period when the housing market took off, this being when the GSAs’ accounting scandals came to light. To say that Freddie and Fannie then responded aggressively in order to maintain their market shares is not the same as saying that they were driving the market. According to the Federal Reserve Board (2008), at most 6 per cent of subprime lending was connected to the Community Reinvestment Act. Finally, there is the fact that many of the same excesses and problems were evident in the commercial real estate market, where affordable-income mandates did not apply.

All this suggests that while policies channeling excessive finance into affordable housing did not help, a wider credit boom and more pervasive incentive problems were at work.

3. The Role of Global Imbalances

While there is little question that lax regulation and skewed incentives were at the heart of the crisis, some authors have placed equal emphasis on global imbalances. A first argument for the importance of global imbalances is that they lowered the required return on U.S. treasury securities and, by implication, on the residential-mortgage-backed securities and associated derivatives that were close substitutes. But empirical studies suggest that this effect was limited. The largest estimate of which I am aware, by Warnock and Warnock (2009), suggests that the impact on ten-year treasury yields was on the order of 90 basis points. Other estimates (e.g. Craine and Martin 2009) make the impact just half that. No question, lower yields encouraged investors to stretch for yield by moving into riskier assets. They encouraged portfolio managers to add risk in order to meet historical benchmarks. But it is important to think of not only signs but magnitudes. In other words, it is hard to imagine that the financial crisis would have been fundamentally different had long-term rates in the United States been 50 or even 90 basis points higher while everything else remained the same.

Moreover, emphasizing the U.S. current account deficit and corresponding foreign surpluses reflects a focus on net capital flows, where gross flows were larger and growing more quickly. If the concern is not with the level of U.S. interest rates but with flows of finance into toxic mortgage-related securities, then foreigners were fully capable of buying into this market (or into markets for other assets that were substitutes, like the U.S. treasury market, pushing other investors into mortgage-related securities) without their countries running current account surpluses. In a world of international capital mobility, it was only necessary for U.S. investors to take equal-sized positions in foreign markets. In fact, barely a third of the increase in the gross external liabilities of the United States in 2002-7 can be explained in an accounting sense by the country’s cumulative current account deficits. While current account imbalances and capital mobility are related, much of the literature implicating imbalances in the crisis unhelpfully emphasizes the former to the exclusion of the latter.

As good an indication of this as any is the fact that European banks were substantial enablers of the subprime crisis in the sense that they ended up holding large numbers of subprime-related structured credit products. Europe did not run a significant current account surplus with the United States. Two-way trade in assets, in conjunction with lapses in supervision and regulation, and not global imbalances explains this fact.

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13 Causing the two GSAs to adopt a more conservative posture.
14 See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Whelan (2010) is good on this point.
15 Or for foreign investors to sell other safer U.S. securities already in their possession.
A subtler argument made by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) is that global imbalances and the excesses resulting in the financial crisis were jointly determined by the stance of policy. In the early stages of the debate it was fashionable to indict U.S. fiscal policy and specifically the deterioration in the budget balance following the Bush tax cuts of 2001-2. Public dissaving meant national dissaving, widening the current account deficit. By artificially goosing the U.S. economy, the budget deficit goosed the housing market. But much subsequent literature has questioned the link between fiscal policy and global imbalances; it has challenged the “twin deficits hypothesis,” showing that even if there was a link it was less than tight.16 Similarly, while fiscal policy was part of the broad policy backdrop to the housing boom, it is hard to assign it a leading role. And while the fact of large pre-existing deficits limited the authorities’ options when the crisis struck and raised questions about medium-term fiscal sustainability, this is different from saying that fiscal policy caused global imbalances and the crisis.17

More recently, debate has focused on the role of monetary policy in the crisis. U.S. monetary policy was too loose in 2003-4, it is alleged, when the Fed’s discount rate was significantly below the levels suggested by the Taylor Rule. Global imbalances may not have been responsible for the decision to cut rates so sharply in 2001, but they enabled the Federal Open Market Committee to keep them at low levels by providing a steady demand for Treasury bills and bonds, low yields on those instruments notwithstanding. At its maximum in 2004, the gap between the level of interest rates predicted by the Taylor rule and the Fed’s policy rate was 300 basis points. U.S. households responded to the availability of cheap credit by going on a spending binge. This was the driver for both the housing boom and global imbalances, or so it is alleged.18

With benefit of hindsight we can say that the Fed overestimated the danger of a Japan-style deflation. It overreacted by cutting rates so aggressively and leaving them low even once the economy began recovering in 2003. With hindsight we can similarly say that policy makers should have worried more about the decline in personal saving, since this behavior was predicated on an increase in housing and other financial wealth that was illusory. Tightening more quickly would have damped down the increase in asset prices, encouraging saving that would have limited global imbalances while at the same time working to discourage the development of housing-related risks. If this meant that the U.S. economy would have expanded somewhat more slowly after the trough in late 2002, then this was a price worth paying.

Hindsight is 20-20. In addition, there are grounds for questioning whether a somewhat higher level of short-term rates (short-term rates being what are under the control of the central bank) would have made that much difference for conditions in housing markets. The main channel through which short-term rates affected housing was adjustable-rate mortgages, whose low entry rates might have lured more unsuspecting buyers into the market. Between 2001 and 2004, the gap between the rates on adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) keyed to the one-year interest rate and conventional 30-year mortgages nearly doubled – as did the share of new mortgage borrowers opting for ARMs. The question is whether the impact on the housing market was substantial. Bernanke (2010) objects that although the gap between rates on ARMs and conventional mortgages grew over time, it was never large. Greenspan (2010) observes that ARM originations peaked two years before the housing market, the implication being that they could not have been responsible for the bubble.

17 For more on this aspect, see the next section.
18 By inter alia Taylor (2007).
None of this is to deny a role for global imbalances in the crisis. But it is to question whether the priority for policy, and specifically policy makers concerned to prevent renewed financial instability, should be to seek to prevent their recurrence.¹⁹

4. Response

It took three quarters, from the summer of 2007 to the spring of 2008, for the U.S. crisis to spread to the rest of the world. In addition to the sheer fact of a U.S. recession, there was the impact on banking systems (mainly in Europe) and on trade (mainly in Asia and Latin America). Why European banks should have been infected is no mystery. Feeling the intensification of competition (in their case owing to the Single Market rather than the elimination of Glass-Steagall), they were even more highly leveraged than their U.S. counterparts and heavily invested in structured financial products. In some countries, Spain, Ireland, and the UK for example, they were also deeply implicated in local housing booms.

¹⁹ I return to this below.
It is less clear why trade should have collapsed so dramatically, faster even than output and faster than in the 1930s. The main explanation appears to be that a substantial fraction of trade was in parts and components related to the production of “postponeables” (big ticket items on which consumers and firms temporarily stopped spending when uncertainty spiked).20 Disruptions to the availability of trade credit also mattered, especially in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers’ failure, but their effects were less persistent.21 Thankfully, overt and murky protectionism made only a minor contribution to the slump in trade.22

By the summer of 2008, the world economy was tracking the Great Depression. In contrast to that earlier historical episode, the policy response was quick and powerful. That the advanced countries responded with aggressive monetary and fiscal easing is unsurprising; officials were acutely aware of the dangers of inaction (Wessel 2009). More striking is the quick and substantial reaction of emerging markets. In part this reflected the fact that there now existed, for the first time, venues like the Group of 20 to communicate the need for a coordinated response that avoided free riding and beggar-thy-neighbor policies. At least as importantly, it reflected the fact that emerging markets had kept their powder dry. Their fiscal positions were strong, making it possible to increase public spending without exciting fears for fiscal sustainability. Currency and maturity mismatches had been reduced, so that depreciation of exchange rates did not threaten financial stability.23 Because central banks had built credibility, cutting interest rates did not automatically excite fears of inflation. Large war chests of foreign reserves enabled central banks to support the exchange rate where necessary, provide dollar funding, and otherwise reassure investors.

The U.S. moved first, applying the largest stimulus of any country in 2008 (Table 1). By 2009, however, the stimulus applied by G20 emerging market members matched that of the United States, scaled by GDP. It is worth reminding oneself in light of subsequent events that the fiscal stimulus applied by EU G20 members was relatively small all through the period.24

Figure 1 shows that there was some tendency for the countries experiencing the sharpest slowdowns to apply the largest stimulus packages, as might be expected. But there is a tremendous amount of dispersion around the average relationship: to cite some obvious cases, the fiscal stimulus packages applied by the U.S. and China were even larger than can be accounted for by the extent of their downturns, while those of Italy and the UK were smaller than might have been expected.25 A popular conjecture is that these variations can be explained, in part, by the size of the public sector: countries with a larger share of tax-related revenues in GDP had more scope for ramping up public spending or cutting taxes. Figure 2 shows, however, that this was not the case. Figure 3, on the other hand, suggests that countries entering the crisis with relatively high levels of debt applied less fiscal stimulus, as might have been expected. The relationship in question is, however, relatively weak; this is one way of understanding which countries got into trouble subsequently, and why.

Figure 4 provides the analogous picture for monetary policy. It confirms that the central banks of countries suffering the most pronounced growth slowdowns had the greatest inclination to cut interest rates. The other thing that stands out from this figure is the aggressive response, by international

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21 Partly because official export-credit agencies and the multilaterals stepped in to replace private finance.
22 See Kee, Neugu and Nicita (2010).
23 There were exceptions, such as Korea and Hungary, where special circumstances resulted in substantial mismatches, but there exceptional swaps by the Fed and the European Central Bank, respectively, prevented matters from degenerating excessively.
24 Of course, large variations are hidden within the EU G20 average, and the G20 does not include such EU countries as Greece, Portugal and Ireland. Spain (Table 1) is another matter.
25 The UK case might seem anomalous, given the magnitude of and attention devoted to the country’s subsequent deficits; note, however, that the data here consider discretionary fiscal measures alone.
standards, of the Federal Reserve, whether for doctrinal reasons or in reflection of the relatively early eruption of financial problems in the United States.26

Figure 5 shows, however, that the countries cutting policy rates aggressively were not always rewarded with lower long-term real interest rates. This is a reminder of the limited power of conventional monetary policy in a severe slump. In an environment of actual or expected deflation, central banks may be constrained by the zero bound on nominal rates, and policy rates operating on the short end of the term structure will influence the long-term rates on which investment decisions depend only insofar as they succeed in influencing expectations about future conditions and policy (recall the Fed’s “low for long” commitment).

Figure 6 can be read as suggesting that exchange rate adjustment played a positive role in global adjustment to the crisis. Real exchange rates depreciated the most in G20 countries experiencing relatively large falls in output, crowding in exports, other things equal. Since inflation rates were not all that different, much of this adjustment was accomplished by changes in nominal rates. The UK, which saw a sharp depreciation of sterling, is a case in point.

5. Re-Thinking the Response

With the passage of time, the stimulus measures widely credited with averting “Great Depression 2.0” do not come off as looking quite so positive. The resurgence of financial volatility in Europe in 2010 and contagion to other countries, together with drastic fiscal cuts auguring sharp reductions in public-sector support for aggregate demand, suggest that policy makers simply kicked the can down the road. They averted a larger collapse in aggregate demand in 2007-9 only by laying the groundwork for a further collapse in 2010 once investors awoke to problems of sovereign debt sustainability, forcing fiscal retrenchment by now dangerously indebted governments. They socialized the bad debts of the financial and nonfinancial sectors by taking them onto the public-balance sheet, transforming a problem of private debt sustainability into a problem of public debt sustainability but without resolving the underlying issues.

It is easy to be critical but hard, even with benefit of hindsight, to say what exactly should have been done differently. A first hypothesis is that governments should have been more aware of potential problems of debt sustainability and exercised more restraint in applying fiscal stimulus. As a blanket statement this is hard to accept. In the United States, there are no signs that the $787 billion stimulus was too large. It replaced at most a third of the private spending vaporized in the crisis. It was not enough to prevent the unemployment rate from rising into the double digits. It showed no sign of raising immediate concerns about the sustainability of the public debt. There was no upward pressure on treasury yields: as of mid-August 2010, ten-year yields were 2.59, down from 3.17 a year before. There were no downgrades on U.S. sovereign debt from the rating agencies.27 All this suggests that – had we known then what we know now or, alternatively, in the absence of political constraints – even more fiscal stimulus would have been better. A number of other countries (China, Germany) were similarly in a position to provide considerable fiscal support for spending because they entered the crisis with their powder dry (with relatively low levels of debt).

A second hypothesis is that the fiscal response should have been more discriminating. Countries that entered the crisis with heavy debt loads should have been more cautious before undertaking additional deficit spending. They should have recognized that they were apt to run up against problems of debt sustainability relatively quickly because their inherited debts were heavy and also because the denominator of the debt/GDP ratio was now likely to grow more slowly due to the permanent damage to their economies and financial systems. But in the heat of battle everyone laid on massive fiscal stimulus, regardless of whether or not they were really in a position to do so.

26 On the roots of these potential doctrinal differences, see below.
27 Yet, that is.
Of course, to avoid weakening global growth yet further, less deficit spending by heavily indebted countries should have been accompanied by more deficit spending by other countries in a better position to undertake it. Additional international coordination would have been required, in other words. The call for coordinated fiscal stimulus was taken up by the G20, whose communiqués regularly made the case. But the size of national stimulus packages was, in the end, left to national authorities. G20 communiqués prior to the spring of 2010 said nothing about the desirability of countries with debt-sustainability issues doing less while their more lightly-indebted counterparts did more. And even had the national leaders assembled by the G20 acknowledged this point, one can question whether legislatures would have followed where they led. Would the U.S. Congress have supported an even larger stimulus on the ground that the U.S. needed to do more because heavily indebted countries in Europe needed to do less? That domestic politics can be an obstacle to international policy coordination is a well established. It would have posed a significant obstacle in this context.

A third critique is that the fiscal authorities should have done more to detail their exit strategies. Explaining and credibly committing to timely exits would have enhanced confidence, encouraged private spending, and reduced the magnitude of the demand shortfall that the fiscal authorities had to fill. Less deficit spending in the future would have meant lower interest rates in the future, which, operating through the term structure, would have meant lower interest rates now, encouraging private spending. To be sure, insofar as interest rates were already near zero, this mechanism would have helped less than otherwise. But one can still imagine that credible plans for eliminating exceptional deficits would have bolstered private confidence and spending, permitting the fiscal authorities to do less.

A fourth critique is that governments did too little to restructure and recapitalize banking systems, allowing sovereign and private debt problems to jeopardize the stability of financial systems. In the U.S., the Obama Administration’s strategy of relying on stress tests and self-recapitalization, as opposed to quick nationalization and re-privatization, made for less bank lending than would have been the case otherwise. The situation was even worse in Europe. In Germany, banks’ ratio of capital to assets was still barely 5 per cent in 2010, in contrast to 12 per cent in the United States. In Spain, the authorities were reluctant to openly acknowledge the need to shrink the number of cajas (regional savings banks) until fully two years into the crisis. In Ireland, panicked authorities extended a blanket guarantee on not just bank deposits but on all bank debt, effectively taking obligations to bank bondholders onto the public balance sheet. This created renewed difficulties when the guarantees approached their expiration date. It allowed questions about sovereign debt sustainability, when these began to be asked in 2010, to infect banking systems continent wide. If we know one thing about banking crises, it is that the longer their resolution is delayed, the more costly they become. In all these cases, we see how delay in resolving banking problems and questions about fiscal sustainability fed on one another in a vicious spiral.

More generally, it can be argued that the mistake was not moving more quickly to write down bad debts. In some countries (Portugal, the U.S., Spain) problems of excessive indebtedness were associated not so much with public as private debts. Nonviable real estate loans and their corporate equivalents should have been restructured more quickly, as they were in Korea after 1998. This would have both reduced uncertainty and moderated the depressing effects of debt overhangs. The problem was that mass restructuring is easier said than done. The bankruptcy courts would have been swamped. Where mortgage, car, and student loans had been securitized, restructuring was even more complex, and often the loan servicer had little incentive to facilitate the process. Restructuring bad loans would have forced banks to realize additional losses, which would have required additional recapitalization. Voting publics objected to proposals for selective relief, which would have written down the mortgages of homeowners under water but not benefitted their more prudent neighbors who had bought smaller houses with smaller

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28 See inter alia Frankel (1988).
29 Only subordinated debt remained unguaranteed. The authorities might have opted for less expensive measures, such as guarantees for new lending or the early injection of preference or ordinary shares; in the event this was not done. See Honohan (2009) for discussion.
loans. Schemes for across-the-board relief, for their part, would have been prohibitively costly. All this encouraged forbearance rather than recognition of losses. A social planner might have done things differently, but that was not the political reality.

A final critique is that countries should have relied more on monetary easing and less on fiscal easing. Had central banks done more to support aggregate demand, especially in Europe, it would have been possible for governments to do less. Where the monetary authorities pulled out all the stops, as in the U.S. and UK, pursuing unconventional policies and engaging in quantitative easing, it is hard to imagine how they could have done more. But, unlike the Fed and the Bank of England, the European Central Bank was reluctant to push interest rates to near zero and engage in quantitative easing, arguing that it needed to keep interest rates in positive territory so that it still had room to reduce them if conditions deteriorated still further. It was reluctant to engage in direct purchases of government bonds, given that this would likely mean purchasing the bonds of the most heavily indebted governments with the least liquid markets, exposing the central bank to accusations of favoritism, and creating moral hazard. More than anything, it was reluctant to initiate and defend a policy that could be seen as printing money and thereby exciting German fears of inflation.

Given subsequent problems, and the fact that the ECB was ultimately forced to turn to direct government bond purchases anyway, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that it would have been better for Europe, already in 2009, to rely less on fiscal stimulus and more on aggressive monetary stimulus. It is not as if Europe’s problems of fiscal sustainability were unrecognized at that date. If the result would have been a weaker euro already in 2009 – that being the standard result of a mix of tighter fiscal and looser monetary policies – this would have been part of the solution to the festering crisis.

Similar points can be made about the United States and the Federal Reserve. If not in 2009, then in 2010 the Federal Reserve Board came under pressure from regional reserve bank presidents sitting on the Federal Open Market Committee to raise interest rates or at least to refrain from further quantitative easing. In the absence of more aggressive balance-sheet expansion by the Fed, the Obama Administration felt compelled in the summer of 2010 to propose $60 billion of extensions of the 2009 stimulus bill to limit the danger of the economy slipping back into recession. These extenders did not reassure those concerned with the country’s medium-term fiscal outlook, in the Congress and elsewhere. Even if there was no sign as yet of Europe-style sovereign debt crisis, there is an argument that it would have been better for the country to rely on monetary expansion and less on fiscal expansion.

6. Some Conclusions

As in the case of the Asian crisis of 1997-8, we will be debating the causes and consequences of the 2007-10 global financial crisis for years. While evaluations will continue to evolve along with events, no doubt, it is not too early to begin drawing some provisional lessons.

First, while this crisis, like all crises, had multiple causes, at its center were problems of lax supervision and regulation, in the advanced countries in particular. It is appropriate therefore that post-crisis efforts in the United States and at the level of the G20 should focus on regulatory reform. Unfortunately, accomplishments here are less than meet the eye. In the U.S., nothing has been done to downsize big banks. The role of the credit rating agencies in regulatory decision making has not been eliminated. It will still be possible for the banks to trade bespoke credit default swaps over the counter. Other than abolishing the Office of Thrift Supervision, nothing has been done to consolidate the fragmented process of supervisory oversight. Macro-prudential supervision will be by committee, which
sounds suspiciously like no effective macro-prudential supervision at all. The new financial consumer protection agency is in limbo: it is in the Fed but not of the Fed.\textsuperscript{35} It can be argued that financial reform is ongoing – that the Dodd-Frank bill is not the last act in the play – but many observers will be underwhelmed by this opening.

At the level of the G20, there is still no agreement on what should be the priority: a bank tax, an executive compensation tax, new restrictions on hedge funds and private equity funds, or a ban on short selling. While there has been much discussion of further reforms of the Basel II framework, there has been no progress in implementation. The discussion paper released in July suggests that recommendations for significantly higher capital requirements have been watered down, provides no specifics on the measures that will be taken to correct the procyclical bias of the capital adequacy regime, does less than proposed in late 2009 to improve the quality of capital, sets the new leverage requirement (ratio of capital to unweighted assets) at Bear Stearns levels (33 to 1), and proposes waiting as long as seven years to implement new liquidity requirements. Efforts to construct a proper resolution regime for systemically significant financial firms at the global level have barely begun. This may be too negative an assessment. But it is hard to contain one’s disappointment that more was not done to strengthen prudential supervision and regulation in the wake of the most serious global financial crisis in 80 years.

Second, the crisis is a reminder of the value of keeping one’s fiscal powder dry. Too many advanced countries entered the crisis with large budget deficits and elevated debts. An unprecedented crisis justified an unprecedented fiscal response, but against a backdrop of fiscal profligacy it also created unprecedented problems of debt sustainability. Emerging markets learned from the crises of the 1990s the importance of running budget surpluses and keeping fiscal capacity in reserve. One can only hope that the advanced countries, including the United States, now take that lesson to heart.

Third, the crisis underscores the importance of early and concerted intervention to resolve banking-sector problems. Banks with impaired balance sheets relying on the market to recapitalize themselves will not be lending. And in the absence of bank lending, even aggressive fiscal stimulus will not jump-start private spending. The political impediments to early intervention are considerable. Public recapitalization is expensive and unpopular, which encourages politicians to shun it in the short run. But this is something that is apt to come back and bit them in the long run.

Fourth, the crisis reminds us that mechanisms for international policy coordination remain inadequate. It would have been better in 2008-9 if countries with unused fiscal capacity had done more to support global demand, enabling those will less unused capacity to do less.\textsuperscript{36} At the June 2010 G20 meeting in Busan, U.S. Treasury Secretary Geithner urged Germany, China and other countries with unused fiscal capacity not to cut fiscal support willy-nilly, enabling other, mainly European, countries with pressing budgetary problems to get on with the task of fiscal consolidation and preventing the reemergence of global imbalances.\textsuperscript{37} Once again, the sentiment was admirable, but the response was non-existent.

Fifth, the response to the crisis is a reminder of the importance of coordinating monetary and fiscal policies. In the United States, the reluctance of the Congress to recognize the need for fiscal stimulus (recall the first failed TARP vote) forced the Fed to do more than anyone was comfortable with financially or politically. In Europe, the reluctance of the European Central Bank to engage in quantitative easing pushed governments into doing more – often more than they were capable of doing safely. Then the inability of European governments to agree on a concerted response to the second phase

\textsuperscript{35} It has been placed in the Fed mainly in order to avoid any direct budgetary implications of its operation. Moreover, a committee of bank regulators will have the power to veto any decision taken by the new agency as damaging to the banks.

\textsuperscript{36} Recall that mainstream models suggest positive cross-border spillovers from fiscal stimulus, making possible this kind of hypothetical adjustment.

\textsuperscript{37} See Geithner (2010).
of the crisis in 2010 forced the ECB to abruptly reverse its position on direct bond purchases, something that did nothing to enhance the credibility of policy makers.

But to imagine different policies is to ignore the deep-seated historical factors that shaped the response. The Fed’s aggressive quantitative easing reflected memories of the 1930s and the influence of Friedman and Schwartz’s interpretation of the Fed’s culpability in that episode.\(^{38}\) Recall then-Governor Bernanke’s speech on the occasion of Friedman’s 90\(^{th}\) birthday: “You’re right, Milton. We did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.”\(^{39}\) The ECB’s reluctance to pursue comparable policies similarly reflected memories in Europe, and in Germany specifically, of the hyperinflation of the 1920s.\(^{40}\) History casts a long shadow, whether for better or worse.

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\(^{38}\) Friedman and Schwartz (1965).
\(^{39}\) Bernanke (2002).
\(^{40}\) So my reading of Trichet (2007) suggests.
References


Chinn, Menzie, Barry Eichengreen and Hiro Ito (2010), “Global Rebalancing and Economic Growth,” unpublished manuscript, University of Wisconsin, Madison; University of California, Berkeley; and Portland State University (July).


Trichet, Jean Claude (2007), “Short Address at the Gala Dinner for the 50th Anniversary of the Bundesbank” (20 September), [www.ecb.int](http://www.ecb.int).


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1Figures reflect the budgetary cost of crisis-related discretionary measures in each year compared to 2007 (baseline), based on measures announced through early March. They do not include (i) “below-the-line” operations that involve acquisition of assets (including financial sector support, (ii) measures that were already planned for, spring 2010 adjustments in Europe to previous plans.

2Change from the previous year.


Note: All G20 countries for which data are available. Saudi Arabia as an outlier is excluded when the least squares regression line is calculated.
Figure 2. Size of Government and Subsequent Discretionary Fiscal Stimulus


Note: All G20 countries for which data are available.
Figure 3. Discretionary Fiscal Stimulus and Public Debt


Note: All G20 countries for which data are available. Government debt data for Argentina, Australia, Brazil and South Africa are 2007-8 averages.
Figure 4. Growth and the Monetary Policy Response

Note: All G20 countries for which data are available. UK as outlier is excluded when least squares regression line is calculated.
Figure 5. Growth and the Change in Long-Term Real Interest Rates

Note: all G20 countries for which data are available. Russia and Mexico as outliers are excluded when the least squares regression line is calculated.
Figure 6. Growth and the Change in Real Effective Exchange Rate

Note: all G20 countries for which data are available. Russia as an outlier is excluded when the least squares regression line is calculated.