Economics 209B
Behavioral / Experimental Game Theory
(Spring 2008)
Course Description

I. Contact information
Office: 505 Evans Hall
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Web page: http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~kariv/209A.htm

II. Location and time
Lectures will be held in room 639 Evans Hall Mondays 10:00-12:00. There
will be no lecture Feb. 18, Mar. 24 and 31, and Apr. 14 and 28. We will
schedule makeup classes, which would fit with the schedules of those taking the
course for credit, later in the semester.

III. General information
The course presents advanced topics in behavioral / experimental game the-
ory and designed to develop theoretical and experimental tools. Owing to the
limitation of time, the topics covered will necessarily be only a small fraction of
what one could (and ideally, should) cover in this course, and thus, the course
cannot provide a complete coverage of the vast and growing body of work on
behavioral / experimental game theory.

Experimental economics has become a major area of research in economics.
Its basic premise is that all good economic theories can be testable in a controlled
laboratory setting. In fact, one may argue that some economic theories can
only be tested experimentally. The course will also survey some classics of
experimental game theory and discuss some of its recent developments. The
course will not about experimental methods per se.

The course will focus on research! You should now be starting to conduct
your own research. It is hard not to shortchange this goal while taking courses.
But you are strongly encouraged you to apply the material from this (or any)
course to research. If you are in the second year (and above) of the economics
PhD program, you should be attending seminars regularly. The theory seminar
(208) takes place on Mondays 4-5:30 in room 639 Evans Hall.

IV. Prerequisites
The prerequisite is a solid foundation in game theory (209A). Game theory
courses in other PhD programs on campus or outside economics PhD courses
are generally not likely to be adequate substitutes. The course is not suitable
for those without a solid foundation in microeconomics – the first-year micro-
economics courses in the economics PhD program (201A and 201B).
V. Office hours

By appointment. Feel free to drop by my office (Evans 505) to ask questions, or even just to introduce yourself and to chat. You can email any question, and I will try to respond promptly. There is no GSI for the course so please use me as such. I would also be happy to discuss with you any issues beyond the course work, not necessarily of game-theoretic substance.

VI. Books


VII. Syllabus (tentative and incomplete)

- Choice under uncertainty (Jan. 28)
  - HEE ch. 8 III A-E.

- Games with pure information externalities (Feb. 4, 11)


• Equilibrium selection and refinements (Feb. 25)

— BGT ch. 3 and 7.


• Quantal response equilibrium (Mar. 3)


• Alternative equilibria (Mar. 10)

- **Learning (Mar. 17)**

  - BGT ch. 6.

- **Cognition (Apr. 7)**