

How Elastic are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments

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
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Motivation: Rising inequality, no Demand for Redistribution

- Focus in media on growing US income share of “one percent”
- More recent focus on US *wealth* inequality increase
- Demand for redistribution should increase with inequality
 - ▶ But: top income and inheritance taxes in US have fallen during period.
 - ▶ Voter demand for redistribution has been flat or falling during this period.
- Do Americans simply not care about inequality?
 - ▶ Newsweek (2001): *“If Americans couldn’t abide rising inequality, we’d now be demonstrating in the streets.”*

Motivation: Lack of Support for Redistribution



The government should reduce income differences (scale from 1-7, GSS)

Our project explores what drives redistributive preferences

- Use online experiments with Amazon mTurk ($\geq 10,000$ obs) to examine how information about inequality affects redistributive demand.
 - ▶ Income tax rates, transfer policies, and inheritance taxes
 - ▶ General structure: treatment group sees information, control doesn't
 - ▶ Information highly salient and customized (upper bound?)
- Main “omnibus” experiment documents effects of comprehensive info (inequality & taxes).
- Then, series of experiments teasing out mechanisms

Summary of Main Results

- Main omnibus treatment ($N = 4,000$):
 - ▶ Large “first stage” effects on perceptions of inequality.
 - ▶ Very small effects on policies: min wage, food stamps, EITC support.
 - ▶ Big exception: increases support for estate tax a lot.
 - ▶ Decreases trust in government.
- Follow-up with subset of respondents 1 month later: many treatment effects persist— estate tax effect remains very large.
- Real responses: treatment increases likelihood of sending petitions to raise estate tax to respondents’ Senator.
- Preferences about income tax and transfer policies “stubborn” to information, preferences about estate tax “malleable” and persistent.
- Could be due to lack of trust in govt and lack of connection to policies.

Related Literature

- Public fails to connect concern for inequality with public policy preferences, which are “sticky” (Bartels, 2005, Luttmer and Singhal, 2011).
- Determinants of social preferences from political science, sociology, economics and psychology (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005, Luttmer, 2001, Singhal, 2008, Sapienza and Zingales, 2013).
- Effects of framing and priming on policy preferences (Hite and Roberts, 1991, McCaffery and Baron, 2004, Savani and Rattan, 2012).
- Randomized information treatments’ effects on policy preferences (Sides, 2011, Cruces *et al.*, 2013, Kuklinski *et al.*, 2003).

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- 1 Main Experiment: Treatment, Data, Results
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Structure of the Omnibus Experiment

- Common structure of all our mTurk surveys:
 - ① background socio-economic questions
 - ② randomized info treatment
 - ③ questions on views on inequality, tax and transfer policies, government.


- Treatment, comprehensive customized:
 - ▶ Interactive info on current income distribution with sliders [▶ Ineq1](#)
 - ▶ Counterfactual income distribution if growth equally spread. [▶ Ineq2](#)
 - ▶ Redistributive policies: income taxes and econ growth. [▶ Taxes](#)
 - ▶ Estate tax: only top 0.1% of estates pay it. [▶ Estate](#)

Where are you in the income distribution?

Please enter your annual household income* in the box below:

\$

39% of US households earn less than your household



We now encourage you to move the blue slider above (by clicking on the line) to explore the US income distribution on your own and to answer the questions below.

79% of households earn less than **\$73,000** .

https://hbs.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_77fSvTy12ZSBihn

Where would you have been in the income distribution?

Income Inequality has increased dramatically in the United States since 1980.

Incomes of poorer and middle-income families have grown very little while top incomes have grown a lot.

How would YOU be doing if inequality had not increased?

The slider below shows how much each group would make if incomes had grown by the same percentage since 1980 for all groups: the poor, the middle class, and the rich. Use the slider to answer the questions below.



A household making **\$25,800** today would instead be making

\$35,200 if inequality had not changed since 1980.

In other words, if growth had been evenly shared, this household would have earned

37% more.


https://hbs.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_77fSvTy12ZSBihh

Correlation Taxes and Growth

Increasing the federal income tax rate and the estate tax rate on very high incomes can raise tax revenue without hurting economic growth.

The following slides describe both income and estate taxes on high incomes and economic growth over three historical periods: (1) Before the New Deal of 1933, (2) Between 1933 and 1980, (3) Since 1980.

Economic growth is measured as the growth in the average family market income.



https://hbs.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_77fSvTy12ZSBihh

Estate Taxes

Besides the income tax, the government can also level the playing field with the **federal estate tax**.

The **Federal Estate Tax** (also known as the **Death Tax**) applies when a deceased person leaves **more than \$5 million** in wealth to his or her heirs. Wealth left to a spouse or charitable organizations is exempt from estate tax.



Only 1 person out of 1000 is wealthy enough to face the estate tax.

Average Americans do not have anything close to \$5 million in wealth, so the estate tax does not affect them and they can pass on their property to their children tax-free.

Eliminating the estate tax would allow the very richest families to pass down all of their wealth to their children tax-free. Hence, children of rich people would also start off very rich themselves.

Increasing the estate tax is a way to level the playing field between the children of wealthy parents and children of middle-class parents.

https://hbs.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_77fSvTy12ZSBihh

Table: Comparing the mTurk sample to the CBS and ALP samples

	(1) mTurk sample	(2) CBS election poll	(3) American Life
Male	0.428	0.476	0.417
Age	35.41	48.99	48.94
White (non-Hisp)	0.778	0.739	0.676
Black	0.0756	0.116	0.109
Hispanic	0.0444	0.0983	0.180
Other racial/ethnic group	0.0759	0.0209	0.0410
Employed (full or part)	0.465	0.587	0.557
Unemployed	0.123	0.104	0.103
Married	0.397	0.594	0.608
Has college degree	0.433	0.318	0.309
Voted for Obama	0.675	0.555	0.559
Political views, cons. (1) to lib. (3)	2.176	1.586	
Observations	3741	808	1002

Strong First Stage on Inequality Perceptions

	Ineq. v. serious		Ineq. increased		Rich deserving	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treated	0.102*** [0.0154]	0.104*** [0.0144]	0.119*** [0.0130]	0.120*** [0.0128]	-0.0500*** [0.0119]	-0.0526*** [0.0114]
Control mean	0.285	0.285	0.738	0.738	0.180	0.180
Scaled Effect	0.357	0.365	0.539	0.540	0.173	0.182
Covariates?	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Obs.	3703	3703	3704	3704	3690	3690

- Scaled effect = treatment effect / (liberal - conservative gap in control group)
- Knowledge and concern for inequality very malleable.

Weak Effects on Income Taxes, But Very Strong Effect on Estate Tax

	<u>Top tax rate</u>	<u>Millionaire tax</u>	<u>Estate tax</u>	<u>Petition, est. tax</u>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treated	0.931* [0.549]	0.0502*** [0.0126]	0.357*** [0.0140]	0.0648*** [0.0156]
Cont gp. mean	30.21	0.740	0.171	0.234
Scaled Effect	0.0914	0.106	2.043	0.394
Obs.	3741	3704	3673	3060

- Estate tax result very strong: 200% of conservative-liberal gap.
- Translates into real effect: Treatment increases likelihood of sending petition to Senator.

Very Weak Poverty Reduction Policy Effects

	<u>Min. wage</u>	<u>Food stamps</u>	<u>EITC</u>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treated	0.0325** [0.0141]	0.0149 [0.0141]	0.0212 [0.0151]
Cont gp. mean	0.690	0.686	0.611
Scaled Effect	0.0995	0.0369	0.0698
Obs.	3690	3690	3690

- Effect on indirect transfer policies (min wage) stronger than effect on direct transfer policies (Food stamps, EITC).
- Could be explained by distrust in government (below).

Views of Government are Complicated but Trust Decreases

	<u>Trust gov.</u>	<u>Scope gov.</u>	<u>Plan to vote Democrat 2012</u>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treated	-0.0292** [0.0115]	0.132*** [0.0339]	0.0152 [0.0125]
Cont gp. mean	0.158	3.076	0.529
Scaled Effect	1.250	0.110	0.0246
Obs.	3702	3704	3703

- Very low baseline trust in government.
- Treatment makes people see more areas where government intervention may be needed
- But also makes them trust government less (125% of lib-cons gap).

Persistence of Effects in Follow-up One Month Later

	Increase Estate Tax		Govt scope		Trust gov.		Ineq. v. serious	
	(1) First	(2) Follow-up	(3) First	(4) Follow-up	(5) First	(6) Follow-up	(7) First	(8) Follow-up
Treated	0.337*** [0.0953]	0.195** [0.0910]	0.259 [0.207]	0.364* [0.200]	-0.122** [0.0611]	-0.0691 [0.0582]	0.00833 [0.0809]	0.102 [0.0770]
Control mean Obs.	0.180 145	0.179 145	2.995 145	2.910 145	0.122 145	0.128 145	0.283 145	0.218 145

- No differential selection into follow-up survey. [▶ Selection](#)
- Relatively low take-up, better technology developed by us later.

[▶ Full Results 1](#)

[▶ Full Results 2](#)

Bounding the Effects of Attrition

- Assuming Attriters Answer like the Average C = Conservative or L= Liberal

	Ineq. v. serious		Increase Mill. Tax		Increase Estate Tax		Trust Gov	
	(1) C	(2) L	(3) C	(4) L	(5) C	(6) L	(7) C	(8) L
Treated	0.0666*** [0.0129]	0.0980*** [0.0128]	0.0194 [0.0118]	0.0518*** [0.0117]	0.284*** [0.0122]	0.310*** [0.0121]	-0.00692 [0.00979]	-0.0198** [0.00970]
Cont gp. mean	0.267	0.293	0.717	0.744	0.170	0.192	0.172	0.161
Obs.	4547	4547	4546	4546	4519	4519	4546	4546

- Estate Tax Result completely robust to attrition.
- Other Results highly consistent, despite extreme bounding assumption.

▶ Diff. attrition

▶ Attrition

Subsequent Surveys Tease Out Mechanisms

- Same structure as omnibus.
- Isolate particular treatment and develop new single treatment to test hypotheses.
 - ▶ Do respondents think ineq is a problem but don't trust govt to fix it?
 - ▶ Will emotional appeal to "plight of the poor" work better?
 - ▶ Do respondents not connect concerns with actual policies to address ineq?
- New, detailed outcome questions added (present only outcome questions of main interest for each survey – complete results in paper).

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Explaining the Very Robust Estate Tax Result

- Breaking off estate tax part from inequality info leaves effects unchanged.
- Stripped down “Neutral” version: mentions only tax incidence, no moralistic framing, but still has large effect. ▶ Neutral ▶ Emotional.
- Is widespread misinformation on fraction paying estate tax the source of strong effects?
 - ▶ Documented previously as well (Slemrod 2006).
 - ▶ Only 12% of control group answered correctly (random guessing yields 14% correct).
 - ▶ 16% of liberals versus 6% of conservatives answered correctly.
- Potentially important policy implications given recent emphasis on wealth taxation (Piketty 2014).

Results of the Estate Tax Treatment

	<u>Ineq</u> v. serious (1)	<u>Ineq</u> inc. (2)	<u>Deserving</u> rich (3)	<u>Estate</u> increase (4)	<u>Petition</u> . (5)	<u>Trust</u> Govt (6)	<u>Correct</u> Estate Tax (7)
Treated	0.0381 [0.0258]	-0.00239 [0.0243]	-0.0247 [0.0206]	0.289*** [0.0258]	0.0313 [0.0208]	-0.0164 [0.0205]	0.316*** [0.0263]
Neutral T	0.0511** [0.0259]	-0.0501** [0.0244]	-0.0244 [0.0206]	0.109*** [0.0259]	0.0239 [0.0209]	-0.00558 [0.0205]	0.375*** [0.0264]
Cont mean	0.307	0.771	0.174	0.210	0.132	0.153	0.120
Scaled T	0.118	0.0106	0.0984	1.085	0.265	0.235	3.386
Scaled N	0.159	0.223	0.0974	0.408	0.202	0.0803	4.014
Obs.	1777	1777	1777	1777	1762	1756	1773

- Separating estate tax info from inequality info: effects unchanged.
- Stripped down “Neutral” version still has very large effect.

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Negative Treatment to Directly Decrease Trust in Govt

- Negative trust treatment consisting of several multiple choice questions making respondents reflect on negative aspects of government:
 - ▶ Is govt “effective in limiting fraud, waste and abuse” in its programs? (88% disagree).
 - ▶ Do you agree that “Politicians in Washington work to enrich themselves and their largest contributors, instead of working for the benefit of the majority of citizens.”? (90% do).
 - ▶ Aso: Foreign Aid, Wall Street bailout, Citizens United campaign financing.
- Show results from ranking of OECD countries in terms of government transparency (U.S. is in bottom quartile). ▶ Treatment

First Stage Effects of Negative Trust Treatment

	<u>Trust Govt</u>	<u>Scope Govt</u>	<u>No waste</u>	<u>Ineq. v. serious</u>	<u>Ineq. inc.</u>	<u>Pov. v. ser.</u>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treated	-0.0582*** [0.0203]	0.0236 [0.0688]	-0.0278 [0.0346]	0.0547* [0.0311]	0.0119 [0.0289]	-0.00257 [0.0313]
Cont. mean	0.125	3.031	1.423	0.343	0.755	0.383
Scaled Effect	1.730	0.0170	0.109	0.182	0.341	0.00828
Obs.	899	899	898	899	899	899

- Successful in devising treatment that isolates effect of trust.
- Other first stages insignificant or very small.

Effects of the Negative Trust Treatment

	<u>Mill. tax</u>	<u>Estate tax</u>	<u>Petition</u>	<u>Priv. Charities</u>	<u>Educ. Pol.</u>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treated	-0.0421 [0.0275]	-0.00168 [0.0266]	-0.0602** [0.0236]	0.187** [0.0791]	0.0615 [0.0885]
Cont gp. mean	0.722	0.204	0.174	1.800	3.732
Scaled Effect	0.0949	0.00728	0.580	0.169	0.265
Obs.	899	895	899	850	874

- Decreases willingness to write to Senator.
- Increases reliance on private charities to redistribute.

Effects of the Negative Trust Treatment (cont.)

	<u>Min wage</u>	<u>Aid to Poor</u>	<u>Food stamps</u>	<u>Public Housing</u>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treated	-0.00428 [0.0902]	-0.139** [0.0616]	-0.153** [0.0673]	-0.163*** [0.0614]
Cont gp. mean	2.673	2.675	2.454	2.581
Scaled Effect	0.00531	0.128	0.119	0.133
Obs.	899	899	899	899

- Decreases respondents' support for direct govt transfer programs.
- No real effect on min wage, which is indirect transfer.
- Recall omnibus treatment didn't increase support for direct transfers, but did for min wage.

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Will emotional appeals produce larger changes?

- Omnibus treatment extensive, interactive and personalized, but:
 - ▶ factual and numeric information.
 - ▶ focus on relative inequality, not absolute poverty.
- New treatment to create empathy between respondent and low-income families:
 - ▶ *Think about a family of X_1 with X_2 parent(s) working full time at low pay and X_3 kids... What would be the minimal monthly expenses that such a family would have to make to afford living where you live? (Rent, food, utilities, transportation, child expenses).*
 - ▶ X_1 , X_2 , X_3 are customized to respondent's own family situation (without respondent knowing it).
 - ▶ Program computes surplus or deficit relative to poverty line.

Effects of Emotional Poverty Treatment

	<u>Inequality v. serious</u>	<u>Poverty v. serious</u>	<u>Min. wage</u>	<u>Aid to Poor</u>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treated	0.0783*** [0.0292]	0.0885*** [0.0313]	0.0469 [0.0989]	0.117* [0.0665]
Cont. mean	0.337	0.296	2.546	2.559
Scaled Eff.	0.221	0.257	0.0449	0.0714
Obs.	1002	799	799	799

	<u>Food stamps</u>	<u>Public Housing</u>	<u>Trust Government</u>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treated	0.177* [0.101]	0.0397 [0.0670]	-0.00979 [0.0211]
Cont. mean	1.832	2.539	0.124
Scaled Eff.	0.0866	0.0291	0.0931
Obs.	799	799	1002

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Draw Very Explicit Link between Low-Income and Policies

- Ask respondents to estimate budget of family earning min wage for basic needs such as rent, food, utilities, transportation, child care.
- Family composition customized to fit the respondent's own situation.
- Program shows surplus or deficit relative to budget of a min wage earning family.
- Respondents are also told that “*The Food stamps program helps many low income families, such as those earning only minimum wage. It provides \$150/month per person to help with food expenses.*”
- Highly explicit prime in favor of these poverty reduction policies.

Effects of Policy Treatment

	<u>Min. wage</u>	<u>Aid</u>	<u>Food st</u>	<u>Housing</u>	<u>Charities</u>	<u>Trust</u>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treated	0.323*** [0.0949]	0.133** [0.0638]	0.313*** [0.0970]	0.176*** [0.0636]	-0.137* [0.0709]	-0.0325 [0.0207]
Cont. mean	2.546	2.559	1.832	2.539	2.025	0.149
Scaled Eff.	0.310	0.0811	0.153	0.129	0.0740	0.654
Obs.	806	806	806	806	1068	1111

- No first stage on poverty, inequality (not shown)
- Policy preferences react, although economically small effects. Still min wage strongest.
- Treatment does not increase support for actually sending money to Washington (no effect on income or estate tax) (not shown).
- Effect on trust remains negative: respondents still blame govt after thinking about challenged for low-income families, but less so now.

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Conclusion

- Series of mTurk online experiments ($\geq 10,000$ obs) to explain disconnect between historic inequality rise and lack of support for redistribution.
- Greater information increases concerns and perceptions, but not necessarily support for policies.
- Reducing (the already low) trust in govt reduces support for policies.
- Showing concrete link to poverty policies improves support, still largely for programs that do not involve govt collecting and redistributing tax dollars.
- Estate tax is big exception: widespread misinformation or different moral implications?
- Online Appendix has methodological material for online surveys.

Appendix

Full Follow-up Results

	Ineq. v. serious		Ineq. inc.		Deserving rich		Top tax rate	
	(1) First	(2) Follow-up	(3) First	(4) Follow-up	(5) First	(6) Follow-up	(7) First	(8) Follow-up
Treated	0.00833 [0.0809]	0.102 [0.0770]	0.0732 [0.0716]	-0.0160 [0.0786]	0.0589 [0.0799]	0.0195 [0.0785]	2.440 [3.602]	2.674 [3.547]
Cont gp. mean Obs.	0.283 145	0.218 145	0.785 145	0.756 145	0.166 145	0.128 145	32.86 144	30.76 144

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Full Follow-up Results (cont.)

	Mill. tax		Estate tax		Trust govt		Govt scope	
	(1) First	(2) Follow-up	(3) First	(4) Follow-up	(5) First	(6) Follow-up	(7) First	(8) Follow-up
Treated	-0.00817 [0.0801]	0.0273 [0.0803]	0.337*** [0.0953]	0.195** [0.0910]	-0.122** [0.0611]	-0.0691 [0.0582]	0.259 [0.207]	0.364* [0.200]
Cont gp. mean Obs.	0.758 145	0.782 145	0.180 145	0.179 145	0.122 145	0.128 145	2.995 145	2.910 145

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Selection into the Follow-up

Variable	Coefficient	P-value
Voted for Obama in 2008	-0.001	0.957
Age	0.002	0.029
Liberal policy view	-0.011	0.285
Household income	0.006	0.101
Married	0.056	0.014
Education	0.007	0.389
Male	-0.009	0.677
Black	0.041	0.348
Hispanic	0.079	0.177
Native	-0.059	0.216
Employed full time	0.003	0.897
Unemployed	0.004	0.901
Not in labor force	0.080	0.038
Student	-0.064	0.020

Differential Attrition

Survey	Attrition			Obs. (Completed)
	Control	Treatment	Differential	
Omnibus	0.09	0.21	0.11	4045
Estate Tax	0.06	0.03	-0.03	1760
Trust	0.03	0.02	-0.01	901
Poverty	0.03	0.02	-0.01	1003
Policy	0.06	0.04	-0.02	1114

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Is Attrition due to Treatment Selective? Answer is NO

Variable	Coefficient	P-value
Voted for Obama in 2008	0.003	0.856
Age	-0.001	0.479
Liberal policy view	0.002	0.751
Household income	0.005	0.109
Married	-0.013	0.434
Education	-0.003	0.575
Male	0.013	0.447
Black	-0.066	0.031
Hispanic	0.091	0.021
Native	-0.043	0.201
Employed full time	-0.012	0.502
Unemployed	0.015	0.539
Not in labor force	0.021	0.376
Student	-0.027	0.235

Regression coefficients β (conditional on completing survey):

$$Treated_i = \alpha + \beta Covariate_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Estate Taxes: Neutral Treatment

The **Federal Estate Tax** applies when a deceased person leaves **more than \$5 million** in wealth to his or her heirs. Wealth left to a spouse or charitable organizations is exempt from estate tax.


Only 1 person out of 1000 is wealthy enough to face the estate tax.

Average Americans have far less than \$5 million in wealth when they die, so the estate tax does not affect them and they can pass on their property to their children tax-free.

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Trust Treatment Illustrated

Each year, the non-partisan organization Transparency International rates countries based on the amount of government corruption. When the US is compared to countries with similar levels of income and development how do you think it ranks?



Page Break

These are the actual results from the report:



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Poverty Treatment Illustrated

▶ Back to Main

The picture of poverty in a rich country like the United States is striking.

16% of Americans live in **poverty**.

20% of American **children** live in poverty.



25% of the **disabled** Americans live in poverty.



Think about a family of four with two parents working full time at low pay and two kids.

What would be the minimal monthly expenses that such a family would have to make to afford living in your city?

Please enter numbers only, with no "\$" sign and no commas, e.g., 1000.

Rent

Utilities (electric, heating,
cable/phone)

Car payment + car insurance + gas
to go to work

Food

Child care while working

Policy Treatment Illustrated

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Think about a family of four with one parent working full time at the minimum wage and two kids.

What would be the minimal monthly expenses that such a family would have to make to afford living where you live?

Please enter numbers only, with no "\$" sign and no commas, e.g., 1000.

Rent

Utilities (electric, heating,
cable/phone)

Transportation (public transit fare
and/or car payments, insurance,
gas...)

Food

Expenses related to children

Table: Comparing the mTurk sample to the CBS and ALP samples

	(1) mTurk sample	(2) CBS election poll	(3) American Life
Male	0.428	0.476	0.417
Age	35.41	48.99	48.94
White (non-Hisp)	0.778	0.739	0.676
Black	0.0756	0.116	0.109
Hispanic	0.0444	0.0983	0.180
Other racial/ethnic group	0.0759	0.0209	0.0410
Employed (full or part)	0.465	0.587	0.557
Unemployed	0.123	0.104	0.103
Married	0.397	0.594	0.608
Has college degree	0.433	0.318	0.309
Voted for Obama	0.675	0.555	0.559
Political views, cons. (1) to lib. (3)	2.176	1.586	
Observations	3741	808	1002

Table: Summary Statistics

	(1) Liberals	(2) Conservatives	(3) All
Male	0.407	0.472	0.422
Age	32.618	39.823	35.557
White	0.752	0.838	0.776
Black	0.090	0.063	0.085
Hispanic	0.039	0.027	0.037
Asian	0.090	0.053	0.078
Married	0.302	0.543	0.402
Has college degree	0.462	0.455	0.430
Unemployed	0.140	0.076	0.121
Not in labor force	0.093	0.208	0.144
Voted for Obama in 2008	0.914	0.303	0.674
Inequality has increased	0.836	0.615	0.738
Inequality is a very serious problem	0.414	0.129	0.285
Top Tax Rate	34.181	23.996	30.205
Increase Millionaire Tax	0.904	0.452	0.740
Increase Estate Tax	0.254	0.080	0.171
Increase min wage	0.822	0.496	0.690
Support food stamps	0.850	0.446	0.686
Support EITC	0.722	0.418	0.611
Trust Govt	0.171	0.148	0.158
Scope of Govt is broad	3.552	2.349	3.076
Said would petition for higher inc taxes (early rounds only)	0.288	0.118	0.238
Send petition for high estate tax	0.305	0.141	0.234
Plan to vote democrat 2012	0.800	0.182	0.529
Observations	821	475	1976