Patent value and citations: Creative destruction or strategic disruption? Discussion

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Intro

Interesting finding and paper

- Why does value appear to increase and then decline with forward citations when we look at NPE licensing revenue?
- Note that figure also shows substantial increase in variance of cites at higher values
- Some queries about the model
- Some queries about the data
- Some suggestions

Model

Key assumptions for productive patents:

- > All patents on a technology trajectory cite all previous patents
 - So citations grow automatically with patenting in a technology cluster
- Diminishing returns in two senses
 - Quality improvements
 - Congestion costs for R&D
- > => value of entry declines as a trajectory grows, and older patents receive more cites, so value and cites are correlated
- Query: why does radical innovation (a new cluster) destroy the value of entry in the current one?
- Comment: Figure 2 seems to accord with data

Model

Key assumptions for strategic patents


- Firm with radical innovation can take out other patents that raise the cost of subsequent innovation on that trajectory
- Free entry, so higher cost implies less entry
- Value to incumbent increases with less entry, and citations decrease
- Query: what if incumbent obtains many strategic patents that cite his productive patent? Won't that increase citations?
- Query: why would patent be transferred to NPE if foreclosure is successful?
- Comment: Figures 3 and 4 have decreasing variance as value increases, unlike data

Puzzle: contrasting results in HJT

 Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg (2005) relates firm market value V to assets, R&D capital, and patent portfolio (US firms).

 $V_{it} = F[A_{it}, (K_{it} / A_{it}), (P_{it} / K_{it}), (C_{it} / P_{it})]$

Where A = assets, K = R&D, P = patents, C = forward cites; all are stocks.



Coefficients measure elasticity of value with respect to cites per patent. >50 cites: 20 firms, mostly in computing & electronics, relatively small

My main concern - representativeness

- We do not really know much about the NPE(s) that are the source of data – what kinds of patents do they buy?
- Cotropia, Kesan, and Schwartz identify 8 types:
 - (I) university;
 - (2) individual inventor;
 - (3) large patent aggregator;
 - (4) failed operating or start-up company;
 - (5) patent holding company;
 - (6) operating company;
 - (7) IP holding company owned by operating company;
 - (8) technology development company.
- ▶ I am guessing that the one(s) here are (3), (5), or (8)
- Would a firm sell a very valuable productive patent to an NPE?
 - Probably not. So the tail of value is likely to be censored in unknown ways.
 - We would like to know more about the characteristics of the licensing deals in the upper tail.
- So I am not really persuaded by the authors' arguments.

Self citations

- The model highlights the importance of distinguishing between self citation and others – can this provide a way to test model assumptions?
- HJT find self-citations worth twice as much to firm as other citations
- Belenzon finds that grandson cites back to firm are valuable, whereas grandson cites by other firms reduce value

Other comments

- How do you know that licensing deals are not driven by litigation threats?
- Revenue allocation will depend on bargaining position (threat levels)
- The technologies in these data are a restricted set but probably the technologies where the strategic patenting is the greatest
 - Results probably do not generalize
- Finally, it seems very odd that the NPEs believe the sample size reveals anything confidential, once we know it is tens of thousands.
- Fix the cite to Jaffe Trajtenberg Romer (he just wrote the forward)