The development of Asian bond markets

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1. The problem

The 1997-8 crisis in Asia prompted considerable rethinking of the role of financial markets in the region's economic development. Banks had long been at the centre of Asian financial systems. For a set of late developing economies with urgent needs for financial intermediation, banking systems were easier to get up and running. Governments could supply the equity capital and in some cases the managerial talent. Close cooperation between banks and governments allowed the authorities to influence the flow of funds - ideally, to ensure that finance flowed toward sectors that were the locus of productivity spillovers and generators of export revenues. Large corporations in need of funding for expensive investment projects that might require a lengthy incubation period could be confident of a stable source of external finance.

Through the middle of the 1990s this bank-centred financial system was one of the foundation stones of East Asian economic growth. The crisis that followed then revealed that this form of financial organisation also had serious weaknesses. The short maturity of bank loans meant that when confidence was disturbed, as happened in 1997-8, what had once been a set of patient lenders might not be so patient anymore. Seeing their funding decline, banks might call in their loans, subjecting their borrowers to a painful credit crunch. Moreover, with the opening of capital accounts, banks might be in a favoured position to access foreign funds, not least because of the perception that their obligations were guaranteed by the public sector. They aggressively extended their intermediation role by borrowing offshore and on-lending the proceeds to domestic customers. Generally, the tenor of these foreign credits was even shorter than that of the banks' own loans, exposing them to a maturity mismatch that might cause serious problems if confidence was shaken. Since most foreign funds were denominated in dollars, euros or yen, the banks were exposed to either a dangerous currency risk if they on-lent in local currency or an equally serious credit risk if they on-lent in those same foreign currencies. Meanwhile, deregulation allowed banks to take on additional risks using techniques with which supervisors found it difficult to keep pace. And insofar as the banks had allowed themselves to be utilised as instrumentalities of the government's industrial policies, they anticipated help from the official sector in the event of difficulties. Thus, the moral hazard inevitably associated with the existence of a financial safety net appears to have been particularly pervasive in the Asian case.

This episode of financial turmoil led to the restructuring of banking systems and to efforts at upgrading their supervision and regulation. But it also created an awareness of the need for better diversified debt markets and specifically for bond markets to supplement the availability of bank finance. Bank and bond finance have different advantages. Bonds and securitised finance generally are thought to have better risk-sharing characteristics. Risks can be more efficiently diversified when they are spread across a large number of individual security holders. This spreading of risks and the existence of liquid secondary markets in standardised securities encourages creditors to make long term commitments and allows debtors to borrow for extended periods of time.

Banks, in contrast, have a comparative advantage in the information-impacted segment of the economy. They invest in building dedicated monitoring technologies. (This is one way of thinking about what distinguishes banks from other financial market participants.) Consequently they are well placed to identify and lend to small, recently established enterprises about which public information is scarce. In addition, by pooling the deposits of households and firms with non-synchronised demands for liquidity, they are able to provide maturity transformation services for small savers reluctant to lock up

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1 Introduction to *Asian bond markets: issues and prospects* (with Robert McCauley and Yung Chul Park).

2 Revised, November 2004.
their funds for extended periods. As concentrated stakeholders, they contribute to effective corporate governance and are prepared to incur the costs of litigation when legal recourse is required.

The point is not that banks or bond markets are better; there is little systematic evidence of the unconditional superiority of one financial form over the other. Rather, there is a growing body of evidence that countries benefit from well diversified financial systems with a role for both well-regulated banks and well-functioning securities markets. Banks have a comparative advantage in providing external finance to smaller, younger firms operating in information-impacted segments of the economy, while securities markets, including debt markets, do the job more efficiently for large, well established companies. Similarly, banks and securities markets are subject to different risks. Hence, in financial structure, as in other areas, diversification may help an economy attain a superior position on the frontier of feasible risk-return tradeoffs. That is, the existence of a well-diversified financial system, with a role for both banks and securities markets, should be conducive both to an efficient allocation of resources compatible with sustainable medium-term economic growth and to financial stability - and specifically to minimisation of the risk of late-1990s style financial crises.

2. The policy response

It is in this context that recent efforts to foster the development of Asian bond markets should be understood. These efforts have focused on the development of a more robust and efficient market infrastructure at the national and regional levels. Among the prominent initiatives in this area is the Asian Bond Fund Initiative (ABFI) of the ASEAN+3 countries. As endorsed by ASEAN+3 finance ministers at their August 2003 meeting in Manila, the ABFI takes as its goal the development of more robust and efficient primary and secondary markets. To this end ASEAN+3 has established working groups concerned with the creation of standardised debt instruments, the establishment of rating agencies, the provision of technical assistance, foreign exchange transactions and settlement issues, credit guarantee mechanisms, and the role of multilateral development banks, foreign government agencies and Asian multinational corporations in issuing in local markets and local currencies.

These working groups can be seen as mechanisms for sharing information and providing technical assistance about best practice in fostering and regulating bond markets. They can be seen as working toward the establishment of benchmarks for the development of market infrastructure against which national policy and practice can be assessed. Private sector practice has shown such benchmarks to be an effective focal point for reform. The working groups thus may function as a source of peer pressure for governments to move more quickly in the direction of creating active and liquid bond markets than they might otherwise, something that is desirable insofar as the official sector often enjoys privileged access to bank finance and therefore faces a moral hazard of its own.

Other initiatives seek to remove the obstacles to the development of a pan-Asian bond market. They seek to encourage Asian investors to build regional bond portfolios by removing obstacles to cross-border capital flows and by harmonising the regulations, withholding-tax provisions, accounting practices, rating conventions, and clearing and settlement systems that pose obstacles to foreign participation in regional bond markets. These initiatives respond to the perception that the small size of Asian bond markets is part of what limits their liquidity, efficiency and growth. To be attractive for

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4 The members of ASEAN are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam; the “plus 3” countries are Japan, South Korea and China. Another initiative deserving of mention is the APEC Regional Bond Market Initiative agreed to by the APEC Finance Ministers’ Process (FMP). The FMP was established following the 1997 financial crisis to provide a forum for the exchange of views and information on regional financial developments and to cooperatively pursue programs for the promotion of financial sector development and liberalisation. In 2002 APEC finance ministers then agreed to a second policy initiative on the Development of Securitization and Credit Guarantee markets, which aims at using high-level policy dialogues and expert panels to identify impediments to the development of these markets. For details see www.apec.org, and in particular www.apec.org/apec/ministerial_statements/sector_ministerial/finance/2003_finance/annex.html.
5 The use of benchmarking to generate peer pressure for reform is a widely utilised private sector practice. It is also used by the European Union as part of its method of “open cooperation.” See Wyplosz (2004).
investors, a bond market must operate at a certain minimum efficient scale. Otherwise market participants will not be able to acquire or dispose of their holdings without moving prices. Small markets with limited number of participants may also create scope for strategic behaviour by competitors and counterparties to deter entry and participation by other investors. There may exist significant scale efficiency effects in clearing and settlement, payment system data processing, trading operations, firm-specific information processing activities (such as listing), and even regulation. In addition a small market may not be able to develop liquidity in the full range of marketable instruments, including the derivative instruments needed by investors to hedge market risk, which in turn may deter participation. For all these reasons, small countries may find it difficult to develop deep and liquid bond markets. Securing foreign participation through the removal of impediments to cross border issuance and investment is in turn a potential way around this problem.

The most prominent initiative in this area the Asian Bond Fund created by the Executives’ Meeting of East Asian Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP). Launched in June 2003, the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) had an initial size of $1 billion US. It invests in a basket of US dollar denominated bonds issued by Asian sovereign and quasi-sovereign issuers in EMEAP countries other than Japan, Australia and New Zealand. It is managed by the Bank for International Settlements and supervised by an EMEAP Oversight Committee. A second Asian Bond Fund, under discussion at the time of writing, is to include investments in bond denominated in regional currencies issued by sovereigns, quasi-sovereigns, and creditworthy companies. By encouraging the reinvestment of central bank reserves in the qualifying bond markets and securities of the region, the ABF initiative can be seen as helping to augment the installed base of local security holdings and thus overcome the problem of inadequate scale. More generally this initiative can be seen as one of a set of measures designed to foster the development of a deep and liquid bond market at the regional level.

3. Dilemmas

There is an almost instinctual tendency on the part of economists to applaud such efforts, given the compelling nature of the arguments for developing more active bond markets to round out Asia’s bank-dominated financial systems. But there is also a dilemma. In reality what we are talking about is capital account convertibility, and capital account convertibility in advance of the development of regional financial markets. This, of course, is the opposite of what most of us thought that we had learned from the Asian crisis about the right time at which to liberalise the capital account. One of the key lessons of the Asian crisis is that it is important to have strong, diversified and well-developed domestic financial markets, including by implication bond markets, before liberalising the capital account. If financial markets are underdeveloped, market discipline will be weak, and banks and firms will be prone to over-borrow. Capital account liberalisation will then cause funds to flow in through the banking system. Cheap funding will encourage the banks to expand their loan portfolios, resulting in a decline in the average quality of loan projects. Maturity mismatches will be accentuated if banks use this short-term finance to fund long-term loans, and currency mismatches will result either for the banks (if they lend in local currency) or their customers (if their loans are denominated in foreign currency but the borrowers are active in the production of nontraded goods - as in the case of construction firms). If the

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6 McCauley and Remolona (2000) provide evidence on the relationship between market size and liquidity, as measured by inter alia bid-ask spreads and market turnover.

7 Mohanty (2001) cites a number of real-world instances where such behaviour has been evident in small and even middle-sized markets.

8 For evidence on this see Hancock, Humphrey and Wilcox (1999), Saloner and Shepard (1995), Malkamaki (1999) and Bossone, Honohan and Long (2001).

9 See Turner and Van’t dack (1996).

10 EMEAP is a forum of central banks and monetary authorities in the East Asia-Pacific region with 11 members: Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

11 The stated purpose of ABF2 is to encourage the development of index bond funds in regional markets and to act as a catalyst for the improvement of domestic bond markets and for greater harmonisation of bond market infrastructure and legal, regulatory and tax arrangements across the region. For details, see www.emeap.org/press/15apr04.htm.
flow of foreign capital the turns around, the whole financial edifice can come crashing down. The Asian crisis is a stark reminder of the havoc that can be wreaked by this combination of circumstances.

Thus, macroeconomists will insist that governments should not proceed with capital account liberalisation unless they have first made progress in developing local bond markets. And market participants will insist that countries cannot have local bond market development unless they first have open capital accounts. Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore and head of that country’s Monetary Authority, put the point well when writing in the BIS Quarterly Review (2002-I), as follows: “There is a trade-off between tightening up the capital account, and developing the bond markets. Measures to restrict offshore foreign currency trading have been effective, in so far as reducing or eliminating offshore markets is concerned. But these safeguards come at a cost - they also hinder the development of capital markets, especially bond markets. Size and liquidity are essential attributes for a market to attract international interest. Already in size and liquidity, we clearly lag behind our counterparts in the West. If Asian markets are fragmented and unable to grow, they risk being ignored by global investors”.12

Thus, Asia would seem to be in a classic Catch-22 situation. Without removing capital controls, attempting to foster domestic bond markets can be an uphill fight. Yet trying to win it by removing restrictions on the ability of residents and foreigners to invest across borders could be a risky strategy. It is widely recognised that these tradeoffs are implicit in efforts to build domestic bond markets by removing capital controls.13 What is less well understood is that even seemingly benign steps like harmonising regulations and taxation, or creating an Asian rating agency (or a common standard for national rating agencies), or using central bank reserves to jumpstart private cross-border investment are the equivalent of capital account liberalisation in the sense that they too would work to encourage cross border capital flows. This is their intent, and it would certainly be their effect. And these measures create risks - as well as conflicting with the conventional wisdom regarding sequencing - insofar as they encourage capital mobility first and only produce stronger markets later.

The positive message is that governments should proceed with all due speed to strengthen market infrastructure at the national level: more efficient clearing and settlement systems, more efficient information provision and assessment (through inter alia the establishment of disclosure requirements for issuers and the creation of rating agencies), stronger creditor rights, and the development of benchmark assets and yield curves. Even small countries can make progress in this direction, although they may have to forego some of the cost savings associated with the scale efficiency effects enumerated above. They can also overcome some of the disadvantages of small market capitalisation by consolidating the public debt and overfunding their fiscal needs.14 One reading of European experience from the 1950s through the 1980s is that, through the dedicated pursuit of such measures, reasonably robust and liquid markets in debt securities can be created.15 At that point it becomes safe to remove residual capital controls, as Europe did in the 1990s, and to encourage market participants to build pan-regional portfolios.

This perspective suggests that Asian countries, especially lower-income Asian countries with less developed financial infrastructure, should proceed cautiously with capital account liberalisation. It suggests that a relatively small Asian Bond Fund (recall that an ABF-I funded to the tune of $1 billion US compares with regional bond markets with a market capitalisation of some $1.5 trillion) is appropriate in that it does not put the cart before the horse. That is, it does not commit Asian central banks to large amounts of cross border portfolio investment before a stronger market infrastructure is in place. It suggests that efforts to foster the development of bond markets should focus, in the first instance, on measures to strengthen market infrastructure at the national level and not on measures to harmonise and integrate those market structures, thereby encouraging cross-border capital flows, per se. Measures to harmonise and integrate institutions and regulations should come later, once those stronger market structures are in place.

12 I owe this quote to Dwor-Frecaut (2003).
13 The econometric results in Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (Chapter 2 below) are consistent with this emphasis, in that they find a number of alternative measures of capital controls to be negatively associated with domestic bond market capitalisation in a panel of data for 41 countries.
15 Wyplosz (2001) advances this position.
The other issue raised by Europe’s experience in creating a regional bond market is the role of the exchange rate. In Europe, the elimination of currency risk by the creation of the euro strongly stimulated the development of regional bond markets. This is evident in the dramatic increase in corporate bond issuance, speculative-grade issuance in particular, following the irrevocable locking of exchange rates in 1999, and in the adoption of the ten-year German government bond as the benchmark issue for the region. This experience suggests that an exchange rate regime that minimises currency risk can lend strong stimulus to the development of regional bond markets by encouraging investors to build pan-regional portfolios, thereby enhancing market liquidity and in turn inducing additional issuance and investment. The chapter by Barry Eichengreen and Pipat Luengnaruemitchai below provide further support for this association between exchange rate stability and bond market capitalisation.

For Asia, these facts again create something of a dilemma. Another widely-drawn lesson of the Asian crisis is that countries should gravitate toward more flexible exchange rate regimes in order to limit crisis risk and be able to better tailor domestic money and credit conditions to local needs. Moreover, the presumption that Asian countries will continue to move down the road toward capital account convertibility reinforces the argument for greater exchange rate flexibility, insofar as moving to managed flexibility is an essential precondition for full capital account liberalisation. Hence, the exchange rate regime consistent with financial stability in the short run may not be conducive to bond market development in the longer run.

The severity if this problem is not entirely clear. The observation that countries with more stable exchange rates have better capitalised bond markets is based on an all-else-equal comparison. In practice, everything else may not be equal. In particular, macroeconomic policies that minimise currency risk by holding exchange rates stable may heighten credit risk by encouraging banks, firms and governments to borrow more freely, thereby exposing them to financial distress when cyclical conditions deteriorate. Robert McCauley in his chapter below finds a closer conformance of bond yields across countries with flexible exchange rates. One interpretation is that credit risk is even more important than currency risk in driving a wedge between national markets and that in countries where the bulk of debt is domestic-currency denominated these two forms of risk are negatively correlated. If this is right, then greater exchange rate flexibility may not in the end be an impediment to bond market development.

The other solution, also suggested by European experience, is monetary unification to reconcile the desire for exchange rate stability with the reality of capital account convertibility, along with stronger financial market institutions and regulation to prevent overborrowing and avoid unnecessary credit risk. From this point of view the Chiang Mai Initiative for swap lines and other financial supports, ongoing discussions of a collective currency peg, and initiatives to foster the development of bond markets are of a piece. That is to say, these various efforts to further economic and financial development and cooperation at the regional level are complementary to one another. The problem is that the time horizon relevant to these different initiatives is not the same. While furthering the development of bond markets is an urgent task that should be advanced now in order to foster growth and buttress financial stability, monetary unification is a long-run objective that presupposes a significantly more extensive political commitment.

The other question in this context is whether Asia is the right level at which to pursue these objectives. A positive answer is generally presupposed in discussions of exchange rate stabilisation and monetary unification. There is both the European precedent and the fact of rapidly growing intra-regional trade.

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16 In the first year of the euro, the value of euro-denominated corporate bond issues more than tripled, and the share of corporate bond issues accounted for by speculative (sub-investment-grade) issues rose from 4 per cent to 15 per cent. Corporations were able to place unprecedentedly large issues on European markets. See Detken and Hartmann (2000). These extraordinary early growth rates have now tailed off a bit, but the rate of growth of issuance of debt securities by nonfinancial corporations continues to outrun the growth of their other sources of finance. This enhanced access of euro-denominated corporate debt markets helped to finance a wave of mergers and acquisitions which in turn promises to strengthen Europe’s corporate sector.

17 See for example Fischer (2003).

18 This is something that is acknowledged even by the proponents. Thus, Mallet (2004) in describing discussions at the 2004 Asian Development Bank meetings for achieving currency union in Asia, reports that “economists and bankers say a common east Asian currency would take two or three decades.”
and foreign investment linkages, heavily centred on China. But it is not clear that a positive answer is appropriate in discussions of bond market development. There already exist well-developed global securities markets into which Asian countries can link, as emphasised by Robert McCauley and Yung Chul Park in their contribution to this volume. Many of the large issuers and large investors - multilateral institutions, foreign government agencies and multinational corporations alike - whose participation in local markets is desired are headquartered outside of Asia. Harmonising institutions and policies across Asian countries is not the most obvious way of encouraging their participation; better would be to harmonise institutions and regulations with those prevailing in global markets. Even if the answer to the question of whether Asian countries should attempt to integrate into global or regional bond markets is not obvious, that question should at least be asked.

4. The papers that follow

The papers that follow shed additional light on a number of these issues. In keeping with the thematic structure of this introduction, I review those papers in a somewhat different order than they appear below.

Atsushi Takeuchi’s paper sets the stage by describing the rationale the development of deeper and more liquid bond markets, the progress that has been made to date, and the obstacles going forward. As the author notes, the size of local bond markets in Asia, as measured by the volume of issuance, has more than doubled since 1998. However, secondary markets remain relatively illiquid, and foreign participation, in particular, is disappointing. Takeuchi highlights capital controls, taxation, the difficulty of cross border clearing and settlement, and the limited availability of hedging instruments as obstacles to greater participation by nonresidents.

Barry Eichengreen and Pipat Luengnaruemitchai further set the stage by using multiple regression and cross country comparisons to analyse the obstacles to the development of Asian bond markets. While a variety of alternative explanations have been offered in the past, Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai show that bond market undercapitalisation in Asia is in fact a phenomenon with multiple causes. To some extent the problem is one of minimum efficient scale: smaller countries find it more difficult to develop well capitalised bond markets (even when capitalisation is measured relative to GDP). But market size is not the entire problem. In addition, corruption and low bureaucratic quality, which are signs of unreliable securities market regulation, and the failure of countries to follow internationally recognised accounting and disclosure standards have slowed the development of debt markets. Macroeconomic policy, for its part, appears to have played both a supporting and impeding role. On the one hand, Asia’s strong fiscal balances, while admirable on other grounds, have not been conducive to the growth of government bond markets. At the same time, there is little evidence that the small size of public debt markets is a serious obstacle to corporate bond market development. And the stability of exchange rates in the region appears, if anything, to have encouraged bond market development.

Robert McCauley, in his chapter, builds on the observation that small countries find it difficult to achieve the minimum efficient scale required for a deep and efficient bond market. He notes that the sterilisation operations engaged in by Asian central banks in the process of accumulating international reserves have provided an opportunity to get a larger installed base of public debt securities into the market. The problem is that the market has been segmented into government debt and central bank debt. McCauley therefore recommends consolidating this debt into a uniform set of securities by “overfunding” the fiscal deficit (issuing more government debt securities than needed to fund the deficit, and purchasing central bank bills in return). Finance ministries may be reluctant to permit the de facto issuance of additional government debt as a device for mopping up excess liquidity; among other things, doing so is likely to undermine their control of the public debt market. But they still may wish to consider this alternative if they attach priority to the creation of a liquid domestic market in public debt.

Kee-Hong Bae, Warren Bailey and Young-Sup Yun look more closely at the issue of foreign participation, analysing data gathered by the IMF for 165 countries on the holdings of local bonds by foreign investors. They find that measures of property rights protection similar to those analysed by Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai - corruption, risk of expropriation of private property, and the risk that contracts may be repudiated - are the most influential determinants of foreign participation. By comparison, they find little evidence of a role for macroeconomic variables like inflation, interest rates,
and the volatility of growth. This reinforces the message that countries seeking to develop their bond markets, and specifically to encourage foreign participation, should focus on building investment-friendly institutions. Atsushi Taneuchi, in a companion paper, examines these same issues and in addition characterises the obstacles to nonresident issuance. Compared to Bae, Bailey and Yun, he puts more emphasis on statutory restrictions such as capital controls, the opacity and lack of uniformity of withholding tax regimes, and the absence of adequate instruments for hedging interest-rate and currency exposures.

Martin Hohensee and Kyungjik Lee pursue the problem of hedging instruments, both those traded on futures exchanges and over the countier interest rate derivatives such as interest rate swaps and options. They show that Hong Kong and Singapore, two of the leading bond markets in the region, also have the most advanced derivatives markets - a fact that is surely not coincidental. It is impossible to imagine the development of the relevant hedging markets absent the growth of the underlying bond market, for without trading in the underlying bonds there would be nothing on which to base the swaps and options in question. The growth of hedging markets in Hong Kong and Singapore thus reflects the success of these centres at growing their local bond markets. But it also reflects a transparent and flexible regulatory regime, which provides market participants the opportunity and the incentive to engage in derivative transactions. While other Asian countries have launched their own derivatives markets, these remain relatively illiquid. This suggests that markets in the relevant hedging instruments tend to develop as a natural byproduct of bond market development, although their growth can also be fostered by putting in place a transparent, market-friendly regulatory regime.

The case for developing local bond markets is strongest to the extent that the resulting issues are long in tenor and denominated in local currency, thereby helping to relieve the double-mismatch problem. David Fernandez and Simon Klassen focus on the currency-mismatch aspect, analysing the choice of currency by East Asian bond issuers. In contrast to Eichengreen and Luengnarumitchai, they argue for the existence of strong spillovers between the sovereign and corporate segments of the market. They conclude that sovereign issuance has played a catalytic role in the genesis of regional bond markets, this despite the constraints resulting from the traditionally strong fiscal stance of Asian governments. Since the Asian crisis, however, sovereign issuance has soared, and corporate issues have followed in its train. Indeed, as the authors emphasise, corporate issuance has been the most rapidly growing segment of Asian bond markets in the last five years. The constraint on the further growth of the corporate market, they suggest, is not so much inadequate supply as inadequate demand - or at least a mismatch in the structure of supply and demand. High-grade corporates have either ample retained earnings or easy access to equity finance; hence much of the potential supply of corporate bonds is from sub-investment grade credits. The demand, from institutional investors in particular, is however for investment grade debt securities (given restrictive covenants, regulations, etc). One potential solution to this problem is the development of structured products that allow investors to unpackage credit risk from other characteristics of debt securities. While the market in structured products is growing as well, Fernandez and Klassen suggest that Asian financial institutions, which are potential suppliers of such products, need to develop further their expertise and involvement in this area.

Another potential way of addressing this supply-demand imbalance is the provision of credit guarantees. Gyutaeg Oh and Jaeha Park argue that the most important constraint on the development of local currency bond markets is not weakness of creditor rights, imperfections in the rating function, or the absence of a pan-Asian clearing and settlement system, but the absence of credit guarantees. The underlying constraint to bond market development in the region, they argue, is the mismatch between the credit quality of potential issuers (which is often speculative grade) and the credit quality required by provident funds, insurance companies, and other institutions (which, as noted, are often required or prefer to limit their holdings to investment grade securities). Guarantees against credit and political risk could bridge this gap, Oh and Park argue: they would guarantee a high rating for issuers, facilitate the securitisation of outstanding debts, broaden the investor base, and improve marketability by limiting the danger of downgrades. To this end the authors propose the creation of either public-private partnerships or multilateral institutions to provide guarantees for qualifying Asian issuers. The question here is why, if there is a demand for such insurance, private agencies have not sprung up to screen potential customers and provide this service at a price. And if the answer is that there exist distortions preventing the market from doing this job, then there is still the danger that the public provision of guarantees will only reintroduce in another guise the moral hazard problem that arose in the 1990s as a result of the commercial banks' implicit guarantees.
One model for Asian countries seeking to develop their bond markets is Japan, which has a large and highly liquid debt market. Fumiaki Nishi and Alexander Vergus consider the history, structure and prospects of this market. They show that government debt dominates the Japanese market, not surprisingly given the large budget deficits run by the government in the 1990s in the effort to jump-start a deflation-ridden economy.19 Their conclusion is that the Japanese corporate bond market has developed relatively slowly due to the long-standing dominance of Japanese banks over the country’s corporate finance. In this sense Japan is not a reassuring precedent for other Asian countries, which similarly inherit financial systems heavily dominated by commercial banks.

Japan also provides lessons, as Nishi shows, for Asian countries seeking to encourage foreign participation in their local bond markets. The first yen-denominated bond publicly offered by a nonresident issuer in the domestic market was issued by the Asian development Bank in 1970. This was followed by sovereign issues by Singapore in 1976 and the Korea Development Bank in 1978. As controls on nonresident issuance in yen were gradually relaxed, a variety of foreign corporate issuers followed, creating the so-called “Samurai market”.20 However, the development of the Samurai market has been relatively slow, a disappointing record that the authors attribute the onerous regulations and registration requirements imposed by the Japanese authorities - and that might be best avoided by other Asian governments.

The remaining papers consider challenges for the development of market infrastructure, a task that emerges from these analyses as a key step for countries seeking to foster local bond markets. Kate Kisselev and Frank Packer consider the rating function, focusing on the rate of local currency bonds. Transparent and efficient ratings are essential to creating a broad and diversified customer base for local currency bonds. But, as Kisselev and Packer show, local currency sovereign bonds often receive very different ratings than the foreign currency issues of the same governments. Rating agencies tend to give higher ratings to local currency issues on the grounds that the sovereign may find it easier to raise domestic-currency-denominated resources in times of stress. (In extremis they can always print money.) Corruption appears to be important for explaining these rating gaps: the greater perceived corruption, the smaller the rating advantage to local currency bonds. In addition, countries with higher investment rates, and therefore, presumably, superior growth prospects, receive more favourable ratings for their domestic-currency bonds, relative to their foreign-currency counterparts. There are also important differences between S&P and Moody’s in how they calibrate this rating gap, suggesting that the market still has some way to go in arriving at a standard methodology for rating local currency bonds.

One response to dissatisfaction with the global rating agencies is to develop local counterparts. The performance of local rating agencies, one or more of which now exists in most Asian countries, is analysed by Daekeun Park and Changyong Rhee. Park and Rhee argue for standardising the rating systems used by these agencies and creating a pan-Asian settlement system as a way of fostering the development of a pan-regional bond market. Their case for local agencies is based on local knowledge and on the observation that global agencies like S&P, Moody’s and Fitch do not find it worthwhile to provide ratings for the multitude of small local issuers that comprise the most rapidly growing segment of Asian borrowing. Unfortunately, local agencies in different countries follow incompatible practices, assigning government bonds the highest credit ratings and rating other entities ratings below that sovereign ceiling. Since sovereign credit worthiness differs across countries, this renders ratings of corporate credit worthiness incomparable. Harmonising practices and abandoning the sovereign ceiling would help, but this is easier said than done.21

Park and Rhee also consider whether the underprovision of clearing, settlement and depository services is an obstacle to the development of regional bond markets. They compare the advantages of

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19 In fact, large-scale government bond issuance started already in the second half of the 1980s, and Nishi and Vergus trace the development of the Tokyo market back to this period.

20 There may be a more general lesson here for Asia’s less developed countries - and for the Asian Development Bank. Nonresident issuance often starts with the international financial institutions. In addition to creating a local currency benchmark asset and stimulating liquidity, such issuance provides an instrument that local issuers tapping foreign-currency bond markets can use to swap out of their foreign currency exposures, limiting the currency mismatch problem.

21 In any case, it is not clear that local rating agencies provide a meaningful alternative to global agencies, since in practice they are often affiliated with those global agencies, which are also among their major shareholders.
clearing and settling cross-border transactions using local agents, global custodians, and cross-border settlement systems operated by international central securities depositories (ICSDs) like Euroclear and Clearstream. Local custodians must be hired in each relevant market, and the quality of their services varies. Global custodians essentially do little more than arrange local custodians for their clients. ICSDs avoid this duplication and quality variation but have limited coverage in Asia, partly because of regulatory restrictions on financial transactions in various Asian countries. In addition, time zone differences mean that Euroclear and Clearstream do not provide real time clearing for many Asian transactions. Park and Rhee argue for the creation of an Asian clearing and settlement system to rectify these problems. The question is whether creating a new system is really necessary or whether existing networks like Euroclear would provide an expanding range of services if Asian countries simply relaxed regulatory restrictions on financial transactions and the volume of bond market turnover increased.

Frank Braeckevelt also finds much to criticise in these areas, describing Asia's clearing and settlement infrastructure as opaque and fragmented. But he does not find infrastructure is the principal barrier to the development of efficient bond markets in Asia; despite their fragmentation existing clearing and settlement systems operate relatively well. Rather, the principal barriers to the development of regional bond markets, Braeckevelt concludes, are capital controls that limit the participation of foreign investors, along with factors limiting market liquidity such as the absence of incentives for Asian institutions to actively manage their portfolios. This is consistent with the view that clearing and settlement issues, rather than requiring the development of an Asian clearing system, could be resolved by relaxing regulatory restrictions and encouraging additional market liquidity and turnover.

Finally, the paper by Bernhard Eschweiler analyses the role played by supervision and regulation in the development of Asian bond markets. Eschweiler finds that supervision and regulation in the region increasingly resembles global practices, both in its structure and content. At the same time, there is considerable variation within Asia in the quality of regulation, Hong Kong and Singapore being the only countries that are fully compliant with global standards and best practices. Where other Asian countries tend to fall down is not so much in the design of regulation as in its enforcement, reflecting weaknesses in legal systems and creditor rights. Eschweiler concludes that the fastest route to developing bond markets in Asia is not through efforts to harmonise market rules and regulations but rather through the adoption and implementation of global best practices at the national level.

Given this variety of viewpoints and conclusions, it will be evident that there is less than complete consensus on the priority actions that should be taken to effectively foster the development of bond markets in Asia. If there is one thing on which observers agree, it is Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai's point that the slow growth of Asian bond markets is a problem with multiple dimensions whose solution requires multiple interventions: strengthening creditor rights, building stronger market infrastructure, improving regulatory design and enforcement, and removing the capital controls and tax measures that limit foreign issuance and investor participation - while adapting macroeconomic policies, including the exchange rate regime, to the reality of financial integration. The small scale of many Asian economies and financial markets also remains a barrier to the development of deep and liquid local markets at the national level; on this too there is agreement, although there is no consensus, at least yet, on whether this means that priority should be attached to harmonising bond market rules, integrating clearing and settlement systems, and creating pan-Asian standards for rating agencies so that market growth can proceed at the regional rather than the national level. Clearly, there is no shortage of positive steps that can be taken to promote the development of Asian bond markets. The key task going forward is to identify which such measures should be priorities.

References


