Deadweight loss measures the economic cost of market distortions; when one is referring to the distortions caused by taxation, the deadweight loss is referred to as the excess burden of taxation, because it is the economic cost to taxpayers over and above the tax revenue collected.

Although deadweight loss is an intuitive concept, it may be defined in more than one way, depending on the conceptual experiment one has in mind.

Consider the case of a representative consumer. Let \( y \) be the consumer’s initial income endowment and \( p_0 \) be the initial price vector the consumer faces. Assume that this price vector represents the undistorted prices charged by producers, and that these prices are fixed, for example set by world markets. Now, suppose government imposes a tax vector \( t \) to raise revenue, with the resulting new price vector \( p_1 = p_0 + t \). One definition of deadweight loss is the amount that one would have to give the consumer to compensate for the taxes, net of the revenue the government collects. Assuming that the individual’s indirect utility function is \( V(p, y) \), this definition leads to the following expression for deadweight loss:

\[
DWL_1 = E(p_1, V(p_0, y)) - y - t'x'(p_1, V(p_0, y))
\]

where \( E(\cdot) \) is the household’s expenditure function and \( x'(\cdot) \) is the vector of the household’s compensated demands. The first two terms indicate how much the individual must be compensated to remain at the initial level of utility (the Hicksian measure known as compensating variation), and the third term indicates how much tax revenue is available for compensation. Note that, for consistency, we calculate this revenue assuming that the compensation is occurring, i.e., that the consumer remains on the original indifference curve.

An alternative definition of deadweight loss is the amount we could take away from the consumer to offset any gains from removing the tax (the Hicksian equivalent variation), in excess of the revenue we give up; that is,

\[
DWL_2 = y - E(p_0, V(p_1, y)) - t'x(p_1, y)
\]

How do these measures relate? Using the identities \( y = E(p_0, V(p_0, y)) = E(p_1, V(p_1, y)) \), \( x(p_1, y) = x'(p_1, V(p_1, y)) \), and \( t = p_1 - p_0 \), we may rewrite these two expressions as:

\[
(1') \quad DWL_1 = E(p_1, V(p_0, y)) - E(p_0, V(p_0, y)) - (p_1 - p_0)'x'(p_1, V(p_0, y))
\]
\[
(2') \quad DWL_2 = E(p_1, V(p_1, y)) - E(p_0, V(p_1, y)) - (p_1 - p_0)'x'(p_1, V(p_1, y))
\]

The expressions differ only in the level of utility (pre-tax or post-tax) at which the calculation is made. Without some restriction on preferences, the two measures will differ. Figure 3 in Auerbach-Hines provides a graphical illustration of DWL_2, and a similar measure can be drawn for DWL_1.
It is also customary to illustrate these measures graphically in price-quantity diagrams. Assume that there are two goods, a numeraire commodity that is untaxed and has a price of 1, and a taxed commodity with price $p$ and quantity $x$. Then measure DWL₁ (similarly for DWL₂) reduces to an expression that replaces the price and quantity vectors with scalars relating to the taxed good:

\[
(3) \quad \text{DWL}_1 = E(p_1, V(p_0, y)) - E(p_0, V(p_0, y)) - (p_1 - p_0)x'(p_1, V(p_0, y))
\]

Using the fact that $E(p_1, u) - E(p_0, u) = \int_{p_0}^{p_1} x^c(p, u) \, dp$, we graph expression (3) as:

\begin{itemize}
  \item It is important to note that deadweight loss relates to the compensated demand curve, because the distortion is to relative prices; responses to lump-sum taxes also have income effects, but there is no associated distortion. The deadweight loss area, approximately triangular in shape, is known as a Harberger triangle; its size is approximately $-\frac{1}{2}t\Delta x$.
  
  \item One may also derive the vector version of this approximation for many taxes imposed simultaneously from expression (1') or (2') as a second-order Taylor approximation, equal to $-\frac{1}{2}t'\Delta x$, around the undistorted equilibrium.
\end{itemize}

Some Observations about Deadweight Loss
1. Deadweight loss rises roughly with the square of the tax. From the approximation we can see this, since when the tax rate $t$ is twice as large, so, roughly, is the reduction in $x$, $\Delta x$ (this is exact only if the demand curve is linear). For intuition, consider doubling the tax in the above graph:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Increasing the tax so that the price rises from $p_1$ to $p_2$ incurs not only another Harberger triangle, B, but also a rectangle, C; whereas A and B are second-order terms, C is a first-order term – it does not vanish as the additional tax becomes small. This is because the additional tax is imposed starting at a distorted point. In other words, it is more costly to exacerbate an existing distortion. For the additional tax, say $\Delta t$, the second-order DWL approximation is $-(t\Delta x + \frac{1}{2}t\Delta x)$.
  
  \item Another way to view the extra distortion, C, is that it is the revenue loss due to a decline in taxed-goods consumption. That is, additional revenue from the tax increase is D – C, not D. It is even possible for area C to exceed area D in size, in which case revenue would decline with the increase in the tax, indicating that the tax rate is higher than the revenue-maximizing rate, i.e., to the right of the peak of revenue as a function of the tax rate (also known as a Laffer curve).
\end{itemize}
2. Deadweight loss rises roughly in proportion to the elasticity of demand. Since $\Delta x$ is approximately $t \cdot \frac{\partial x^c}{\partial p} = \frac{t}{p} \cdot \frac{\partial x^c}{\partial p} = -\frac{t}{p} \cdot x \cdot \epsilon$, where $\epsilon$ is the own compensated demand elasticity (defined so that it is nonnegative), we can rewrite the second-order approximation for DWL as $(t/p)^2 \cdot px \cdot \epsilon$. Graphically, we can see that a larger elasticity of demand increases deadweight loss and reduces revenue for a given tax rate.

3. Excess burden applies for subsidies as well as taxes. The point is that we are measuring the cost of a market distortion. With a subsidy, an individual will be better off, but by less than if the government had transferred the revenue directly:

Here, area E represents DWL, equal to the revenue cost of reducing the price to $p_3$, E+F, net of the individual gain, F. As before, $\text{DWL} \approx -\frac{1}{2} \Delta t \Delta x$, where now $\Delta t < 0$ and $\Delta x > 0$.

4. Excess burden applies to supply distortions as well, for example the labor supply decision; we could represent this using a horizontal curve for labor demand and an upward sloping compensated labor supply curve. We can also measure deadweight loss in markets where both demand and supply are not infinitely elastic. See the discussion in Auerbach and Hines, sec. 2.2.

Can’t we just avoid excess burden by imposing taxes at the same rate on all commodities? That is, if the consumer’s budget constraint is $p'x = y$, why not just impose taxes at a constant rate, say $\theta$, so that the household’s budget constraint becomes $(1+\theta)p'x = y \Rightarrow p'x = y/(1+\theta)$ – effectively, a lump-sum tax on income? The problem is that most of what we call “income” results from
individual choices, for example how much labor to supply. That choice would be distorted by
the proposed scheme. Suppose that income equals $w(\bar{L} - l)$, where the term in parentheses is
labor endowment less leisure; then we can rewrite the budget constraint as $p'x + wl = w\bar{L}$. If we
taxed everything on the left-hand side at a constant rate, $\theta$, this would give us a nondistortionary
tax, but it would require that we be able to tax leisure, $l$, separately from the labor endowment, $\bar{L}$, which we cannot do. But if the government taxes leisure net of labor endowment at rate $\theta$, then its nondistortionary tax will be feasible but will raise no revenue, because it will be applied to a
tax base $p'x + w(l - \bar{L})$.

Given that a realistic tax system will involve distortions, how should we choose taxes to
minimize deadweight loss? The discussion above suggests that we should avoid high rates of tax
on any one commodity, and be especially concerned about taxing commodities with high
response elasticities. But this intuition is based on analysis of a tax on a single margin.

**Optimal Taxation**

The basic optimal tax problem (to be enriched later) seeks to maximize a representative agent’s
utility given that the government must raise a certain amount of revenue, $R$, using proportional
commodity taxes (which may include taxes on supplies of factors, such as labor. (As Auerbach
and Hines discuss, this is equivalent to minimizing one of the definitions of deadweight loss
derived above.) We also assume, initially, that producer prices, $q$, are fixed, and that the
household has no truly exogenous income $y$. This means that the initial budget constraint is $q'x = 0$, and hence that proportional taxes on all commodities raise no revenue, as just discussed.

We can therefore arbitrarily set one tax rate equal to zero. Let’s do this for good 0, which we
also choose as numeraire: $p_0 = q_0 = 1$, where $p$ is the price the consumer faces. (The same
analysis would apply for $y > 0$ if we assumed that such pure profits can be taxed away, except
that the government would then face the task of raising the remaining $R - y$ rather than $R$.
Alternatively, we could assume the presence of exogenous income $y > 0$ that is not taxed away,
but then there would have to be some reason why good 0 cannot be taxed; the analysis would be
the same but this is a less appealing assumption.)

Setting up the Lagrangian for the problem as $L = V(p, 0) - \mu[R - (p - q)'x]$, we can maximize
with respect to $p$ directly. (Given that $dt_i/dp_i = 1$, choosing $t$ is the same as choosing $p$.) This
gives first-order conditions:

$$-\lambda x_i + \mu \left( x_i + \sum_j t_j \frac{dx_j}{dp_i} \right) = 0 \quad \forall i$$

where $\lambda$ is the marginal utility of income. Using the Slutsky equation, $\frac{dx_j}{dp_i} = s_{ji} - x_i \frac{dx_i}{dy}$, and
grouping terms in $x_i$, we get:

$$(4) \quad \left[ \mu - \left( \lambda + \mu \sum_j t_j \frac{dx_j}{dy} \right) \right] x_i + \mu (\sum_j t_j s_{ji}) = 0 \implies -\sum_j t_j s_{ji} = \frac{\mu - \alpha}{\mu} x_i \quad \forall i$$
where \( \alpha \) can be thought of as the “social” marginal utility of income. As Auerbach and Hines discuss, \( \mu \geq \alpha \), i.e., the marginal shadow cost of revenue must be at least as high as the marginal social utility of income – increasing revenue entails additional deadweight loss. To interpret expression (4), which is referred to as the Ramsey rule, note that the term \(- \sum_j t_j s_{ji}\) is the excess burden introduced by the additional tax on good \( i \) (the \(- t\Delta x \) terms). Also, revenue collected from an additional tax on good \( i \), holding utility fixed, is \( x_i + \sum_j t_j s_{ji} \). Thus, (4) says that, at an optimum, where small feasible variations in the tax instruments have no first-order effects on utility,

\[
dDWL/dt_i = (\mu - \alpha)(dR/dt_i - dDWL/dt_i)/\mu \quad \Rightarrow \quad dDWL/dt_i = (\mu - \alpha)(dR/dt_i)/\alpha
\]

That is, we should choose taxes so that the marginal deadweight loss associated with each tax is the same proportion of marginal revenue, \((\mu - \alpha)/\alpha\); put another way, the marginal cost of public funds per dollar of revenue, which taking account of the excess burden of taxation, should be equal for all taxes.

What do optimal taxes look like? Consider a three-commodity model, with two consumption goods and labor as the untaxed numeraire. Stacking the two first order conditions,

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
S_{11} & S_{12} \\
S_{12} & S_{22}
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
t_1 \\
t_2
\end{pmatrix}
= -\frac{\mu - \alpha}{\mu}
\begin{pmatrix}
x_1 \\
x_2
\end{pmatrix},
\]

we invert the matrix in Slutsky terms to obtain the following expression for the ratio of tax rates, in terms of compensated cross-elasticities of demand, \( \varepsilon_{ij} \),

\[
\frac{t_1/p_1}{t_2/p_2} = \frac{\varepsilon_{22} - \varepsilon_{12}}{\varepsilon_{11} - \varepsilon_{21}} = \frac{\varepsilon_{20} + \varepsilon_{12} + \varepsilon_{21}}{\varepsilon_{10} + \varepsilon_{12} + \varepsilon_{21}}
\]

where the second version of the expression follows from the condition (implied by the envelope theorem) that \( \sum_i p_i s_{ij} = 0 \). (To see this, note that \( dU/dp_j |_{u} = \sum_i U_i s_{ij} = \lambda \sum_i p_i s_{ij} = 0 \).)

In (5), were we to ignore the cross-elasticities \( \varepsilon_{12} \) and \( \varepsilon_{21} \), the first version would call for tax rates that are inversely proportional to the own demand elasticities. This inverse elasticity rule is consistent with the intuition developed earlier when looking at a single distortion, but it does not hold when the distortions interact (i.e., when \( s_{12} \neq 0 \)). The second version says that we should tax more heavily the good with the smaller value of \( \varepsilon_0 \) – the good that is more complementary to leisure. The logic is that taxing goods 1 and 2 discourages labor supply (since either tax lowers the real wage – the wage relative to the price of consumer goods), so taxing more heavily the good that is complementary to leisure helps lessen this distortion, but at the cost of a new distortion, between goods 1 and 2. This illustrates the general principle of “second-best” – that once we have one distortion, in this case the labor-leisure distortion, we may improve welfare by introducing another distortion, in this case to the margin of choice between goods 1 and 2.