Outline

1. Hidden Action (Moral Hazard) II

2. The Takeover Game

3. Hidden Type (Adverse Selection)

4. Evidence of Hidden Type and Hidden Action

5. Empirical Economics: Intro
1 Hidden Action (Moral Hazard) II

- Consider solution when effort is observable

- This is so-called **first best** since it eliminates the uncertainty involved in connecting pay to performance (as opposed to effort)

  - Principal offers a flat wage $w = a$ as long as agent works $e^*$

  - Agent accepts job if
    
    $$a - c(e^*) \geq 0$$

  - Principal wants to pay minimal necessary and hence sets $a^* = c(e^*)$

  - Substitute into profit of principal
    
    $$\max_{a,b} E [\pi] = e - E [w(y)] = e - a^* = e - c(e)$$
– Solution for $e^*$: $c' (e^*) = 1$ or

$$e^*_{FB} = 1/c$$

• Compare $e^*$ above and $e^*_{FB}$ in first best

• $\rightarrow$ With observable effort (first best) agent works harder
• Summary of hidden-action solution with risk-averse agent:

• **Risk-incentive trade-off:**

  – Agent needs to be incentivized ($b^* > 0$) or will not put in effort $e$

  – Cannot give too much incentive ($b^*$ too high) because of risk-aversion

  – Trade-off solved if

    * Action $e$ observable OR

    * No risk aversion ($\gamma = 0$) OR

    * No noise in outcome ($\sigma^2 = 0$)

  – Otherwise, effort $e^*$ in equilibrium is sub-optimal

• Same trade-off applies to other cases
Example 2: \textit{Insurance} (Not fully solved)

- Two states of the world: Loss and No Loss
- Probability of Loss is $\pi(e)$, with $\pi'(e) < 0$
  * Example: Careful driving (Car Insurance)
  * Example: Maintaining your house better (House insurance)
  * Agent chooses quantity of insurance $\alpha$ purchased
- Agent risk averse: $U(c)$ with $U' > 0$ and $U'' < 0$
• Qualitative solution:

  − No hidden action $\rightarrow$ Full insurance: $\alpha^* = L$

  − Hidden action $\rightarrow$

    * Trade-off risk-incentives $\rightarrow$ Only Partial insurance $0 < \alpha^* < L$

    * Need to make agent partially responsible for accident to incentivize

    * Do not want to make too responsible because of risk-aversion
2 Takeover Game

- “The Takeover Game” (Samuelson and Bazerman, 1985)

- See hand-out
3 Hidden Type (Adverse Selection)

• Solution of Take-over game
  - When does seller sell? If bid profitable \((b \geq V)\)
  - Profit of buyer? \(1.5V - b \rightarrow \text{BUT: Must take into account strategic behavior of seller}\)

• Solution:
  \[
  E[\text{profit}(b)] = (E[1.5V|V \leq b] - b) \cdot \Pr(V \leq b)
  \]
  \[
  = \left(1.5 \frac{b}{2} - b\right) \Pr(V \leq b)
  \]
  \[
  = -0.25b \Pr(V \leq b)
  \]

• Derive First order condition
  - Solution: \(b^* = 0\!\!\)

• No market for take-overs, despite clear benefits. Why?
• First type of asymmetric information problems: Hidden Action (Moral Hazard)
  – Manager can shirk when she is supposed to work hard.

• Second type of asymmetric information problems: Hidden Type (Adverse Selection)
  – Informational problem: one party knows more than the other party.
  
  – Example 1: wisdom teeth extraction (Doctors are very prone to recommend extraction. Is it necessary? Or do they just want to make money. Likely too many wisdom teeth extracted.)

  – Example 2: finding a good mechanic. (Most people don’t have any idea if they are being told the truth. People can shop around, but this has considerable cost. Because of this, mechanics can sometimes inflate prices)
• **Lemons Problem**

• Classic asymmetric information situation is called “Lemons Problem”
  
  – (Akerlof, 1970) on used car market
  
  – Idea: “If you’re so anxious so sell to me do I really want to buy this?”

• Simple model:
  
  – The market for cars has two types, regular cars (probability $q$) and lemons (probability $1 - q$).
    
    * To seller, regular cars are worth $1000, lemons are worth $500.
    
    * To potential buyer, regular cars are worth $1500 and lemons worth $750.
• Which cars should be sold (from efficiency perspective)?
  
  – All cars should be sold since more valuable to buyer.
  
  – BUT: buyers do not know type of car, sellers do know

• Solve in two stages (backward induction):
  
  – Stage 2: Determine buyers willingness to pay
  
  – Stage 1: Determine selling strategy of sellers

• Stage 2. What are buyers’ WTP?
  
  – Expected car value = \( \mu 1500 + (1 - \mu)750 = 750 + \mu 750 \)
  
  – Notice: \( \mu \) is expected probability that car sold is regular (can differ from \( p \))
- Buyer willing to pay up to $p = 750 + \mu 750$

- Stage 1. Seller has to decide which car to sell
  - Sell lemon if $500 \leq p = 750 + \mu 750$ YES for all $\mu$
  - Sell regular car if $1000 \leq p = 750 + \mu 750$ $\iff \mu \geq 1/3$

- Two equilibria
  1. If $q \geq 1/3$: Sell both types of cars $\Rightarrow \mu = q \geq 1/3$ $\Rightarrow p^* = 750 + \mu 750$
  2. If $q < 1/3$: Sell only lemons $\Rightarrow \mu = 0$ $\Rightarrow p^* = 750$

- Market for cars can degenerate: Only lemons sold
• **Conclusion**: the existence of undetectable lemons may collapse the market for good used cars

• **Basic message**: If sellers know more than buyers, buyers must account for what a seller’s willingness to trade at a price tells them about hidden information

• Same issues apply to:
  - *Car Insurance*. If offer full insurance, only bad drivers take it
  - *Salary*. If offer no salary incentives, only low-quality workers apply
4 Evidence of Hidden Type and Hidden Action

- Consider asymmetric information in lending market (Karlan-Zinman, 2007)

- Lenders offer different borrowing rates
  - High interest rates → Adverse selection: Tend to select bad borrowers
  - Moral Hazard: Borrowers have incentive to default on loan

- Both forms of asymmetric information lead to defaults

- Separate the two:
- Randomize high and low credit offer

- To some (randomized) high-offer consumers, lower rate ex-post

- To some (randomized) high-offer consumers, offer incentives to keep good credit (can keep loan ex post if repay in time

Figure 1. Basic Intuition Behind the Experimental Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Contract Rate</th>
<th>Low Contract Rate with Dynamic Incentive</th>
<th>Low Contract Rate with No Dynamic Incentive</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Offer Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td>Repayment burden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Offer Rate</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Diagram showing different offer rates and contract rates with arrows indicating repayment burden and moral hazard.]
• **Timing:**

57,533 direct mail solicitations with randomly different offer interest rates sent out to former clients.

5,628 clients go to branch and apply for loan.

Client is offered r* (regardless of whether she brings in letter).

Loan officer makes credit and loan supply decisions based on "normal" interest rates, hence "blind" to experimental rates. 4,348 clients are approved.

Client offered loan at r* (contract rate). Borrower may revise size and maturity.

Contract finalized and client told whether rate is good for one year (D=1) or just one loan (D=0).

Client given short survey and then picks up cash.

Repayment behavior observed.

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• **Results:**

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**Figure 2: Operational Steps of Experiment**

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**Table 3. Identifying Adverse Selection, Repayment Burden, and Moral Hazard: Comparison of Means**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Selection Effects</th>
<th>Repayment Burden Effects</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Offer,</td>
<td>High Offer,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Contract,</td>
<td>Low Contract,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Full Sample</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average Monthly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proportion Past Due</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.082</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.006)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.101</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
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<tr>
<td># of observation</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>2087</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Substantial effect of incentives to keep good credit (moral hazard)

• Some effect of adverse selection

• Importance of field experiment: Can do controlled test of theory
5 Empirical Economics: Intro

- So far we have focused on economic theory

- What have we learnt (maybe)?

- Power of models

- Consumers. We tried to capture:
  - savings decisions (consumer today/consumer in future)
  - work-leisure trade-off (how much to work?)
  - attitudes toward risk (insurance, investment)
  - self-control problems (health club, retirement saving)
  - altruism (charitable contribution, volunteer work)
• Producers.

• Beauty of competitive markets:
  – price equals marginal costs
  – zero profit with entry into market
  – welfare optimality (no deadweight loss)

• Market power, the realistic scenario:
  – choice of price to maximize profits
  – single price or price discrimination
  – interaction between oligopolists
• But this is only half of economics!

• The other half is empirical economics

• Creative and careful use of data

• Get empirical answers to questions above (and other questions)

• Different methodologies $\rightarrow$ Econometrics 140-141 to get started
6 Next lecture

• Examples of Empirical Economics
  – Home insurance
  – Save More Tomorrow
  – Fox News