Tying Odysseus to the Mast:
Evidence from a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines[1]

Nava Ashraf	Dean S. Karlan	Wesley Yin
Harvard University	Princeton University	Princeton University
ashraf@fas.harvard.edu	dkarlan@princeton.edu	wyin@princeton.edu

May 6th, 2004

Abstract

We designed a commitment savings product for a Philippine bank and implemented it using a randomized control methodology. The savings product was intended for individuals who want to commit now to not have access to their savings, and who were sophisticated enough to engage in such a mechanism. We conducted a baseline survey on 1777 existing or former clients of a bank. Two weeks later, we offered the product to a randomly chosen subset of 710; 202 (28.4 percent) accepted the offer and opened the account. In the baseline survey, we asked hypothetical time discounting questions. Women who exhibited a lower discount rate for future relative to current tradeoffs, and hence potentially have a preference for commitment, were indeed more likely to open the commitment savings account. After six months, average savings balances at the partnering bank increased by 46 percent for the treatment group relative to the control group. Those who opened the account increased savings by 192 percent relative to the control group; but, only thirty-four percent of individuals continued using the account beyond the initial deposit.

1. Introduction

Although much has been written, little has been resolved concerning representation of preferences for consumption over time. Beginning with Strotz (1955) and Phelps and Pollak (1968), models have been put forth which predict individuals will exhibit more impatience for near-term tradeoffs than for future tradeoffs. These models often incorporate hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic preferences (Ainslie, 1992; Frederick et al., 2001; Laibson, 1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), or models of temptation (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2004, 2001). One implication is consistent across these models: individuals who engage in commitment devices will *ex-ante* improve their welfare. Hence, if individuals with time inconsistent preferences are sophisticated enough to know it, we should observe them engaging in various forms of commitment (much like Odysseus tying himself to the mast to avoid the tempting song of the sirens).

We conduct a field experiment to test whether individuals would open a savings account with a commitment feature (specifically, which restricts their access to the funds), but no other benefits. Second, we test whether such individuals save more as a result of opening the account. We also examine whether individuals who exhibit hyperbolicity in hypothetical time preference questions are more likely to open such accounts, since theoretically these individuals should have a preference for commitment.

We partnered with the Green Bank of Caraga, a small rural bank in Mindanao in the Philippines. First, we administered a household survey of 1,777 existing clients of the bank. We asked hypothetical time discounting questions in order to identify individuals as having hyperbolic preferences. We then randomly chose half of the clients and offered them a new account, called a "SEED" account. This account was a pure commitment savings product that restricted access to deposits as per the client's instructions upon opening the account, but did not

compensate the client for this restriction.[2] The other half of the surveyed individuals were

assigned to one of two groups: a control group which received no further contact; and a marketing

group which received a special marketing visit to encourage use of existing savings products only

(i.e., these individuals were encouraged to save more, but were not offered the new product in

order to do so).

We find after six months that average bank account savings increased by 48 percent in the

treatment group relative to the control group (ITT), and that those who opened the account

increased savings by 198 percent (TOT).[3] We find that individuals who exhibit hyperbolic

preferences were indeed more likely to take up our offer to open a commitment savings product.

Lastly, the product has several features to it, and we find that for the hyperbolic individuals, those

who choose the feature that generates a higher future incentive to deposit save more than those

who choose the weaker feature.[4]

These findings are significant for three reasons. They are the first field evidence that links

reversals on hypothetical time discount questions to a firm decision to engage in a commitment

device. A debate exists surrounding whether to interpret preference reversals in survey questions

on time discounting as evidence for (1) temptation models (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2004, 2001), (2)

hyperbolic discounting models (Laibson, 1997, 1996; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), (3) a non-

reversal model in which individuals discount differently between different absolute time periods

(i.e., the discount rate between two particular time periods t and period t+1 is different than t+1

and t+2, but do not change conditional on the which period is the "current" time period), (4)

higher uncertainty over future events relative to current events, or (5) simply noise and/or

superficial responses. Explanations (1) and (2) both suggest a preference for commitment,

---

[2] Clients received the same interest rate in the SEED account as in a regular savings account (4% per annum). This is
the nominal interest rate. The inflation rate as of Feb, 2004 is 3.4% per annum. Previous year's inflation was 3.1%.
[3] The average starting balance for clients within each of the three groups were: P477(Control), P487(Marketing),
P468(Treatment). These means are not significantly different from each other. Table 1 describes pre-intervention
means across treatment assignment.
[4] The product features were not randomized, so we cannot determine whether this feature was more effective because of
the selection of clients that opted for it or because of the actual incentive effect of the stronger feature.

whereas explanations (3), (4) and (5) do not. By showing a preference for commitment, we find support for both (or either) the temptation model and the hyperbolic discounting model.

Second, our findings bridge the gap between experimental economics and the real world. Traditionally, economics experiments are conducted in a laboratory where the environment is tightly controlled. Recent efforts have pushed many of the techniques of experimental economics to the field, through either conducting money games outside of university settings or including surveys of laboratory participants to correlate game behavior with personal characteristics, past experience, and demographics (Barr, 2003; Barr and Kinsey, 2002; Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Glaeser et al., 2000; Henrich et al., 2001). Yet few projects have extended this to behavior to real decisions (exceptions include Binswanger (1980), Karlan (2003) and Shapiro (2003)). In this paper, we establish strong links between answers to hypothetical time preference questions and real financial decisions.

Third, these findings have implications regarding the development of best savings practices for policymakers and financial institutions, specifically suggesting that product design influences both savings levels as well as the selection of clients that take-up a product. A natural question arises concerning why such commitment products have yet to be developed by individuals and/or firms. There is, in fact, substantial evidence that such commitment mechanisms actually do exist in the informal sector, but the institutional evolution of such devices is slow.[5] We examine this question in more detail later when we examine determinants of participating in informal savings groups. From a policy perspective, however, the mere fact that hyperbolic individuals did in fact take-up the product and save more suggests that whatever was previously available was not meeting the needs of these individuals. Furthermore, the partnering bank is now preparing for a larger launch of the commitment savings product in their other branches.

---

[5] In the U.S., Christmas Clubs were popular in the early 20th century because they committed individuals to a schedule of deposits and limited withdrawals. In more recent years, defined contribution plans, housing mortgages, and tax overwitholding now play this role for many people in developed economies (Laibson, 1997). In developing countries, many individuals use informal mechanisms such as rotating savings and credit organizations (roscas) in order to commit themselves to savings (Gugerty, 2001).

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the SEED Commitment Savings Product. Section 3 presents the literature on self control and time inconsistent discounting. Section 4 explains the experimental design employed as part of the larger project to assess the impact of this savings product. Section 5 describes the survey instrument used for the baseline survey. Section 6 presents the empirical strategy. Section 7 presents the empirical results for estimating the impact of the commitment product on financial institutional savings and Section 8 presents the empirical results for predicting take-up of the commitment product. Section 9 concludes.

2. SEED Commitment Savings Product Design

We designed and implemented a commitment savings product called a SEED[6] account with the Green Bank of Caraga, a small rural bank in Mindanao in the Philippines. The SEED account requires that clients commit to not withdraw funds that are in the account until they reach a goal date or amount, but does not explicitly commit the client to deposit funds after opening the account.

There are three critical design features, one regarding withdrawals and two regarding deposits. First, individuals had to restrict their rights to withdrawing funds until they reached a goal. Clients could restrict withdrawals until a specified month when large expenditures – for their business, school, Christmas purchases, or a particular celebration – were expected. Alternatively, clients could set a goal amount and only have access to the funds once that goal was reached (e.g., if a known quantity of money is needed for a new roof). The clients had complete flexibility to choose which of these restrictions they would like on their account; but once the decision was made it could not be changed, and they could not withdraw from the account until they met their chosen goal amount or date.[7] Of the 202 opened accounts, 140 opted

---

[6] "SEED" stands for Save, Earn, Enjoy Deposits.
[7] Exceptions are allowed for medical emergency, in which case a hospital bill is required, for death in the family, requiring a death certificate, or relocating outside the bank's geographic area, requiring documentation from the area government official. The clients who signed up for the SEED product signed a contract with the bank agreeing to these strict requirements. After six months of the project, no instances occurred of someone exercising these options. For

for a date-based goal and 62 opted for an amount-based goal. Of the 140 date-based goals, 113 were under one year, with 24 of them being just before Christmas. We conjecture that the amount-based goal is a stronger device, since there is an incentive to continue depositing after the initial deposit (because otherwise the money already deposited can never be accessed), whereas for the date-based goal there is no explicit incentive to continue depositing.[8]

In addition, all clients, regardless of the type of restriction they chose, were encouraged to set a specific savings goal as the purpose of their SEED savings account. This savings goal was written on the bank form for opening the account, as well as on a "Commitment Savings Certificate" that was given to them to keep. Table 1 reports a tabulation of the goals given. Forty-eight percent of clients reported wanting to save for a celebration, such as Christmas, birthdays, or fiestas.[9] Twenty-one percent of clients chose to save for tuition and education expenses, while a total of 20 percent of clients chose business and home investments as their specific goals.

On the deposit side, two optional design features were offered. First, a locked box (called a "ganansiya" box) was offered to each client in exchange for a small fee. This locked box is similar to a piggy bank: it has a small opening to deposit money and a lock to prevent the client from opening it. In our setup only the bank, and not the client, had a key to open the lock. Thus, in order to make a deposit, clients need to periodically bring the box to the bank. Out of the 202 clients who opened accounts, 167 opted for this box. This feature can be thought of as a mental account with a small physical barrier.

Second, we offered the option to automate transfers from a primary checking or savings account into the SEED account. This feature was not popular. Many clients reported not using

---

the amount-based goals, the money remains in the account until either the goal is reached or the funds withdrawn, or the funds are requested under an emergency.

[8] However, it should be noted that the amount-based commitment is not fool-proof. For instance, in the amount-based account, someone could borrow the remaining amount for five minutes from a moneylender in order to receive the current balance in the account. No anecdotal evidence suggests that this occurred.

[9] Fiestas are large local celebrations that happen at different dates during the year for each barangay in this region. Families are expected to host large parties, with substantial food, when it is their barangay's fiesta date. Families often pay for this annual party through loans from local high-interest rate money-lenders.

their checking or savings account regularly enough for this option to be meaningful. Out of the 202 clients, only 2 opted for automated transfers.

Lastly, the goal orientation of the accounts might inspire higher savings due to mental accounting (Shefrin and Thaler, 1988; Thaler, 1990, 1985). If this is so, it implies that the impact observed in this study comes in part from the labeling of the account for a specific purpose; the rules on the account would thus serve not only to provide commitment but also to create more mental segregation for this account.

Other than providing a possible commitment savings device, no further benefit accrued to individuals with this account. The interest rate paid on the SEED account was identical to the interest paid on a normal savings account (4 percent per annum).

3. Literature Review

Theories of temptation and hyperbolic discounting suggest that an individual may have a preference for commitment, specifically that an individual's current self may want to restrict the choice set available to the individual's future self. On the other hand, exponential discounting implies that preferences are time-consistent as long as they satisfy a stationarity property, and hence commitment devices would be welfare-reducing and not desired.

Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) provides a simple model that explains time inconsistency: consider an individual who is indifferent between adding x units of consumption at time t, and adding y ($y > x$) units of consumption at a later time, t', to a baseline level of consumption c. Therefore, $u(c + x)d^t + u(c)d^{t'} = u(c)d^t + u(c + y)d^{t'}$. After dividing through by d^t, the equation becomes $u(c + x) - u(c) = (u(c + y) - u(c))d^{t-t'}$. Exponential discounting implies that preferences between two consumption adjustments depend only on the constant discount factor d and the fixed interval (t-t') between time periods. However, a long literature suggests that many individuals suffer from a time inconsistency problem (Laibson, 1997; Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; Thaler, 1990, 1992). Specifically, a reversal implies that the inter-temporal discount rate d not only depends on the fixed difference in time periods (t-t'), but

also on the independent values of *t* and *t'* relative to the current time period. This is consistent with psychological experiments which suggest that preferences are roughly hyperbolic in shape, entailing a high discount rate in the immediate future, and a relatively lower rate between periods that are further away (Ainslie, 1992; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992).

Such reverals imply that commitment mechanisms can lead to welfare improvements (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2004, 2001; Laibson, 1996). By binding an individual to future actions or restricting individual choice in the future, one can overcome such time inconsistencies.

While the experimental literature provides many examples of hyperbolic-shaped preferences, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that individuals who are experimentally identified as having hyperbolic preferences desire commitment savings devices. Observational data provide suggestive, but not decisive, evidence. For example, evidence from analysis of portfolio allocation suggests that illiquid assets are held as a form of a commitment device; however, typically confounding effects such as differential returns make it difficult to conclude that such portfolio allocations are strictly about commitment.

The existing empirical literature has instead focused on the association between high implied discount rates and other non-savings related outcomes of interest, such as job searches and food stamp usage patterns (DellaVigna and Paserman, 2001; Shapiro, 2003)[10]. Angeletos *et al* (2001) provides empirical evidence for a hyperbolic discounting model using household level data on savings and assets from the US, and Morton and Oster (Morton and Oster, 2003) finds evidence from magazine subscription pricing data that individuals are willing to pay more to commit to

---

[10] DellaVigna and Paserman (2001) models job search in the presence of hyperbolic discounting, specifically examining the comparative static of impatience on search effort and demanded wages. For individuals with hyperbolic preferences, higher levels of impatience are associated with increased search efforts. For individuals with non-hyperbolic preferences, higher levels of impatience are associated with higher wage demands. Data showing that impatience is associated with longer job search suggest that a substantial percentage of the jobless have hyperbolic preferences. Shapiro (2003) finds a positive association between high present biased discounting (short-run impatience) and the propensity to run out of food stamp. Shapiro argues that responses to hypothetical inter-temporal questions imply discount factors that are implausibly out of range for an exponential discounting model, and thus identify quasi-hyperbolic preferences. Hence, preference reversals are inferred but not observed directly.

magazines which purport to offer higher future, relative to present, gains (e.g., investment rather than entertainment magazines).

On a theoretical level, several studies argue that the standard laboratory preference questions (whether hypothetical or real) cannot in fact identify hyperbolic preferences, and instead put forth competing hypothesis that explain these observed reversals.[11] For instance, Fernandez-Villaverde and Mukherji (2002) argues that relative to an immediate reward, uncertainty in future rewards will lead individuals to choose the immediate reward. Read (2001) argues that preference reversals4 may be the outcome of subadditive discounting, where the amount of discounting over an interval increases as the interval is more finely partitioned. Rubinstein (2003) argues that similarity relations can be exploited by the framing used in questions, and that these relations can deliver the observed preference reversals.

Each of these theories provide an alternative explanation for observed preference reversals. However, they do not imply that time preference reversals should be correlated with a preference for commitment. We will show findings to the contrary – that reversal of time preferences, specifically hyperbolic preferences, does indeed predict take up of a commitment savings product.

Lastly, another body of literature addresses take-up of commitment savings mechanisms for intra-household allocation, not self control, reasons. Anderson and Baland (2002) argues that Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) provide a forced savings mechanism that a woman can impose on her household; if men have a greater preference than women for present consumption (or steal from their wives), women are better off saving in a ROSCA than at home. They motivate their study with the observation that ROSCAs are predominantly filled with women, and that, in their sample of 520 households from 385 ROSCAs in the Kibera district of Nairobi, married women are much more likely than single women to participate. In addition, working women are more likely than non-working women to participate and working women

---

[11] For a thorough literature review of these issues, see Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2001).

living in a couple have the highest likelihood of participation. They find that women's bargaining power in the household, proxied by the fraction of household income that she brings in, predicts ROSCA participation through an inverted u-relationship.

In contrast, Gugerty (2001) uses a different sample, one from western Kenyan that contains 70 ROSCAs with 1066 ROSCA members, and finds that married women appear no more likely to participate in ROSCAs than unmarried women or women who are household heads. While women participate in ROSCAs at higher rates than men on average, those with a salaried income are no more likely to participate than women without a regular source of income. Among married women, those whose husbands live at home are no more likely to participate in ROSCAs, providing evidence against the intra-household conflict hypothesis.

The closest field study to the one in this paper is Benartzi and Thaler's Save More Tomorrow Plan (SMarT)(Benartzi and Thaler, 2004). This plan offered individuals in the United States an option to commit (albeit a non-binding commitment) to allocate a portion of future wage increases towards their retirements savings plan. When the future wage increase occurs, these individuals typically leave their commitment intact and start saving more: savings increased from 3.5 percent of income to 13.6 percent over 40 months for those in the plan. Individuals who do not participate in SMaRT do not save more (or as much more) when their wage increases occur. Our project complements the SMarT study in that we also use lessons from behavioral economics and psychology to design a savings product. Aside from the product differences, our methodology differs from SMarT in two ways: (1) we introduce the product as part of a randomized control experiment in order to account for unobserved determinants of participation in the savings program, and (2) we conduct a baseline household survey in order to understand more about the characteristics of those who take-up such products; specifically, we link hyperbolic preferences to a preference for commitment.

4. <u>Experimental Design</u>

The SEED product was implemented under a randomized control experiment to evaluate its impact on the level of savings. Our sample consists of 4001 adult Green Bank clients who have savings accounts in one of two bank branches in the greater Butuan City area, and who have identifiable addresses. We then randomly assigned these 4001 individuals to three groups: commitment-treatment (T), marketing-treatment (M), and control (C) groups. One-half the sample was randomly assigned to T, and a quarter of the sample each were randomly assigned to M and C groups[12]. We verified that the three groups were not statistically significantly different in terms of preexisting financial and demographic data.

We then performed a second randomization to select clients to interview for our baseline household survey. 3154 of the 4001 individuals were chosen randomly to be surveyed. 1777 of the 3154 were found by the survey team and a survey was completed. We test whether the observable covariates of *surveyed* clients are statistically identical across treatment groups. The top half of Table 2 (A) shows the means and standard errors for the seven variables[13] that were explicitly verified to be equal after the randomization was conducted, but before the study began, for clients who completed the survey. The right column gives the p-value for the F-test for equality of means across assignment. The bottom half of Table 2 (B) shows summary statistics for several of the demographic and key survey variables of interest from the *post*-randomization survey (i.e., not available at the time of the randomization, but verified *ex-post* to be similar across treatments and control groups). Of the individuals not found for the survey, the majority had moved (i.e., the surveyor went to the location of the home and found nobody by that name). This introduces a bias in the sample selection towards individuals who did not relocate recently.

---

[12] Using a computer program, each individual was assigned a random number drawn from a uniform distribution between zero and one. Individuals with a number between 0 and 0.25 were assigned to the control group; those between 0.25 and 0.50 were assigned to the marketing-treatment group; and those above 0.50 were assigned to the commitment-treatment group.

[13] These seven variables are client savings balance, active account, distance to branch, bank penetration in barangay of client, mean bank balance of barangay, standard deviation of bank balance in barangay, and barangay population.

See Appendix Table 1 for an analysis of the observable differences between those who were and were not surveyed.

Next, we trained a team of marketers hired by the cooperating bank to go to the homes and/or businesses of the clients in the commitment-treatment group, to stress the importance of savings to them – a process which included eliciting the clients' motivations for savings and emphasizing to the client that even small amounts of saving make a difference – and then to offer them the SEED product. We were concerned, however, that this special (and unusual) house visit might in and of itself inspire higher savings. To address this concern, we created a second treatment, the "marketing" treatment. We used the same exact script for both the commitment treatment group and the marketing-treatment groups, up to the point when the client was offered the SEED savings account. For instance, members of both groups were asked to set specific savings goals for themselves, write those savings goals into a specific "encouragement" savings certificate, and talk with the marketers about how to reach those goals. However, members of the marketing treatment group were not offered (nor allowed to take-up) the SEED account. If control or marketing-treatment group members asked to open a SEED account, bank staff were trained to address their concerns through a "lottery" explanation: clients were chosen at random, through the lottery, for a special trial period of the product, after which time it would be available for all bank clients. This happened on fewer than ten occurrences as reported to us by the Green Bank, and in one instance an individual in the control group did open a SEED account.[14]

5. **Survey Data**

The survey data serve two purposes. First, they allow us to understand the determinants of take-up of the commitment savings product. Second, they serve as a baseline instrument for a later impact study. We want to know whether the observed impacts to financial savings at the bank (as found here) are in fact the result of a net increase in household savings, or whether they

---

[14] This individual is a family member of the owners of the bank and hence was erroneously included in the study. Due to this family connection, the individual was dropped from the all analysis and summary statistics.

are just a result of the household substituting savings from other instruments to the SEED account. The later impact study will focus on household savings data collected in a follow-up survey to the baseline instrument in order to examine the impact of the commitment product on aggregate household and enterprise savings.

Determinants of Take-up

The primary variable of interest for the current analysis is a measure of time-preference. As is common in the related literature, we measure time preferences by asking individuals to choose between receiving a smaller reward immediately and receiving a larger reward with some delay (Benzion et al., 1989; Shelley, 1993; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). The same question is then asked at a further time frame (but with the same rewards) in an attempt to identify time-preference reversals. Sample questions are as follows:

1) Would you prefer to receive P200[15] guaranteed today, or P300 guaranteed in 1 month?

2) Would you prefer to receive P200 guaranteed in 6 months, or P300 guaranteed in 7 months?[16]

We call the first question the "near-term" frame; and call the second question the "distant" frame choice. We interpret the choice of the immediate reward in ether of the frames as "impatient." We interpret the choice of the immediate reward in the near-term frame combined with the choice of the delayed reward in the distance frame as "hyperbolic," since the implied discount rate in the near-term frame is higher than that of the distant frame. We also identify inconsistencies the other direction, where individuals are patient *now* but in six months are *not* willing to wait. For lack of a simple term, we refer to these as individuals as "patient now and impatient later." One explanation for such a reversal is that an individual is flush with cash now, but foresees being liquidity constrained in six months. Table 3 describes the cell densities for each of these categories.

---

[15] The exchange rate is P50 to the US$, and the median household annual income of those in our sample is US$2,400.
[16] The two frames, now versus one month and six months versus seven months, were asked roughly 10-15 minutes apart in the survey in order to avoid individuals answering consistently merely for the sake of being consistent, and not proactively considering the question anew.

We also include similar questions for rice (a pure consumption good), and for ice cream (a superior good which is easily consumed – an ideal candidate for temptation). Although money is fungible, we wanted to test whether the context of these questions influences the prevalence and predictive power of hyperbolicity.

Baseline Demographic and Economic Questions

The survey included extensive demographic and household economic questions. These questions allow us to examine further the determinants of take-up of the SEED product, as well as the determinants of engaging in other informal savings organizations, similar to Anderson and Baland (2002). Data were collected on aggregate savings levels (fixed household assets, financial assets, business assets and agricultural assets), levels and seasonality of income and expenditures, employment, ability to cope with negative shocks, remittances, participation in informal savings organizations, and access to credit.

6. Empirical Analysis

The two main outcome variables of interest are take-up of the commitment savings product (D) and savings at the financial institution (S). Financial savings held at the Green Bank refers to both savings in the SEED account and/or one of their other accounts. Hence, we can examine crowd-out to other savings vehicles at the bank. If the SEED account caused individuals to shift from one financial savings instrument to another, then there is no implication to aggregate savings.[17]

We analyze the take-up of the savings products for the individuals randomly assigned to the treatment group. Let D be an indicator variable for take-up of the commitment savings product. Let Z_{T1} be an indicator variable for assignment to treatment group T1 – the commitment product

---

[17] After further data collection, we plan to examine potential crowd-out of other perhaps informal savings. Regardless, even if perfect crowd-out exists to informal savings, this would be a net welfare gain as long as the bank savings had a higher return and/or was more secure. Admittedly, this would not incorporate any social capital benefits that may accrue from some forms of informal savings organizations.

treatment group. Let Z_{T2} be an indicator variable for assignment to treatment group T2 – the marketing treatment group.

We compute the percentage of the commitment treatment group that takes-up the product as a_{T1} (for use later in computing the Treatment on the Treated effect). Then, in equation 1, we examine the predictors of take-up. We use a probit model to analyze the decision to take-up the SEED product:

(1) $D_i = \gamma X_i + \mu_i$,

where X is a vector of demographic and other survey responses, and μ_i is an error term for individual i.

The primary characteristic of interest is reversal of the time preference questions. For each category of money, rice and ice cream, we code an individual as hyperbolic if they wanted immediate rewards in the short term, but were willing to wait for the higher amount in the long term. Another variable of interest is "impatience." We classify an individual as impatient if the smaller rewards are consistently taken over larger delayed rewards.

We also measure the impact of the intervention on savings. The dependent variable is *S*, the change in total deposit account balances at financial institution. We estimate the following equation on the full sample of surveyed clients:

(2) $S_i = \beta_{T1} Z_{T1,i} + \beta_{T2} Z_{T2,i} + e_i$

β_{T1} provides an estimate for the ITT effect - an average of the causal effects of receiving encouragement to take up a regular savings product for those who take up the treatment and those who do not. Given that the control group will have the same access to banking services as the treatment groups, β_{T2} will capture the marketing effect of the experiment. Then, since the estimate of β_{T2} gives the base effect of being encouraged to use a standard savings product, $\beta_{T1} - \beta_{T2}$ gives an estimate of the differential impact of a savings product with a commitment mechanism.

In order to calculate the effect of treatment on the treated (TOT) effect in equation 2, we use assignment to commitment-treatment as an instrumental variable for take-up of the SEED product. This requires that several assumptions be satisfied, in particular that the effects on savings of treatment is unaffected by treatment assignment except through the product itself. The experimental process itself feasibly could encourage savings through its own mechanism, since offering any kind of savings product to a population could plausibly get them to start thinking about savings on their own. Hence, the experiment potentially could violate the exclusion restriction for using the random assignment as an instrument. We examine this issue using the marketing-treatment group. If $\beta_{T2}=0$ from (2), then it is plausible that the encouragement to take up a savings product has no direct effect on savings (and also no indirect effect, as taking up the regular savings product did not effect savings); because the encouragement to take up a savings product with a commitment mechanism should not prompt savings directly any more than the encouragement to take up a regular savings product, we could conclude that encouragement to treat would be a valid instrument for treatment. As explained in the empirical results section below, we do not find any statistically significant effect of the marketing-treatment condition on savings balances. Furthermore, after accounting for two outliers in the marketing-treatment group, the point estimates on the marketing effect are close to zero relative to the control group. We thus conclude that the encouragement to treat did not directly affect savings balances. With this conclusion, and with the additional fact that treatment group assignment is random and that control group members are prohibited from using the commitment products, we calculate the Treatment on the Treated effect TOT using β_{T1}/a_{T1}, or ITT divided by the proportion receiving the commitment-treatment.[18]

---

[18] The insignificant estimate of the marketing-treatment coefficient merely suggests that SEED marketing affected savings through take-up of the SEED product alone. Based on this estimate, we cannot argue that the exclusion restriction holds for certain; we argue only that the effects of marketing are not statistically measurable in this intervention, and that any indirect affects of marketing are orders of magnitude smaller than the direct effect. Furthermore, the encouragement to save is not identical to the SEED marketing, and it may be that the coefficient on the encouragement treatment indicator does not provide a perfect measure of the independent effect of SEED marketing. It is not clear that an "ideal" marketing treatment group that receives SEED marketing – but are barred

We further examine the correlates of savings changes. ? is a vector of coefficients that allows us to understand the relationship between various personal characteristics and changes in institutional balances:

(3) $S_i = \beta_{T1}Z_{T1,i} + \beta_{T2}Z_{T2,i} + \gamma X_i + \phi(X_iZ_{T1,i}) + e_i$

ϕ in equation 3 estimates heterogeneous treatment effects. Covariates (X_i) are interacted with commitment-treatment assignment to estimate whether being offered the commitment product has larger impact on savings for certain types of individuals.

The Treatment on the Treated effect provides us with an estimate of the average treatment effect on those who take up the product. Heterogeneous treatment effects suggest that this interpretation cannot and should not be broadened to include the effect on those who do not take up the product. Hence, the results should not be used to predict, for example, the consequence of a state-mandated pension program.[19] It can, however, be used to project the impact of a savings program where participation is voluntary.

7. Empirical Results: Impact of the SEED Product on Financial Savings

In the sub-sections that follow, we present results from the experimental control design on the impact of the savings product on financial savings held at the financial institution (both in the SEED account and in other accounts). We focus on the change in total balances held in the financial institution (which includes the SEED and the preexisting "normal" savings account) from before the intervention to six months after the intervention began. Clients who took up the SEED account may have had different withdrawal dates for their accounts; however, we use the

---

from taking-up SEED – would serve as a legitimate test of the exclusion restriction for reasons of spite, resentment, etc. The TOT estimates are therefore interpreted as approximations of the isolated impact of voluntary SEED take-up.
[19] The presence of heterogeneous treatment effects may imply that we cannot interpret the treatment effect we observe as entirely due to the treatment; it may be that the type of individuals who respond to the encouragement for a commitment savings product are different from those who respond to the encouragement for a regular savings product. Thus the difference we observe in their outcomes is due more to the difference in types of individuals that take-up the two products than to the difference in treatment. Regardless, this does not imply that the commitment product is not effective relative to a normal savings product; rather it suggests that financial institutions should offer both a commitment product and a normal savings product to clients in order to attract both types of clients. In the empirical section, we test for heterogeneous treatment effects across different observable characteristics but do not find any significant differences in outcomes.

same timing for evaluating the impact on all subjects: all pre-intervention data is from June, 2003 and post-intervention data is taken at Jan, 2004.

The impact analysis takes on several steps. Section 7.1 presents descriptive results of the accounts opened under this program. Section 7.2 highlights the distribution of changes in savings balances that occurred during the intervention across treatment, marketing and control. Section 7.3 through 7.5 show the impact both using Intent to Treat and Treatment on the Treated specifications, and using both change in savings balance as well as percent increase as the outcome measure. We find significant impacts, both economically and statistically. Section 7.6 examines outlier issues, specifically performing various robustness checks on a truncated sample. Section 7.7 examines impact conditional on different demographics and behavioral variables. Section 7.8 examines crowd-out to other savings held at the financial institution. Lastly, Section 7.9 examines whether certain features of the SEED product are correlated with higher or lower usage.

7.1 Seed Account Savings

202 SEED accounts were opened. Figure 1 shows the distribution of SEED account balances. About a third of the clients have deposited money into their SEED account since the initial opening deposit. Sixty percent of all accounts are at P100, the minimum opening deposit. Formerly dormant clients typically continued to not use their accounts: they opened a SEED account by making an initial deposit then made no further deposits in any account held at the financial institution. Among formerly dormant clients with SEED accounts, 25 reached their date-based goals yet did not withdraw their savings, even when approached through home visits by bank representatives who reminded them that their goal had been met. 16 other SEED clients reached their goal dates or goal amounts. Eleven of these clients withdrew their savings, but did not close their accounts, opting instead to roll over their account and set a new goal for which to continue saving. Three clients did not withdraw their money when their goal was reached, but instead committed themselves to higher goal amounts or a further away date. Time deposits pay

higher interest, so these clients are forgoing higher interest rates that could accrue for their now-large balances (some up to 10,000 pesos) in order to retain their savings in the SEED account[20].

7.2 Distributional Differences over Changes in Savings Balances

Recall that the randomization procedure verified that means of pre-intervention bank savings were the same across treatments and control groups. In theory, we could analyze the product-impact using post-intervention savings levels as our outcome of interest. However, using change in total balance as our outcome measure allows for a more precise estimate of the impact of the program. Figure 2a shows the distribution of changes in savings balances for each of the three experimental groups. Because treatment was randomly assigned, we can infer from this graph that the distribution of changes in savings was significantly shifted towards the upper deciles. Figure 2b distinguishes between those who were offered the product and took it up, and those were offered but did not take it up. Clients in the latter group, labeled "non-SEED Treatment" group, appear to have increased savings in line with clients in the control and marketing-treatment groups. In contrast, the savings behavior of clients in the commitment-treatment group who took-up SEED looks very different, suggesting that the effect of treatment indeed came from the product itself, rather than from simply being offered the product. These effects are confirmed in the point estimates on marketing and treatment assignment in the subsequent sections, and further support using treatment assignment as an instrument for treatment in the treatment on the treated analysis.

7.3 Intent to Treat Effect

Estimates for β_{T1} in equation 2 can be interpreted as the average savings *increase* from being offered the commitment product. This is also the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect. Likewise, the β_{T2} coefficient estimate can be taken as the average savings increase of clients who were randomly

---

[20] At Green Bank, time deposits begin at amounts of 10,000-49,999, which earn an interest rate of 4.5% if deposited for 30 days- 4.8% if the time deposit is for 360 days.

chosen to receive marketing of standard savings products. The difference between the two coefficients ($\beta_{T1} - \beta_{T2}$) can be interpreted as the differential effect of being offered a savings product with the commitment features.

The coefficient on assignment to the commitment treatment group, β_{T1}, is positive but significant only at the 90-percent level for full sample (Table 4, Panel A, Column 1). The marketing effect is insignificant. The estimate for $\beta_{T1} - \beta_{T2}$ is positive but it is also statistically indistinguishable from zero. This regression includes outliers with high wealth, which reduces the precision of our estimates. Two outliers in particular drive the results for the marketing group; removing these two outliers brings the point estimate for the marketing close to zero. Therefore, we repeat the regression for previous sample of clients, but truncate the sample by deleting the clients with the top ten highest changes in total bank balance, which represent 0.56% of our sample. Appendix Table 6 lists the top 30 values for the outcome variable; there is a clear break point with 10 observations being far above the remaining. After removing these ten clients (five commitment-treatment, three marketing-treatment, and two control clients), the coefficient on treatment assignment remains positive, although as expected it decreases from 234.7 in the full sample to 164.3 in the truncated, and is significant at the 99th percent confidence level (Table 4, Panel A, Column 2). This coefficient represents the Intent to Treat effect and is equivalent to 20.1 percent of pre-intervention institutional savings, or 0.68 percent of total household monthly income. Table 4, Panel A, Columns 3 and 4 show the analysis for only marketing and treatment groups, using the marketing group as the base control group for our commitment-treatment group. The statistically insignificant effect found in Column 3 for the full sample is driven entirely by outliers: dropping the top ten observations from the full sample yields a positive coefficient of 105.7, statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level.[21] The negative intercept in almost

---

[21] The regressions in Table 4 are repeated while controlling for a host of demographic and financial variables. The qualitative results change little controlling for these variables. Table X in the appendix show results of these regression specifications.

every regression reveals the general level of dissavings for control clients over the course of the intervention.[22]

Appendix Table 5 examines the consequence of dropping the top 10 outliers from the analysis. Columns (1) and (2) show the ITT analysis on the full sample and on the truncated sample with the top 10 outliers deleted. Moving from column (3) to column (8), each regression progressively removes the client in the commitment-treatment group with the next highest increase in savings balances. If outliers in the commitment-treatment group are generating the positive and significant ITT estimates, then regressions (3) through (8) should show a marked drop in the point estimate for the treatment effect. Instead, the ITT estimates drop gradually as clients in the commitment-treatment group are dropped from the regression. This gives informal assurance that the ITT estimates from the analysis on the truncated sample is not being influenced by observations at the extreme tails of the distribution of balance changes.

A second method to limit the influence of savings outliers in the sample is to treat savings changes above a certain percentage threshold as a binary outcome variable. We construct indicator variables for whether a client achieved a positive a savings increase exceeding some cutoff percentage. These indicator variables are regressed on treatment assignment dummies as before to get the treatment effect on the probability of increasing savings in excess of some percentage. This enables a substantial increases in savings by a wealthy individual to be muted in two ways: first, an outlier in the distribution of percentage savings increase would be no different than a client with a savings increase slightly higher than a given cutoff level would from the perspective of a binary dependent regression; second, the absolute magnitude of the savings increase is normalized by her initial savings level.

Table 4, Columns 5-8 report the outcomes of ordinary least squares regressions for cutoffs in savings changes of greater than 0 percent and greater than 20 percent. The treatment effect is significant and precisely estimated in every specification, and can be interpreted as the additional

---

[22] Given the timing of the analysis, this is perhaps due to expenditures for the Christmas season.

probability that a client randomly assigned into the treatment group will save more than the cutoff percentage: the coefficient on commitment-treatment in Column 5 can be interpreted as the impact of treatment relative to the control clients, and that in Column 6 as the impact of treatment relative to marketing group clients. Both results demonstrate positive and significant impact. For instance, Column 7 tells us that a client offered our commitment product will be 12.7 percentage points more likely to increase have their savings by 20% or more after 6 months of the intervention. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients on assignment into the marketing group are insignificant in every specification, compared to the control group. This is consistent with the statistically insignificant marketing effects estimated in the previous specifications, and suggests that the impact of the commitment product came from the product itself, and not from the door-to-door marketing.

7.4 Treatment on the Treated Effect

Two conditions must hold for the treatment assignment to be a valid instrument for take-up of the seed commitment product. First, the assignment must be correlated to take-up of the seed product. By experimental design and internal bank operating controls, this is so. No marketing or control individuals were permitted to open the SEED product. Among clients offered the commitment product, 27.6 percent opened an account. Second, the treatment assignment must satisfy the exclusion restriction. That is, offering the commitment product cannot have an effect on savings except through take-up of the product. The ITT regressions support that the exclusion restriction holds.[23] In every regression in Table 4, Panel A, the estimate on β_{T2} is insignificant statistically.[24] Although the coefficient in Column 1 is close to the point estimate of β_{T2}, this

---

[23] Although as discussed earlier, we cannot rule out the possibility that the offering of the SEED product had a differential effect than the marketing treatment, despite the similarity in the scripts of the door-to-door marketing.
[24] For the significance of β_{T2} to be a legitimate test of the exclusion restriction, we assume that there is no direct interaction effect between the treatment assignment and marketing on savings (i.e. we assume that the effect marketing the commitment product is captured by the marketing of the standard savings product). If, on the other hand, the offering of the product itself (over and beyond the marketing provided to the marketing group) has a direct treatment effect even for those who do not take-up, then the insignificance of β_{T2} does not guarantee that the exclusion restriction holds. The interaction effect on savings between marketing and treatment assignment would not be captured by β_{T2}, and the Treatment on the Treated estimates would be invalid.

results is driven by two outliers (see Appendix Table 6) and the other specifications support more strongly the claim that there was no marketing effect.

Estimates for the treatment on the treated effect (TOT) are reported in Table 4, Panel B. They are calculated by regressing balance changes on take-up of the commitment product, instrumented with treatment assignment. The sample restrictions mimic those in the ITT regressions in Panel A. The TOT effect is equivalent to the ITT divided by the probability of take-up among those offered the product. In every specification, the TOT is roughly four times the magnitude of the average ITT effect.

7.5. Quantile Treatment Effects

Estimating quantile treatment effects allows us to see impact across the distribution, and also avoids drawing misleading conclusions from outliers. Table 5 shows regressions for both deciles and quintiles of the distribution. The estimated treatment effect at the xth percentile may be interpreted as the difference in balance changes between two clients – one in the treatment group, the other in the control group – both positioned at the xth percentile of the distribution of balance changes, conditional on her group. Column (1) of Table 5 shows the quantile treatment effects at every decile breakpoint, and compares commitment- and marketing-treatment savings behavior to the control group. Column (2) restricts the sample to only those clients in the commitment- and marketing-treatment groups so that the savings changes of clients in the commitment-treatment group can be directly compared against those in the marketing-treatment group. Columns (3) and (4) repeat these quantile regression, but for quintiles. They reveal that the majority of changes in the impact are happening at the top two quantiles. The decile regressions allow us to understand these treatment effects more finely: the largest treatment effects are for the 30th and 40th percentiles, and then for the 80th and 90th percentiles. The 90th percentile shows the largest treatment effect, at 403 pesos.

7.6 Further Examination of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Next we examine the demographic characteristics that correlate with increased savings resulting from the treatment assignment. We repeat the regressions from Table 4, Panel A, but interact the treatment indicator variable with one demographic variable. The demographic variables include the following indicator variables: sex, has attended some post secondary education, shows present-biased preferences when asked hypothetical time preference questions, and shows impatience in the hypothetical questions. These are the demographic variables that have, to some extent, shown to be correlated with up-take of the commitment product (analysis of take-up shown in Section 8). We are also interested in the impact of previously being an active client on changes in balances. We define active as a binary variable for transacting on a non-SEED deposit account in the past six months.

The coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant for all variables. This suggests that, within the treatment group, the average effect of the treatment assignment is working fairly uniformly across these characteristics. The clients who were active clients prior to the intervention have a much higher change in savings balances, at a coefficient of 747.6, but there is no differentially larger effect for the Active clients who opened a SEED account[25].

We would also like to understand the effect of the treatment on encouraging formerly dormant account holders to become more active depositors. If dormancy is mainly due to a combination of time-inconsistent preferences and high transaction costs of making deposits (e.g. travel costs), then we may expect to find a treatment effect through use of the home-use lock-box. On the other hand, if dormancy is an outcome of a lack of interest in formal savings institutions, or forgetfulness of past deposits, then we may expect to find a marketing effect. Appendix Table 3 reports the commitment product and marketing treatment effects on likelihood to activate a dormant client. The dependent variable in column 1 is a binary variable for transacting on a non-SEED deposit account in the past two months. The binary variable is redefined for past-two

---

[25] Appendix Table 2 runs these same specifications for only the Commitment Treatment and Marketing Treatment groups and shows no difference in effect.

through past-six months, and for past-year – the definition we use for dormancy. In every regression, neither the treatment nor marketing effect is remotely significant.

7.8 *Shifting Assets vs. Generating New Savings*

To test whether the SEED account balances represent new savings, or whether they represent shifting of assets between accounts held at the institution, we define a new outcome variable: change in balance in all non-SEED savings accounts. This is the change in savings in their normal savings account over the six months since the experiment began. We regress non-SEED change in balance on the indicators for the treatment groups. We then compare the coefficient estimates against the ITT coefficient estimates. Perfect crowd-out (shifting) of SEED savings occurs when increases in total savings can be accounted for by declines in non-SEED balances for the clients in the commitment treatment group. That is, when there is perfect crowd-out, the coefficient on the commitment treatment indicator in the non-SEED change in balance regression will be the negative of commitment ITT estimate. If all SEED savings lead to new institutional savings, then the coefficient in this regression will be zero. In general, the sum of the commitment treatment coefficient estimate in the non-SEED change in balance equation and the commitment ITT estimate yields the net effect of the SEED account. We use "net" because the regressions cannot separately identify the crowd-out effect and the externality on behavior that the SEED account may have on non-SEED account savings.

Table 7 reports the results of this regression. Column 1 reports the regression of non-SEED change in balance on treatment indicators. The estimated coefficient on the both treatment indicators is positive but insignificant. Column 2 shows the ITT regression from Table 4 as a comparison. The net crowd-out is essentially zero, implying that on average, SEED balances were created out of new savings. If anything, the positive but insignificant treatment effect on non-seed savings suggests potential positive externalities from opening the SEED account. The crowd-out effect is insignificant for active and formerly dormant clients as well.

7.9 Determinants of SEED Balance: Commitment Features

We attempt to shed light on the mechanism by which the SEED account is, in practice, generating new savings. First, we test whether particular features of the commitment product are a determinant of SEED balance. Recall that features of a SEED account are determined by the clients themselves. Thus, we do not interpret these results as causal from that particular feature. Rather, features that predict SEED balance can be interpreted as a proxy for underlying heterogeneity that may be of interest to economists. For amount-based goals, there is a stronger incentive to deposit after the initial deposit (in order to get to the goal and get the balance out) than for date-based goals (for which the balance can be withdrawn once the date is reached). If this conjecture is right, then we should see amount-based accounts being used more by those who are hyperbolic, and we do. We also conjecture that those clients who choose investment-type goals, such as education or raising business capital, may be more likely to save more than those who choose consumption-type goals, such as parties and celebrations. We do not find evidence for this conjecture.

Table 8 reports regression results where SEED balance is the outcome variable, and characteristics of the commitment product are the regressors, including whether the client choose a date based or amount based goal, whether the client choose an investment-type or consumption-type specific savings objective, and whether the client was previously active or not. Note that only two regressors pertaining to the commitment product have significant coefficient estimates: the constant, and the indicator of being an active client prior to the experiment. These variables are also interacted with whether the client exhibited time inconsistency in the baseline survey. Just as theory predicts, the interaction of having time inconsistent preferences and having an amount-based commitment savings device is positive, large at P792, and statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level. Although we cannot disentangle this effect from a selection story, because this feature was not randomized, it is suggestive evidence that the amount-based feature yields larger increases in savings balances.

8. Empirical Results: Takeup

If commitment devices are effective in increasing savings, as our results seem to suggest, it is important to understand the type of person that demands such commitment mechanisms. In this section, we analyze determinants of the adoption of commitment savings mechanisms through four subsections. First, we examine the predictors of responses to the time discounting questions. Second, we examine predictors of taking up the SEED commitment savings product, with particular focus on the ability of the time discounting questions (and specifically preference reversals) to predict this decision. Third, we use our data on informal savings behavior, such as ROSCAs, to revisit important questions about the motivations for participation in such institutions, particularly to the extent that such informal devices are construed as commitment mechanisms themselves. Fourth, we discuss alternative explanations for reversals of the time preference questions and present evidence on these explanations.

8.1 Determinants of Time Preferences

Theoretical predictions we reviewed in the beginning of this paper suggested that time preference would be a significant predictor of demand for a commitment device. Before turning to the predictive ability of time preference characteristics, we first examine the determinants of different time preference responses by all individuals surveyed. Three characteristics are identified: impatience, present-biased time inconsistency (hyperbolicity), and future-biased time inconsistency (referred to herein as "Patient Now and Impatient Later"). We create three variables for each of these traits, with reference to money, rice and ice cream[26]. Table 3 shows the tabulations of the responses to these questions. In the next section, we will discuss alternative explanations (other than hyperbolicity) for response reversals. For now, we will refer to this reversal as "hyperbolic."

Table 9 shows that few observable characteristics predict this time inconsistency. For the specification which includes both males and females, the only statistifcally significant result is

---

[26] Appendix Table 2 shows the correlations across these different time preference responses.

that those who are less satisfied with their current savings habits are more likely to be hyperbolic (see Column 1). This result is driven by females as indicated by Columns 2 and 3. For females, the more educated also are more likely to be time inconsistent with respect to money. The point estimate is similar with respect to rice and ice cream, but is not statistically significant. For males, no independent variables predict time inconsistency (regardless of whether the frame is money, rice or ice cream) with statistical significance.[27]

Table 10 shows the determinants of impatience. With respect to money, we find that women are more patient than men (more true for tradeoffs between 6 and 7 months), that married individuals are less patient than single individuals, that education is uncorrelated with impatience, and that members of households with higher incomes are less impatient. In general, we find similarly signed results for the three frames of money, rice and ice cream. One intuitive result is that those who report having skipped meals in the past month are radically more impatient with respect to rice (coefficient of 0.371, significant at 90 percent). The similar result for money and ice cream is positive, but not significant statistically.

Lastly, we examine the determinants of being patient now but impatient later (i.e., the opposite and less intuitive reversal of time preferences). We suggest three explanations for this reversal: noise in survey response, inability to understand the survey question; and the timing of a respondent's expected cash flows. If noise is the explanation, then no covariate should predict response of this type. We more or less find this to be the case. Twice as many individuals reversed in the "hyperbolic" direction than in this direction (see Table 3). This suggests that the reversal measures also include some noise. If this is the case, then attenuation bias will cause our estimates of the effect of time inconsistency on take-up of the SEED product (see next section) to

---

[27] The same regressions were also performed on the sub-sample of individuals who exhibited "impatience" with respect to money, rice, or ice cream. Coefficient estimates for these regressions are not shown; however, they are statistically identical to the estimates in Table 3. Furthermore, the every covariate remains statistically the same between the full sample and sub-sample regressions. The variable for impatience cannot be directly included in the regressions shown in Table 3 without downwardly biasing every coefficient in the regressions. This is because conditional on not being impatient for one of the three items, a respondent cannot be hyperbolic, and no covariate will predict hyperbolicity in that case.

be biased downward. Inability to understand the question may be driving these responses; if education makes individuals more able to grasp hypothetical questions and answer them in a consistent fashion, then education should negatively predict this reversal. We find no such statistically significant relationship. Lastly, we examine a simple cash flow story. In the survey, we ask the individuals what months are high and low income months. For females (but not males), individuals who report being in a high income month now but low income month in six months are in fact more likely to demonstrate the patient now, impatient later reversal.[28]

Since little else predicts this particular reversal (see Table 11), we believe that reversals in this direction represent mostly noise. Furthermore, as we will show later, these reversals do not predict real behavior, such as taking up the SEED product, like the hyperbolic reversals do. If this reversal was in fact about being flush with cash now, then one might be more likely to save now in order to be ready for the low income months later.

8.2 Predicting Take-up of a Commitment Savings Product

Next we analyze the take-up of the savings products for the individuals randomly assigned to the commitment-treatment group. Table 12 and Table 13 show the determinants of take-up. We find that those who are time inconsistent (impatient now, but patient for future tradeoffs) are in fact more likely to take-up the SEED product. Little else predicts take-up of the product. Table 12 Columns 1, 2 and 3 show the results using simple OLS for the entire sample, women and men, respectively. The time preference questions allow us to categorize individuals into one of three categories, Most Impatient, Middle Impatient and Least Impatient. The omitted indicator variable is "Most Impatient." We include indicator variables for impatience level over current tradeoffs as well as future tradeoffs, and then we include the interaction term which captures the preference reversal ("Hyperbolic"). In Columns 4 & 5 we show the results without the interaction term. Hyperbolicity strongly predicts take-up of the SEED product for women: women who are

---

[28] A similar prediction suggests that individuals in low income months now but high income in six months should appear to be hyperbolic. Table 3 shows that this conjecture does not in fact hold.

hyperbolic are 17.2% points more likely to take-up than women who are not hyperbolic. No similar effect is found for men. Preference reversals in the opposite direction (patient now and impatient later) do not predict take-up.

Table 13 shows results with a full set of independent variables. We find that hyperbolic females (with respect to money) are 16 and 24 percentage points more likely to take up the SEED product[29]. This effect is non-existent, however, for men. Table 13 shows that this result on hyperbolicity is robust to controlling for income, assets, education, household composition and other potentially influential characteristics.

Education and income also predict take-up of the commitment savings product. Individuals who have received some college education are more likely to take-up. The relationship between income and take-up is parabolic, with our lowest and highest observed income households less likely to take-up than those we observe in the middle.

Spousal control issues are likely to be another motivating factor in the take-up of a commitment product, and should be greater for women than for men. Therefore, we analyze the impact of household composition on the likelihood to take-up the commitment product over the normal savings product. Although women are more likely than men to take-up the commitment product (Table 13, Column 1: 13.4 percent points more likely), the interaction term of married and female is negative, though not statistically significant[30]. This suggests that *single* women are in fact more likely to take-up than married women, which is counter to the typical spousal control story. However, in the Philippines most single women live in extended households before getting married, so this still could be a result of familial control issues for single women needing to find a mechanism to maintain savings outside the control of the household head.

---

[29] With respect to rice, females are 7.7% points more likely to take-up, whereas with respect to ice cream females are only 4% points more likely to take-up. However, the effects with respect to rice and ice cream are not significant.
[30]We may be concerned that familial control issues, ie keeping money out of the hands of demanding relatives or parents, may be just as important as spousal control, and affect single income earners as well. Only 5 percent of the individuals live in a household with no other adult. Although this subsample is neither more nor less likely to takeup the product, little inference should be drawn from this small sample of 34 individuals. This result is not shown in the tables. Also not shown, the share of income attributable to the female does not predict take-up of the SEED product.

In interpreting these results on female and married, it is important to recognize that our sample of women is a select sample of women who hold their own bank accounts. Particularly for married women, a woman with a bank account is likely different in many ways from the average married woman in the Philippines.

8.3 Determinants of ROSCA Participation

Next, we analyze the correlates of participating in informal savings organizations, based on survey data we gathered before the intervention. Informal savings organizations are interesting in this context because they are often cited as potential commitment devices for savings for individuals, particularly females. The need for commitment can be due to spousal or self-control issues (Anderson and Baland, 2002; Gugerty, 2001). Note that for an informal savings account to provide spousal control, there must be a social norm in society by which the spouse respects the sanctity of the savings held in the informal savings vehicle (or is unaware of it).

In our survey data, we asked several questions about the structure of the informal savings organization. We generate three dependent variables for different types of informal savings alternatives. First, we examine savings organizations with fewer than 30 members where no loans are made using the savings pool. Second, we examine small groups only, since large groups (over 30 individuals) are often organized through employers or some other large network, and by design do not appear to exert peer pressure on their members to save. Hence, they are more like a normal (albeit informal) savings vehicle rather than a commitment savings device. Similarly, when borrowing against savings is possible, the vehicle clearly provides benefits beyond a mere commitment to save. Last, we examine propensity to keep cash in the home. We hypothesize that sophisticated individuals with self or spousal control issues will not try to save at home, and unsophisticated individuals might try but will not succeed in saving at home. Either way, we predict that those with self-control or spousal control issues are less likely to save at home.

We find evidence to support both self and spousal control stories of ROSCA participation. For self-control stories, we find that just as time inconsistency (more impatient for near term tradeoffs) predicts SEED take-up for women, it also predicts participation in a ROSCA for those with less education. Table 14, Column 1 shows that hyperbolicity positively predicts ROSCA participation (significant at 90 percent level), but the interaction of hyperbolicity and being highly educated (some college), is negative although only marginally significant. We suggest that educated individuals are sophisticated enough to overcome their self control issues through some other mechanism, and hence do not resort to informal savings clubs to plan their savings. Whereas for the SEED product only hyperbolic females are more like to take-up the product, for ROSCAs both hyperbolic males and females are more likely to take-up (although only statistically significant when pooled, the coefficients remain similar when disaggregated by gender).

To further understand the role of spousal control, we conduct a similar analysis to Anderson and Baland (2002) and examine the percentage share of income the female controls in the household. As with Anderson and Baland, we find that women with some but not all of the income are most likely to participate in ROSCAs. Table 14, Columns 1 and 2 show this result, that when female income share is between 50 and 75 percent of household income, the female is most likely to participate in a ROSCA. Anderson and Baland suggests that females with no income share have neither power nor money and therefore are unable to join any savings clubs. Furthermore, women with the full income of the household do not need to join ROSCAs because they hold significant power[31]. Hence, women with some but not all of the income in the household are most likely to participate in ROSCAs[32]. Contrary to Anderson and Baland, however, we do not find that married females are more likely to participate in ROSCAs. This

---

[31] If the man exerts power (perhaps violently) over the wife then the wife's share of income may not lead to more household power.
[32] We conduct a similar analysis on take-up of SEED and find similar point estimates but with larger standard errors and hence insignificant results statistically. These results are not shown.

could be because non-married females typically live in households with other adult men, so the absence of a husband suggests the presence of a father, brother, etc., who exerts similar pressure on household spending decisions. Methods of overcoming spousal power issues might be dictated largely by social norms, similar to Duflo and Udry (2003). In this context, informal savings clubs might be acceptable vehicles that spouses respect and hence provide the female with autonomy over those funds. However, the SEED account, perhaps because it is new and unknown, has no established social norms to dictate acceptable use within the household. This suggests that a long-term study would prove worthwhile in order to understand what norms evolve regarding the SEED product as it becomes more common.

Table 14 also shows the determinants of savings at home. Individuals with low discount rates (labeled "Patient") are more likely to save at home. Supporting a spousal control conflict story, we find an interesting corollary to the ROSCA finding on spousal control: households where women control some but not all of the household income (50-75 percent) are less likely to save at home (where these same individuals are more likely to save in a ROSCA).

8.4 Alternative Interpretations of the Time Preference Reversal

Here we consider explanations other than hyperbolicity for the time preference reversals and present evidence for or against these alternatives. We present three alternative explanations: 1) pure noise, 2) inability to understand the questions, and 3) personal cash flows match timing of the questions.

Regarding noise, two pieces of evidence suggest that individuals who we code as hyperbolic do indeed reverse their time preferences. First, note from Table 3 that typically more than twice as many individuals reverse time preferences in the "hyperbolic" direction than in the other[33]. Second, if this were pure noise, then it should not predict real behavior, such as take-up of a commitment savings product, or usage of ROSCAs. Table 12 shows that this is not the case.

---

[33] The means are statistically different at the 99% level.

Regarding inability to understand the hypothetical questions, we examine whether education predicts reversals. We test whether less educated individuals are more likely to report preference reversals (in either direction). If this is the case, and less educated individuals are more likely to take-up the SEED product, then we would spuriously conclude that take-up of SEED was due to hyperbolicity, rather than just being uneducated. However, Table 9 shows that hyperbolicity is *positively* correlated with attending college for women (and uncorrelated for men). As shown in Table 11, reversals in the other direction, "patience now but impatience later," are uncorrelated with higher education (although in this case, the point estimate is negative: the more educated are less likely to reverse).

Lastly, we examine a precise story about cash flows: individuals who report patience (impatience) now and impatience (patience) later are flush with cash now (later) but expect to be short cash later (now). In order to make sense, such a story also requires some element of savings constraints. Although we are unable to test this precisely, we did ask individuals what months are their high-income and low-income months. Females who report being in a high-income month at the time of the survey and a low-income month 6 months after the survey are in fact more likely to reverse time preferences, indicating patience now and impatience later (Table 11, Column 2). Hyperbolic reversals, however, are predicted neither by these cash flow measures (Table 9, all columns, "Low income now, High in 6 months" row).[34]

9. **Conclusion**

Savings requires a delay of immediate rewards for greater future rewards and is thus considered particularly difficult for individuals who have hyperbolic preferences and/or self-control problems. Individuals with such preferences, theoretically, should have a preference for commitment. However, identifying hyperbolic preferences, and observing a preference for commitment, is difficult. Using hypothetical survey questions, we identify individuals who exhibit impatience over near-term tradeoffs but patience over future tradeoffs. Although we find

---

[34] Credit constraint regressions not shown, but include the number of self-reported alternatives for a loan.

this reversal uncorrelated with most demographic and economic characteristics, we do find that for women this reversal predicts take-up of a commitment savings product.

Using a randomized control methodology, we offer individuals a commitment savings account. Twenty-eight percent of those offered the commitment savings product open such an account. Comparing those offered the product to a randomly chosen control group not offered the product, we find a strong positive impact on savings. A second treatment group received a marketing intervention, but no product, to measure the direct effect of the marketing on savings levels. After six months, average bank account savings increased by 48 percent in the commitment-treatment group relative to the control group (ITT); those who opened the account increased savings by 198 percent (TOT). This corresponds to an average increase of 164 pesos (=~$3USD) for the ITT and 690 pesos ($13.8USD) for the TOT. Although the nominal amounts are small, as a percentage of prior formal bank savings the product impact is significant. Among those with prior positive balances, the treatment group participants have a 12.7 percent higher probability of increasing their savings by more than 20 percent, relative to the control group participants, and a 10 percent higher probability of increasing their savings by more than 20 percent, relative to the marketing group participants. In terms of economic significance, a doctor's visit in this area of the Philippines costs about $3USD, public school fees are $3/year plus $4/month for special projects, and a one month supply of rice for a family of five costs $20.

Whereas these results are economically and statistically significant, they suggest that further research is warranted to understand several issues. For instance, will the effect of the product diminish over time without constant reminders? Which product features exactly generate the outcomes we observed (i.e., is it the locked box or the withdrawal restrictions that matter most)? From an institutional perspective, what are the costs involved in implementing this product and do the benefits in terms of savings mobilization warrant such efforts? Lastly, does this represent substitution from other forms of savings in assets or in other institutions?

References Cited

Ainslie, George. *Picoeconomics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Anderson, Siwan and Baland, Jean-Marie. "The Economics of Roscas and Intra-Household Resource Allocation." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2002, *117*(3), pp. 963-95.

Angeletos, George-Marios; Laibson, David; Tobacman, Jeremy; Repetto, Andrea and Weinberg, Stephen. "The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical Evaluation." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 2001, *15*(3), pp. 47-68.

Barr, Abigail. "Trust and Expected Trustworthiness: Experimental Evidence from Zimbabwean Villages." *Economic Journal*, 2003, *113*(489), pp. 614-30.

Barr, Abigail and Kinsey, Bill. "Do Men Really Have No Shame?" *Oxford University working paper*, 2002.

Benartzi, Shlomo and Thaler, Richard. "Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving." *Journal of Political Economy*, 2004, *112*(S1).

Benzion, Uri; Rapoport, Ammon and Yagil, Joseph. "Discount Rates Inferred from Decisions: An Experimental Study." *Management Science*, 1989, *35*(3), pp. 270-84.

Binswanger, Hans. "Risk Attitudes of Rural Households in Semi-Arid Tropical India." *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 1980, *62*, pp. 395-407.

DellaVigna, Stefano and Paserman, M. Daniele. "Job Search and Impatience." *Harvard University and Hebrew University Working Paper*, 2001.

Duflo, Esther and Udry, Christopher. "Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in Cote D'ivoire: Social Norms, Separate Accounts and Consumption Choices." *M.I.T. Working Paper*, 2003.

Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus and Mukherji, Arijit. "Can We Really Observe Hyperbolic Discounting?" *Univ. of Pennsylvania and the Univ. of Minnesota Working Paper*, 2002.

Fershtman, Chaim and Gneezy, Uri. "Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach." *Quartery Journal of Economics*, 2001, *116(1)*, pp. 351-77.

Frederick, Shane; Loewenstein, George and O'Donoghue, Ted. "Time Discounting: A Critical Review." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 2001, *40*, pp. 351-401.

Glaeser, Edward; Laibson, David; Scheinkman, Jose and Soutter, Christine. "Measuring Trust." *Quartery Journal of Economics*, 2000, *115*, pp. 811-46.

Gugerty, Mary Kay. "You Can't Saving Alone: Testing Theories of Rotating Savings and Credit Organizations," Boston: Harvard University, 2001.

Gul, Faruk and Pesendorfer, Wolfgang. "Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption." *Econometrica*, 2004, *72*(1), pp. 119-58.

____. "Temptation and Self-Control." *Econometrica*, 2001, *69*(6), pp. 1403-36.

Henrich, Joseph; Boyd, Robert; Bowles, Samuel; Camerer, Colin; Fehr, Ernest; Gintis, Herbert and McElreath, Richard. "Cooperation, Reciprocity and Punishment in Fifteen Small-Scale Societies." *American Economic Review*, 2001, *91(2)*, pp. 73-78.

Karlan, Dean. "Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict Financial Decisions." *Princeton University working paper*, 2003.

Laibson, David. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1997, *112*(2), pp. 443-77.

____. "Hyperbolic Discount Functions, Undersaving, and Savings Policy." *NBER Working Paper*, 1996.

Loewenstein, George and Prelec, Drazen. "Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1992, *107*(2), pp. 573-97.

Loewenstein , George and Thaler, Richard. "Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 1989, *3*(4), pp. 181-93.

Morton, Fiona Scott and Oster, Sharon. "Behavioral Decision-Making: An Application to the Setting of Magazine Subscription Prices." *NBER Working Paper*, 2003, (10120).

O'Donoghue, Ted and Rabin, Matthew. "Doing It Now or Doing It Later." *The American Economic Review*, 1999, *89*(1), pp. 103-21.

Phelps, E.S. and Pollak, R.A. "On Second-Best National Savings and Game-Equilibrium Growth." *Review of Economic Studies*, 1968, *35*, pp. 185-99.

Read, Daniel. "Is Time-Discounting Hyperbolic or Subadditive?" *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 2001, *23*(1), pp. 5-32.

Rubinstein, Ariel. "Is It "Economics and Psychology"?: The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting." *International Economic Review*, 2003, *44*(4 (11)), pp. 1207-16.

Shapiro, Jesse M. "Is There a Daily Discount Rate? Evidence from the Food Stamp Nutrition Cycle." *Harvard University Working Paper*, 2003.

Shefrin, H.M. and Thaler, Richard. "The Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis." *Economic Inquiry*, 1988, *26*, pp. 609-43.

Shelley, M.K. "Outcome Signs, Question Frames and Discount Rates." *Management Science*, 1993, *39*(7), pp. 806-15.

Strotz, R. H. "Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization." *Review of Economic Studies*, 1955, *23*(3), pp. 165-80.

Thaler, Richard. "Anomalies: Saving, Fungibility and Mental Accounts." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 1990, *4*(1), pp. 193-205.

____. "Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice." *Marketing Science*, 1985, *4*, pp. 199-214.

____. *The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.

Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel. "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions." *Journal of Business*, 1986, *59*, pp. S251-0S78.

Figure 1: Distribution of SEED Balances[35]

---

[35] Sample restricted to SEED greater than P100 (134 observations at or below P100) and observations within the middle 98% of the total balance change distribution. Including the outliers would make it difficult to observe on the graph the observed distribution for the majority of the participants. Furthermore, excluding the outliers mimics the primary impact specifications used in the tables.

Figure 2: Change in Institutional Savings Balances by Treatment Group

Figure 2a: Changes in Overall Savings Balances

Figure 2b: Change in Overall Savings Balances

Table 1: Clients' Specific Savings Goals

	Frequency	Percent
Christmas/Birthday/Celebration/Graduation	97	48.0%
Education	42	20.8%
House/Lot construction and purchase	21	10.4%
Capital for Business	20	10.1%
Purchase or Maintenance of Machine/Automobile/Appliance	8	4.0%
Agricultural Financing/Investing/Maintenance	4	2.0%
Vacation/Travel	4	2.0%
Personal Needs/Future Expenses	3	1.5%
Did not report reason for saving	2	1.0%
Medical	1	0.5%
Total	202	100%
Date-based goals	140	69%
Amount-based goals	62	31%
Total	202	100%
Bought Ganansiya Box	167	83%
Did not buy Ganansiya Box	35	17%
Total	202	100%

Table 2. Summary Statistics of Variables, by Treatment Assignment
Means and Standard Errors

	Control	Marketing	Treatment	F-stat P-value
A. VARIABLES AVAILABLE AT TIME OF RANDOMIZATION				
Client Savings Balance (hundreds)	5.307	4.990	5.027	0.554
	(0.233)	(0.234)	(0.174)	
Active Account	0.360	0.363	0.349	0.861
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.017)	
Barangay's Distance to Branch	21.865	23.230	22.708	0.541
	(0.818)	(0.884)	(0.656)	
Bank's Penetration in Barangay	0.022	0.022	0.019	0.372
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	
Standard Deviation of Balances (hundreds)	4.922	4.975	4.960	0.562
	(0.364)	(0.365)	(0.272)	
Mean Balances of Barangay (hundreds)	5.079	5.081	5.104	.884
	(0.463)	(0.464)	(0.345)	
Population of Barangay (thousands)	5.854	5.708	5.730	0.856
	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.154)	
B. VARIABLES FROM SURVEY INSTRUMENT				
Education	11.642	11.358	11.713	.200
	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.119)	
Female	0.616	0.547	0.600	0.011
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.013)	
Age	42.051	42.871	42.108	.556
	(0.620)	(0.622)	(0.463)	
Impatient (near)	0.808	0.890	0.869	0.309
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.030)	
Hyperbolic (250)	0.203	.224	.201	.586
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.014)	
Hyperbolic (300)	0.130	0.149	0.140	0.705
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.012)	
Enterprise Owner	1.746	1.708	1.738	0.374
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.015)	
Sample Size	469	466	842	1777

Standard errors are listed in parentheses below the means.

Table 3: Tabulations of Responses to Hypothetical Time Preference Questions

Panel A. Money Preferences

			Indifferent between 200 pesos in 6 months and X in 7 months			
			Patient	Somewhat Impatient	Most Impatient	Total
			X<250	250<X<300	300<X	
Indifferent between 200 pesos now and X in one month	Patient	X<250	606 / 34.4%	126 / 7.2%	73 / 4.1%	805 / 45.7%
	Somewhat Impatient	250<X<300	206 / 11.7%	146 / 8.3%	59 / 3.3%	411 / 23.3%
	Most Impatient	300<X	154 / 8.7%	93 / 5.3%	299 / 17%	546 / 31%
	Total		966 / 54.8%	365 / 20.7%	431 / 24.5%	1,762 / 100%

Panel B. Rice Preferences

			Indifferent between 10 kg of rice in 6 months and X in 7 months			
			Patient	Somewhat Impatient	Most Impatient	Total
			X<15	15<X<20	20<X	
Indifferent between 10 kg of rice now and X in one month	Patient	X<15	699 / 39.4%	50 / 2.8%	42 / 2.4%	791 / 44.6%
	Somewhat Impatient	15<X<20	234 / 13.2%	138 / 7.8%	35 / 2%	407 / 23%
	Most Impatient	20<X	162 / 9.1%	106 / 6%	307 / 17.3%	575 / 32.4%
	Total		1,095 / 61.80%	294 / 16.6%	384 / 21.7%	1,773 / 100%

Panel C. Ice Cream Preferences

			Indifferent between 0.5 gallon in 6 months and X in 7 months			
			Patient	Somewhat Impatient	Most Impatient	Total
			X<1.5	1.5<X<2	2<X	
Indifferent between 0.5 gallon now and X in one month	Patient	X<1.5	831 / 47.2%	43 / 2.4%	33 / 1.9%	907 / 51.5%
	Somewhat Impatient	1.5<X<2	215 / 12.2%	109 / 6.19%	39 / 2.21%	363 / 20.6%
	Most Impatient	2<X	147 / 8.34%	66 / 3.75%	279 / 15.83%	492 / 27.92%
	Total		1193 / 67.7%	218 / 12.4%	351 / 19.9%	1762 / 100%

☐ Hyperbolic

☐ Confused

☐ Hyperbolic/Confused/Impatient (depending on exact response)

Table 4: Impact on Change in Savings Held at Bank

PANEL A. INTENT TO TREAT EFFECT: OLS

Dependent Variable:	Change in Total Balance	Change in Total Balance	Change in Total Balance Commitment & Marketing Only	Change in Total Balance Commitment & Marketing Only	Binary Outcome = 1 if Change in Balance > 0%	Binary Outcome = 1 if Change in Balance > 0% Commitment & Marketing Only	Binary Outcome = 1 if Change in Balance > 20%	Binary Outcome = 1 if Change in Balance > 20% Commitment & Marketing Only
Sample Restriction:	All	All	Marketing Only	Marketing Only	All	Marketing Only	All	Marketing Only
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Commitment Treatment	234.678*	164.312***	49.828	105.733**	0.081***	0.084***	0.127***	0.102***
	(132.130)	(45.785)	(147.242)	(49.526)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Marketing Treatment	184.851	58.579			-0.003		0.025	
	(149.992)	(51.987)			(0.032)		(0.027)	
Constant	40.626	-37.813	225.476*	20.766	0.520***	0.517***	0.154***	0.178***
	(105.890)	(36.681)	(118.137)	(39.740)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Deleted 10 outliers	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Observations	1777	1767	1308	1300	1777	1308	1777	1308
R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01

PANEL B. TREATMENT ON THE TREATED EFFECT: IV

Dependent Variable:	Change in Total Balance	Change in Total Balance	Change in Total Balance Commitment & Marketing Only	Change in Total Balance Commitment & Marketing Only	Binary Outcome = 1 if Change in Balance > 0%	Binary Outcome = 1 if Change in Balance > 0% Commitment & Marketing Only	Binary Outcome = 1 if Change in Balance > 20%	Binary Outcome = 1 if Change in Balance > 20% Commitment & Marketing Only
Sample Restriction:	All	All	Marketing Only	Marketing Only	All	Marketing Only	All	Marketing Only
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
SEED takeup	978.214*	687.645***	207.699	442.493**	0.336***	0.349***	0.336***	0.426***
	(549.598)	(191.394)	(612.562)	(205.281)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.098)
Marketing Treatment	184.851	58.579			-0.003		-0.003	
	(149.676)	(51.929)			(0.032)		(0.032)	
Constant	40.626	-37.813	225.476*	20.766	0.520***	0.517***	0.520***	0.178***
	(105.667)	(36.640)	(117.907)	(39.359)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Deleted 10 outliers	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Observations	1777	1767	1308	1300	1777	1308	1777	1308
R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.10

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in the first four column is the change in total savings held at the Green Bank. Column (1) regresses total savings balances on indicators for assignment in the commitment- and marketing-treatment groups. The omitted group indicator in this regression corresponds to the control group. Column (2) repeats this regression, after deleting the 10 clients with the highest savins increases - a natural breakpoint in the distribution (see Appendix Table 6). The dependent variable in columns (4)-(8) is a binary variable equal to 1 if balances increased by x%. Panel B of this the table reports the instrumental variables regression of change in balance on take-up of the SEED product, where assignment into the commitment-treatment group is used as an instrument for take-up.

We call the coefficient estimate on the commitment-treatment indicator the TOT effect. While we cannot in principle say that the independent effect of marketing the SEED product can be captured by the marketing treatment effect, we are confident that the direct effect of marketing on savings is small relative to the impact of SEED take-up based on the negligible coefficient estimate on the marketing group assignment. Exchange rate is 50 pesos for US $1.00.

Table 5. Impact on Financial Savings

Dependent Variable: Change in Total Savings Held at Bank

	Sample Restriction	Decile Regressions All (1)	Decile Regressions Commitment & Marketing Groups Only (2)	Quintile Regressions All (3)	Quintile Regressions Commitment & Marketing Groups Only (4)
10th Percentile	Commitment Treatment	146.450 (103.252)	118.040 (130.026)		
	Marketing Treatment	28.410 (108.964)			
20th Percentile	Commitment Treatment	0.000 (7.806)	0.000 (6.519)	0.000 (6.317)	0.000 (7.602)
	Marketing Treatment	0.000 (6.247)		0.000 (0.000)	
30th Percentile	Commitment Treatment	59.820*** (15.411)	50.300*** (9.175)		
	Marketing Treatment	9.520 (16.101)			
40th Percentile	Commitment Treatment	60.000*** (20.908)	56.330*** (13.709)	60.000*** (15.276)	56.330*** (11.676)
	Marketing Treatment	3.670 (25.270)		3.670 (21.220)	
50th Percentile	Commitment Treatment	0.000 (10.878)	0.000 (8.985)		
	Marketing Treatment	0.000 (12.051)			
60th Percentile	Commitment Treatment	4.140*** (0.746)	4.140*** (0.874)	4.140*** (0.749)	4.140*** (1.493)
	Marketing Treatment	0.000 (0.927)		0.000 (0.798)	
70th Percentile	Commitment Treatment	8.690*** (2.056)	8.740*** (0.576)		
	Marketing Treatment	-0.050 (1.013)			
80th Percentile	Commitment Treatment	87.770*** (18.417)	87.510*** (11.707)	87.770*** (14.061)	87.510*** (17.034)
	Marketing Treatment	0.260 (1.898)		0.260 (2.631)	
90th Percentile	Commitment Treatment	403.730*** (87.149)	367.210*** (68.556)		
	Marketing Treatment	36.520 (66.827)			
Observation		1777	1308	1777	1308

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Column (1) reports the quantile regression (deciles) of change in total savings balances on indicators for treatment group assignment. The ommited indicator in the regression corresponds to the control group. Column (2) repeats the regression in column (1), however directly compares the impact of commitment-treatment assignment against savings increases by clients assigned into the marketing group. That is, the control group is dropped from the sample in this regression. The analysis in columns (1) and (2) repeats the quantile analysis at every quintile of the change in balance distribution. Note that the point estimates at each quintile remains the same as in the decile reressions; only the standard errors change.

Table 6: Intent to Treat Effect of Subgroups
OLS

	Dependent Variable: Change in Total Insitutional Savings Balance						
	Middle 98%	All	All	All	All	All	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Commitment-Treatment	234.678*	404.776**	248.426	208.993	226.555	182.268	225.401
	(132.130)	(188.612)	(154.135)	(185.306)	(173.041)	(147.991)	(140.936)
Marketing-Treatment	184.851	185.617	183.709	184.501	189.072	187.523	187.733
	(149.992)	(150.323)	(149.317)	(150.076)	(150.167)	(150.354)	(150.224)
Female		11.108					
		(152.376)					
Female * Commitment-Treatment		-283.844					
		(221.807)					
Active			491.990***				
			(155.397)				
Active * Commitment-Treatment			-23.630				
			(226.682)				
Some college				-49.531			
				(151.479)			
Some college * Commitment-Treatment				45.166			
				(221.340)			
High household income					100.975		
					(150.238)		
High household income * Commitment-Treatment					13.253		
					(218.174)		
Time inconsistent						-100.346	
						(169.524)	
Time inconsistent * Commitment-Treatment						195.303	
						(244.849)	
Patient now & impatient in future							232.988
							(200.265)
Patient now & impatient in future * Commitment-Treatment							79.838
							(294.666)
Constant	40.626	33.781	-136.659	68.929	-10.400	66.942	0.387
	(105.890)	(141.504)	(119.363)	(136.811)	(130.319)	(114.964)	(111.438)
Observations	1777	1777	1777	1777	1777	1774	1774
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in the OLS regressions is the change in total savings held at the institution. The sample used in the regressions truncate the full sample of interviewed by dropping clients in the highest and lowest one percentiles of the change in balance distribution. Similar regressions were run after deleting the control group, so that the impact of the commitment-treatment can be directly compared against the impact of the marketing. These results are not reported in the present table, but can be found in the appendix. Exchange rate is 50 pesos for US $1.00.

Table 7: Tests for New Savings
OLS

Panel A: Full Sample of Clients	Dep Var = Change in Non-SEED Balances	Dep Var = Change in Total Balances	Dep Var = Change in Non-SEED Balance	Dep Var = Change in Total Balances
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Commitment-treatment	124.382	234.678*	129.319	240.051*
	(124.956)	(132.130)	(124.400)	(131.504)
Marketing-treatment	184.851	184.851	183.826	183.735
	(141.848)	(149.992)	(141.211)	(149.275)
Active			441.871***	480.886***
			(106.994)	(113.105)
Constant	40.626	40.626	-118.598	-132.657
	(100.141)	(105.890)	(106.886)	(112.991)
Observations	1777	1777	1777	1777
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01

Panel B: Sample Restricted to Commitment and Marketing Treatment Clients	Dep Var = Change in Non-SEED Balances	Dep Var = Change in Total Balances	Dep Var = Change in Non-SEED Balance	Dep Var = Change in Total Balances
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Commitment-treatment	-60.468	49.828	-53.509	57.504
	(138.437)	(147.242)	(137.767)	(146.470)
Active			515.809***	568.927***
			(137.967)	(146.683)
Constant	225.476**	225.476*	38.413	19.149
	(111.072)	(118.137)	(121.322)	(128.987)
Observations	1308	1308	1308	1308
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in the regressions in columns (1) and (3) is the change savings in all non-SEED savings accounts held at the institution. Negative coefficients on the commitment-treatment indicator in columns (1) and (3) imply that the SEED savings came at the expense of deposits into regular savings accounts. Note that the regressions resluts in columns (2) and (4) are the same as those found in Table 4. Adding the commitment-treatment coefficient estimates in columns [(1) and (2), and in columns (3) and (4), give the net effect of the treatment on total savings. Panel B repeats the analysis without the clinets in the control group. Exchange rate is 50 pesos for US $1.00.

Table 8: Dependent Variable: SEED balance
All SEED Clients

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Amount Goal	-12.451	-2.491	-239.312			
	(170.749)	(171.655)	(203.224)			
Time Inconsistent		110.555	-107.762	110.768	28.866	
		(167.537)	(195.123)	(166.470)	(236.232)	
Time Inconsistent * Amount Goal			791.970**			
			(371.638)			
Investment Goal (versus Consumption Goal)					-33.814	
					(202.037)	
Time Inconsistent * Investment Goal					228.852	
					(347.339)	
Active						404.380**
						(165.459)
Constant	463.571***	420.806***	502.827***	422.461***	426.624***	327.625***
	(94.597)	(149.579)	(117.769)	(96.586)	(137.707)	(94.577)
Observations	202	202	202	202	192	202
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.03

Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in the regressions is the balance held in SEED accounts. "Amount goal" is an indicator variable equal to one if the client opened a SEED account with an "amount" goal (rather than a "date" goal). "Time Inconsistent" is explained in the notes to Table 9, and only refers to those who are impatient now and patient for future tradeoffs. Active is an indicator variable equal to one if clients have had transactions in their account in the six months prior to the intervention.

Table 9: Determinants of Exhibiting Time Inconsistency in Hypothetical Questions (Impatient Now, Patient for Future Tradeoffs)
Probit

	Money			Rice			Ice Cream		
	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female	0.049**			0.058***			-0.011		
	(0.022)			(0.022)			(0.022)		
Satisfied with savings, 1-5	-0.017*	-0.026*	-0.003	-0.016	-0.019	-0.013	-0.005	-0.008	-0.000
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Low income now, High in 6 months	-0.061	-0.056	-0.064	-0.036	-0.049	0.000	-0.042	-0.008	-0.106*
	(0.039)	(0.049)	(0.067)	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.076)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.062)
Married	0.046*	0.033	0.062	0.019	0.042	-0.051	-0.013	-0.023	0.025
	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.044)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.050)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.047)
Some college	0.022	0.052*	-0.018	0.014	0.045	-0.033	0.037*	0.040	0.031
	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.035)
Number of household members	-0.001	-0.004	0.004	-0.002	-0.004	0.002	-0.006	-0.012**	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Unemployed	0.004	-0.017	0.031	-0.045	-0.059	-0.030	-0.046	-0.060	-0.002
	(0.060)	(0.071)	(0.106)	(0.057)	(0.069)	(0.097)	(0.054)	(0.064)	(0.102)
Age	0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Total household income	-0.011	-0.009	-0.016	-0.022**	-0.023	-0.022	-0.009	-0.006	0.014
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.031)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.031)
Total household monthly income squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.005
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)
Observations	1774	1046	728	1773	1046	727	1772	1046	724
Pseudo r-squared:	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01

Marginal effects reported for coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

In columns 1, 2 and 3, dependent variable equals one if respondent preferred 200 (200) pesos now more than 250 (300) pesos in one month, but then preferred 250 (300) pesos in seven months more than 200 (200) pesos in six months. If respondent reported preferring 200 pesos over 300 pesos with one month delay, then the respondent was asked what amount would be required to entice them to wait the additional month. Respondents were then coded as hyperbolic (i.e., the dependent variable equal to one) if the imputed discount rate was higher for the tradeoff between now and one month from now than for the imputed discount rate for the tradeoff between six and seven months.

Columns 4, 5 and 6 show the same responses, except with respect to rice (10 kilos versus 15 or 20 kilos). Column 7, 8 and 9 show the same responses, except with respect to ice cream (0.5 gallon versus 1.5 or 2.0 gallons). "Low income now, High in 6 months" is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reported being in a lower than average income month at the time of the survey, but expected to be in a higher than average income month six months after the survey. Each respondent was asked which months tend to be their high (low) (average) months of the year. Three individuals did not answer completely the time preference questions with respect to money, and four did not respond completely to the questions with respect to ice cream and rice.

Table 10: Determinants of Impatience
Ordered Probit

	Money		Rice		Ice Cream	
	Now vs. 1 month	6 months vs. 7 months	Now vs. 1 month	6 months vs. 7 months	Now vs. 1 month	6 months vs. 7 months
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.056	-0.121**	0.015	-0.114*	-0.240***	-0.288***
	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.062)
Hungry	0.209	0.132	0.371*	0.118	0.169	0.040
	(0.181)	(0.192)	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.194)	(0.196)
Married	0.121*	0.108	0.057	0.050	-0.023	0.020
	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.074)
Some college	0.083	-0.032	-0.042	-0.067	0.110*	0.073
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.066)
Number of household members	0.002	-0.011	0.013	0.004	-0.023*	-0.013
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Unemployed	0.072	0.147	0.152	0.167	0.107	0.215
	(0.164)	(0.157)	(0.165)	(0.155)	(0.149)	(0.157)
Age	0.003	-0.000	0.002	0.002	0.000	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Lending client from bank	0.048	0.085	0.045	-0.001	0.074	-0.009
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.078)
Lending client with default	0.040	0.087	0.165	0.015	-0.081	0.298*
	(0.170)	(0.164)	(0.156)	(0.174)	(0.160)	(0.169)
Total household income	-0.078***	-0.041	-0.090***	-0.034	-0.034	-0.024
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Total household income squared	0.003*	0.002**	0.003**	0.002	0.002**	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Household debt per capita	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	1774	1764	1775	1773	1774	1762

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Marginal effects reported for coefficients.
The dependent variable equals zero, one or two. A zero value indicates the most patient and two indicates the most impatient. For each frame (money, rice, ice cream), the respondent first was asked to chose between 200 pesos now (0.5 gallons for ice cream; 10 kilos for rice) and 250 pesos in one month (1.5 gallons for ice cream; 15 kilos for rice). If the respondent preferred the payment now, the future benefit was then raised to 300 pesos (2.0 gallons for ice cream; 20 kilos for rice). If the respondent was patient in both settings, the dependent variable was coded as 0. If the respondent was impatient in the first question but then patient for the second, the dependent variable was coded as 1. If the respondent was impatient for both questions, the dependent variable was coded as 2. Between three and thirteen observations dropped when respondent answers did not map into the above 3 categories.

Table 11: Determinants of Exhibiting Patience Now and Impatience Later with Respect to Money
Probit

	All (1)	Female (2)	Male (3)
Female	0.014		
	(0.018)		
High income now, Low income in 6 months	0.104*	0.179**	-0.056
	(0.057)	(0.075)	(0.070)
Satisfied with savings, 1-5	0.004	0.003	0.006
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Married	0.020	0.027	0.014
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.039)
Some college	-0.002	-0.020	0.022
	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.029)
Number of household members	-0.001	-0.006	0.008
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Unemployed	0.009	0.035	-0.061
	(0.050)	(0.065)	(0.068)
Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Total household income	-0.010	-0.009	-0.032
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.023)
Total household income squared	0.001**	0.001	0.004
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)
Observations	1774	1046	728

Marginal effects reported for coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable equals one if respondent preferred 200 (200) pesos now less than 250 (300) pesos in one month (patient now), but then preferred 250 (300) pesos in seven months less than 200 (200) pesos in six months (impatient later). Hence, these individuals exhibit time inconsistency, but not in the direction associated with hyperbolicity.

Table 12: Determinants of SEED Takeup
Probit

	Dependent Variable = 1 if Respondent Opened SEED Account				
	All	Female	Male	Female	Male
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Time Preference with Respect to Money					
Time Inconsistent (Impatient Now, Patient Future)	0.123*	0.172*	0.025		
	(0.069)	(0.091)	(0.099)		
Time Inconsistent (Patient Now, Impatient Future)	0.039	0.015	0.062		
	(0.064)	(0.086)	(0.095)		
Middle Impatient, Now versus 1 Month	-0.036	-0.043	-0.043	-0.081	-0.055
	(0.050)	(0.068)	(0.074)	(0.063)	(0.068)
Least Impatient, Now versus 1 Month	0.044	0.018	0.069	-0.125**	0.067
	(0.078)	(0.107)	(0.114)	(0.060)	(0.068)
Middle Impatient, 6 months versus 7 Months	0.088	0.110	0.080	0.179**	0.083
	(0.065)	(0.089)	(0.097)	(0.083)	(0.084)
Least Impatient, 6 months versus 7 Months	0.046	0.062	0.024	0.170***	0.006
	(0.078)	(0.105)	(0.116)	(0.064)	(0.070)
Observations	715	429	286	429	286
Mean dependent variable	0.28	0.31	0.24	0.31	0.24
Panel B: Time Preference with Respect to Ice Cream					
Time Inconsistent (Impatient Now, Patient Future)	-0.058	0.004	-0.149		
	(0.068)	(0.096)	(0.091)		
Time Inconsistent (Patient Now, Impatient Future)	0.030	-0.025	0.095		
	(0.073)	(0.096)	(0.111)		
Middle Impatient, Now versus 1 Month	-0.000	0.042	-0.065	0.039	-0.020
	(0.057)	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.076)
Least Impatient, Now versus 1 Month	-0.085	-0.028	-0.185	-0.036	-0.006
	(0.089)	(0.118)	(0.131)	(0.066)	(0.074)
Middle Impatient, 6 months versus 7 Months	0.065	0.057	0.108	0.066	0.009
	(0.077)	(0.104)	(0.124)	(0.096)	(0.091)
Least Impatient, 6 months versus 7 Months	0.101	0.017	0.216*	0.032	0.047
	(0.083)	(0.115)	(0.122)	(0.070)	(0.078)
Observations	715	429	286	429	286
Mean dependent variable	0.28	0.31	0.24	0.31	0.24
Panel C: Time Preference with Respect to Rice					
Time Inconsistent (Impatient Now, Patient Future)	0.073	0.077	0.083		
	(0.073)	(0.096)	(0.115)		
Time Inconsistent (Patient Now, Impatient Future)	-0.065	-0.026	-0.110		
	(0.063)	(0.094)	(0.076)		
Middle Impatient, Now versus 1 Month	0.112*	0.030	0.265**	0.011	0.243**
	(0.058)	(0.072)	(0.104)	(0.067)	(0.099)
Least Impatient, Now versus 1 Month	0.108	0.014	0.301**	-0.063	0.195**
	(0.088)	(0.115)	(0.133)	(0.061)	(0.078)
Middle Impatient, 6 months versus 7 Months	0.003	0.168*	-0.183***	0.203**	-0.148**
	(0.068)	(0.099)	(0.066)	(0.089)	(0.065)
Least Impatient, 6 months versus 7 Months	-0.055	0.049	-0.265*	0.117*	-0.131
	(0.090)	(0.114)	(0.143)	(0.065)	(0.084)
Observations	715	429	286	429	286
Mean dependent variable	0.28	0.31	0.24	0.31	0.24

Marginal effects reported for coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The omitted indicator for each panel is the "Most Impatient, Now versus 1 Month" and "Most Impatient, 6 months versus 7 Months." See Table 9 for a detailed description of the coding rules for Time Inconsistent.

Table 13: Determinants of SEED Takeup
Probit

	All (1)	All (2)	Female (3)	Male (4)	All (5)	All (6)	Female (7)	Male (8)
Time Inconsistent, Money	0.120*	0.101	0.161*	0.039	0.117*	0.135	0.239**	0.036
	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.084)	(0.098)	(0.067)	(0.086)	(0.122)	(0.113)
Time Inconsistent AND Some College						-0.021	-0.089	0.006
						(0.075)	(0.090)	(0.117)
Some college	0.086**	0.093**	0.085*	0.079	0.083**	0.091**	0.109**	0.078
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.054)	(0.062)
Impatient, Now versus 1 Month	-0.032	-0.056	-0.033	-0.046	-0.034	-0.031	-0.032	-0.046
	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.062)	(0.074)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.062)	(0.073)
Patient, Now versus 1 Month	0.067	0.019	0.035	0.110	0.068	0.067	0.037	0.110
	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.088)	(0.110)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.088)	(0.110)
Impatient, 6 months versus 7 Months	0.098	0.169**	0.118	0.084	0.102	0.097	0.113	0.084
	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.086)	(0.091)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.086)	(0.090)
Patient, 6 months versus 7 Months	0.020	0.068	0.057	-0.014	0.022	0.020	0.056	-0.014
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.080)	(0.093)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.080)	(0.093)
Female	0.134*	0.154*			0.106	0.135*		
	(0.077)	(0.079)			(0.092)	(0.077)		
Married * Female	-0.109	-0.095	-0.070		-0.116	-0.109	-0.071	
	(0.088)	(0.092)	(0.049)		(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.049)	
Married	0.055	0.043		0.061	0.058	0.056		0.061
	(0.075)	(0.078)		(0.066)	(0.075)	(0.075)		(0.066)
Number of household members	-0.001	0.002	0.002	-0.007	0.000	-0.001	0.002	-0.007
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Unemployed	0.024	-0.008	0.039	0.018	0.048	0.025	0.045	0.018
	(0.099)	(0.095)	(0.109)	(0.227)	(0.108)	(0.100)	(0.109)	(0.226)
Age	-0.002	-0.003*	-0.001	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Lending client from bank	0.003	0.000	-0.043	0.046	-0.008	0.003	-0.042	0.046
	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.045)	(0.053)
Lending client with default	-0.030	-0.017	-0.021	-0.050	-0.028	-0.030	-0.025	-0.050
	(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.086)	(0.106)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.085)	(0.106)
Total household income	0.045	0.044	0.133***	-0.031	0.042	0.045	0.132***	-0.031
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Total household income squared	-0.007*	-0.007*	-0.024***	0.002	-0.007*	-0.007*	-0.023***	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Female * HH income share >0 & <=25%					0.009			
					(0.095)			
Female * HH income share >25 & <=50%					0.001			
					(0.073)			
Female * HH income share >50 & <=75%					0.100			
					(0.086)			
Female * HH income share >75 & <=100%					0.047			
					(0.076)			
Neighborhood Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	715	715	429	286	715	715	429	286
Mean Dependent Variable	0.28	0.28	0.31	0.24	0.28	0.28	0.31	0.24

Marginal effects reported for coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sample restricted to those reached by the Green Bank marketing team. Results robust to including those surveyed by the research team but not reached by the Green Bank marketing team. Independent variables coded identically to those in Tables 3, 4 and 5. "Some College" is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent reported having attended at least one year of college. See Table 9 for a detailed description of the coding rules for Time Inconsistent.

Table 14: Informal Savings Activities
Probit

	Fewer Than 30 Members			No Loan Option			Saves at Home		
	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Time inconsistent, Money	0.044*	0.037	0.039	0.032	0.025	0.028	0.060	0.048	0.086
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.060)	(0.070)
Some College	0.009	0.007	0.009	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.011	-0.015
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.033)
Time Inconsistent AND Some College	-0.022	-0.022	-0.013	-0.025	-0.022	-0.020	-0.031	-0.054	-0.003
	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.064)
Impatient, Now versus 1 Month	0.006	0.004	0.007	0.011	-0.005	0.028	0.021	0.026	0.002
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Patient, Now versus 1 Month	0.017	0.024	0.005	0.012	0.016	-0.001	0.124***	0.087*	0.171***
	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.058)
Impatient, 6 months versus 7 Months	-0.008	0.008	-0.021*	-0.020	0.021	-0.045***	-0.046	-0.001	-0.094**
	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.014)	(0.030)	(0.044)	(0.037)
Patient, 6 months versus 7 Months	-0.000	0.007	-0.004	0.003	0.029	-0.017	-0.015	0.018	-0.055
	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.049)
Female	0.001			-0.020			0.058		
	(0.025)			(0.034)			(0.048)		
Married X Female	0.004	0.003		0.010	0.007		-0.018	-0.039	
	(0.023)	(0.014)		(0.030)	(0.016)		(0.048)	(0.028)	
Married	-0.002		-0.003	-0.004		-0.011	-0.024		-0.033
	(0.020)		(0.011)	(0.025)		(0.021)	(0.042)		(0.043)
Number of household members	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	-0.000	0.002	-0.008**	-0.013***	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Unemployed	0.002	-0.012	0.030	-0.018	-0.030	0.012	-0.072*	-0.048	-0.110**
	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.047)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.053)	(0.041)	(0.058)	(0.047)
Age	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.002**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Lending client from bank	-0.005	-0.018	0.005	-0.007	-0.027	0.011	-0.030	-0.052	-0.015
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Lending client with default	0.048	0.069	0.052	0.055	0.105	0.016	0.011	0.023	0.017
	(0.044)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.050)	(0.079)	(0.058)	(0.067)	(0.088)	(0.106)
Total household income	0.005	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.019	0.033***	0.029**	0.078***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.025)
Total household monthly income - squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.003	-0.002**	-0.001	-0.008**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Female X Income share >0 & <=25%	-0.007	-0.007		-0.024	-0.022		-0.027	-0.012	
	(0.021)	(0.028)		(0.025)	(0.030)		(0.043)	(0.048)	
Female X Income share >25 & <=50%	0.010	0.014		0.034	0.041		-0.039	-0.023	
	(0.022)	(0.026)		(0.034)	(0.035)		(0.036)	(0.040)	
Female X Income share >50 & <=75%	0.066**	0.081**		0.081**	0.094***		-0.088***	-0.078**	
	(0.038)	(0.040)		(0.044)	(0.045)		(0.032)	(0.038)	
Female X Income share >75 & <=100%	0.032	0.040		0.038	0.046		-0.060*	-0.051	
	(0.027)	(0.030)		(0.033)	(0.034)		(0.034)	(0.039)	
Observations	1774	1046	728	1774	1046	728	1774	1046	728

Marginal effects reported for coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Columns 1-3: The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is a member of an informal savings organization with 30 or fewer members.

Columns 4-6: The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is a member of an informal savings organization with no option for borrowing from the pooled savings.

Columns 7-9: The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reported keeping cash at home as savings.

	Not Found for Survey	Surveyed	T-stat P-value
A. VARIABLES USED IN RANDOMIZATION			
Distance to Branch	2.085	2.262	0.009
	(0.051)	(0.045)	
Savings Balance (ten thousands)	4.306	5.091	0.000
	(0.133)	(0.117)	
Active Account	0.288	0.356	0.000
	(0.013)	(0.011)	
Penetration	0.017	0.027	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Mean Balances (ten thousands)	4.716	4.774	0.048
	(0.022)	(0.019)	
Standard Deviationof Balances (ten thousands)	4.841	4.908	0.012
	(0.02)	(0.017)	
Population (thousands)	6.984	5.757	0.000
	(0.127)	(0.112)	
Sample Size	1377	1777	

This table demonstrates the observable selection bias of those surveyed versus not surveyed. The sample frame was taken from existing clients Column 2 shows summary statistics of those chosen for survey but where the individual was not found or not willing to complete the survey.in the Green Bank database. Column 3 shows the summary statistics of those with completed survey. Standard errors are listed in the parentheses below the estimates of the means.

Appendix Table 2: Intent to Treat Effect of Subgroups
OLS

	Dependent Variable: Change in Total Savings Held at Bank						
	Commitment & Marketing Groups Only	Commitment & Marketing Groups Only	Commitment & Marketing Groups Only	Commitment & Marketing Groups Only	Commitment & Marketing Groups Only	Commitment & Marketing Groups Only	Commitment & Marketing Groups Only
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Commitment-Treatment	49.828	153.297	157.409	-41.962	125.157	-73.677	96.135
	(147.242)	(223.705)	(182.786)	(226.705)	(205.026)	(173.607)	(161.250)
Female		-109.252					
		(237.286)					
Female * Commitment-Treatment		-163.484					
		(297.383)					
Active			747.580***				
			(244.429)				
Active * Commitment-Treatment			-279.219				
			(305.577)				
Some college				-167.277			
				(238.394)			
Some college * Commitment-Treatment				162.912			
				(298.405)			
High household income					290.123		
					(236.912)		
High household income * Commitment-Treatment					-175.895		
					(295.067)		
Time inconsistent						-348.375	
						(265.192)	
Time inconsistent * Commitment-Treatment						443.332	
						(330.035)	
Patient now & impatient in future							585.315*
							(318.211)
Patient now & impatient in future * Commitment-Treatment							-272.488
							(398.731)
Constant	225.476*	285.260	-45.642	319.884*	90.999	322.888**	129.652
	(118.137)	(175.529)	(147.199)	(179.094)	(161.295)	(139.286)	(129.629)
Observations	1308	1308	1308	1308	1308	1305	1305
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in the OLS regressions is the change in total savings held at the institution. The sample used in the regressions truncate the full sample of interviewed by dropping clients in the highest and lowest one percentiles of the change in balance distribution. The regressions shown here are run having dropped the control group. Similar regressions were on the full sample,and are reported in in Table 6. Exchange rate is 50 pesos for US $1.00.

Appendix: Table 3. Getting Dormant Clients to Start Saving
Probit

	Dependent Variable: Activity Status					
	Transaction Last 2 Months	Transaction Last 3 Months	Transaction Last 4 Months	Transaction Last 5 Months	Transaction Last 6 Months	Transaction Last 12 Months
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Commitment-treatment	0.016	0.028	0.035	0.022	0.013	0.010
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Marketing-treatment	0.037	0.046	0.049	0.043	0.034	0.041
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Observations	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is 1 if a transaction has been made in any savings account in the past x number of months. It is 0 otherwise. The sample is restricted to clients who were recorded as dormant (not active) prior to the intervention. A client was considered active is she had transacted on any savings account within the previous six months. Exchange rate is 50 pesos for US $1.00.

Appendix: Table 4. Correlations of Different Time Preference Responses

	Hyperbolic with Respect to Money (1)	Hyperbolic with Respect to Rice (2)	Hyperbolic with Respect to Ice Cream (3)	Impatient Now with Respect to Money (4)	Impatient Now with Respect to Rice (5)	Impatient Now with Respect to Ice Cream (6)	Impatient Later with Respect to Money (7)	Impatient Later with Respect to Rice (8)	Impatient Later with Respect to Ice Cream (9)
Hyperbolic with Respect to Money	1								
Hyperbolic with Respect to Rice	0.397	1							
Hyperbolic with Respect to Ice Cream	0.208	0.279	1						
Impatient Now with Respect to Money	0.518	0.227	0.119	1					
Impatient Now with Respect to Rice	0.171	0.508	0.180	0.520	1				
Impatient Now with Respect to Ice Cream	0.053	0.118	0.543	0.321	0.431	1			
Impatient Later with Respect to Money	-0.274	-0.098	-0.022	0.468	0.412	0.334	1		
Impatient Later with Respect to Rice	-0.163	-0.240	-0.053	0.368	0.569	0.364	0.652	1	
Impatient Later with Respect to Ice Cream	-0.154	-0.135	-0.161	0.259	0.325	0.598	0.492	0.557	1

Appendix Table 5: Impact Sensitivity Checks

OLS

Dependent Variable: Change in Total Institutional Savings Balance

Deleted Clients:	None	10 Highest Changes in Balance	10 Highest Balance Increases + Next Highest Commitment Client	10 Highest Balance Increases + Next Two Highest Commitment Client	10 Highest Balance Increases + Next Three Highest Commitment Client	10 Highest Balance Increases + Next Four Highest Commitment Client	10 Highest Balance Increases + Next 10 Highest Commitment Client	10 Highest Balance Increases + Next 15 Highest Commitment Client
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Commitment-Treatment	234.678*	164.312***	153.820***	144.655***	135.660***	127.006***	87.463**	63.078*
	(132.130)	(45.785)	(44.187)	(42.934)	(41.693)	(40.512)	(35.999)	(33.866)
Marketing-Treatment	184.851	58.579	58.579	58.579	58.579	58.579	58.579	58.579
	(149.992)	(51.987)	(50.162)	(48.730)	(47.310)	(45.961)	(40.787)	(38.328)
Constant	40.626	-37.813	-37.813	-37.813	-37.813	-37.813	-37.813	-37.813
	(105.890)	(36.681)	(35.394)	(34.383)	(33.382)	(32.429)	(28.779)	(27.044)
Observations	1777	1767	1766	1765	1764	1763	1757	1752
R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The regressions reported here take changes in total savings clients as the dependent variable. Column (1) repeats regression shown in column (1) of Table 4. The coefficient on the commitment-treatment group indicator is ITT effect. Column (2) repeats the regression in column (1), after deleting the 10 clients with the highest savins increases - a natural breakpoint in the distribution (see Appendix Table 6). Moving from column (3) to column (8), each regression progressively removes the client in the treatment group with thenext highest increasein savings balances. This series of regressions informally test whether the ITT estimate obtained in column (2) is influenced by outliers in the change in balance distribution that happened to be assigned to the commitment-treatment group. Exchange rate is 50 pesos for US $1.00.

Appendix: Table 6 - Distribution of Balance Changes

Rank	Change in Savings Balance, Pesos	Change in Savings Balance, Dollars	Treatment Group
1	50,000.00	$ 1,000.00	Marketing
2	49,213.35	$ 984.27	Commitment
3	30,146.69	$ 602.93	Marketing
4	25,008.81	$ 500.18	Commitment
5	22,133.74	$ 442.67	Commitment
6	19,403.70	$ 388.07	Control
7	17,308.53	$ 346.17	Control
8	15,412.48	$ 308.25	Commitment
9	15,310.77	$ 306.22	Marketing
10	14,158.35	$ 283.17	Commitment
11	8,897.70	$ 177.95	Commitment
12	7,768.50	$ 155.37	Commitment
13	7,609.15	$ 152.18	Commitment
14	7,306.53	$ 146.13	Commitment
15	7,141.31	$ 142.83	Control
16	7,035.90	$ 140.72	Commitment
17	6,908.78	$ 138.18	Commitment
18	5,728.34	$ 114.57	Marketing
19	5,693.95	$ 113.88	Marketing
20	5,562.35	$ 111.25	Marketing
21	5,032.41	$ 100.65	Commitment
22	5,027.07	$ 100.54	Commitment
23	4,847.70	$ 96.95	Commitment
24	4,388.13	$ 87.76	Marketing
25	4,385.06	$ 87.70	Commitment
26	4,266.06	$ 85.32	Commitment
27	4,217.46	$ 84.35	Commitment
28	4,131.97	$ 82.64	Marketing
29	4,099.88	$ 82.00	Commitment
30	4,067.19	$ 81.34	Control

This table lists the 30 clients in the study with the highest increases in total savings held at the Green Bank. The are ranked, with the change in balance reported in pesos and in dollars. The fourth column shows the assignment for each client. The sizeable gap in balances increases exists between the 10th and the 11th ranked clients. Exchange rate is 50 pesos for US $1.00.

Appendix: Table 7: Upper and Lower Tails of the Change in Balance Distribution

Percentile	Cutoff Level of Savings Change	Percentile	Cutoff Level of Savings Change
0.5	-1628.22	90	200
1	-1111.04	90.5	252.05
1.5	-1023.16	91	318.59
2	-979.24	91.5	413.23
2.5	-930.17	92	460
3	-850.72	92.5	513.44
3.5	-748.56	93	579.38
4	-631.63	93.5	633.27
4.5	-630	94	735.56
5	-628.57	94.5	909.22
5.5	-605.24	95	1089.8
6	-541.39	95.5	1265.5
6.5	-520.28	96	1487.8
7	-517.42	96.5	1598.64
7.5	-495.68	97	1810.07
8	-486.16	97.5	2415.78
8.5	-474.91	98	3590.39
9	-450.97	98.5	4217.46
9.5	-418.28	99	5728.34
10	-393.11	99.5	15310.77

This table shows the cut-offs in the distribution of the chnage in balances at the top and bottom percentiles of the distribution. The cut-offs are reported at every half percentile. The distribution is characterized by a long right-side tail. Exchange rate is 50 pesos for US $1.00.

Appendix Table 8: Tabulations of Responses to Hypothetical Time Preference Questions

	Prefers 200P in 6 months	Prefers 250P in 7 months	Total		Prefers 200P in 6 months	Prefers 300P in 7 months	Total
A. MONEY PREFERENCES							
Prefers 200P today	592	368	960	Prefers 200P today	306	247	553
	33.56%	20.86%	54.42%		17.35%	14.00%	31.35%
Prefers 250P in 1 month	199	605	804	Prefers 300P in 1 month	132	1079	1211
	11.28%	34.30%	45.58%		7.48%	61.17%	68.65%
Total	791	973	1764	Total	438	1326	1764
	44.84%	55.16%	100.00%		24.83%	75.17%	100.00%
B. RICE PREFERENCES							
	Prefers 10 kilos in 6 months	Prefers 15 kilos in 7 months	Total		Prefers 10 kilos in 6 months	Prefers 20 kilos in 7 months	Total
Prefers 10 kilos today	584	395	979	Prefers 10 kilos today	306	267	573
	33.11%	22.39%	55.50%		17.35%	15.14%	32.48%
Prefers 15 kilos in 1 month	89	696	785	Prefers 20 kilos in 1 month	75	1116	1191
	5.05%	39.46%	44.50%		4.25%	63.27%	67.52%
Total	673	1091	1764	Total	381	1383	1764
	38.15%	61.85%	100.00%		21.60%	78.40%	100.00%
C. ICE CREAM PREFERENCES							
	Prefers 0.5 gallon in 6 months	Prefers 1.5 gallons in 7 months	Total		Prefers 0.5 gallon in 6 months	Prefers 2 gallons in 7 months	Total
Prefers 0.5 gallon today	490	360	850	Prefers 0.5 gallon today	276	212	488
	27.95%	20.54%	48.49%		15.66%	12.03%	27.70%
Prefers 1.5 gallons in 1 month	75	828	903	Prefers 2 gallons in 1 month	72	1202	1274
	4.28%	47.23%	51.51%		4.09%	68.22%	72.30%
Total	565	1188	1753	Total	348	1414	1762
	32.23%	67.77%	100.00%		19.75%	80.25%	100.00%