The course will be based mostly on the new book by T. Persson and G. Tabellini “Political Economics. Explaining Economic Policy”, MIT PRESS 2000 which synthesizes the large literature that has been growing analyzing the interaction between economic and political processes. Readings are generally indicated in each chapter.

Students are supposed to do the problem sets after each lecture.

**Lecture 1. From Social Choice to Political Economics.**


Other readings:


**Lectures 2 and 3. Preferences and Institutions.**


Other readings:


**Lecture 4. Electoral Competition**


**Lecture 5. Agency.**


**Lecture 6. Partisan Politicians.**

Lecture 7. Models of redistributive politics.


Lecture 8, 9 and 10. Special Interest Politics.


Lecture 11. Institutions and Accountability.


Lecture 12. Political Regimes.

Persson-Tabellini (2000): chapter 10


Aghion, Ph. Alesina, A. and F. Trebbi “Endogenous Political Institutions”.

Other readings: D. Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni “Endogenous Constitutions”, working paper.

Lecture 15. Politics, Inequality and Growth.


GRADE: final exam based on problem sets.