Resource Misallocation in European Firms: The Role of Constraints, Firm Characteristics and Managerial Decisions

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Abstract: Using a new survey, we document high dispersion of marginal revenue products across firms in the European Union (EU). To interpret this dispersion, we develop a portable framework to quantify gains from better allocation of resources. We demonstrate that apart from direct measures of distortions, firm characteristics, such as demographics, quality of inputs, utilization of resources, and dynamic adjustment of inputs, are predictors of the marginal revenue products of capital and labor. We emphasize that some firm characteristics may reflect compensating differentials rather than constraints and the effect of constraints on the dispersion of marginal products may hence be smaller than has been assumed in the literature. We show that cross-country differences in the dispersion of marginal products in the EU are largely due to differences in how the business, institutional and policy environment translates firm characteristics into outcomes rather than to the differences in firm characteristics *per se*. Removing distortions could raise EU aggregate productivity and hence GDP by 43 percent or more.

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I. Introduction

Although the large cross-country differentials in income per capita have been the subject of much research, accounting for sources of this dispersion has proven to be difficult. The most important factor appears to be differences in "productivity", which Moses Abramovitz famously called a measure of our ignorance. In an attempt to explain "productivity" differences within and across countries, recent research pioneered by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) emphasizes the importance of firm-level misallocation of resources for aggregate economic outcomes. It is based on the insight that if there is a dispersion of marginal revenue products of inputs across firms, the economy may achieve considerable productivity – and hence output – gains by reallocating capital from firms with low marginal revenue product of labor (MRPK) to firms with high MRPK and, similarly, from firms with low marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL) to firms with high MRPL. This concept is reflected in the textbook outcome when cost-minimizing firms face identical input prices in a perfectly functioning spot market economy and MRPK and MRPL are equalized across firms.

The recent slowdown in productivity growth in the United States, European Union (EU) and other developed economies has generated a sense of urgency among policymakers and academics to identify impediments to productivity increases and to find ways to spur economic growth. Although a number of explanations has been put forth, rising misallocation of resources could be one of the culprits (see, e.g., Gopinath et al., 2017 for an analysis of manufacturing firms in 6 European countries).¹

While existing research has been successful in measuring the dispersion of marginal products and assessing potential gains from better allocation of resources, *why* firms have different marginal products remains an open question. To a large extent, the paucity of research on this question has been brought about by data limitations. In particular, research in this area typically uses census-type data to calculate MRPK or MRPL for firms in *one* economy. But these administrative data usually contain only income statements, balance sheet information about capital, and basic data on employment. As a result, researchers do not have complete firm-level information as well as rich, consistently measured cross-country variation to tell why a given dispersion of MRPK or MRPL exists. Furthermore, the lack of exogenous variation in potential explanatory variables limits the scope of possible inferences or requires strong identification assumptions.

¹ Consistent with this view, the dispersion of MRPK and MRPL within individual European countries and within individual economic sectors has been trending up since the mid-1990s according to data in Orbis, a popular source of firm-level data.

In this paper we aim to make progress along three key dimensions. First, we continue and extend the long tradition of employing survey data for analyses of misallocation (e.g., Hsieh and Klenow, 2009) and use a new, large and representative cross-country survey of firms: the European Investment Bank (EIB 2025) Investment Survey (EIBIS).² The data that we use come from EIBIS that was administered annually from 2016 to 2018 to a stratified random sample of firms in each of the 27 EU countries and the UK (which at the time was part of the EU) and was designed to be representative of the business population for each EU country for different sectors and firm sizes. The broad cross-country coverage brings in diversity of institutional arrangements which generates variation necessary to identify and quantify the contribution of various factors affecting the allocation of resources. EIBIS contains information about the investment behavior and constraints of firms - e.g., recent investment activities and future priorities, how firms obtain capital and whether the quantity is sufficient, whether their capital stock is state-of-the-art, and information about capacity utilization, rates of innovation, access to infrastructure, and foreign presence in management. In contrast to administrative data, EIBIS has information on expectations and perceptions of firms, thus introducing a *novel* type of data to the literature. Survey responses are also matched to administrative data of the firm (e.g., balance sheet information). Importantly, the design and implementation of the survey is consistent across countries and sectors, which is critical for understanding cross-country and cross-industry variation in the dispersion of marginal revenue products. In addition, the survey does not only cover firms in the manufacturing sector but also firms in services, utilities and construction.

Second, informed by a theoretical model, we develop an empirical framework to quantify the contribution of various forces to the dispersion of marginal revenue products across firms and map the contribution to potential productivity gains. Specifically, we show that under empirically relevant conditions one can use marginal R^2 to obtain an *upper bound* for possible gains from removing a friction by estimating equilibrium relationships (optimality conditions) in a regression framework. This framework does not rely on exogenous variation in frictions or other predictors of MRPK and MRPL which makes our approach highly portable.

Third, we examine the extent to which the dispersion of marginal products is related to firm-level characteristics (as opposed to the usual country-level or sector-level effects) and we

² Hsieh and Klenow (2009) use plant-level data from the Indian Annual Survey of Industries (ASI; 1987–1994) and firm-level data from the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Production (1998–2005).

compute the associated productivity gains. We note that while the existing literature treats the dispersion of marginal products as reflecting barriers and distortions, this may not always be the case. Some dispersion may reflects optimizing behavior of firms (e.g., paying compensating differentials in the labor market), in which case it is economically rational from the standpoint of the firms and should not be interpreted as a "cost" to aggregate productivity. While we cannot always establish which of these phenomena is consistent with the data, we present a range of estimates consistent with various interpretations. Relatedly, we perform a Machado-Mata decomposition to construct counterfactual distributions of MRPK and MRPL for each country on the assumption that it has estimated coefficients or values of explanatory variables from another country (e.g., Greece and Germany). This decomposition exercise allows us to understand better whether observed dispersion in MRPK and MRPL is brought about by cross-country differences in firm characteristics or cross-country differences in how the business, institutional and policy environment guides the allocation of resources across heterogeneous firms.

We document that there is a sizable dispersion of marginal products measured across all the firms in our sample. The standard deviation is 1.43 for log(MRPK) and 1.19 for log(MRPL). As we discuss below, studies of the U.S. find the dispersion of marginal value-added product across establishments ("plants") to be considerably smaller, namely 0.98 for capital and 0.58 for labor. While contrasting the EU and US figures highlights challenges of cross-country comparisons, we show that measurement error can only account for a limited portion of the EU-US difference and that comparing EU firms and US establishments is in fact likely to *understate* the difference in the dispersion of marginal products between the two economies.

Our estimates indicate that in terms of labor allocation firms are more segmented across EU countries than across industries, as seen in the fact that differences in the levels of MRPL are higher across countries than across industries. The opposite is true for capital. This suggests that national regulations, language barriers or differences in worker quality play an important part in the efficiency of allocation of labor, while the result for capital suggests that moving a unit of capital from one EU country to another is "cheaper/easier" than moving it from one industry to another, or that quality differences in capital are smaller across countries than across industries.

When we exploit the detailed firm-level information in EIBIS, we find that the significant association between marginal products and firm characteristics is predominantly driven by variables measuring firm demographics, quality of inputs, utilization of resources, and dynamic adjustment of

inputs. In contrast, the contribution of *direct* measures of "barriers and constraints" (which are a *part* of distortions) to cross-sectional variation in MRPK and MRPL seems to be modest. Using the Machado-Mata decomposition we document that the cross-country variation in the within-country dispersion of marginal revenue products is largely brought about by differences in the regression coefficients – reflecting how a country's business, institutional and policy environment "prices" firm characteristics – rather than by differences in the ("endowments" of) firm characteristics. This result is important because it provides large-scale *microeconomic* evidence that institutions matter. In short, if one took all EU countries as a single market where marginal products ought to be equalized, then the current state of Europe is very far from that. We estimate that removing distortions to allocation of resources across EU firms could raise aggregate EU productivity by 43 percent or more.

Our work is related to several strands of previous research. First, we contribute to the rapidly growing literature measuring misallocation of resources (e.g., Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Bartelsman et al., 2013; see Restuccia and Rogerson, 2013, 2017 for literature surveys). In particular, we document new facts about the allocation of capital and labor across EU countries. Since EIBIS data are consistent across countries, our analysis is particularly well suited for cross-country comparisons.

Second, we provide new insights into the nascent literature on *sources* of observed dispersion in marginal products. For example, consistent with Asker et al. (2014), we show that dynamic adjustment of inputs is an important force in accounting for cross-sectional variation in marginal products. However, we also document that other firm characteristics and various measures of distortions have predictive power for marginal revenue products. Previous work tends to use *countrylevel* measures of distortions (e.g., Gamberoni et al., 2016; Kalemli-Ozcan and Sorensen, 2012), tight theoretical restrictions (e.g., David and Venkateswaran, 2019) or specific reforms (e.g., Rotemberg, 2019) to understand the sources of distortions. But there are notable exceptions. For example, Eslava et al. (2024) use administrative data on firm-specific product and input prices to disentangle supply vs. demand/quality in explaining cross-sectional dispersion. In a similar spirit, Kehrig and Vincent (2017) use the full force of administrative data to quantify the contribution of the variation across establishments within firms. We draw on the richness of our survey and utilize *firm-level* information about various constraints and characteristics to account for cross-sectional variation in marginal revenue products with minimal restrictions. As a result, we can move beyond comparison of raw dispersion across countries, estimate the contribution of specific factors to misallocation, compute the associated productivity losses, and maintain high external validity.

Third, by comparing administrative data to survey data, we contribute to recent efforts to assess the importance of measurement errors in observed marginal products (e.g., Bils et al., 2021). In particular, we document high consistency of responses in the survey data of EIBIS and the (census-type) administrative data of Orbis, thus showing that surveys can be a useful source of information so that applied work does not necessarily have to use only data with census-like coverage. Furthermore, data from administrative sources may contain manipulations (e.g., via imputation) that materially influence dispersion and hence implied productivity gains (Rotemberg and White, 2020), and these manipulations vary across statistical agencies. As a result, we likely reduce systematic errors in our data by applying the same EIBIS survey instrument across countries.

Finally, from the policy point of view, our estimates relate to the debate on the need to remove distortions in the EU single market. Launched in 1993, the single market allows for free mobility of labor, capital, goods, and services within the EU. Persistency of frictions and distortions have prevented the full exploitation of the associated benefits, with measurable costs of misallocation, or costs of "non-Europe".

II. Theoretical Framework

To motivate our empirical analysis, consider a Cobb-Douglas production function, isoelastic demand function, and additively separable quadratic adjustment costs. Firm i's profit at time t is given by

$$\pi_{it} = G_{it} \Big[(U_{it}K_{it})^{\alpha} (E_{it}L_{it})^{\beta} (\Delta_{it}X_{it})^{\omega} \Big]^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}} - R_{it} (U_{it})K_{it} - W_{it} (E_{it})L_{it} - P_{it}^{X} (\Delta_{it})X_{it} - \frac{\phi_{K}}{2} \times \left(\frac{K_{it}}{K_{i,t-1}} - 1\right)^{2} R_{it} (U_{it})K_{i,t-1} - \frac{\phi_{L}}{2} \times \left(\frac{L_{it}}{L_{i,t-1}} - 1\right)^{2} W_{it} (E_{it})L_{i,t-1},$$

where $\gamma = \alpha + \beta + \omega$ reflects returns to scale in production, K_{it} is capital, L_{it} is labor, X_{it} is an intermediate input, U_{it} is a measure of capital utilization (or quality), E_{it} is a measure of labor effort (this can also capture efficiency wages or labor quality), Δ_{it} is a measure of intermediate input quality (or utilization), $R_{it}(U_{it})$ is the price schedule for the price of capital as a function of capital utilization (or quality), $W_{it}(E_{it})$ is the price schedule for the price of labor as a function labor effort (or quality), $P_{it}^X(\Delta_{it})$ is the price schedule for the price of intermediate input as a function of its quality (or

utilization), ϕ_K and ϕ_L capture the size of adjustment costs (these could be stochastic and firm specific), G_{it} is a combination of productivity and demand shifters, and σ is the elasticity of demand.

In order to capture the large variation in input prices across firms (e.g., Eslava et al. 2024), we model price schedules as $R_{it}(U_{it}) = R_t^{base} \times U_{it}^{\psi_K}/\psi_K \times \xi_{it}^R$, $W_{it}(E_{it}) = W_t^{base} \times E_{it}^{\psi_L}/\psi_L \times$ ξ_{it}^W , and $P_{it}^X(\Delta_{it}) = P_t^{X,base} \times \Delta_{it}^{\psi_X}/\psi_X \times \xi_{it}^X$, where ψ_K , ψ_L , and ψ_X are slopes of the respective supply schedules, R_t^{base} , W_t^{base} , $P_t^{X,base}$ are market prices for the base quality/utilization of capital, labor and intermediate input, and ξ_{it}^R , ξ_{it}^W , ξ_{it}^X are random shocks (structural distortions) to the schedule.³ Note that while we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function, our empirical approach is effectively based on first-order (log) approximations, which are exact for the Cobb-Douglas case. We also assume that parameters of the production function are the same across firms. In a robustness check reported below, we verify that our conclusions are not sensitive to this assumption.

Firms are assumed to maximize the present value of their profits

$$\Pi_{it} = \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \left(\prod_{s=t}^{\tau} (1+r_s) \right)^{-1} \pi_{i\tau}$$

where r is the market interest rate which we assume to be constant across firms (e.g., the marginal or representative investor is the same across firms).

Let $S_{it} \equiv G_{it} [(U_{it}K_{it})^{\alpha} (E_{it}L_{it})^{\beta} (\Delta_{it}X_{it})^{\omega}]^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}$ be the firm revenue (sales). The optimality conditions imply that marginal revenue products should be equal to (shadow) costs of inputs:

$$MRPK_{it} \equiv (1 - \sigma^{-1})\alpha \frac{S_{it}}{K_{it}} = R_{it}(U_{it}) \left\{ 1 + \phi_K \times \left(\frac{K_{it}}{K_{i,t-1}} - 1\right) - \frac{\phi_K}{1 + r_{t+1}} \times \left(\frac{K_{i,t+1}}{K_{it}} - 1\right) \right\}, \quad (1')$$

$$MRPL_{it} \equiv (1 - \sigma^{-1})\beta \frac{S_{it}}{L_{it}} = W_{it}(E_{it}) \left\{ 1 + \phi_L \times \left(\frac{L_{it}}{L_{i,t-1}} - 1\right) - \frac{\phi_L}{1 + r_{t+1}} \times \left(\frac{L_{i,t+1}}{L_{it}} - 1\right) \right\}, \quad (1'')$$

$$MRPX_{it} \equiv (1 - \sigma^{-1})\omega \frac{S_{it}}{X_{it}} = P_{it}(\Delta_{it}).$$

$$(1''')$$

³ We follow Hall (2004) and others in assuming that firms rent capital. Similar expressions can be derived for the case when firms own capital.

We treat shocks to G_{it} (productivity and demand), R_t^{base} , W_t^{base} , $P_t^{X,base}$ (base input prices that are common across firms), ξ_{it}^R , ξ_{it}^W , and ξ_{it}^X (idiosyncratic volatility in taxes, regulation, input quality, firm age, corporate structure, access to credit markets, etc.) as primitive sources of variation in marginal revenue across firms. Depending on the primitives, firms will choose different mixes of quantity and quality of inputs and, perhaps, different technologies (Jones 2005). In our empirical work below, we will use measures of these factors (quality of inputs, capacity utilization, etc.) as well as variables measuring past and expected quantities in equation (1). This equation also highlights that marginal revenue products depend on both static and dynamic forces. For example, *MRPK* at time *t* depends on the level of capital in periods t - 1 and t + 1. Also note that we cast these optimality conditions in such a manner that we can capture the dynamic forces with variables that we can observe in the survey (e.g., past capital and planned capital) rather than variables that we cannot recover from our data (e.g., Tobin's Q).

Given that the share of pure economic profits is small (e.g., Basu and Fernald, 1997), we can further simplify the expressions for marginal revenue products (see Appendix C, Section A) to obtain the corresponding expressions using observable cost shares s^{K} , s^{L} , s^{X} : $MRPK_{it} \approx s^{K} \frac{S_{it}}{K_{it}}$, $MRPL_{it} \approx s^{L} \frac{S_{it}}{L_{it}}$, $MRPX_{it} \approx s^{X} \frac{S_{it}}{X_{it}}$. Consistent with Hsieh and Klenow (2009), our assumptions imply that we can measure marginal revenue products with average revenue products. Note that, given the mapping from s^{K} , s^{L} , s^{X} to α , β , ω , when we allow heterogeneity in cost shares we allow firms or sectors to have different production function parameters.

To make the connection to the misallocation literature, we consider the following canonical *static* model where firm $i \in [0,1]$ maximizes profit

$$\max \tau_{it}^{Y} P_{it} Y_{it} - \tau_{it}^{K} R_t K_{it} - \tau_{it}^{L} W_t L_{it} - \tau_{it}^{X} P_t^{X} X_{it}$$

subject to the demand constraint $Y_{it} = Y_t \left(\frac{P_{it}}{P_t}\right)^{-\sigma}$ and production function $Y_{it} = A_{it}K_{it}^{\alpha}L_{it}^{\beta}X_{it}^{\omega}$, where Y_{it} is output of firm *i*, Y_t is aggregate output, P_{it} is the price of firm *i*'s output, P_t is the price index, K_{it} is capital, L_{it} is labor, X_{it} is materials (intermediate input), A_{it} is productivity, $\tau^Y, \tau^K, \tau^L, \tau^X$ are distortions in product and input market (no distortion corresponds to $\tau = 1$). Note that in this setting, firms face the same factor prices R_t, W_t, P_t^X . We show in Appendix B that optimality conditions for inputs are

$$MRPK_{it} \equiv (1 - \sigma^{-1})\alpha \frac{P_{it}Y_{it}}{K_{it}} = \frac{\tau_{it}^{K}}{\tau_{it}^{Y}}R_{t},$$
(2')

$$MRPL_{it} \equiv (1 - \sigma^{-1})\beta \frac{P_{it}Y_{it}}{L_{it}} = \frac{\tau^L_{it}}{\tau^Y_{it}}W_t, \qquad (2'')$$

$$MRPX_{it} \equiv (1 - \sigma^{-1})\omega \frac{P_{it}Y_{it}}{X_{it}} = \frac{\tau_{it}^{X}}{\tau_{it}^{Y}} P_{t}^{X}.$$
(2''')

When we compare equations (1) with equations (2), we note that we can define "reducedform" distortions (or "wedges") τ as functions of structural distortions (e.g., ξ) and various compensating differentials for quality, capacity utilization, and adjustment costs:

$$\begin{split} & \frac{\tau_{it}^{K}}{\tau_{it}^{Y}}R_{t} = R_{t}^{base} \times \frac{U_{it}^{\psi_{K}}}{\psi_{K}} \times \xi_{it}^{R} \times \left\{1 + \phi_{K} \times \left(\frac{K_{it}}{K_{i,t-1}} - 1\right) - \frac{\phi_{K}}{1 + r_{t+1}} \times \left(\frac{K_{i,t+1}}{K_{it}} - 1\right)\right\}, \\ & \frac{\tau_{it}^{L}}{\tau_{it}^{Y}}W_{t} = W_{t}^{base} \times \frac{E_{it}^{\psi_{L}}}{\psi_{L}} \times \xi_{it}^{W} \times \left\{1 + \phi_{L} \times \left(\frac{L_{it}}{L_{i,t-1}} - 1\right) - \frac{\phi_{L}}{1 + r_{t+1}} \times \left(\frac{L_{i,t+1}}{L_{it}} - 1\right)\right\}, \\ & \frac{\tau_{it}^{X}}{\tau_{it}^{Y}}P_{t}^{X} = P_{t}^{X,base} \times \frac{\Delta_{it}^{\psi_{X}}}{\psi_{X}} \times \xi_{it}^{X}. \end{split}$$

These expressions lead us to conclude that the variation in marginal revenue products across firms that we attribute to distortions τ may also reflect differences in adjustment costs, as well as input quality, utilization rates, and taxes or regulations. For example, equation (1) makes clear that dispersion of marginal revenue products in a given period is a mixture of distortions such as entry barriers and other factors such as dynamic responses to shocks, a point made forcefully by Asker et al. (2014). If one is interested in long-term dispersion, then dispersion due to dynamic factors should be removed.

Furthermore, if one adjusted inputs for quality and/or account for adjustment costs and if the price schedules were the same across firms, then marginal revenue products for *effective* units of capital ($K_{it}U_{it}$), labor ($E_{it}L_{it}$), and intermediate inputs ($\Delta_{it}X_{it}$) should be equalized across firms and the cross-sectional dispersion ought to be zero. While appealing in theory, adjusting for quality differences in empirical work is fraught with a number of issues. For example, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) adjust for quality differences in labor by dividing output by the wage bill (e.g., more educated workers receive higher wages and the wage bill should hence be higher) rather than by the number of employees so that $(1 - \sigma^{-1})\beta \frac{PY}{WL} = \frac{\tau^L}{\tau^Y}$ provides a measure of distortions. One can make a similar argument for using the ratio of output to the value of capital (rather than the number of machines).

Apart from assuming that observed input prices are allocative (i.e., they affect the mix of inputs),⁴ this approach implicitly assumes that distortions do not accrue to the owners of inputs and wages can reflect only differences in quality (more generally, market segmentation created by distortions is implicitly assumed not to influence factor prices in a given firm or industry). For example, a distortion in the labor market is not captured by workers and the distortion in revenue $(\tau_L - 1)WL$ goes to a third party or is wasted. One can view this assumption as potentially problematic. For example, distortions created by trade unions are likely to be captured at least partially by increased wages for union-covered workers, that is, the wage received by workers is $\tau^L W$ rather than W. Likewise, constraints on immigration almost certainly translate into higher wages for incumbents. As a result, normalizing output by the wage bill not only adjusts for quality differences but also eliminates some distortions that are absorbed into wages, i.e., this adjustment can yield $(1 - \sigma^{-1})\beta \frac{PY}{\tau^L WL} = \frac{1}{\tau^Y}$ which does not include labor market distortions. Because we have direct measures of quality and distortions, we can account for the importance of these directly in the regression contexts by using these measures as controls.

If the dispersion in marginal revenue products is due to distortions, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) offer a simple approach to assess potential gains from a better allocation of resources. Specifically, if distortions are log normally distributed — $\log(\tau_{it}^Y) \sim N(0, V_{\tau Y})$, $\log(\tau_{it}^K) \sim N(0, V_{\tau K})$, $\log(\tau_{it}^K) \sim N(0, V_{\tau K})$, $\log(\tau_{it}^K) \sim N(0, V_{\tau X})$ — and are uncorrelated, the loss in aggregate productivity from the distortions under constant returns to scale in production is given by (see Appendix B)

$$loss = -\left\{\frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)}{2} + \frac{\alpha^{2}\sigma}{2}\right\}V_{\tau K} - \left\{\frac{\beta(1-\beta)}{2} + \frac{\beta^{2}\sigma}{2}\right\}V_{\tau L} - \left\{\frac{\omega(1-\omega)}{2} + \frac{\omega^{2}\sigma}{2}\right\}V_{\tau X} - \frac{\sigma}{2}V_{\tau Y} + t.\,i.\,d.$$
 (3)

where t. i. d. captures terms independent of distortions.⁵

Because we do not have a measure of material costs in EIBIS, we cannot recover a distortion in intermediate inputs. However, we know that this distortion has a non-negative variance and hence this distortion will lower aggregate productivity and output. By ignoring this distortion, we likely understate the gains from improving resource allocation across firms. Also note that, consistent with Hsieh and Klenow (2009), analyses of misallocation use value added rather than gross output for computing marginal revenue products. This approach implicitly assumes that the elasticity of

⁴ This is unlikely to be true for balance sheet values of capital with long lives, see Appendix C, Section B.

⁵ The Hsieh-Klenow framework does not include input-output structure of production and equation (3) may understate the cost of distortions (see, e.g., Jones 2011).

substitution between value added and materials is zero, that is, value added and materials are combined in a Leontief production function (see Basu and Fernald 1996 for a relevant discussion). As a result of this assumption (and specifically zero elasticity of substitution), distortions in materials are not allocative (i.e., they do not alter the mix of inputs) and hence they can be absorbed into τ^{Y} . If distortions for materials are correlated with distortions for labor input for example, our empirical approach will allocate part of the material-input distortion to the labor-input distortion. However, in general it is difficult to sign the bias unambiguously.

III. The Econometric Framework and Identification

Given our derivations in the previous section, we can find that the data analogue of the marginal revenue product of capital (the left-hand side of equation (1)) is $\log(MRPK_{ijct}) = \log\left(s_{jct}^{K} \frac{Y_{ijct}}{K_{ijct}}\right)$ where subscripts *i*, *j*, *c*, *t* index firms, sectors, countries and time, respectively. The discussion in Section II also makes it clear that $\log(MRPK_{ijct})$ is a function of distortions, input quality, capacity utilization, and other variables (the right-hand side of equation (1)) that after further linearization may be summarized as

$$\log(MRPK_{ijct}) = \psi_c + \kappa_j + \lambda_t + X_{ijct}\boldsymbol{b} + \epsilon_{ijct}$$
(4)

where ψ_c is the set of country fixed effects, κ_j is the set of industry fixed effects, λ_t is the set of year fixed effects, X_{ijct} is the vector of explanatory variables (defined below), and ϵ_{ijct} is the disturbance term that captures unexplained variation in *MRPK*. This specification does not include firm fixed effects because we work with the null hypothesis of equalized marginal revenue products across firms rather than within firms. For now, we restrict **b** to be the same across countries but we will relax this assumption later. Note that specification (4) estimates a log-linear approximation of equilibrium relationships in equation (1). An analogous specification and approach is used for other inputs. Data permitting, one can also estimate a more flexible specification with country × sector × year fixed effects η_{ict} :

$$\log(MRPK_{ijct}) = \eta_{jct} + X_{ijct}\boldsymbol{b} + \epsilon_{ijct}.$$
(4')

If one does so, one of course has to expect that a significant part of the overall variation in firmspecific MRPK and MRPL will be absorbed by these country × sector × year fixed effects η_{jct} and that a smaller share of total variation will be explained by the vector X_{ijct} . In estimating equation (4) and similar specifications, we generate several important "outputs". First, we can use ϵ_{ijct} to compute a "residual" measure of dispersion in MRPK and MRPL across countries to assess whether some cross-country variation can be explained by differences in observable firm characteristics and to quantify the contribution of various distortions and compensating differentials to the observed dispersion of marginal revenue products. Second, we obtain estimates of **b** and hence can evaluate how the explanatory variables X_{ijct} predict MRPK and MRPL. Third, we can construct counterfactual distributions of MRPK and MRPL for a given country if it had coefficients **b** or endowments **X** from another country. We will cover this last point in Section VI.D.

A. QUANTIFYING THE CONTRIBUTION OF OBSERVABLE CHARACTERISTICS

Equation (2) makes it clear that we have fewer observables (marginal revenue products) than distortions (τ^Y , τ^K , τ^L , τ^X). In order to identify distortions from the observables, we need to impose a restriction. We follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and impose $\tau_{it}^L = 1$ for all *i* and *t*.⁶ Under this assumption, we show (Appendix B) that

 $log(\tau_{it}^{Y}) = constant - log(MRPL_{it}),$ $log(\tau_{it}^{K}) = constant + log(MRPK_{it}) - log(MRPL_{it}).$

Hence, $V_{\tau Y}$ can be estimated with var $(\log MRPL_i)$ and $V_{\tau K}$ with var $(\log MRPK_i - \log MRPL_i)$.

In Appendix B, we can generalize equation (3) to the case where distortions are correlated to

$$loss = -\left\{\frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)}{2} + \frac{\alpha^2\sigma}{2}\right\} V_{\tau K} - \frac{\sigma}{2} V_{\tau Y} - \rho \sqrt{V_{\tau K} V_{\tau Y}} \sigma \alpha$$
$$= -\left\{\frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)}{2} + \frac{\alpha(1+\alpha)\sigma}{2}\right\} V_{\tau K} - \frac{\sigma(1+\alpha)}{2} V_{\tau Y} + \frac{\sigma\alpha}{2} var(\log(\tau_{it}^K) - \log(\tau_{it}^Y)), \quad (3')$$

where $\rho \equiv corr(\log(\tau_i^Y), \log(\tau_i^K))$. In our data, $\rho > 0$ so that ignoring covariance results in understatement of productivity gains from removing distortions.

Because the variance of distortions is directly mapped into the dispersion of marginal revenue products, there is a simple way to quantify a productivity gain from "removing" a friction. Consider specification (4) with marginal revenue product of capital as the dependent variable. We

⁶ The results are similar when we use an alternative assumption that $\tau_{it}^{K} = 1$ for all *i* and *t*. We also make an implicit identifying assumption that distortions are not correlated with the underlying productivity of firms A_{it} . If there is a positive correlation between distortions and A_{it} , we may understate productivity gains from removing distortions. Note that in our setting distortions may be correlated with *measured* productivity or firm size.

are interested in how much variation in marginal revenue products is explained by a given regressor or a set of regressors. R^2 provides a convenient estimate for this object of interest.

We can quantify the contribution of a given friction to the variation in *MRPK* across firms with the marginal R^2 associated with the friction, that is, the increase in R^2 when a regressor measuring the friction is added to some baseline regression.⁷ Because $V_{\tau Y} = var (\log(MRPL_i))$ under our assumptions, it follows that the change in $V_{\tau Y}$ after removing the friction is $var(\log(MRPL_i)) \times (marginal R^2)$.⁸ Likewise, we can compute the change in $V_{\tau K}$ as $var(\log(MRPK_i) - \log(MRPL_i)) \times (marginal R^2)$ where $(\log(MRPK_i) - \log(MRPL_i))$ is the dependent variable in the regression. Because $var(\log(\tau_{it}^K) - \log(\tau_{it}^Y)) = var (\log(MRPK_i))$, we can estimate the contribution from the last term in equation (3'') as $var (\log(MRPK_i)) \times (marginal R^2)$. Thus, we measure productivity gains from removing a friction with

$$loss = -\left\{\frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)}{2} + \frac{\alpha(1+\alpha)\sigma}{2}\right\} \times var(\log(MRPK_i) - \log(MRPL_i)) \times (marginal \ R^2) - \frac{\sigma(1+\alpha)}{2} \times var(\log(MRPL_i)) \times (marginal \ R^2) + \frac{\sigma\alpha}{2} var(\log(MRPK_i)) \times (marginal \ R^2).$$
(3")

B. ENDOGENEITY OF REGRESSORS

Because X is likely not exogenous, the estimates of b are not causal and hence the interpretation of b is not straightforward. Finding convincing instrumental variables for many regressors in X appears to us to be an unsurmountable challenge. As a result, our empirical strategy is based on two different insights that do not rely on exogeneity of X. First, we know that under the null hypothesis of no misallocation, none of the regressors (including the fixed effects) should have *predictive* power for marginal revenue products. This simple test does not rely on exogeneity of regressors.

Second and more importantly, we are interested in how much variation in marginal revenue products is explained by a given regressor or a set of regressors. In other words, we focus on R^2

⁷ Marginal R^2 is distinct from adjusted R^2 . The former measures an incremental increase in the explanatory power of a regressor (or a set of regressors). The latter measures the fit of the model adjusted for the number of regressors to avoid overfitting and thus is a popular metric for model selection. Given the large number of observations in our sample, the difference between R^2 and adjusted R^2 is miniscule.

⁸ The marginal R^2 is symmetric in the following sense. First, we can compute the marginal R^2 as a change in R^2 when we add regressor X_2 to the specification $Y = b_1 X_1 + error$. Second, we can compute the marginal R^2 as a change in R^2 when we remove regressor X_2 in the specification $Y = b_1 X_1 + b_2 X_2 + error$.

rather than **b**. We know from basic econometrics that estimating specification (4) and similar specifications with OLS will (weakly) overstate R^2 . That is, one can show (all derivations may be found in Appendix D) that for e.g., log (*MRPK*)

$$R_{OLS}^2 \equiv 1 - \frac{var(\hat{\epsilon}_{OLS})}{var(\log(MRPK))} \ge R_{IV}^2 \equiv 1 - \frac{var(\hat{\epsilon}_{IV})}{var(\log(MRPK))}$$
(5)

where $\hat{\epsilon}_{OLS}$ is the estimated error term in the OLS regression and $\hat{\epsilon}_{IV}$ is the *structural* error term in the instrumental variable (IV) regression. Intuitively, some of the attributed variation in OLS estimates could be due to, e.g., simultaneity or omitted variables that may confound an OLS estimated relationship between marginal revenue products and regressors.⁹ Thus, R^2 in an OLS estimate of specification (4) is a biased estimate but it provides an upper bound for how much variation in marginal revenue products may be due to a given friction or a given compensating differential measured in X. As we discussed in the previous section, because larger R^2 s are *ceteris paribus* associated with greater productivity gains and OLS yields an upper bound for R^2 , we likely provide an upper bound for productivity gains from a better allocation of resources across firms. While having an upper bound may be only partially informative, our analysis does not rely on a structural interpretation of \boldsymbol{b} and thus opens a number of opportunities. For example, one does not have to restrict the analysis only to variables with well-identified, exogenous variation. Likewise, one does not have to impose tight theoretical restrictions to achieve identification. This logic extends to marginal R^2 in the sense that OLS estimates of marginal R^2 provide an upper bound for the contribution of a given variable or a vector of variables (hence multivariate settings are also covered) to the variation in a marginal revenue product after partialling out other factors.

There are also a few practical concerns with using the insight of equation (5). First, R_{IV}^2 is not guaranteed to be between 0 and 1 and indeed R_{IV}^2 is often negative in empirical work, which makes model comparisons a challenge. Using $\frac{var(\hat{b}_{IV}X)}{var(\log(MRPK))}$ could be equally problematic for measuring the contribution of exogenous variation in X to variation in $\log(MRPK)$ because X is potentially correlated with the structural shock ϵ and some of the variation in X is due to structural error ϵ (as a result, $\frac{var(\hat{b}_{IV}X)}{var(\log(MRPK))}$ may be greater than 1). To address this issue, Pesaran and Smith (1994) propose a generalized R^2 which uses the *predictive* error in an IV regression: $GR_{IV}^2 \equiv 1 -$

⁹ To address this issue of potentially confounding factors, we include many control variables in specification (4).

 $\frac{var(\tilde{\epsilon}_{IV})}{var(\log(MRPK))} \in [0,1]$, where $\tilde{\epsilon}_{IV} \equiv \log(MRPK) - \hat{b}_{IV}\hat{X}_{IV}$ and \hat{X}_{IV} is the predicted value of X from the first-stage regression (for OLS, $GR_{OLS}^2 = R_{OLS}^2$). We show in Appendix D that R_{OLS}^2 is guaranteed to be greater than GR_{IV}^2 when X is positively (negatively) correlated with ϵ and X is positively (negatively) correlated with log (*MRPK*). This condition is, for instance, satisfied when an omitted variable (e.g., the entrepreneurial talent of a manager) raises log (*MRPK*) and makes a distortion more binding because a growing firm is for instance more likely to run into red tape. In turn, this entails a higher log (*MRPK*) because the firm has too little capital due to red tape. This setting appears plausible to us and we take R_{OLS}^2 to provide an upper bound.

Second, measurement error in X, a potential concern for survey data, will attenuate R_{OLS}^2 toward zero. In particular, we show in Appendix D that $R_{OLS}^2 = R_{true}^2 \frac{var(x)}{var(x)+var(\eta)}$ where var(x)is the variance of a correctly measured regressor x and $var(\eta)$ is the variance of classical measurement error η . If one has N measurements of x with uncorrelated measurement errors, one can reduce the bias by running the regression on averaged values of x: $R_{OLS}^2 = R_{true}^2 \frac{var(x)}{var(x)+\frac{1}{N}var(\eta)}$. We will use this insight to assess how/if measurement errors can materially alter our conclusions. We also show that, with multiple measurements of x, one can use one measurement as an instrument for another measurement (e.g., Griliches 1986). In this case, we will generate $R_{IV}^2 \leq R_{OLS}^2$ and $GR_{IV}^2 = R_{OLS}^2$. Thus, even in this case R_{OLS}^2 is an upper bound. We also note that classical measurement error may affect the level of dispersion in marginal revenue products. However, because classical measurement error is additive in terms of variances, it does not influence the variance contribution attributed to a friction.

IV. Data

The main data source for our analysis is the EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS). In this section we provide information on the design and implementation of the survey. We also compare EIBIS responses to the administrative data of the surveyed firms, as collected in the Orbis database. Once we establish consistency across the survey and administrative data, we describe survey questions that we use in the empirical analysis to account for the variation in MRPK and MRPL across firms.

A. THE EIB INVESTMENT SURVEY (EIBIS)

EIBIS is an annual firm-level survey conducted by the market research company Ipsos MORI on behalf of the European Investment Bank (EIB); see Ipsos (2020) for a detailed review of the survey. The first wave of EIBIS was administrated in 2016, targeting firms in the 27 current EU member states and the UK, with the objective of being representative in each country for different size classes and sectors. The sampling targeted head offices.¹⁰ Eligible respondents were senior persons with responsibility for investment decisions and how investments were financed. This person could be the owner, the finance manager, finance director, head of accounts, Chief Financial Officer (CFO), or Chief Executive Officer (CEO).

The sample was stratified disproportionally by country, industry group (sector) and sizeclass, and stratified proportionally by region within the country. The minimum number of employees of all enterprises is 5, with full-time and part-time employees being counted as one employee and employees working less than 12 hours per week being excluded.¹¹ The Orbis dataset of Bureau van Dijk was used as the sampling frame in all countries. Brutscher et al. (2020) provide evidence on representativeness of the data for the business population of interest (namely enterprises above 5 employees) by comparing distributions in EIBIS with the population of firmlevel data available in Eurostat's Structural Business Statistics (SBS).

The fieldwork for the first wave started in July 2016 and continued until November 2016. The vast majority of the interviews were conducted in the months of August and September 2016. The interview was administrated by telephone using computer-assisting telephone interviewing (CATI). The responses refer to the fiscal year 2015. The response rate was approximately 13 percent, which is typical for surveys of executives (Cycyota and Harrison, 2006). The resulting sample of the first wave consists of 12,483 non-financial enterprises in the 27 current EU countries plus the UK in NACE categories C to J (industrial and services firms). The sample size varies across countries and ranges from 150 enterprises in Cyprus and Luxembourg to 600 in France, Germany,

¹⁰ An enterprise is defined as a company trading as its own legal entity. As such, branches were excluded from the target population. However, the definition is broader than a typical enterprise survey given that some company subsidiaries are their own legal entities.

¹¹ Although the cutoff of 5+ employees is applied consistently across countries, the coverage of firms varies because the size distribution varies across countries. For example, according to Eurostat's SBS, 34 percent of 2015 employment in Greece is accounted by firms with less than five employees while the corresponding figure for Germany is 9 percent. A similar issue arises in other data and studies using fixed cutoffs. At the same time, disparities could be attenuated if one uses value added to measure coverage. For example, SBS reports that, in 2015, the share of value added accounted by firms with less than 10 employees was at 22 percent for Greece and at 15 percent for Germany. Thus, the majority of economic activity is covered by our sample.

Italy and the UK. A total sample of 12,300 firms was targeted, with 150, 400, 475, or 600 quotes of completed interviews per country depending on the size of the population. Because the sampling frame as well as the resulting samples may not be fully representative, Ipsos MORI constructed weights to correct for possible imbalances. In particular, firms are weighted to make them representative of the EU economy based on country, sector and firm size (employment) where the population distribution is reported by SBS.

The second (2017) and third (2018) waves have similar properties and were conducted between April and August 2017 and 2018. At the end of each wave, firms are invited to participate in the next wave of the survey so that EIBIS has a panel component. Approximately 2,000 firms participated in all three waves and approximately 4,500 firms participated in two waves. We have on average 24 firms per country/year/industry (2-digit NACE classification) cell.

EIBIS is a rich source of information with a number of unique characteristics (Appendix E provides the questionnaire for the first wave). First, EIBIS collects basic information on firms (e.g., number of employees, value of fixed assets, sales) which is matched to administrative data.¹² This feature of the survey allows us to cross-check survey responses against data from administrative sources and hence to assess the quality of survey data.

Second, EIBIS gathers data on expectations and perceptions of firms' management (e.g., perceived obstacles to investment, plans for future investment) as well as statistics that are often not available in standard official sources (e.g., quality of capital, capacity utilization, sources of financing). These variables can inform us directly about sources of variation in marginal revenue products across firms and we can thus make progress relative to studies based only on income statements and balance sheets.

Third, EIBIS data are collected in a *consistent* manner for a large number of firms across *many* countries and industries, thus permitting us to carry out a comparative analysis of resource allocation in diverse institutional settings. Using these unique data, we explore the relationship between MRPK and MRPL and a large number of explanatory variables at the *firm* level. To this end, we use questions on firm demographics, capacity utilization, quality of the capital stock, obstacles to long-term investment, investment plans, investment rate, employment growth, and sources of finance.

¹² The data on each firm from EIBIS was merged with Orbis and the match was done by Ipsos-Mori, which provided anonymized data to the EIB. This means that EIBIS does not have the name, the address, the contact details or any additional individual information that could identify the firms in the final sample. Note that not every firm in EIBIS has complete information in Orbis (e.g., Orbis may have missing information on employment while EIBIS does not).

While surveys can offer important insights not available in administrative records (e.g., perceptions and investment plans), survey data present some challenges too. For example, surveys tend to have larger measurement errors (but not always, see Kapteyn and Ypma, 2007), an issue that we investigate below. Because surveys rely on voluntary participation, they tend to be short to avoid survey fatigue. As a result, some information is not gathered (e.g., EIBIS does not collect data on intermediate inputs). Despite these limitations, we find that on balance the pros of EIBIS outweigh its cons.

B. DATA FILTERS AND ADDITIONAL DATA

To minimize potentially adverse effects of extreme observations, we winsorize continuous variables at the top and bottom one percent. For firms with missing information for a given variable, we impute the average value of that variable in the industry-country cell.¹³ For each variable, we create a corresponding indicator variable taking value one if the values were imputed. We include these indicator variables as additional regressors but do not report their estimated coefficients in the regression tables. We estimate the cost shares for labor and materials using data from the Industrial Analysis section of the OECD's Structural Analysis Database (STAN) or from Eurostat national accounts that are available at the level of a country, year and 2-digit NACE industry (OECD 2025, Eurostat 2025). In a series of robustness checks, we compute cost shares using more disaggregated data which permit greater variation in production function parameters across sectors or firms. We find that the results are not materially different.

C. COMPARISON OF SURVEY AND ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

The Orbis database is a popular source of administrative data for cross-country analyses at the firm level.¹⁴ We use these data to cross-check EIBIS responses. In particular, we match firms' EIBIS responses with their administrative (Orbis) data and compare cross-firm dispersion of the logarithm of sales, fixed assets and employment in EIBIS and Orbis for those firms by country (Table 1) and by industry (Table 2). In columns (4), (7) and (10) of Tables 1 and 2, we also report correlations between the responses in EIBIS and the administrative data in Orbis.

¹³ We impute 3.3 percent of observations. The results are similar if we constrain the sample to observations with nonmissing values.

¹⁴ See Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015) and Bajgar et al. (2020) for a detailed analysis of the (dis)advantages of using this dataset.

We observe high consistency across the two sources of data. For example, the correlation between log employment in EIBIS and administrative data in Orbis is 0.91. The dispersion of the survey responses across firms is on average slightly larger than the dispersion in the administrative data, which is consistent with small noise (measurement error) in survey responses. Note that relative to the data on fixed assets, data on employment are available for fewer firms in the Orbis database.

Because EIBIS uses a random sample of firms, we also evaluate whether the dispersion of the sales-to-capital and sales-to-labor ratios estimated on the sample is consistent with the dispersion calculated for the population of firms. For this exercise, we use data for countries that have excellent (i.e., close to population) coverage in Orbis for each industry and firm size category (Brutscher et al. 2020): Italy, Portugal, and Romania. We find that mean absolute log difference between EIBIS and Orbis measures of standard deviations computed at the country level is approximately 2 percent, that is, the two sources of data produce very similar measures of dispersion. We conclude that EIBIS provides a satisfactory quality of firm-level data and that the survey responses are therefore suitable for our analysis.

D. DISPERSION OF MARGINAL REVENUE PRODUCTS

We report descriptive statistics for the EIBIS sample in Table 3. The key statistic for our analysis is the dispersion of marginal revenue products. We observe a sizable dispersion across firms in the EU: the standard deviation is 1.43 for log(*MRPK*), 1.19 for log(*MRPL*), and 1.63 for (log(*MRPL*) – log(*MRPK*)).¹⁵ For comparison, the dispersion of marginal value-added product across establishments ("plants") for the U.S. is considerably smaller, namely 0.98 for capital (Table 2 in Asker et al., 2014) and 0.58 for labor (Table 1 in Bartelsman et al., 2013).

Before drawing conclusions, we note that there are three potentially confounding sources of differences between our statistics and statistics reported for the U.S. First, EIBIS does not collect information on the cost of intermediate inputs and we therefore use sales to compute marginal revenue products for capital and labor, while previous studies use value added. Using EIBIS firms matched to the Orbis database (which has information on sales and value added), we find that the standard deviation of log(MRPK) based on sales is approximately 0.16 log points higher than the

¹⁵ We find similar magnitudes when we use robust methods to estimate standard deviation. For example, when we employ median absolute deviation (MAD) to estimate $st. dev. = 1.48 \times MAD$ where $MAD = median|x_i - \tilde{x}|$, $\tilde{x} = median(x_i)$ and x_i is a random variable, we find that the standard deviation is 1.49 for log *MRPK*, 1.14 for log(*MRPL*) and 1.68 for (log(*MRPL*) - log(*MRPK*)).

standard deviation of log(MRPK) based on value added. On the other hand, the standard deviation of log(MRPL) based on sales is approximately 0.21 log points lower than the standard deviation of log(MRPL) based on value added. Thus, using revenue rather than value added does not appear to explain the difference between the EU and US.

Second, our analysis is based on survey responses while US studies typically rely on administrative data. We might observe a US-EU difference in dispersion because survey data are more likely to have measurement error. As we discuss above, however, survey responses in EIBIS are broadly consistent with administrative data in Orbis.¹⁶ To explore further the quantitative significance of measurement error, we exploit the panel component of EIBIS and compute the average $\log(MRPK)$ and $\log(MRPL)$ across years for a given firm, as well as cross-sectional dispersion of these averages. The disadvantage of taking averages across years (using repeated measurements) is that one attenuates not only measurement errors but also transitory factors (e.g., adjustment costs or high-frequency variation in demand) and the reduction in dispersion is likely to overstate the role of measurement errors. With this caveat in mind, we find that, in a consistent sample of firms, the standard deviation of average log MRPK is 8 percent lower for firms participating in two waves of the survey and 12 percent lower for firms participating in three waves. The corresponding figures for log MRPL are 4 percent for two-wave firms and 1 percent for three-wave firms. These results suggest that measurement error can only account for a limited portion of the EU-US difference in the dispersion of marginal revenue products. Note that while measurement error can influence the *level* of dispersion, our objective is to study what *share* of dispersion in marginal revenue products can be rationalized by various measures of distortions and compensating differentials. As we show below, using three-year averages does not alter our calculations of variance contributions due to these forces.

Third, the unit of analysis in EIBIS is either a firm or a subsidiary which is a (weakly) larger unit than an establishment. Kehrig and Vincent (2017) document that approximately two-thirds of the variance in marginal value-added product of capital across establishments happens across establishments within a firm; that is, the variance across firms is approximately one-third

¹⁶ In agreement with high consistency in measures of employment, capital, and sales across data sources, we observe that measured dispersion of marginal revenue products is similar in EIBIS and Orbis. For example, for the sample of EIBIS firms that are matched to Orbis firms with non-missing data (6,432 firms in 2015), the standard deviation of log(MRPK) is 1.44 in Orbis and 1.37 in EIBIS. The corresponding figures for log(MRPL) are 1.07 in Orbis and 1.30 in EIBIS. Consistent with some measurement error in survey responses, the dispersion of MRPL is somewhat larger in the survey than in administrative data.

of the variance across establishments. Hence, comparing the US and EU figures is likely to *understate* the difference between the two economies.

While contrasting the EU and US figures highlights challenges of cross-country comparisons, it is clear that qualitatively the greater dispersion of marginal revenue products (misallocation of resources) in the EU relative to the US is consistent with lower aggregate productivity in the EU relative to the US (e.g., van Ark et al., 2008). Fortunately, EIBIS covers all EU member states and we can exploit the consistency of measurement across countries within the survey to examine whether greater dispersion of marginal revenue products is associated with lower aggregate productivity. Figure 1 demonstrates that, as predicted by theory, there is a robust negative correlation between dispersion and productivity. This fact not only adds credibility to survey-based measures of marginal revenue products, but it also provides further motivation for studying dispersion as a potential source of cross-country productivity differences.

V. Cross-Country and Cross-Industry Differences

In our data, there is also considerable cross-country variation in the *average* marginal revenue products – 0.33 for log(*MRPK*) and 0.70 for log(*MRPL*) – but this variation is small relative to the within-country variation in MRPK and MRPL. In Figure 2, we show the estimated dispersion in MRPK (Panel A) and MRPL (Panel B) within countries, measured as the within-country standard deviation in the logarithm of MRPK and MRPL, respectively. We present the dispersion in "raw" marginal revenue products and in marginal revenue products adjusted for various groups of fixed effects (country, industry and year fixed effects; country × industry × year fixed effects) in a cross-country regression given by equation (4). Although MRPK and MRPL are dispersed in both the more and less advanced economies, the dispersion of raw marginal products is particularly high in smaller countries such as Malta (MT), Luxembourg (LU) and Cyprus (CY). As may be seen in Figure 3, the dispersion of MRPK and MRPL is highly correlated at the country level, suggesting an important role of the τ^{Y} distortion in line with our results above.

Although controlling for industry and year fixed effects reduces the cross-sectional dispersion, it generally preserves the ranking of countries. Introducing country × industry × year fixed effects does not only reduce the level of dispersion, it also attenuates differences across countries. For example, France and Italy have rather different dispersion of "raw" MRPK but they have similar

dispersion of MRPK after the adjustment is made for the controls and country \times industry fixed effects. Table 4 summarizes the predictive power of various fixed effects.

The quantitative importance of country, industry and year fixed effects or the interaction terms country \times industry \times year raises an important identification challenge. In particular, fixed effects absorb not only cross-country/industry compensating differentials related to the quality of inputs, but also barriers to capital and/or labor flows across countries and industries. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to resolve this identification problem, we can provide some leads for discussion and future research.

To the extent that fixed effects embody distortions or compensating differentials common to countries or industries, for MRPL these patterns suggest either that moving a worker from one country to another is "costlier" than moving the worker from one industry to another – that is, countries are more segmented than industries and therefore differences in levels of MRPL are higher across countries than across industries and these differences are reflected in fixed effects – or that quality differences across workers are larger between countries than between industries. Indeed, the R^2 in the regression with country fixed effects is much higher than the R^2 in the regression with industry fixed effects only, which suggests that industry is likely a less important driver of MRPL dispersion across countries.

On the other hand, for capital the R^2 with industry fixed effects is higher than the R^2 with country fixed effects. One may interpret this as suggesting that moving a unit of capital from one country to another is "cheaper/easier" than moving it from one industry to another, or that quality differences in capital are smaller between countries than between industries.

Finally, there is a large increase in the R^2 when we introduce country × industry × year fixed effects: R^2 is 0.492 for MRPK and 0.736 for MRPL (column 5 of Table 4). Again, these results are consistent with two explanations. The first one is that there is an additional barrier to move a worker or a unit of capital across countries *and* industries relative to moving a worker or a unit of capital across countries but within an industry or across industries within a country. The alternative explanation is that there is an additional quality difference when workers or capital are compared across industries *and* countries. Irrespective of which view is taken, it is clear that there are quantitatively important complementarities in industry and country attributes.

What are the welfare implications of these results? Equation (3") provides a straightforward approach to measure potential gains from improved allocation of resources. For our approximate

estimates of productivity losses due to potential misallocation, we use \bar{s}^{K} (equal to 0.19 in the data) to parameterize α . We follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and calibrate $\sigma = 3$ which likely yields a conservative estimate of productivity losses due to misallocation. With these parameter values, the weight on $V_{\tau Y}$ is 1.50 and the weight on $V_{\tau K}$ is 0.13. To have a level of variation in marginal revenue products, we use the dispersion from Table 3: $var(\log(MRPK)) = 1.43^2 \approx 2.05$, $var(\log(MRPL)) = 1.19^2 \approx 1.42$ and $var(\log(MRPL) - \log(MRPK)) = 1.63^2 \approx 2.66$.

To trace the steps of our approach, suppose that one can interpret fixed effects as capturing barriers and distortions and consider the results for country fixed effects. As reported in column (1) of Table 4, the marginal R^2 s are 0.042 for log(*MRPK*) (row 1, Table 4), 0.387 for log(*MRPL*) (row 2, Table 4) and 0.172 for (log(*MRPL*) – log(*MRPK*)) (row 3, Table 4). It follows that the gain in productivity is $1.8 \times 1.42 \times 0.387 + 0.44 \times 2.66 \times 0.172 - 0.3 \times 2.05 \times 0.042 = 1.16$. In other words, removing country-border distortions can raise aggregate productivity by more than 116 log percentage points according to the Hsieh-Klenow framework. Industry fixed effects also suggest potentially large productivity gains (60 log percentage points; row 4, column 2) if capital and labor can flow freely across industries. Year fixed effects account for very little variation in our data. Removing barriers between industries *and* countries could raise productivity by at least 169 log percentage points (row 4, column 4 of Table 4).

Because countries may specialize in certain industries, country fixed effects may be correlated with industry fixed effects. Although there is no unique way to decompose the contribution of regressors in a multivariate specification, Shapley's (1953) classic approach computes marginal R^2 s that are not sensitive to the ordering in which regressors are included. In other words, this approach allows us to allocate R^2 across sets of regressors when all regressors are included and the regressors are potentially correlated. Panel B of Table 4 reports Shapley's marginal R^2 s for groups of fixed effects in the regression given by column (4) in Panel A. By construction, for each row the sum of marginal R^2 s reported in columns (1)-(3) is equal to the total R^2 reported in column (4). Given the additive nature of productivity calculations in equation (3''), we can then compute productivity gains for a set of fixed effects after controlling for other regressors. Row (8) shows that out of 169 (log) percent gain from removing barriers between industries *and* countries (column (4), row (8)), country barriers account for almost 113 log percentage points, while almost 57 log percentage points stem from industry barriers. To be clear, there could be alternative decompositions of R^2 and alternative interpretations of fixed effects (e.g., recall the discussion of quality vs. distortion above)

Our findings suggest that EU is rather fragmented economically and that it could achieve considerable gains in productivity. What set of estimates should one use to compute the cost of inadequately integrated Europe? In an ideal case, marginal revenue products should be equalized across countries *and* industries. However, achieving this objective may be infeasible. For example, industries may have a variety of idiosyncratic factors that could prevent equalization. As a result, one may propose a weaker goal: equalize marginal returns across countries. In our context, this means that one should focus on the case where we control only for industry fixed effects, i.e., within-industry marginal revenue products should for instance be similar in "Germany" and "Greece". To be clear, this exercise ignores variation in firm characteristics within industries/countries and to make further progress we need to consider a richer set of covariates to understand the variation in marginal revenue products. This is the goal of the next section.

VI. Firm-Level Covariates

In this section, we present four sets of results. First, we explore the extent to which firm characteristics predict log(MRPK) and log(MRPL). Second, we use our estimates to quantify productivity gains from better allocation of resources. Third, we consider how adjustment for observed firm characteristics can influence measures of cross-sectional dispersion in MRPK and MRPL and hence potentially reduce inefficiencies in resource allocation. Fourth, we assess whether the observed cross-country dispersion in MRPK and MRPL is due to differences in firm characteristics ("endowments," as reflected in the values of the explanatory variables) or to differences in how these characteristics are "priced" (i.e., in how regression coefficients – reflecting business, institutional and policy environment – affect MRPK and MRPL).

A. EIBIS VARIABLES USED IN THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS

We consider several blocks of variables available in the survey to construct vector X in equation (4). We next discuss possible relationships between the variables and marginal revenue products. The choice of variables is motivated by previous work and is partially constrained by data

availability.¹⁷ Some of the variables in the survey are qualitative, which creates some distance between an ideal theoretical metric and its survey counterpart. However, even these imperfect measures — which are often used for policy (e.g., the World Bank uses similar measures to construct its *Ease of Doing Business* index) and research (e.g., Djankov et al. 2002) — allow us to go well beyond what one can achieve relying only on administrative data. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3 (and by survey wave in Appendix Table A.1). While we include many regressors to fully exploit the richness of the EIBIS, one should not be concerned with overfitting in specification (4) because the sample size is very large relative to the number of regressors. Generally, EIBIS variables can be interpreted as endowments (e.g., firm age), managerial choices (e.g., capacity utilization, quality of capital, investment plans, composition of financing), and constraints (e.g., access to infrastructure).

Firm demographics

Employment size: Gourio and Roys (2014), Garicano et al. (2016), Bento and Restuccia (2017), Eslava et al. (2022) and other studies document that various size-based policies can introduce distortions to the scale of operation and, hence, allocation of resources (e.g., firms in low-productivity countries are systematically smaller than firms in high-productivity countries).

Firm age: Hsieh and Klenow (2014) and others argue that productivity of firms may have an important life-cycle component. For example, firms may accumulate more organizational capital as they age. On the other hand, one may expect that firms that have been longer in existence have older and probably lower quality capital so that older firms could have lower measured MRPK.

Subsidiary status – Subsidiaries may have access to cheap intra-group capital, resulting in a lower optimal MRPK, or they may be rationed and monitored for efficient use of capital by the parent company, resulting in a higher MRPK. Subsidiaries may also have a higher quality capital, resulting in higher MRPK. As regards labor, subsidiaries of foreign firms tend to pay higher wages than local firms (see, e.g., Lipsey, 2003; Malchow-Møller et al., 2013). In addition, labor services provided by headquarters may not be included as a labor input for a subsidiary. One may hence

¹⁷ Lack of data prevents us from exploring the importance of firm-level variation in market power (mark-ups). To the extent other variables are correlated with markups, we can overstate the quantitative significance of these other variables in accounting for observed variation in marginal revenue products.

expect that their MRPL will be higher than that of other firms. Approximately one-third of firms in our sample are subsidiaries.

Exporter status: Being more exposed to competition, exporters are relatively more likely to employ high-quality, and hence more expensive inputs (see, e.g., Verhoogen, 2008).

Utilization and quality of inputs

Quality of capital: OECD (2001) and other statistical agencies emphasize that proper measurement of productivity requires adjustment for the quality of inputs (e.g., new vintages of capital goods). In our context, a higher quality of capital, measured by a greater share of "machinery and equipment (including ICT) that are state-of-the-art", and a higher proportion of "commercial buildings that satisfy high energy efficiency standards" are expected to have a positive effect on MRPK if they represent an upward shift in the MRPK curve or a negative effect if they constitute a movement along the MRPK curve.

Capacity utilization: Fernald (2001) and others document that variable utilization of resources can materially influence measured productivity. For example, firms operating at (or even above) maximum capacity are expected to have high MRPK and MRPL as all machinery, equipment and labor are used to the fullest extent and there is demand for more. Capacity utilization can also help us control for firm-level variation in the composition of transitory vs. persistent shocks. Intuitively, Abel and Eberly (1998) show that, when facing adjustment costs, firms should use utilization in response to transitory shocks and adjust inputs (buy more machines or hire more workers) in response to persistent shocks.

Obstacles to investment

The variables included in this cluster are answers of firms' top management to questions about constraints on investment. The World Bank and other institutions use similar questions to construct measures for barriers to entry, which have been related to reduced productivity (see e.g., Gorodnichenko et al. 2010; Commander and Svejnar 2011; World Bank 2018).¹⁸ When asked about a specific potential constraint, the respondent in EIBIS reports whether he/she considers it to be a "major obstacle", "minor obstacle", or "not an obstacle at all". The list of constraints includes: *Demand for products or services, Availability of staff with the right skills, Energy costs*,

¹⁸ While these indicators may be imperfect measures of various barriers, they are relevant variables from the viewpoint of policymakers. Indeed, many governments focus on addressing poor scores on these variables so as to move up in various rankings.

Access to digital infrastructure, Availability of adequate transport infrastructure, Labor market regulation, Business regulations and taxation, Availability of finance, Uncertainty about future. For each obstacle, approximately 20-40 percent of firms report it to be a major obstacle and another 30 percent regard it as a minor obstacle.

Dynamic adjustment

Firms are exposed to a variety of shocks and with adjustment costs it may take time and resources for firms to reoptimize factor allocation. Although EIBIS data does not have a large panel component, the survey asks questions about firms' current and previous investment choices – an aspect that enables us to examine the dynamics of inflows and outflows of capital and labor.¹⁹ These variables can help us understand misallocation because, as argued by Asker et al. (2014), the variability of input growth can inform us about the importance of adjustment costs. Indeed, the optimality conditions in equation (1) highlight that, with adjustment costs, *current* marginal revenue products depend on *past* and *future* choices of capital, labor and other inputs. The variables included in this cluster are:

Investment: Investment increases the amount of capital used and should result in a lower MRPK as the firm experiences diminishing returns to capital (movement down along the MRPK curve). While it is common to use investment rate (that is, investment normalized by capital stock or by sales), we use log(1 + investment). Our choice is motivated by the possible presence of measurement error in reported fixed assets and/or sales. Since these two variables appear on the left-hand side of equation (4), the conventional scaling of investment may introduce spurious correlations due to measurement errors. We use the log transformation to take care of the thick right tail in the volume of investment. We add one to the transformation to keep in the sample firms with zero investment.

Employment growth over the past three years: This explanatory variable should have a negative effect on MRPL as the firm experiences diminishing returns to labor.

Investment over the past three years: This variable comes in the form of management's information about whether this investment was "too much", "too little" or "about the right amount." One would expect that "too much" results in a low MRPK as the firm experiences diminishing returns to capital, while "too little" goes the other way.

¹⁹ Since EIBIS does not have information about material costs, we assume implicitly that materials can be adjusted quickly.

Investment plans for the next three years: Our derivations indicate that MRPK should be a function of not only current and past investment rates but also expected future investment activities. Thus, having information about firms' investment plans may be useful in explaining contemporaneous dispersion of MRPK across firms. A unique feature of EIBIS data is that the survey asks firms to report their investment priority for the next three years, which contrasts with studies such as Asker et al (2014) that have data only on realized investment. Specifically, firms can report whether investment will focus on "replacing capacity (existing buildings, machine, equipment and IT)", "expanding capacity for existing products and services", "developing or introducing new products, processes or services", or "do not have investment planned." There is no *a priori* expectation as to which types of investment (replacement versus capacity expansion) would enhance or diminish the effect of the investment rate variable. However, the response "developing or introducing new products, processes or services" may be expected to have a positive effect on MRPK as the firm expands into these new areas and needs time to accumulate the optimal capital stock. The most popular investment priority is "replacing capacity" (35 percent).

Source of funding

Share of investment funded by internal and external finance: Firms may have different cost of capital depending for instance on how old they are or how connected they are to capital markets. In particular, a number of studies (e.g., Desai et al., 2004; Fama and French, 2002) document that the cost of external funds is higher than the cost of internal funds (or funds obtained within a business group). EIBIS asks firms with positive investment to report the source of their funds to pay for their investment (internal, external, intra-group).

Credit constraint: Midrigan and Xu (2014) and others document that credit frictions can generate misallocation of capital. To measure the importance of this channel, we use an indicator variable that is equal to one if a firm was rejected in its loan application, was discouraged from applying for a loan, or received a loan that was too small or too expensive.

B. REGRESSION RESULTS

In our analysis we estimate equation (4) and its versions where we enter as regressors variables X together with various combinations of fixed effects. We re-iterate that we do not interpret the estimated relationships as causal. We estimate equilibrium relationships and estimated coefficients may therefore have signs and magnitudes potentially inconsistent with priors built on causal

relationships between the variables. For example, we may observe a positive association between a marginal product and a constraint because the constraint can be only binding for the more advanced firms. While this may be viewed as a limitation, our analysis has important benefits. Recall that if X does not predict the variation in marginal revenue products across firms, one can under certain conditions use "raw" marginal revenue products to compute productivity losses from the dispersion of marginal revenue products across firms. On the other hand, if X predicts a sizable fraction of the variation in marginal revenue products, then the dispersion of "raw" marginal revenue products is potentially not the appropriate indicator for productivity calculations.

Moreover, in our explanatory analysis we assess the potential of X to predict the variation of marginal revenue products in the data by providing an upper bound on the magnitude of causal effects and thus (marginal) R^2 is an informative statistic. Whether the variables in vector X reflect genuine distortions (e.g., undesirable regulations) or compensating differentials (e.g., quality of inputs or intensity of effort) influences how one should interpret R^2 s. If the variables measure distortions, then our estimates suggest that by removing distortions one can achieve considerable productivity gains. On the other hand, if variables in X measure compensating differentials, then R^2 s point to adjustments that one should make *before* calculating productivity losses. In other words, the observed dispersion may overstate inefficiency and hence also productivity losses. To illustrate this point, we classify X into "distortions" and "compensating differentials" although, as we emphasized above, the interpretation of the estimated coefficients is tentative and the issue ought to be tackled systematically in future research.²⁰

Table 5 (panels A and B) presents marginal R^2 s for blocks of variables, that is, by how much R^2 increases after a given block of variables is added to various fixed effects specifications. We observe for both MRPK and MRPL that the marginal R^2 s are the largest for variables in the

²⁰ We report estimated coefficients of equation (4) in Appendix Table A.4. The results are qualitatively similar when we restrict the sample to firms that participated in all three waves of the survey (Appendix Table A.5). The results are also similar when we estimate equation (4) for each wave separately. The results are similar when we include an indicator variable equal to one if a firm reports positive investment, and zero otherwise (the baseline specification uses log(1+investment)). See Appendix Table A.7 (analogue of Table A.4). One may be concerned that we use employment and capital (investment) measured with error to compute the dependent variables and use the same employment and capital as a regressor because measurement error can mechanically create a negative correlation between a regressor and a regressand. To address this concern, we use employment and investment from Orbis as regressors and we find nearly identical results (compare Appendix Tables A.4 and A.17). The correlation matrix for to **X** is reported in Appendix Table A.3

"adjustment" and "demographics" blocks, and that they are relatively low for variables in the "obstacles to investment" block.²¹

For illustration purposes, we next lump these blocks of variables into two groups. In the first group we include "quality of capital," "capacity utilization," and "adjustment." We interpret this group as *compensating differentials* because it could be argued that they reflect firm policies. Just as more educated workers have higher productivity and hence demand a compensating premium for accumulating higher human capital, higher-quality capital may demand a compensating differential for the cost of inputs necessary to ensure higher quality. The second group of variables includes "demographics," "obstacles to investment," and "source of funds," which we interpret as *constraints and distortions* because they reflect predetermined factors and business environment. We see in Table 5 that in terms of marginal R^2 the predictive power is similar for the two important conclusions. First, the "raw" dispersion in marginal products is likely to overstate the extent of misallocation since some variation is likely to be brought about by heterogeneity in the "quality" of inputs. Second, "distortions" are likely to be substantial and removing them may lead to significant gains in productivity.

We find that these results are robust. First, we obtain similar results (Appendix Tables A.6, A.7, A.8) when we estimate equation (4) using a "between" regression — a regression that is estimated on average (across years) values of the regressors and regressands. This specification likely reduces the importance of transitory factors such as measurement errors and adjustment costs. The results suggest that measurement error is unlikely to overturn our conclusions. Second, we find similar results when we do not use sampling weights which can amplify idiosyncratic variation for firms with high weights (Appendix Tables A.18, A.19, A.20). Third, one may be concerned that the dispersion of marginal revenue products is driven by heterogeneity in firm-level production functions rather than by distortions. To assess the quantitative importance of this concern, we use average *firm-level* cost shares from the survey (rather than cost shares computed at the country \times industry level) to compute marginal revenue products. In other words, we allow each firm to have a

²¹ We also see (in the memorandum section of Table A.4) that the R^2 for the specification without (with) fixed effects is 0.14 (0.49) for MRPK and 0.29 (0.74) for MRPL, which may appear somewhat small but in fact is in line with R^2 s estimated for wage regressions and for regressions with detailed firm/worker fixed effects (see, e.g., Card et al., 2013). As we saturate the regression with fixed effects, the variance contribution in Y due to X shrinks. The remaining explanatory power of X in this case is comparable to 4-5 percent reported for time-varying worker characteristics in other studies (e.g., Card et al., 2013).

different set of production function parameters.²² We find results that are similar to the baseline, thus indicating that firm-level heterogeneity in the production function is unlikely to materially change our conclusions (Appendix Tables A.21, A.22, A.23). The results are also similar when we use more disaggregated industry definitions to compute cost shares. Finally, we apply our approach separately to three major sectors in the data -- manufacturing; services; construction and utilities. We find that the results are similar across these sectors (Appendix Tables A.24-A.30).²³ These results suggest that distortions could be uniformly hurtful across sectors.

C. PRODUCTIVITY GAINS

We carry out calculations for several policy scenarios. First, assume that the policymakers would eliminate the dispersion in marginal revenue products brought about by the "distortions" group of variables. Table 5 reports the marginal R^2 for various specifications without and with fixed effects. Clearly, the marginal R^2 decreases as we add a richer set of fixed effects. To obtain an upper bound on productivity gains, we consider the marginal R^2 without fixed effects (column (1)). The marginal R^2 s of the "distortions group" are 0.071 for log(*MRPK*) (row 8, Table 5), 0.146 for log(*MRPL*) (row 17, Table 4) and 0.112 for (log(*MRPL*) – log(*MRPK*)) (row 26, Table 4). It follows that the gain in productivity is $1.8 \times 1.42 \times 0.146 + 0.44 \times 2.66 \times 0.112 - 0.3 \times 2.05 \times 0.071 = 0.459$, which is reported in Panel D (row 35, column 1) of Table 5. In other words, removing distortions could raise aggregate productivity by close to 50 log percentage points. The magnitude of productivity gains depends on which fixed effects are included (e.g., the gain is 36 log percentage points after controlling for industry fixed effects; see column 3, row 35 of Table 5) and how fixed effects are interpreted, a matter that we cover in the next subsection. The gains also vary with alternative values of σ and α , which are relatively conservative in our baseline calibration.

Second, consider the possibility that *all* variables in *X* capture distortions. In this case, without fixed effects the marginal R^2 s are 0.119 for log(*MRPK*) (row 9, Table 5), 0.228 for log(*MRPL*) (row 18, Table 5) and 0.243 for (log(*MRPL*) – log(*MRPK*)) (row 27, Table 5). With these marginal R^2 s, the gain is $1.8 \times 1.42 \times 0.228 + 0.44 \times 2.66 \times 0.243 - 0.3 \times 2.05 \times 0.119 = 0.793$, which is reported in Panel D (row 36, column 1) of Table 5. Interestingly,

²² The coefficients in these regressions may be identified even with firm fixed effects because output-to-input ratios vary over time.

²³ For example, the gains from removing "distortions" are 47.8 (log) percent for manufacturing (column 1, row 35, Table A.27), 44.8 (log) percent for services (column 1, row 35, Table A.28), and 51.8 (log) percent for construction and utilities (column 1, row 35, Table A.29).

variables in the "adjustment" block contribute to productivity gains (row 32) as much as variables in the "demographics" block (row 28). In short, treating all variables in X as distortions increases the magnitude of potential gains by over one-half relative to the first scenario. Consistent with our prediction that measurement errors can attenuate estimated productivity gains, we find higher gains when we use "between" regressions (Appendix Table A.8), but the difference from the baseline estimates in Table 5 is small.

Because marginal R^2 s may be sensitive to the ordering in which (blocks of) variables are included, in Table 6 we report Shapley decomposition of R^2 . In Panel A of Table 6 we show the allocation of R^2 across groups of variables when fixed effects are included, while in Panel B we show the same results when fixed effects are not included. In column (4) of Panel B we present the upper bound on productivity gains of groups of variables given by the marginal R^2 without fixed effects. Consistent with our earlier findings, country fixed effects account for the largest gains in productivity and industry fixed effects have the second largest contribution. These are followed by "adjustment" variables and "demographics" variables. The productivity gain associated with the "distortions group" of variables is 0.427, which is close to the 0.459 estimate reported in the simple (non-Shapley) approach above.²⁴

These results suggest that the EU has the potential to increase productivity considerably by improving its allocation of resources. Obviously, the magnitude of the gains depends on the interpretation of variables collected in X and fixed effects, but our approach is highly portable and can provide an upper-bound estimate for any variable of interest. Indeed, comparing dispersion of marginal revenue products across countries may be a first step in identifying the problem, but our approach permits one to identify *which* factors are likely to be most limiting. Given that frictions are often best measured with surveys (e.g., where firms may report the importance of various barriers, regulation, etc.), EIBIS and other similar initiatives can provide a key input for policymakers.

D. MACHADO-MATA DECOMPOSITION

While our analysis so far is helpful for understanding what factors can predict MRPK and MRPL, it is also useful to understand whether the cross-country differences in dispersion are brought about

²⁴ If we consider the possibility that *all* variables in *X* capture distortions, the gain in productivity remains at 0.793 by construction of the Shapley decomposition of R^2 .

by differences in firm characteristics or by the way how these characteristics are translated into differences in marginal revenue products. To address this question, we carry out a Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition of the variance in MRPK and MRPL.²⁵ We start by using Germany and Greece as two polar cases: $\sigma(\log(MRPK))$ is 0.89 for Germany and 1.57 for Greece, while $\sigma(\log(MRPL))$ is 0.60 for Germany and 0.88 for Greece. We decompose the distributions of MRPK and MRPL, respectively, into effects that are due to the values of the explanatory variables X ("endowments") and effects that are due to the coefficients b ("prices") on these variables. This *predictive* (not causal, and hence subject to the Lucas critique) decomposition permits us to assess whether the cross-country differences in the dispersion of marginal revenue products are due to differences in endowments of observed firm characteristics X or to how the business environment, institutions and policies translate ("price") these characteristics via b into outcomes. Because b has an economic interpretation, we restrict X to include only arguably exogenous variables: various fixed effects and variables in the firm demographics block.

In Figure 4, we depict the distribution of Greek MRPK in Panel A and Greek MRPL in Panel B. In each panel, we show the actual distribution using Greek X and b (solid black line), as well as a counterfactual distribution using Greek X and German b (long-dash, blue line) and a counterfactual distribution using Greek X and Greek b (short-dash, red line). Using Greek X and German b results in a less dispersed distribution of both MRPK and MRPL, suggesting that German business, institutional and policy environment would increase the efficiency of Greek firms by reducing the dispersion of marginal products of capital and labor across firms. In other words, German "prices" help increase the equalization of returns across firms. Indeed, the standard deviation of this

²⁵ This decomposition is implemented as in Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter (2007). For country *c* we make B = 10,000 independent random draws (with replacement) from the distribution of firm characteristics *X* so that we generate samples $\{X_{bc}\}_{b=1}^{B}$. We also make *B* independent random draws (with replacement) from the distribution of quantile regressions $Q_{c\theta}(\log(MPRK_{ic})|X_{ic}) = X_{ic}\gamma_{c\theta}$ estimated for each country *c* and quantile θ separately. Thus, we obtain $\{\gamma_{cb}\}_{b=1}^{B}$. Coefficients $\gamma_{c\theta}$ can be interpreted as prices for observable characteristics of firms. Machado and Mata (2005) show that the generated sequence $\{X_{bc}\gamma_{cb}\}_{b=1}^{B}$ reproduces the distribution of the original series of $\log(MPRK_{ic})$. We can also combine $\{X_{bc}\}_{b=1}^{B}$ for country *c* with $\{\gamma_{db}\}_{b=1}^{B}$ for country *d* to construct a counterfactual distribution of $\log(MPRK_{ic})$ if observables from country *c* were priced as in country *d*. Since the number of firms per industry fixed effects as in Table 3. Note that in these decompositions we only use the variation due to observable characteristics, that is, we do not use unexplained ("residual") variation. Thus, when we report dispersion for country *c*, we report $\{X_{bc}\gamma_{cb}\}_{b=1}^{B}$. Because we have many countries in the sample, we report estimates of specification (4) for three blocs of EU countries (North/West, South, Center/East) in Appendix Tables A.10, A.11, A.12. Marginal R^2 and welfare calculations for the blocs are reported in Appendix Tables A.13-A.16.

counterfactual distribution is much closer to the actual distribution of marginal revenue products in Germany (e.g., for MRPK the counterfactual standard deviation for Greece is 0.90 rather than 1.57).

When we use German X and Greek b, the distribution of MRPK is more dispersed and shifts to the right. The latter is consistent with German firms having characteristics associated with high levels of productivity. The former suggests that the dispersion of firm characteristics in Germany is greater than the corresponding dispersion in Greece which, when combined with the Greek business, institutional and policy environment ("prices"), results in a wider dispersion of marginal products than is actually observed in Greece. Interestingly, using German X and Greek b does not generate large differences in the mean or dispersion of MRPL. This pattern suggests that differences in firm characteristics are not likely to be a key determinant of the differences in the dispersion of MRPL between Germany and Greece. In contrast, using German b with Greek Xnot only reduces dispersion of MRPL but also increases the mean value of MRPL.

Our decomposition exercise suggests that German business, institutional and policy environment could be the main reason for the smaller dispersion of marginal revenue products in Germany relative to Greece. We generalize this result by showing in Table 7 for each EU country the standard deviation of MRPK and MRPL when we use the country's own X and b (column 1) as compared to using (a) German X or b (columns 2 or 3 for MRPK and columns 7 or 8 for MRPL) and (b) Greek X or b (columns 4 or 5 for MRPK and columns 9 or 10 for MRPL). We find that using German b tends to reduce the dispersion of MRPK for most countries, while using German X tends to increase it. This suggests that relative to other countries Germany has more diverse firm characteristics but the business, institutional and policy environment is relatively effective in ensuring that marginal returns are not very different across firms. In contrast, other countries have relatively more homogenous firm characteristics or, at least, have more homogeneity for characteristics with large variation in "prices" (that is, steep slopes in X). Core EU countries, such as France, exhibit less sensitivity to using German X or b, while countries of the EU periphery, such as Portugal, show relatively large movements in the counterfactual dispersions of marginal revenue products.²⁶

²⁶ We find similar results when we use all variables for the decomposition. Appendix Figure A1 shows the kernel densities for counterfactual distributions and Appendix Table A.31 reports the counterfactual dispersions for marginal revenue products.

As may also be seen in Table 7, when we combine Greek b with X for a given country, the counterfactual distributions tend to increase considerably, as they did in the Germany and Greece comparison. Similarly, using Greek X with b for a given country tends to increase (but to a smaller extent) the dispersion of marginal revenue products across firms. These results suggest that the Greek business, policy and institutional environment would be relatively ineffective in reducing the dispersion of marginal returns across firms.²⁷

VII. Concluding remarks

Misallocation of resources is often seen as an important reason for the slowdown in productivity growth in Europe, the Unites States and other advanced economies. Using 2016-2018 annual data from the unique EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS) of firms in the current 27 EU countries and the UK (which at the time was part of the EU), we go beyond existing studies by using firm-level data to explain *why* there is dispersion in marginal revenue products. In addition to presenting new cross-country evidence on allocation of resources, we propose a novel approach, based on marginal R^2 , to quantify potential (upper bound) productivity gains from better capital and labor allocation. In particular, we develop a portable framework for quantifying gains from better resource allocation that does not rely on exogenous variation in measured frictions or compensating differentials. Researchers may hence apply this approach in a wide range of settings.

Using a simple dynamic theoretical framework as a guide, we find that there is a sizable dispersion of marginal revenue products across the firms in our sample. If one would consider all EU countries as a single market, where marginal revenue products ought to be equalized, then the situation in Europe is very far from that. Our relatively conservative calculations suggest that by removing frictions in the EU could increase EU productivity by 43 percent or more, depending on specification and interpretation of results. Thus, we find large costs of "inadequately integrated Europe" induced by frictions and distortions related to incomplete integration of the EU single market.

Much of the overall dispersion in marginal revenue products could be attributed to fixed differences among countries or sectors/industries. We also find, however, that there is a significant association between marginal revenue products and firm characteristics, and that it is predominantly

²⁷ Consistent with this interpretation and evidence in Figure 1, we find that gains from reduced dispersion of marginal revenue products (measured as $\sigma(\mathbf{b}^{Germany} \mathbf{X}^{own})/\sigma(\mathbf{b}^{own} \mathbf{X}^{own})$) are correlated with popular measures of institutional quality such as World Bank's Governance Indicators and the International Country Risk Guide: countries with lower quality of institutions having greater gains from "importing" German institutions.

driven by variables measuring firm demographics (e.g., age), quality of inputs, utilization of resources, and dynamic adjustment of inputs. In contrast, we show that the contribution of direct measures of "barriers and constraints" to cross-sectional variation in marginal revenue products of capital and labor seems to be modest. In carrying out this analysis, we emphasize that some firm characteristics may reflect compensating differentials rather than constraints and the effect of constraints on the dispersion of marginal products may hence be smaller than has been assumed in the literature. Finally, using a Machado-Mata decomposition we show that cross-country variation in the within-country dispersion of marginal revenue products can be largely rationalized by differences in how a country's business, institutional and policy environment translates firm characteristics into outcomes than by differences in firm characteristics *per se*. This result provides large-scale *microeconomic* evidence that institutions are important for efficient allocation of resources.

Our work contributes to the growing literature measuring misallocation of resources, provides new insights into the nascent literature on the *sources* of the observed dispersion in marginal revenue products, documents that various firm characteristics and measures of distortions have predictive power for marginal revenue products, and contributes to recent efforts to assess the importance of measurement errors in observed marginal revenue products. Future research should make progress by further combining administrative and survey data to reduce measurement errors, generate direct measures of distortions and compensating differentials, and improve identification of causal effects.

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Figure 1. Productivity and dispersion of marginal revenue products



https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/pwt-releases/pwt9.0. Standard deviation of marginal revenue products is computed using EIBIS data. The red, solid line shows the fitted linear regression. The slope of the fitted relationship is -0.24 (s.e. 0.10) for the top panel (this panel excludes LU as an outlier from the regression) and -0.38 (s.e. 0.15) for the bottom panel. Country codes: AT-Austria, BE-Belgium, BG-Bulgaria, CZ-Czech Republic, CY-Cyprus, DE-Germany, DK-Denmark, EE-Estonia, EL-Greece, ES-Spain, FI-Finland, FR-France, HR-Croatia, HU-Hungary, IE-Ireland, IT-Italy, LT-Lithuania, LU-Luxembourg, LV-Latvia, MT-Malta, NL-Netherlands, PL-Poland, PT-Portugal, RO-Romania, SE-Sweden, SI-Slovenia, SK-Slovakia, UK-United Kingdom.

Note: TFP data is for year 2015 from Penn World Tables (see Feenstra et al. 2015); the data are available from

Panel A. Marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK)









Note: The figures show how adding different sets of controls accounts for the dispersion in MRPK and MRPL. "Raw" means no controls. "country + industry + year" controls for fixed effects for countries, industries and years (28 countries, industry at 2-digit NACE level, 3 years). "country × industry × year" controls for the interactions country × industry × year. Country codes: AT-Austria, BE-Belgium, BG-Bulgaria, CZ-Czech Republic, CY-Cyprus, DE-Germany, DK-Denmark, EE-Estonia, EL-Greece, ES-Spain, FI-Finland, FR-France, HR-Croatia, HU-Hungary, IE-Ireland, IT-Italy, LT-Lithuania, LU-Luxembourg, LV-Latvia, MT-Malta, NL-Netherlands, PL-Poland, PT-Portugal, RO-Romania, SE-Sweden, SI-Slovenia, SK-Slovakia, UK-United Kingdom.

Figure 3. Association of the dispersion of the marginal revenue products of capital and labor



Note: The figures show the association between the dispersion of MRPK and MRPL across countries. "Raw" means no controls. "country + industry + year" controls for fixed effects for countries, industries and years (28 countries, industry at 2-digit NACE level, 3 years). "country × industry × year" controls for the interactions country × industry × year. Country codes: AT-Austria, BE-Belgium, BG-Bulgaria, CZ-Czech Republic, CY-Cyprus, DE-Germany, DK-Denmark, EE-Estonia, EL-Greece, ES-Spain, FI-Finland, FR-France, HR-Croatia, HU-Hungary, IE-Ireland, IT-Italy, LT-Lithuania, LU-Luxembourg, LV-Latvia, MT-Malta, NL-Netherlands, PL-Poland, PT-Portugal, RO-Romania, SE-Sweden, SI-Slovenia, SK-Slovakia, UK-United Kingdom.



Figure 4. Machado-Mata decomposition of the marginal revenue products of capital and labor for Greece



Note: The figures show actual and counterfactual distributions of the log marginal revenue product of capital (Panel A) and marginal revenue product of labor (Panel B).

		log(sales) St. dev. Correl.			log	g(fixed ass	sets)	log(employment)				
	Sample	St.	dev.	Correl.	St.	dev.	Correl.	St.	dev.	Correl.		
Country	Size	Orbis	EIBIS	coeff.	Orbis	EIBIS	coeff.	Orbis	EIBIS	coeff.		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)		
Austria	771	2.05	2.38	0.83	2.72	2.85	0.84	1.93	2.17	0.70		
Belgium	1,111	1.83	2.21	0.86	2.90	2.74	0.87	1.95	2.18	0.85		
Bulgaria	1,164	2.44	2.47	0.90	2.83	2.88	0.89	1.86	1.81	0.98		
Cyprus	320	1.75	1.92	0.94	2.27	2.25	0.85	1.63	1.63	0.99		
Czech Rep.	978	2.02	2.23	0.90	2.29	2.58	0.86	1.71	1.72	0.95		
Germany	825	2.05	2.21	0.91	2.60	2.52	0.79	1.72	1.98	0.87		
Denmark	1,105	2.68	2.52	0.80	3.27	3.01	0.91	2.16	2.36	0.88		
Estonia	990	2.14	2.23	0.94	2.67	2.42	0.85	1.73	1.87	0.97		
Greece	1,125	2.25	2.37	0.82	3.18	2.82	0.89	2.21	1.95	0.93		
Spain	1,035	2.26	2.37	0.94	2.86	2.82	0.90	2.10	2.14	0.96		
Finland	1,367	2.73	2.64	0.95	3.37	3.09	0.93	2.54	2.42	0.94		
France	1,194	2.03	2.17	0.93	2.55	2.76	0.84	1.58	1.91	0.94		
Croatia	1,218	2.13	2.18	0.82	2.87	2.74	0.86	1.88	1.93	0.96		
Hungary	1,138	2.46	2.49	0.94	2.84	2.77	0.89	1.97	1.92	0.99		
Ireland	845	1.76	2.10	0.97	2.75	2.47	0.68	1.71	1.99	0.69		
Italy	1,361	2.44	2.54	0.96	3.03	2.96	0.90	2.12	2.18	0.96		
Lithuania	977	1.98	2.05	0.94	2.40	2.68	0.86	1.65	1.50	0.97		
Luxembourg	352	1.71	1.75	0.77	2.77	2.36	0.53	1.28	1.61	0.92		
Latvia	995	2.31	2.37	0.80	2.96	3.13	0.87	1.71	1.82	0.86		
Malta	415	2.00	1.81	0.17	2.47	2.24	0.66	0.64	1.50	0.95		
Netherlands	1,128	1.63	2.26	0.97	3.03	2.52	0.71	1.99	2.05	0.88		
Poland	1,086	1.84	2.01	0.90	2.38	2.38	0.85	2.11	1.77	0.97		
Portugal	1,259	2.24	2.28	0.92	2.75	2.74	0.81	1.71	1.90	0.97		
Romania	931	1.97	2.16	0.89	2.77	2.75	0.81	1.81	1.62	0.90		
Sweden	1,143	2.29	2.31	0.92	3.06	2.67	0.85	2.04	2.07	0.93		
Slovenia	1,104	2.18	2.05	0.94	2.65	2.46	0.91	1.95	1.80	0.95		
Slovakia	832	2.03	2.34	0.95	2.49	2.62	0.82	1.74	1.83	0.95		
UK	1,047	2.19	2.46	0.86	2.77	2.68	0.88	1.92	2.17	0.78		
All countries	27,816	2.14	2.30	0.91	2.76	2.70	0.85	1.90	2.00	0.91		

Table 1. Dispersion of sales, fixed assets and employment in Orbis and EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS), by country

Note: Dispersion of the logarithm of sales, fixed assets and employment, by country and data source (Orbis and EIBIS). Columns (4), (7) and (10) report correlation between the logarithm of sales, fixed assets and employment across the two data sources. All statistics are computed using sampling weights.

NACE	NACE		log(sales)			log	(fixed ass	sets)	log	log(employment)			
industry	Industry	Sample	St. o	dev.	Correl.	St. o	dev.	Correl.	St.	dev.	Correl.		
code	Name	size	Orbis	EIBIS	coeff.	Orbis	EIBIS	coeff.	Orbis	EIBIS	coeff.		
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)		
10-12	food; beverages; tobacco	1,216	2.18	2.27	0.96	2.29	2.39	0.85	1.90	1.79	0.76		
13-15	textiles; apparel; leather and related products	677	1.94	2.02	0.96	2.32	2.35	0.86	1.40	1.50	0.88		
16-18	wood; paper; printing and recorded media	888	2.34	2.45	0.89	2.58	2.58	0.77	1.86	1.89	0.93		
19-20	coke and refined petroleum; chemicals	315	1.95	1.86	0.92	3.03	2.11	0.78	1.60	1.54	0.94		
21	pharmaceutical products	78	2.01	2.20	0.80	2.54	2.37	0.87	1.53	1.41	0.94		
22-23	rubber and plastic products; mineral products	960	1.76	2.11	0.89	2.04	2.28	0.77	1.46	2.00	0.84		
24-25	basic and fabricated metal products	1,535	2.06	1.94	0.95	2.32	2.17	0.88	1.58	1.53	0.95		
26	computer, electronic and optical products	317	2.40	2.46	0.98	3.09	2.87	0.94	2.17	2.14	0.97		
27	electrical equipment	375	1.91	2.02	0.96	2.19	2.13	0.87	1.81	2.21	0.96		
28	machinery and equipment	931	1.97	2.08	0.94	2.37	2.23	0.90	1.75	1.87	0.93		
29-30	motor vehicles; other transport equipment	335	2.06	1.91	0.88	1.94	2.11	0.87	1.54	1.56	0.88		
31-33	furniture; other manuf.; repair and installation	763	2.13	2.23	0.91	2.46	2.39	0.82	1.86	1.90	0.97		
35	electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning	565	2.70	2.78	0.88	2.99	3.16	0.91	2.16	2.20	0.92		
36-39	water supply; sewerage and waste management	1,140	1.93	2.33	0.90	2.58	2.84	0.82	1.70	1.89	0.94		
41	construction of buildings	2,040	2.51	2.59	0.93	2.77	2.63	0.78	1.89	1.85	0.91		
42	civil engineering	1,026	2.41	2.41	0.93	2.49	2.59	0.79	1.96	2.00	0.93		
43	specialised construction activities	3,210	2.00	1.92	0.94	2.29	2.23	0.73	1.65	1.58	0.95		
45	wholesale and retail trade	755	2.15	2.47	0.83	2.22	2.61	0.81	1.61	1.99	0.92		
46	wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles	2,962	2.13	2.12	0.94	2.56	2.41	0.82	1.79	1.91	0.86		
47	retail trade, except of motor vehicles	1,804	2.53	2.53	0.93	2.82	2.83	0.82	2.30	2.28	0.97		
49-53	transportation and storage	3,813	2.41	2.37	0.86	3.07	2.78	0.84	2.01	2.12	0.86		
55-56	accommodation and food service activities	1,032	2.16	2.24	0.94	2.60	2.74	0.82	2.00	2.00	0.95		
58-63	information and communication	1,021	2.41	2.43	0.96	3.38	2.90	0.84	1.91	1.88	0.96		
64-99	other services	58	1.72	2.42	0.64	2.81	2.65	0.95	1.94	2.16	-0.25		
10-99	all industries	27,816	2.20	2.25	0.92	2.58	2.53	0.83	1.84	1.92	0.90		

Table 2. Dispersion of sales, fixed assets and employment in Orbis and EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS), by industry

Note: Dispersion of the logarithm of sales, fixed assets and employment, by country and data source (Orbis and EIBIS). Columns (4), (7) and (10) report correlation between the logarithm of sales, fixed assets and employment across the two data sources. All statistics are computed using sampling weights.

Table 3.	Descriptive	statistics
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Group of variables	Variable	Mean	St. dev.
Outcome variables	log(sales)	16.58	2.37
	log(fixed assets)	15.31	2.75
	log(employment)	4.84	2.01
	log(MRPK)	-0.42	1.43
	log(MRPL)	10.22	1.19
	log(MRPL) - log(MRPK)	10.65	1.63
Demographics	Firm age		
	less than 5 years	0.04	0.18
	5-9 years	0.08	0.26
	10-19 years	0.20	0.40
	20+ years	0.69	0.46
	Subsidiary	0.34	0.47
	Exporter	0.52	0.50
Quality of capital and other inputs	Share of state-of-the art machinery and equipment	0.41	0.32
	Share of high energy efficiency commercial building stock	0.36	0.34
Capacity utilization	above maximum capacity	0.06	0.24
	at maximum capacity	0.44	0.50
	somewhat below full capacity	0.40	0.49
	substantially below full capacity	0.08	0.27
Obstacles to investment	Demand for products or services		
	Major	0.24	0.43
	Minor	0.26	0.44
	Availability of staff with the right skills		
	Major	0.43	0.49
	Minor	0.31	0.46
	Energy costs		
	Major	0.24	0.42
	Minor	0.34	0.47
	Access to digital infrastructure		
	Major	0.12	0.32
	Minor	0.29	0.45
	Labor market regulations		
	Major	0.30	0.46
	Minor	0.33	0.47
	Business regulations and taxation		
	Major	0.32	0.47
	Minor	0.33	0.47
	Availability of adequate transport infrastructure		
	Major	0.17	0.37
	Minor	0.28	0.45
	Availability of finance		
	Major	0.21	0.41
	Minor	0.25	0.43
	Uncertainty about future	0.00	0.40
	Major	0.38	0.49
	Minor	0.35	0.48
Adjustment	Investment, $log(1 + investment)$	12.44	3.96
	Percent change in employment in the last three years	0.13	0.44
	Investment over the last three years	0.04	0.10
	too much	0.04	0.18
	about the right amount	0.79	0.41
	too little	0.17	0.37
	company did not exist three years ago	0.00	0.03
	Investment priority in the next three years	0.25	0.40
	replacing capacity	0.35	0.48
	capacity expansion for existing products or services	0.28	0.45
	developing new products, processes or services	0.26	0.44
	no investment planned	0.09	0.29
Source of funds	internal funds or retained earnings	0.66	0.37
	external finance	0.31	0.35
	intra-group funding	0.02	0.12
	Finance constrained	0.07	0.25
Sample size		27,816	27,816

Note: All statistics are computed using sampling weights.

			Li	st of fixe	d effects	
		Country	Industry	Year	Country + Industry + Year	Country × Industry × Year
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel	A. R^2 for fixed effects					
(1)	MRPK	0.042	0.226	0.000	0.263	0.492
(2)	MRPL	0.387	0.214	0.000	0.575	0.736
(3)	MRPL - MRPK	0.172	0.162	0.000	0.332	0.555
(4)	Productivity gain	1.162	0.596	0.001	1.693	2.225
Panel	B. Shanley decomposition	of R^2 for f	ixed effec	ts		
(5)	MRPK	0.039	0.224	0.000	0.263	
(6)	MRPL	0.374	0.202	0.000	0.575	
(7)	MRPL - MRPK	0.171	0.161	0.000	0.332	
(8)	Productivity gain	1.129	0.566	0.001	1.693	

Note: The table reports R^2 in equation (4) when a group of fixed effects is added to a specification with no other controls. Industries are defined at 2-digit NACE level. All estimates are based on Huber robust regression. Observations are weighted so that the sample represents the population in terms of employment. Productivity gain is computed according to equation (3''). For each row in Panel B, column (4) is equal to the sum of columns (1)-(3) by the properties of Shapley decomposition. Column (4) in Panel A is identical to column (4) in Panel B by construction.

					eu enects		
Row	Group of regressors	No fixed effects	Country	Industry	Year	Country + Industry + Year	Country × Industry × Year
	1 2	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A: MRPK	~ /	/				
(1)	Demographics	0.039	0.033	0.020	0.039	0.016	0.013
(2)	Quality of capital	0.015	0.008	0.016	0.015	0.009	0.007
(3)	Capacity utilization	0.014	0.015	0.008	0.014	0.009	0.008
(4)	Obstacles to investment	0.023	0.015	0.012	0.023	0.006	0.004
(5)	Adjustment	0.048	0.052	0.015	0.048	0.016	0.013
(6)	Source of funds	0.025	0.021	0.016	0.025	0.012	0.008
(7)	"Compensating differentials"	0.077	0.074	0.040	0.077	0.034	0.028
(8)	"Distortions"	0.071	0.061	0.036	0.071	0.028	0.021
(9)	All variables	0.119	0.109	0.068	0.119	0.057	0.045
	Panel B: MRPL						
(10)	Demographics	0.105	0.034	0.092	0.105	0.034	0.028
(11)	Quality of capital	0.027	0.008	0.020	0.027	0.007	0.005
(12)	Capacity utilization	0.012	0.008	0.010	0.012	0.005	0.004
(13)	Obstacles to investment	0.062	0.023	0.043	0.062	0.012	0.009
(14)	Adjustment	0.078	0.030	0.085	0.078	0.034	0.025
(15)	Source of funds	0.032	0.008	0.027	0.032	0.004	0.004
(16)	"Compensating differentials"	0.104	0.047	0.105	0.104	0.048	0.038
(17)	"Distortions"	0.146	0.045	0.119	0.146	0.033	0.026
(18)	All variables	0.228	0.082	0.197	0.228	0.069	0.052
	Danal C. MDDI MDDV						
(10)	Panel C: MRPL – MRPK	0.090	0.052	0.044	0.090	0.024	0.020
(19)	Ovality of agrital	0.080	0.032	0.044	0.080	0.024	0.020
(20)	Quality of capital	0.039	0.018	0.033	0.039	0.010	0.014
(21)	Obstacles to investment	0.002	0.004	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.001
(22)	A diustment	0.027	0.010	0.014	0.027	0.000	0.003
(23)	Source of funds	0.021	0.013	0.015	0.132	0.002	0.048
(24)	Source of funds	0.021	0.015	0.015	0.021	0.009	0.007
(25)	"Compensating differentials"	0.181	0.127	0.123	0.181	0.076	0.061
(26)	"Distortions"	0.112	0.069	0.067	0.112	0.033	0.027
(27)	All variables	0.243	0.159	0.172	0.242	0.099	0.078
(=/)		0.2.12	0.1203		0.2.2	0.077	01070
	Panel D: Productivity gain						
(28)	Demographics	0.337	0.129	0.275	0.336	0.105	0.086
(29)	Quality of capital	0.105	0.036	0.081	0.106	0.031	0.023
(30)	Capacity utilization	0.025	0.015	0.021	0.025	0.010	0.006
(31)	Obstacles to investment	0.176	0.069	0.117	0.176	0.035	0.026
(32)	Adjustment	0.347	0.173	0.321	0.347	0.148	0.113
(33)	Source of funds	0.091	0.022	0.076	0.091	0.015	0.013
(34)	"Compensating differentials"	0.429	0.224	0.386	0.429	0.191	0.150
(35)	"Distortions"	0.459	0.159	0.359	0.458	0.105	0.085
(36)	All variables	0.793	0.329	0.663	0.792	0.256	0.197

Table 5. Marginal R^2 of adding a group of variables to a specification with fixed effectsList of fixed effects

Note: The table reports change in R^2 in equation (4) when a group of variables is added to a specification with a given combination of industry and/or country and/or year fixed effects. Industries are defined at 2-digit NACE level. All estimates are based on Huber robust regression. Observations are weighted so that the sample represents the population in terms of employment. Standard errors are clustered by industry and country. The group "compensating differentials" includes "quality of capital", "capacity utilization" and "adjustment". The group "distortions" includes "demographics", "obstacles for investment" and "source of funds". Productivity gain is computed according to equation (3").

			Dependent va	ariable	Productivity
Row	Group of regressors	MRPK	MRPL	MRPL - MRPK	gain
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A: Include fixed effects				
(1)	Demographics	0.022	0.049	0.040	0.159
(2)	Quality of capital	0.010	0.012	0.021	0.048
(3)	Capacity utilization	0.011	0.006	0.002	0.011
(4)	Obstacles to investment	0.012	0.026	0.013	0.074
(5)	Adjustment	0.027	0.046	0.089	0.206
(6)	Source of funds	0.012	0.015	0.012	0.046
(7)	Country fixed effects	0.031	0.295	0.127	0.881
(8)	Industry fixed effects	0.192	0.189	0.112	0.496
(9)	Year fixed effects	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
(10)	Total	0.317	0.639	0.417	1.921
	Memorandum: sum of rows (1)-(6)	0.094	0.154	0.178	0.544
	Panel B: Exclude fixed effects				
(11)	Demographics	0.026	0.075	0.054	0.240
(12)	Quality of capital	0.012	0.018	0.028	0.071
(13)	Capacity utilization	0.014	0.008	0.003	0.014
(14)	Obstacles to investment	0.018	0.041	0.020	0.117
(15)	Adjustment	0.035	0.064	0.120	0.281
(16)	Source of funds	0.014	0.023	0.017	0.070
(17)	Total	0.119	0.228	0.243	0.793

Table 6. Shapley marginal R^2 s and implied productivity gains

Notes: Panel A reports Shapley decomposition of R^2 for the specification which includes country, industry, year fixed effects as well as all blocks of variables in X. Row (10) shows the total R^2 for each dependent variable indicated in the headers of columns (1)-(3). By construction, the sum of R^2 s in rows (1)-(9) is equal to the total R^2 reported in row (10). For column (4), row (10) shows the total welfare gains across fixed effects and X, where all blocks of variables. Panel B reports the Shapley decomposition of R^2 for the specification which includes only variables in X (no fixed effects). See Appendix Table A.32 for a more detailed decomposition.

			$\sigma(MRPK)$				$\sigma(MRPL)$							
Country b	Own	Germany	Own	Greece	Own	_	Own	Germany	Own	Greece	Own			
Country X	Own	Own	Germany	Own	Greece	_	Own	Own	Germany	Own	Greece			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)		(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)			
Austria	1.33	0.88	1.36	1.57	1.38		0.73	0.62	0.72	0.88	0.74			
Belgium	1.40	0.89	1.44	1.61	1.43		0.77	0.61	0.73	0.90	0.75			
Bulgaria	1.30	0.93	1.28	1.60	1.35		1.01	0.64	0.97	0.88	0.99			
Cyprus	1.61	0.94	1.58	1.66	1.55		1.12	0.63	1.07	0.93	1.14			
Czech Rep.	1.13	0.88	1.14	1.56	1.17		0.72	0.60	0.71	0.88	0.73			
Germany	0.89	0.89	0.89	1.55	0.90		0.60	0.60	0.60	0.89	0.62			
Denmark	1.35	0.90	1.32	1.64	1.36		0.71	0.61	0.70	0.89	0.73			
Estonia	1.52	0.93	1.49	1.64	1.51		0.99	0.62	0.93	0.87	0.98			
Greece	1.57	0.90	1.55	1.57	1.57		0.88	0.62	0.89	0.88	0.88			
Spain	1.02	0.87	1.06	1.52	1.07		0.68	0.60	0.68	0.87	0.70			
Finland	1.23	0.90	1.21	1.60	1.26		0.73	0.61	0.71	0.90	0.73			
France	1.07	0.88	1.08	1.60	1.10		0.59	0.63	0.56	0.92	0.58			
Croatia	1.38	0.92	1.36	1.55	1.38		0.81	0.60	0.79	0.88	0.83			
Hungary	1.25	0.92	1.26	1.56	1.27		0.83	0.62	0.82	0.89	0.85			
Ireland	1.39	0.93	1.31	1.61	1.34		0.92	0.62	0.87	0.91	0.89			
Italy	1.10	0.90	1.10	1.53	1.11		0.67	0.61	0.66	0.90	0.68			
Lithuania	1.51	0.93	1.44	1.63	1.43		0.89	0.63	0.89	0.90	0.90			
Luxembourg	1.81	0.90	1.82	1.66	1.81		0.84	0.64	0.85	0.90	0.85			
Latvia	1.50	0.94	1.52	1.59	1.50		1.01	0.62	0.97	0.88	1.02			
Malta	1.80	0.93	1.79	1.67	1.77		0.92	0.64	0.91	0.92	0.90			
Netherlands	1.27	0.89	1.21	1.69	1.24		0.69	0.63	0.64	0.92	0.67			
Poland	1.07	0.88	1.10	1.51	1.09		0.65	0.58	0.70	0.89	0.74			
Portugal	1.37	0.90	1.41	1.58	1.42		0.80	0.62	0.78	0.89	0.80			
Romania	1.28	0.95	1.26	1.54	1.24		0.87	0.60	0.88	0.88	0.89			
Sweden	1.29	0.91	1.21	1.66	1.21		0.69	0.62	0.66	0.93	0.69			
Slovenia	1.22	0.91	1.22	1.56	1.29		0.76	0.59	0.73	0.87	0.78			
Slovakia	1.28	0.92	1.25	1.58	1.28		0.96	0.60	0.93	0.88	0.98			
UK	1.09	0.90	1.08	1.59	1.11		0.61	0.61	0.60	0.93	0.62			

Table 7. Machado-Mata decomposition of the marginal revenue products of capital and labor

Note: The table reports actual and counterfactual dispersion of marginal revenue products. See section VI.D for more details.

ONLINE APPENDIX

Resource Misallocation in European Firms: The Role of Constraints, Firm Characteristics and Managerial Decisions

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Appendix A: Additional Tables and Figures

		2	2015	2	016	2	017
Group of variables	Variable	Mean	St. dev.	Mean	St. dev.	Mean	St. dev.
<u></u>							
Outcome variables	log(sales)	16.56	2.32	16.53	2.39	16.65	2.38
	log(fixed assets)	15.29	2.75	15.27	2.79	15.37	2.71
	log(employment)	4.81	1.98	4.80	2.02	4.90	2.02
	log(MRPK)	-0.47	1.48	-0.41	1.43	-0.40	1.39
	log(MRPL)	10.21	1.22	10.20	1.17	10.25	1.17
	log(MRPL) - log(MRPK)	10.68	1.69	10.61	1.66	10.65	1.54
Demographics	Firm age						
	less than 5 years	0.03	0.18	0.04	0.20	0.03	0.17
	5-9 years	0.08	0.28	0.08	0.27	0.07	0.25
	10-19 years	0.20	0.40	0.21	0.41	0.20	0.40
	20+ years	0.68	0.47	0.67	0.47	0.71	0.46
	Subsidiary	0.33	0.47	0.34	0.47	0.35	0.48
	Exporter	0.51	0.50	0.52	0.50	0.51	0.50
Quality of capital and other inputs	Share of state-of-the art machinery and equipment	0.42	0.32	0.41	0.32	0.40	0.32
	Share of high energy efficiency commercial building stock	0.37	0.34	0.35	0.34	0.35	0.34
Capacity utilization	above maximum capacity	0.05	0.22	0.05	0.23	0.08	0.26
	at maximum capacity	0.44	0.50	0.46	0.50	0.42	0.49
	somewhat below full capacity	0.40	0.49	0.38	0.49	0.42	0.49
	substantially below full capacity	0.09	0.28	0.09	0.28	0.07	0.26
Obstacles to investment	Demand for products or services						
	Major	0.26	0.44	0.23	0.42	0.23	0.42
	Minor	0.24	0.43	0.27	0.44	0.26	0.44
	Availability of staff with the right skills						
	Major	0.38	0.49	0.43	0.49	0.46	0.50
	Minor	0.30	0.46	0.31	0.46	0.31	0.46
	Energy costs						
	Major	0.22	0.41	0.23	0.42	0.25	0.43
	Minor	0.32	0.47	0.35	0.48	0.35	0.48
	Access to digital infrastructure						
	Major	0.10	0.30	0.11	0.32	0.14	0.35
	Minor	0.26	0.44	0.31	0.46	0.29	0.46
	Labor market regulations						
	Major	0.28	0.45	0.31	0.46	0.30	0.46
	Minor	0.29	0.46	0.33	0.47	0.36	0.48
	Business regulations and taxation						
	Major	0.32	0.47	0.32	0.47	0.31	0.46
	Minor	0.28	0.45	0.33	0.47	0.37	0.48
	Availability of adequate transport infrastructure						

 Table A.1. Descriptive statistics, by year

	Major	0.16	0.36	0.16	0.37	0.18	0.38
	Minor	0.24	0.43	0.28	0.45	0.31	0.46
	Availability of finance						
	Major	0.24	0.43	0.19	0.40	0.19	0.39
	Minor	0.22	0.41	0.26	0.44	0.26	0.44
	Uncertainty about future						
	Major	0.41	0.49	0.38	0.48	0.36	0.48
	Minor	0.32	0.47	0.36	0.48	0.37	0.48
Adjustment	Investment, log(1 + investment)	12.41	3.99	12.29	4.04	12.62	3.84
	Percent change in employment in the last three years	0.12	0.47	0.14	0.44	0.14	0.40
	Investment over the last three years						
	too much	0.04	0.19	0.03	0.18	0.04	0.19
	about the right amount	0.78	0.41	0.79	0.40	0.78	0.41
	too little	0.16	0.37	0.16	0.37	0.17	0.38
	company did not exist three years ago	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.02
	Investment priority in the next three years						
	replacing capacity	0.41	0.49	0.32	0.47	0.33	0.47
	capacity expansion for existing products or services	0.25	0.43	0.28	0.45	0.31	0.46
	developing new products, processes or services	0.24	0.43	0.28	0.45	0.26	0.44
	no investment planned	0.09	0.28	0.11	0.31	0.09	0.28
Source of funds	internal funds or retained earnings	0.66	0.37	0.66	0.37	0.67	0.37
	external finance	0.31	0.35	0.31	0.36	0.30	0.35
	intra-group funding	0.02	0.13	0.01	0.10	0.02	0.12
	Finance constrained	0.07	0.25	0.07	0.26	0.06	0.23
Sample size		8,926	8,926	9,447	9,447	9,443	9,443

Note: All statistics are computed using sampling weights.

Index	Group of variables	Variable	
1	Outcome variables	log(sales)	
2		log(fixed assets)	
3		log(employment)	
4		log(MRPK)	
5		log(MRPL)	
6		log(MRPL) - log(MRPK)	
7	Demographics	Firm age	less than 5 years
8			5-9 years
9			10-19 years
10			20+ years
11		Subsidiary	
12		Exporter	
13	Quality of capital and other inputs	Share of state-of-the art machinery and equipment	
14		Share of high energy efficiency commercial building stock	
15	Capacity utilization	above maximum capacity	
16		at maximum capacity	
17		somewhat below full capacity	
18		substantially below full capacity	
19	Obstacles to investment	Demand for products or services	Major
20			Minor
21		Availability of staff with the right skills	Major
22			Minor
23		Energy costs	Major
24			Minor
25		Access to digital infrastructure	Major
26			Minor
27		Labor market regulations	Major
28			Minor
29		Business regulations and taxation	Major
30			Minor
31		Availability of adequate transport infrastructure	Major
32			Minor
33		Availability of finance	Major
34			Minor
35		Uncertainty about future	Major
36			Minor
37		Investment, $log(1 + investment)$	
38		Percent change in employment in the last three years	
39	Adjustment	Investment over the last three years	too much
40			about the right amount
41			too little
42			company did not exist three years ago
43		Investment priority in the next three years	replacing capacity
44			capacity expansion for existing products or services
45			developing new products, processes or services
46			no investment planned
47	~ ~ ~ ~		internal funds or retained earnings
48	Source of funds	external finance	
49		intra-group funding	
50		Finance constrained	

Table A.2. Correlation matrix: variable index

	Table A.3. Correlation matrix: coefficients																							
Index	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
1	1	1																						
3	0.86	0.80	1																					
4	-0.02	-0.51	-0.13	1																				
5	0.48	0.29	0.02	0.24	1																			
6	0.37	0.66	0.13	-0.71	0.52	1																		
7	-0.12	-0.13	-0.11	0.04	-0.05	-0.08	1																	
8	-0.16	-0.17	-0.14	0.08	-0.07	-0.12	-0.05	1	1															
9	-0.14	-0.15	-0.15	0.04	-0.07	-0.09	-0.10	-0.14	0.75	1														
10	0.20	0.27	0.24	0.07	0.13	0.08	-0.28	-0.03	-0.02	0.04	1													
12	0.28	0.24	0.24	-0.05	0.11	0.13	-0.04	-0.06	-0.07	0.11	0.15	1												
13	0.06	0.08	-0.01	-0.07	0.14	0.16	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	0.09	1											
14	0.07	0.11	0.04	-0.10	0.07	0.14	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.03	0.05	0.41	1										
15	-0.01	-0.04	-0.03	0.06	0.03	-0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.02	1									
16	0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.08	0.05	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.07	0.06	0.07	-0.23	1	1							
17	0.01	0.04	0.03	-0.06	-0.03	0.03	0.01	-0.02	-0.04	0.04	0.01	0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.21	-0.72	0.24	1						
10	0.10	0.04	0.01	-0.05	-0.07	0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	0.00	-0.03	0.00	-0.04	0.04	-0.03	-0.20	0.02	0 11	1					
20	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.03	-0.04	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.05	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04	0.06	0.00	-0.33	1				
21	-0.12	-0.12	-0.09	0.03	-0.10	-0.10	0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.03	-0.07	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.07	0.01	-0.04	0.00	0.17	0.03	1			
22	0.12	0.12	0.11	-0.03	0.04	0.06	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.06	-0.08	-0.06	-0.05	-0.02	0.05	-0.01	-0.05	0.09	-0.57	1		
23	-0.06	0.01	-0.03	-0.11	-0.08	0.04	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.10	-0.04	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.07	0.07	0.03	0.15	0.02	0.17	-0.05	1	
24	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.04	-0.04	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.06	0.12	0.07	0.11	-0.40	1
25	-0.01	0.00	-0.03	-0.02	0.04	0.05	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.04	-0.02	0.06	0.04	0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.18	-0.04	0.17	-0.06	0.21	0.00
20	-0.11	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.05	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05	0.01	0.01	-0.07	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.17	0.09	-0.08	0.07	0.27
28	0.06	0.05	0.06	-0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.06	-0.04	-0.03	0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.11	0.01	0.14	-0.04	0.19
29	-0.10	-0.05	-0.09	-0.06	-0.05	0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.11	-0.06	0.04	0.05	0.01	-0.04	0.03	0.03	0.16	0.01	0.15	-0.06	0.26	-0.01
30	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03	-0.07	-0.04	-0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.11	0.03	0.09	-0.06	0.22
31	0.01	0.05	0.02	-0.06	-0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.03	-0.05	-0.02	0.02	0.04	0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.02	0.18	-0.01	0.15	-0.07	0.22	-0.02
32	0.02	0.03	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.03	-0.06	-0.04	0.00	-0.03	0.03	0.00	0.09	0.16	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.21
33 34	-0.14	-0.09	-0.12	-0.06	-0.10	-0.02	0.03	0.03	0.01	-0.04	-0.11	-0.06	-0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.06	0.01	0.12	0.27	-0.03	0.10	-0.06	0.20	-0.02
35	-0.04	-0.05	-0.02	-0.04	-0.08	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.12	-0.04	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.12	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.05	0.26	0.00
36	0.10	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.04	0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.02	0.07	0.05	-0.07	-0.04	0.00	0.01	0.02	-0.06	-0.12	0.18	-0.05	0.12	-0.11	0.14
37	0.67	0.67	0.65	-0.21	0.21	0.33	-0.07	-0.10	-0.11	0.18	0.26	0.23	0.09	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.03	-0.09	0.00	0.00	-0.05	0.10	-0.02	0.02
38	-0.02	-0.04	-0.01	0.05	-0.04	-0.07	0.11	0.08	0.03	-0.12	-0.03	0.01	0.07	0.03	0.09	0.06	-0.06	-0.08	-0.05	0.02	0.07	-0.02	0.00	0.01
39	-0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.05	-0.03	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.03	0.01	0.06	0.04	0.00	0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.01
40	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.00	0.09	0.06	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.13	0.10	0.01	0.10	-0.05	-0.12	-0.07	0.00	-0.04	0.01	-0.03	0.02
41	-0.00	-0.00	-0.03	-0.01	-0.08	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.04	0.01	-0.01	-0.14	-0.11	-0.01	-0.09	-0.03	0.09	-0.00	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.03	-0.01
43	-0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.09	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.00
44	0.05	0.06	0.05	-0.03	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.03	-0.04	0.00	-0.01	0.03	0.00	-0.03	0.01
45	0.10	0.08	0.07	0.00	0.06	0.04	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04	0.05	0.07	0.15	0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.06	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.04	0.00	-0.01
46	-0.21	-0.21	-0.21	0.07	-0.06	-0.10	0.00	0.04	0.03	-0.05	-0.10	-0.13	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.04	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.05	0.00	-0.01
47	-0.08	-0.12	-0.06	0.11	-0.04	-0.13	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.03	-0.06	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	-0.02	0.03	-0.03	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	0.02	-0.08	0.00
48	0.03	0.08	0.02	-0.12	0.01	0.11	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	0.04	-0.05	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.02	-0.03	0.04	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.04	-0.03	0.09	0.00
49 50	-0.08	-0.04	-0.05	-0.01	-0.08	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.03	-0.03	-0.10	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.00	-0.04	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.01

Index	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
25	1																								
26	-0.23	1																							
27	0.22	0.13	1																						
28	-0.03	0.16	-0.45	1																					
29	0.19	0.07	0.41	-0.09	1																				
30	-0.02	0.19	-0.10	0.30	-0.48	1																			
31	0.24	0.05	0.23	-0.04	0.23	-0.02	1																		
32	0.04	0.27	0.09	0.18	0.08	0.19	-0.28	1																	
33	0.19	0.05	0.19	-0.04	0.21	-0.04	0.19	0.02	1																
34	0.01	0.24	0.08	0.11	0.04	0.16	0.02	0.27	-0.29	1															
35	0.16	0.10	0.27	-0.05	0.29	-0.05	0.19	0.08	0.28	0.07	1														
36	-0.07	0.09	-0.10	0.16	-0.12	0.17	-0.08	0.09	-0.12	0.10	-0.58	1													
37	0.02	0.01	-0.07	0.05	-0.07	0.06	0.01	0.04	-0.13	0.00	-0.11	0.09	1												
38	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.04	-0.03	0.03	-0.06	0.02	0.05	1											
39	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.02	0.06	0.00	0.04	-0.01	0.02	0.01	1										
40	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.16	-0.01	-0.09	0.04	0.11	0.06	-0.37	1									
41	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.14	0.02	0.08	-0.03	-0.09	-0.06	-0.09	-0.85	1								
42	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.06	-0.01	1							
43	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.05	0.00	-0.02	0.00	-0.03	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	0.05	-0.01	1						
44	0.00	0.02	-0.03	0.04	-0.02	0.05	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.08	0.07	-0.02	0.04	-0.04	0.01	-0.46	1					
45	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.10	0.00	0.03	-0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.44	-0.37	1				
46	0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.03	0.03	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	-0.02	0.06	-0.06	-0.29	-0.03	0.02	0.01	-0.04	0.01	-0.24	-0.20	-0.19	1			
47	-0.07	-0.02	-0.09	0.01	-0.06	-0.02	-0.07	-0.02	-0.11	-0.04	-0.06	0.01	-0.18	-0.03	-0.04	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.03	0.01	-0.01	0.03	1		
48	0.07	0.02	0.09	-0.01	0.06	0.02	0.07	0.02	0.11	0.05	0.07	-0.02	0.15	0.03	0.04	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.94	1	
49	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.08	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.06	-0.01	0.01	0.03	-0.04	-0.24	-0.08	1
50	-0.01	0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.05	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.19	-0.03	0.06	-0.01	-0.04	0.00	0.03	-0.10	0.08	0.05	-0.01	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.12	-0.13	0.03

Note: The table reports the correlation coefficients for the variables listed in Table A.2. All statistics are computed using sampling weights.

Regressor	Dependen	nt variable		
	log(MRPK)	log(MRPL)		
Demographics				
Firm age (omitted category: less than 5 years)				
5-9 years	-0.009	0.041**		
	(0.039)	(0.019)		
10-19 years	-0.218***	0.062***		
	(0.035)	(0.018)		
20+ years	-0.339***	0.097***		
	(0.034)	(0.017)		
log(employment)	0.031***	-0.024***		
	(0.005)	(0.003)		
Subsidiary	0.351***	0.139***		
	(0.019)	(0.010)		
Exporter	0.135***	0.241***		
	(0.016)	(0.009)		
Quality of capital and other inptus				
Share of state-of-the art machinery and equipment, including ICT	-0.123***	0.140***		
	(0.023)	(0.012)		
Share of high energy efficiency commercial building stock	-0.260***	0.055***		
	(0.020)	(0.010)		
Capacity utilization (omitted category: somewhat below full capacity)				
above maximum capacity	0.255***	0.099***		
	(0.026)	(0.014)		
at maximum capacity	0.134***	0.045***		
	(0.014)	(0.007)		
substantially below full capacity	-0.301***	-0.125***		
	(0.022)	(0.012)		
Obstacles to investment (omitted category: not an obstacle at all)				
Demand for products or services				
Major	0.078***	0.001		
	(0.018)	(0.009)		
Minor	0.058***	0.002		
	(0.016)	(0.008)		
Availability of staff with the right skills				
Major	0.065***	-0.054***		
	(0.017)	(0.009)		
Minor	0.036**	0.003		
	(0.017)	(0.009)		
Energy costs				
Major	-0.132***	-0.087***		
	(0.018)	(0.009)		
Minor	-0.092***	-0.052***		
	(0.015)	(0.008)		
Access to digital infrastructure				
Major	0.040*	0.021*		
	(0.023)	(0.011)		
Minor	0.003	0.036***		
	(0.016)	(0.008)		
Labor market regulations				
Major	0.003	-0.068***		
	(0.018)	(0.009)		
Minor	-0.018	-0.045***		
	(0.016)	(0.008)		
Business regulations and taxation				
Major	-0.041**	0.024***		
	(0.019)	(0.009)		
Minor	0.023	0.029***		
	(0.016)	(0.009)		
Availability of adequate transport infrastructure				
Major	-0.030	0.077***		

Table A.4. Predictors of the dispersion of the marginal revenue products of capital and labor

	(0.019)	(0.010)
Minor	0.013	0.050***
	(0.015)	(0.008)
Availability of finance		
Major	-0.058***	-0.084***
	(0.018)	(0.010)
Minor	-0.006	-0.068***
	(0.015)	(0.008)
Uncertainty about future		
Major	0.052***	0.043***
	(0.018)	(0.010)
Minor	0.042**	0.035***
A Production	(0.017)	(0.009)
Adjustment	0.057***	0.040***
investment, $\log(1 + investment)$	-0.03/***	(0.049^{+++})
Dereast shange in appletyment in the last three years	(0.005)	(0.001) 0.100***
Percent change in employment in the last three years	(0.090^{+++})	-0.109^{111}
Investment over the last three years (omitted category: about the right amount)	(0.013)	(0.008)
too much	_0 232***	-0 008***
	(0.030)	(0.016)
too little	-0.063***	-0.067***
	(0.016)	(0.008)
company did not exist three years ago	-0.269	-0.084
······ ····· ····· ····· · ····· · ·····	(0.179)	(0.090)
Investment priority in the next three years (omitted category: no investment planned)	()	()
replacing capacity	-0.054**	-0.028**
	(0.023)	(0.012)
capacity expansion for existing products or services	-0.068***	-0.006
	(0.024)	(0.012)
developing new products, processes or services	-0.056**	-0.007
	(0.025)	(0.012)
Source of funds (omitted category: external finance)		
internal funds or retained earnings	0.189***	0.066***
	(0.020)	(0.010)
intra-group funding	-0.124**	0.183***
	(0.062)	(0.031)
Credit constrained	-0.099***	-0.08/***
	(0.024)	(0.012)
Sampla giza	27.816	27 662
R ²	0.527	27,005
Memorandum	0.327	0.770
R^2 with country × industry × year fixed effects and no X	0 492	0.736
R^2 with X and no fixed effects	0.138	0.289
R^2 with X and country fixed effects	0.170	0.526
R^2 with X and industry fixed effects	0.302	0.461
R^2 with X and year fixed effects	0.139	0.288
R^2 with X and country fixed effects, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects	0.329	0.676
R^2 with X and slopes varying by country	0.221	0.459
R^2 with X and slopes varying by industry	0.301	0.445
R^2 with X and slopes varying by year	0.141	0.292

Note: The table reports estimates of equation (4) with country × industry × year fixed effects. Industries are defined at 2-digit NACE level. All estimates are based on Huber robust regression. Observations are weighted so that the sample represents the population in terms of employment. All regressors are included simultaneously unless indicated otherwise. Standard errors are clustered by industry and country. ***, **, ** denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.

Table A.5. Predictors of the disp	persion of the marginal	revenue products of ca	pital and labor,	balanced p	anel
D			D 1	• 11	-

Regressor	Dependent variable			
	log(MRPK)	log(MRPL)		
Demographics				
Firm age (omitted category: less than 5 years)	0.101	0.100**		
5-9 years	0.131	0.100**		
10.10	(0.095)	(0.051)		
10-19 years	0.098	0.097**		
	(0.089)	(0.048)		
20+ years	-0.116	0.032		
	(0.086)	(0.046)		
log(employment)	0.026**	-0.040***		
	(0.011)	(0.006)		
Subsidiary	0.345***	0.125***		
	(0.043)	(0.022)		
Exporter	0.258***	0.295***		
	(0.031)	(0.017)		
Juality of capital and other inptus				
Share of state-of-the art machinery and equipment, including ICT	0.049	0.262***		
	(0.050)	(0.024)		
Share of high energy efficiency commercial building stock	-0.184***	0.136***		
	(0.043)	(0.020)		
Capacity utilization (omitted category: somewhat below full capacity)				
above maximum capacity	0.364***	0.270***		
1 7	(0.058)	(0.029)		
at maximum capacity	0.135***	0.038***		
	(0.030)	(0.014)		
substantially below full canacity	-0 242***	-0 110***		
Substantianty below ran expansion	(0.050)	(0.024)		
Destacles to investment (omitted category: not an obstacle at all)	(0.050)	(0.021)		
Demand for products or services				
Maior	0 111***	0.043**		
Mujor	(0.038)	(0.049)		
Minor	0.094***	0 113***		
WIIIOI	(0.094)	(0.018)		
Availability of staff with the right skills	(0.034)	(0.018)		
Availability of staff with the right skills	0.026	0 000***		
Major	(0.020)	-0.088		
M	(0.036)	(0.019)		
Minor	0.031	0.004		
	(0.035)	(0.018)		
Energy costs				
Major	-0.10/***	-0.102***		
	(0.038)	(0.021)		
Minor	0.055	-0.041**		
	(0.034)	(0.018)		
Access to digital infrastructure				
Major	-0.134***	0.104***		
	(0.049)	(0.024)		
Minor	-0.117***	0.048***		
	(0.034)	(0.016)		
Labor market regulations				
Major	0.028	-0.098***		
5	(0.038)	(0.020)		
Minor	0.099***	-0.043**		
	(0.035)	(0.018)		
Business regulations and taxation	((
Maior	-0.150***	0.026		
	(0.040)	(0.020)		
Minor	_0 047	0.058***		
1111101	(0.036)	(0.050)		
Availability of adaquate transport infrastructure	(0.050)	(0.017)		
Major	0.056	_0.000		
14101	0.050	-0.009		

	(0.042)	(0.021)
Minor	-0.134***	0.023
	(0.033)	(0.017)
Availability of finance		
Major	0.026	-0.169***
	(0.041)	(0.021)
Minor	0.137***	-0.080***
	(0.036)	(0.018)
Uncertainty about future	0.064	0.0(0***
Major	-0.064	0.063***
M	(0.043)	(0.021)
Minor	$(0.0/9^{**})$	0.038^{**}
A dimeter and	(0.039)	(0.019)
Adjustment	0.051***	0 0 1 0 * * *
mvesunem, $\log(1 + mvesunent)$	-0.031	(0.048)
Democrate allow and in sumplex meant in the last three years	(0.000)	(0.003)
Percent change in employment in the last three years	(0.022)	-0.120
Investment over the last three years (amitted estagenty shout the right emount)	(0.032)	(0.010)
too much	0 20/***	0.071**
	-0.294	-0.071
too little	-0.104***	-0.043**
	(0.035)	(0.043)
company did not exist three years ago	-3 549***	-0.312
company and not exist ance years ago	(0.471)	(0.298)
Investment priority in the next three years (omitted category: no investment planned)	(0.471)	(0.290)
renlacing canacity	0.070	-0.029
Tephaeming edipations	(0.049)	(0.023)
capacity expansion for existing products or services	0.007	-0.072***
enfantif enfanzion for encounty produces of controls	(0.052)	(0.025)
developing new products, processes or services	0.083	-0.043*
	(0.053)	(0.025)
Source of funds (omitted category: external finance)	()	()
internal funds or retained earnings	0.111***	0.015
C C	(0.041)	(0.021)
intra-group funding	-0.200	0.155**
	(0.149)	(0.075)
Credit constrained	-0.161***	-0.157***
	(0.048)	(0.024)
Sample size	5,406	5,370
\mathbb{R}^2	0.682	0.870
Memorandum		
\mathbb{R}^2 with country \times industry \times year fixed effects and no X	0.642	0.832
\mathbb{R}^2 with X and no fixed effects	0.148	0.283
\mathbb{R}^2 with X and country fixed effects	0.185	0.550
\mathbb{R}^2 with X and industry fixed effects	0.356	0.472
\mathbb{R}^2 with X and year fixed effects	0.149	0.286
\mathbb{R}^2 with X and country fixed effects, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects	0.389	0.703
\mathbb{R}^2 with X and slopes varying by country	0.386	0.583
\mathbb{R}^2 with X and slopes varying by industry	0.475	0.585
R^2 with X and slopes varying by year	0.160	0.293

Note: The sample is restricted to firms that participated in all three waves of EIBIS. See notes to Appendix Table A.4 for more details.

 Table A.6. Predictors of the dispersion of the marginal revenue products of capital and labor, sample averaged across waves

Regressor	Dependent variable			
	log(MRPK)	log(MRPL)		
Demographics				
Firm age (omitted category: less than 5 years)				
5-9 years	-0.216**	0.578***		
	(0.088)	(0.085)		
10-19 years	-0.208***	0.623***		
	(0.072)	(0.078)		
20+ years	-0.380^{***}	0.005^{***}		
log(amployment)	(0.075)	(0.077)		
log(employment)	(0.011)	(0.083)		
Subsidiary	(0.011) 0 544***	0.092***		
Subsidiary	(0.041)	(0.0)2		
Exporter	0 187***	0 324***		
Exporter	(0.034)	(0.026)		
Duality of capital and other inptus	(0.001)	(0.020)		
Share of state-of-the art machinery and equipment, including ICT	-0.028	0.228***		
	(0.050)	(0.037)		
Share of high energy efficiency commercial building stock	-0.331***	0.103***		
	(0.046)	(0.029)		
Capacity utilization (omitted category: somewhat below full capacity)		× /		
above maximum capacity	0.312***	0.177***		
	(0.072)	(0.054)		
at maximum capacity	0.132***	0.108***		
	(0.034)	(0.027)		
substantially below full capacity	-0.411***	-0.127***		
	(0.053)	(0.035)		
Obstacles to investment (omitted category: not an obstacle at all)				
Demand for products or services				
Major	0.065*	0.003		
	(0.034)	(0.024)		
Minor	-0.005	0.043**		
	(0.027)	(0.021)		
Availability of staff with the right skills	0.0(7**	0.041*		
Major	0.06/**	-0.041*		
	(0.032)	(0.023)		
Minor	0.106***	0.023		
E	(0.033)	(0.024)		
Energy costs	0 115***	0 100***		
Major	-0.113^{+++}	-0.180^{+++}		
Minor	(0.052)	(0.023)		
WIIIOI	-0.000^{-1}	$-0.000^{-0.000}$		
A cress to digital infrastructure	(0.029)	(0.021)		
Major	0.067	0 003***		
Major	(0.00)	(0.033)		
Minor	(0.043)	(0.031)		
1411101	(0.001)	(0.007)		
Labor market regulations	(0.051)	(0.022)		
Maior	0 110***	-0.086***		
	(0.051)	(0.023)		
Minor	0.010	-0.066***		
THE	(0.032)	(0.024)		
Business regulations and taxation	(0.052)	(0.021)		
Maior	-0.063*	0.007		
	(0.034)	(0.025)		
Minor	-0.002	0.043*		
	(0.029)	(0.025)		

Availability of adequate transport infrastructure		
Major	-0.087**	0.053**
	(0.037)	(0.027)
Minor	-0.012	0.041*
	(0.030)	(0.023)
Availability of finance		
Major	-0.059*	-0.052**
	(0.034)	(0.025)
Minor	-0.021	-0.046**
	(0.028)	(0.022)
Uncertainty about future		
Major	0.005	0.127***
	(0.038)	(0.024)
Minor	0.002	0.088***
	(0.033)	(0.022)
Adjustment		
Investment, $log(1 + investment)$	-0.096***	0.092***
	(0.007)	(0.005)
Percent change in employment in the last three years	0.094**	-0.041
	(0.039)	(0.034)
Investment over the last three years (omitted category: about the right amount)		
too much	-0.464***	-0.336***
	(0.084)	(0.062)
too little	-0.121***	-0.074**
	(0.041)	(0.031)
company did not exist three years ago	0.761	0.116
	(0.507)	(0.404)
Investment priority in the next three years (omitted category: no investment planned)		
replacing capacity	-0.123**	0.120***
	(0.061)	(0.041)
capacity expansion for existing products or services	-0.149**	0.047
	(0.061)	(0.044)
developing new products, processes or services	-0.137**	0.113***
	(0.065)	(0.042)
Source of funds (omitted category: external finance)	0.057***	0 101***
internal funds or retained earnings	0.257***	0.121***
	(0.049)	(0.036)
intra-group funding	-0.165	0.300***
	(0.178)	(0.111)
Credit constrained	-0.018	-0.145***
	(0.062)	(0.044)
Sample size	6 670	6 679
D2	0,072	0,028
<u>K</u> <u>Managana hun</u>	0.380	0.749
\mathbf{P}^{2} with country X industry fixed effects and no V	0 526	0.676
\mathbf{R}^2 with V and no fixed effects	0.520	0.070
\mathbf{P}^2 with \mathbf{Y} and country fixed affects	0.103	0.203
\mathbf{R}^2 with \mathbf{Y} and industry fixed effects	0.244	0.520
\mathbf{R}^2 with \mathbf{Y} and country fixed effects and industry fixed effects	0.337	0.500
\mathbf{R}^2 with \mathbf{Y} and clones varying by country	0.371	0.071
R with X and slopes varying by country R2 with X and slopes varying by industry	0.574	0.007
1×2 with $2\times$ and stopps varying by industry	0.211	0.051

Note: The table reports "*between*" estimates of equation (4) with country \times industry \times year fixed effects. All RHS and LHS variables are averaged across waves. See notes to Appendix Table A.4 for more details.

Regressor	Dependent variable			
6	log(MRPK)	log(MRPL)		
Demographics				
Firm age (omitted category: less than 5 years)				
5-9 years	-0.002	0.025		
	(0.039)	(0.020)		
10-19 years	-0.212***	0.045**		
20.	(0.036)	(0.018)		
20+ years	-0.341***	$0.0/4^{***}$		
log(omployment)	(0.035)	(0.018)		
log(employment)	-0.031***	(0.023)		
Subsidiary	0.220***	0.198***		
Substanty	(0.020)	(0.011)		
Exporter	0.104***	0.261***		
	(0.016)	(0.009)		
Quality of capital and other inputs		· · ·		
Share of state-of-the art machinery and equipment, including ICT	-0.160***	0.166***		
	(0.023)	(0.012)		
Share of high energy efficiency commercial building stock	-0.270***	0.067***		
	(0.020)	(0.010)		
Capacity utilization (omitted category: somewhat below full capacity)				
above maximum capacity	0.232***	0.097***		
	(0.027)	(0.014)		
at maximum capacity	0.126***	0.046***		
	(0.014)	(0.007)		
substantially below full capacity	-0.304***	-0.136***		
	(0.022)	(0.012)		
Demand for products or services				
Major	0 060***	0.001		
Wajoi	(0.018)	(0.001)		
Minor	0.049***	0.003		
	(0.016)	(0.008)		
Availability of staff with the right skills	(0.010)	(0.000)		
Major	0.047***	-0.044***		
5	(0.017)	(0.009)		
Minor	0.031*	0.005		
	(0.017)	(0.009)		
Energy costs				
Major	-0.129***	-0.078***		
	(0.018)	(0.010)		
Minor	-0.096***	-0.049***		
	(0.015)	(0.008)		
Access to digital infrastructure				
Major	0.034	0.028**		
	(0.023)	(0.012)		
Minor	-0.005	0.042***		
Labor montrat recording	(0.016)	(0.008)		
Labor market regulations	0.017	0 071***		
IMajoi	(0.017)	-0.071		
Minor	-0.009	-0.043***		
WINO	(0.016)	(0.043)		
Business regulations and taxation	(0.010)	(0.000)		
Maior	-0.063***	0.024***		
	(0.019)	(0.009)		
Minor	0.017	0.030***		
	(0.017)	(0.009)		

Table A.7. Predictors of the dispersion of the marginal revenue products of capital and labor, alternative measure of investment

Availability of adequate transport infrastructure		
Major	-0.050***	0.077***
	(0.019)	(0.011)
Minor	-0.006	0.057***
	(0.016)	(0.008)
Availability of finance		
Major	-0.023	-0.098***
	(0.018)	(0.010)
Minor	0.013	-0.077***
	(0.015)	(0.009)
Uncertainty about future	0.070***	0.047***
Major	0.0/9***	0.04/***
	(0.018)	(0.010)
Minor	0.056^{***}	0.036^{***}
A J:	(0.017)	(0.009)
Aujustinent I_{a} diagtar variable for a solitive investment 1 (investment > 0)	0 1 2 0 * * *	0 215***
indicator variable for positive investment, 1 {investment > 0}	(0.026)	(0.213)
Demonst show on in annular mount in the last three views	(0.030)	(0.018)
Percent change in employment in the last three years	$(0.0/1^{-1.1})$	-0.109
Investment over the last three years (amitted estagory; about the right amount)	(0.013)	(0.008)
too much	0 274***	0 070***
	-0.2/4	-0.079
too little	-0.039**	-0.091***
	(0.016)	(0.008)
company did not exist three years ago	-0.189	-0.118
company did not exist unce years ago	(0.185)	(0.091)
Investment priority in the next three years (omitted category: no investment planned)	(0.105)	(0.091)
replacing canacity	-0.095***	0.006
top.mon.g. oupmon.y	(0.024)	(0.012)
capacity expansion for existing products or services	-0.116***	0.031**
	(0.024)	(0.012)
developing new products, processes or services	-0.106***	0.038***
	(0.025)	(0.012)
Source of funds (omitted category: external finance)	× ,	. ,
internal funds or retained earnings	0.220***	0.025**
	(0.020)	(0.011)
intra-group funding	0.075	0.103***
	(0.064)	(0.031)
Credit constrained	-0.094***	-0.093***
	(0.024)	(0.012)
Sample size	27,815	27,648
<u>R²</u>	0.518	0.77
Memorandum	0.400	0.726
R^2 with country × industry × year fixed effects and no X	0.492	0.736
K^2 with A and no fixed effects $P^2 = i41$ $K = 1$ as $r = 1$ of $r = 1$ of $r = 1$	0.119	0.247
K^{-} with A and country fixed effects R^{2} with V and inductry fixed effects	0.146	0.513
\mathbf{K}^- with \mathbf{A} and industry fixed effects \mathbf{P}^2 with \mathbf{V} and wear fixed effects	0.294	0.420
\mathbf{R} with \mathbf{A} and year fixed effects inductor fixed effects and user fixed effects	0.119	0.24/
\mathbf{R} with \mathbf{A} and country fixed effects, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects \mathbf{P}^2 with \mathbf{V} and slopes verying by country	0.321	0.000
\mathbf{R}^2 with \mathbf{X} and slopes varying by country \mathbf{R}^2 with \mathbf{Y} and slopes varying by industry	0.190	0.437
R^2 with X and slopes varying by indusity R^2 with X and slopes varying by year	0.200	0.409
	V.144	V.4.71

Note: Investment is measured as an indicator variable equal to one if a firm reports positive investment, and zero otherwise (the baseline specification uses log(1+investment)). See notes to Appendix Table A.4 for more details.

				List of	fixed effects	
		No fixed			Country +	Country >
		effects	Country	Industry	Industry +	Industry >
Row	Group of variables				Year	Year
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1)	Panel A: average MRPK	0.040	0.026	0.007	0.021	0.017
(1)	Demographics	0.048	0.036	0.027	0.021	0.017
(2)	Quality of capital	0.024	0.014	0.018	0.010	0.008
(3)	Capacity utilization	0.030	0.030	0.015	0.015	0.009
(4)	Obstacles to investment	0.038	0.027	0.019	0.011	0.008
(5)	Adjustment	0.078	0.080	0.028	0.023	0.020
(6)	Source of funds	0.034	0.026	0.015	0.011	0.010
(7)	"Compensating differentials"	0.128	0.119	0.064	0.051	0.038
(8)	"Distortions"	0.096	0.075	0.047	0.035	0.028
(9)	All variables	0.185	0.168	0.100	0.084	0.066
	Danal R. avaraga MDDI					
(10)	Demographics	0 148	0.051	0.118	0.058	0.042
(10) (11)	Quality of capital	0.140	0.031	0.036	0.038	0.042
(11)	Canacity utilization	0.021	0.013	0.030	0.014	0.015
(12) (13)	Obstacles to investment	0.021	0.010	0.019	0.007	0.000
(13)	Adjustment	0.133	0.053	0.128	0.010	0.019
(14) (15)	Source of funds	0.056	0.033	0.040	0.008	0.007
(16)	"Compensating differentials"	0.172	0.076	0 159	0.080	0.060
(10)	"Distortions"	0.203	0.070	0.139	0.030	0.000
(17) (18)	All variables	0.350	0.130	0.281	0.112	0.041
	Danal C. avaraga MDDI av	oraga MDDL	7			
(19)	Demographics	0.109	0.077	0.060	0.039	0.026
(20)	Quality of capital	0.055	0.028	0.049	0.024	0.017
(20) (21)	Capacity utilization	0.004	0.009	0.001	0.003	0.003
(22)	Obstacles to investment	0.034	0.022	0.014	0.000	0.009
(23)	Adjustment	0.227	0.164	0.150	0.100	0.076
(24)	Source of funds	0.020	0.012	0.013	0.009	0.008
(25)	"Compensating differentials"	0.265	0 190	0 184	0.121	0.092
(25)	"Distortions"	0.148	0.190	0.104	0.050	0.032
(20)	All variables	0.346	0.235	0.249	0.157	0.119
	Panal D. Productivity gain by	sad on over	nga margin	al ravanua	nraduets	
(28)	Demographics	0.395	0.165	0.294	0.150 0.106	0.395
(29)	Ouality of capital	0.145	0.057	0.114	0.047 0.040	0.145
(30)	Capacity utilization	0.032	0.019	0.024	0.011 0.011	0.032
(31)	Obstacles to investment	0.185	0.070	0.107	0.041 0.036	0.185
(32)	Adjustment	0.465	0.232	0.404	0.213 0.150	0.465
(33)	Source of funds	0.120	0.025	0.088	0.019 0.018	0.120
(34)	"Compensating differentials"	0.559	0.285	0.484	0.262 0.199	0.559
(35)	"Distortions"	0.522	0.199	0.362	0.150 0.108	0.522
(33)		0.022	0.119	0.796	0.247 0.274	0.022

Table A.8. Marginal R^2 of adding a group of variables to a specification with fixed effects, sample averaged across waves

Note: The table replicates Table 5 in the paper for average marginal revenue products. Taking within-firm average marginal products should attenuate adverse effects of measurement errors. This table does not have a column with year fixed effects because panel data are collapsed to a cross-section. See notes to Table 4 for more details.

		List of fixed effects							
		Country	Industry	Country + Industry	Country × Industry				
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)				
	Dispersion								
(1)	MRPK	0.061	0.278	0.314	0.526				
(2)	MRPL	0.408	0.243	0.563	0.676				
(3)	MRPL - MRPK	0.193	0.190	0.346	0.554				
(4)	Productivity gain	1.050	0.701	1.529	1.975				

Table A.9. R^2 for various sets of fixed effects, sample averaged across waves

Note: The table replicates Table 4 in the paper for average marginal revenue products. Taking within-firm average marginal products should attenuate adverse effects of measurement errors. This table does not have a column with year fixed effects because panel data are collapsed to a cross-section. See notes to Table 5 for more details.

Regressor	Danandar	Dependent veriable			
Regressor	log(MRPK)	log(MRPL)			
Demographics		->S(1111 D)			
Firm age (omitted category: less than 5 years)					
5-9 years	0.109*	0.001			
	(0.064)	(0.029)			
10-19 years	-0.103*	0.062**			
	(0.056)	(0.026)			
20+ years	-0.241***	0.079***			
	(0.052)	(0.026)			
log(employment)	0.075***	-0.028***			
	(0.009)	(0.005)			
Subsidiary	0.398***	0.101^{***}			
	(0.029)	(0.013)			
Exporter	0.206***	0.139^{***}			
On ality of any ital and other impute	(0.025)	(0.013)			
Quality of capital and other inputs	0.140***	0 007***			
Share of state-of-the art machinery and equipment, including IC I	-0.149^{+++}	$(0.08)^{+++}$			
Chang of high an analy officianaly commencial hydring staals	(0.040)	(0.017)			
Share of high energy entitiency commercial building stock	(0.025)	(0.000)			
Canacity utilization (omitted category: somewhat below full conacity)	(0.055)	(0.013)			
above maximum canacity	0 78/***	0 122***			
above maximum capacity	(0.039)	(0.133)			
at maximum conscitu	(0.039)	(0.019)			
at maximum capacity	(0.022)	(0.003^{+++})			
substantially below full canacity	(0.022)	0.006***			
substantially below full capacity	-0.223	-0.090			
Obstacles to investment (omitted category: not an obstacle at all)	(0.037)	(0.017)			
Demand for products or services					
Major	-0.047	-0.004			
1Vlaj01	(0.032)	(0.014)			
Minor	-0.006	(0.014)			
MIIIO	(0.026)	(0.011)			
Availability of staff with the right skills	(0.020)	(0.011)			
Major	0 139***	-0 074***			
Widjoi	(0.029)	(0.012)			
Minor	0.059**	-0.012			
WINO	(0.027)	(0.013)			
Energy costs	(0.027)	(0.015)			
Major	-0.131***	-0.069***			
	(0.033)	(0.015)			
Minor	-0.108***	-0.054***			
	(0.024)	(0.012)			
Access to digital infrastructure					
Major	0.031	-0.006			
-	(0.038)	(0.017)			
Minor	-0.028	0.015			
	(0.026)	(0.012)			
Labor market regulations	· /	. /			
Major	-0.021	-0.072***			
	(0.031)	(0.014)			
Minor	-0.062**	-0.046***			
	(0.025)	(0.012)			
Business regulations and taxation					
Major	-0.128***	0.015			
	(0.033)	(0.014)			
Minor	-0.017	0.013			
	(0.026)	(0.012)			
Availability of adequate transport infrastructure		,			
Major	-0.039	0.118***			
	(0.035)	(0.017)			
Minor	0.009	0.049***			
	(0.026)	(0.012)			
Availability of finance					
Major	-0.017	-0.090***			

Table A.1	Predictors	of the dispersion	of the marginal	revenue products of	f capital and labor,	, EU North/West
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	(0.034)	(0.015)
Minor	-0.009	-0.072***
	(0.026)	(0.013)
Uncertainty about future		
Major	0.173***	0.043***
	(0.030)	(0.014)
Minor	0.133***	0.023**
	(0.025)	(0.012)
Adjustment		
Investment, $\log(1 + \text{investment})$	-0.090***	0.047***
	(0.005)	(0.002)
Percent change in employment in the last three years	-0.001	-0.116***
	(0.022)	(0.011)
Investment over the last three years (omitted category: about the right amount)		
too much	-0.230***	-0.044*
	(0.054)	(0.025)
too little	-0.041	0.000
	(0.027)	(0.012)
company did not exist three years ago	-0.620***	0.109
	(0.205)	(0.121)
Investment priority in the next three years (omitted category: no investment planned)		
replacing capacity	-0.070*	-0.010
	(0.039)	(0.017)
capacity expansion for existing products or services	-0.035	0.004
	(0.039)	(0.018)
developing new products, processes or services	-0.064	-0.004
	(0.043)	(0.018)
Source of funds (omitted category: external finance)	()	× ,
internal funds or retained earnings	0.285***	0.087***
	(0.034)	(0.015)
intra-group funding	0.268***	0.203***
	(0.085)	(0.040)
Credit constrained	-0.206***	-0.138***
	(0.048)	(0.020)
	(0.0.0)	(0.020)
Sample size	11,172	11,016
<u></u>	0.509	0.649
Memorandum		
R^2 with country × industry × year fixed effects and no X	0.456	0.591
R^2 with X and no fixed effects	0.166	0.180
\mathbf{R}^2 with X and country fixed effects	0.174	0.210
\mathbf{R}^2 with X and industry fixed effects	0.309	0.439
R^2 with X and year fixed effects	0.169	0.180
R^2 with X and country fixed effects, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects	0.318	0.456
R^2 with X and slopes varying by country	0.229	0.252
R^2 with X and slopes varying by industry	0.388	0.445
R^2 with X and slopes varying by year	0.176	0.189

Note: The sample is restricted to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. See notes to Appendix Table A.4 for more details.

Regressor	nt variable			
	log(MRPK) log(MRPL)			
Demographics	<i>D</i> ()	<u> </u>		
Firm age (omitted category: less than 5 years)				
5-9 years	-0.357***	0.022		
	(0.108)	(0.049)		
10-19 years	-0.472***	-0.013		
201	(0.092)	(0.046)		
20+ years	0.664^{***}	0.08/*		
lag(employment)	0.094)	-0.043***		
log(employment)	(0.025)	(0.043)		
Subsidiary	0 253***	0.078***		
	(0.050)	(0.023)		
Exporter	0.159***	0.316***		
1	(0.035)	(0.019)		
Quality of capital and other inputs		· · · ·		
Share of state-of-the art machinery and equipment, including ICT	-0.108**	0.080***		
	(0.052)	(0.027)		
Share of high energy efficiency commercial building stock	-0.272***	0.074***		
	(0.046)	(0.025)		
Capacity utilization (omitted category: somewhat below full capacity)		0.010		
above maximum capacity	0.347***	0.013		
	(0.066)	(0.037)		
at maximum capacity	0.082^{***}	0.03/**		
substantially below full canacity	(0.051) 0.471***	(0.017) 0.158***		
substantiarly below full capacity	-0.4/1 (0.052)	-0.138 (0.026)		
Obstacles to investment (omitted category: not an obstacle at all)	(0.052)	(0.020)		
Demand for products or services				
Major	0.173***	0.009		
	(0.039)	(0.021)		
Minor	0.179***	0.046**		
	(0.041)	(0.022)		
Availability of staff with the right skills				
Major	0.120***	-0.033*		
	(0.039)	(0.019)		
Minor	0.150***	0.004		
	(0.039)	(0.020)		
Energy costs	0 172***	0.026		
Major	$-0.1/3^{-0.1}$	-0.026		
Minor	-0 129***	(0.021)		
WINO	(0.039)	(0.004)		
Access to digital infrastructure	(0.055)	(0.022)		
Major	0.042	0.044*		
5	(0.048)	(0.023)		
Minor	-0.013	0.074***		
	(0.038)	(0.019)		
Labor market regulations				
Major	0.143***	-0.105***		
	(0.043)	(0.022)		
Minor	0.017	-0.056**		
Duringer angelations on datasetion	(0.044)	(0.023)		
Mojor	0.06	0.064***		
Major	(0.044)	(0.004)		
Minor	_0.044)	0.021		
	(0.041)	(0.023)		
Availability of adequate transport infrastructure	(0.010)	(0.025)		
Major	0.018	0.044**		
J	(0.037)	(0.021)		
Minor	0.017	0.018		

Table A.11. Predictors of the dispersion of the marginal revenue products of capital and labor, EU South

	(0.036)	(0.019)
Availability of finance		× ,
Major	-0.165***	-0.099***
·	(0.036)	(0.021)
Minor	-0.068*	-0.074***
	(0.040)	(0.023)
Uncertainty about future	· · · ·	. ,
Major	-0.168***	0.004
	(0.049)	(0.028)
Minor	-0.118**	-0.045
	(0.051)	(0.028)
Adjustment	· · · ·	. ,
Investment, $log(1 + investment)$	-0.051***	0.048***
	(0.006)	(0.003)
Percent change in employment in the last three years	0.160***	-0.128***
	(0.036)	(0.020)
Investment over the last three years (omitted category: about the right amount)		· · · ·
too much	-0.231***	-0.124***
	(0.069)	(0.039)
too little	-0.184***	-0.105***
	(0.043)	(0.020)
company did not exist three years ago	-0.701	-0.418*
	(0.491)	(0.238)
Investment priority in the next three years (omitted category: no investment planned)		· · · ·
replacing capacity	-0.040	0.017
	(0.052)	(0.024)
capacity expansion for existing products or services	-0.043	0.015
	(0.051)	(0.025)
developing new products, processes or services	-0.010	0.054**
	(0.053)	(0.024)
Source of funds (omitted category: external finance)		()
internal funds or retained earnings	0.098**	0.044*
C	(0.043)	(0.024)
intra-group funding	-0.613***	0.314***
	(0.147)	(0.084)
Credit constrained	-0.075	-0.075***
	(0.056)	(0.026)
	· · · ·	()
Sample size	5,657	5,602
<u>R²</u>	0.483	0.627
Memorandum		
\mathbb{R}^2 with country × industry × year fixed effects and no X	0.432	0.574
\mathbb{R}^2 with X and no fixed effects	0.136	0.185
\mathbb{R}^2 with X and country fixed effects	0.147	0.208
\mathbb{R}^2 with X and industry fixed effects	0.327	0.471
\mathbb{R}^2 with X and year fixed effects	0.136	0.185
\mathbb{R}^2 with X and country fixed effects, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects	0.341	0.525
\mathbb{R}^2 with X and slopes varying by country	0.193	0.248
\mathbb{R}^2 with X and slopes varying by industry	0.489	0.568
R^2 with X and slopes varying by year	0.153	0.200

Note: The sample is restricted to Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain. See notes to Appendix Table A.4 for more details.

Regressor	Donondor	Den en deut ereniskile			
Regressor	log(MRPK)	log(MRPL)			
Demographics					
Firm age (omitted category: less than 5 years)					
5-9 years	0.006	0.066**			
·	(0.051)	(0.030)			
10-19 years	-0.271***	0.093***			
	(0.051)	(0.028)			
20+ years	-0.374***	0.097***			
	(0.050)	(0.028)			
log(employment)	0.007	-0.017***			
	(0.009)	(0.005)			
Subsidiary	0.293***	0.227***			
	(0.033)	(0.021)			
Exporter	0.096***	0.368***			
	(0.027)	(0.016)			
Quality of capital and other inptus	0.000**	0.0(0***			
Share of state-of-the art machinery and equipment, including ICT	-0.080**	0.262***			
	(0.034)	(0.020)			
Share of high energy efficiency commercial building stock	-0.298***	0.101***			
	(0.029)	(0.017)			
Capacity utilization (omitted category: somewhat below full capacity)	A 101444	0 112444			
above maximum capacity	0.184***	0.113^{***}			
	(0.045)	(0.027)			
at maximum capacity	0.058***	0.020*			
	(0.021)	(0.012)			
substantially below full capacity	-0.260***	-0.132***			
Obstacks to investigate $($ $(4, 1, 4, 1)$	(0.034)	(0.019)			
Obstacles to investment (omitted category: not an obstacle at all)					
Demand for products or services	0.0(9***	0.042***			
Major	0.068***	0.042^{***}			
M	(0.026)	(0.016)			
Minor	0.025	0.023^{*}			
	(0.022)	(0.013)			
Availability of staff with the right skills	0.022	0.020*			
Major	-0.023	-0.028^{*}			
Miner	(0.027)	(0.015)			
Minor	-0.043	(0.010)			
Enorgy costs	(0.028)	(0.013)			
Major	0 11/***	0 121***			
1viajoi	-0.114	-0.131			
Minor	(0.027)	0.065***			
IVIIIOI	(0.002)	-0.003			
Access to digital infrastructure	(0.023)	(0.014)			
Major	0.034	0.019			
11101	(0.034)	(0.01)			
Minor	0.035	0.020			
MINIOI	(0.035)	(0.032)			
Labor market regulations	(0.024)	(0.013)			
Major	-0.070**	-0 058***			
1410)01	-0.070	(0.000)			
Minor	0.020)	-0.052***			
	(0.019)	(0.052)			
Business regulations and taxation	(0.024)	(0.017)			
Major	0.012	-0.007			
11101	(0.012)	(0.007)			
Minor	0.020)	0.063***			
	(0.025)	(0.003)			
Availability of adequate transport infrastructure	(0.023)	(0.014)			
Major	0.039	0.060***			
14101	(0.03)	(0.000)			
Minor	0.027)	0.051***			
	(0.020	(0.051)			
Availability of finance	(0.023)	(0.013)			
Major	-0 074***	-0.069***			
1120101	U.U / T	0.007			

Table A	12 .	Predictors	of the	dispersion	of the	e marginal	revenue	products c	of capital	and labor	, EU	Center/East
---------	-------------	------------	--------	------------	--------	------------	---------	------------	------------	-----------	------	-------------
	(0.026)	(0.016)										
--	---------------	---------------------										
Minor	-0.032	-0.050***										
Uncertainty about future	(0.021)	(0.013)										
Major	0.032	0.050***										
Major	(0.032)	(0.050)										
Minor	-0.003	0.057***										
	(0.027)	(0.015)										
Adjustment	. ,	. ,										
Investment, log(1 + investment)	-0.050***	0.058***										
	(0.004)	(0.003)										
Percent change in employment in the last three years	0.172^{***}	$-0.0^{7/***}$										
Investment over the last three years (amitted estagory, shout the right amount)	(0.026)	(0.014)										
too much	-0 208***	-0 162***										
	(0.041)	(0.026)										
too little	-0.006	-0.094***										
	(0.023)	(0.013)										
company did not exist three years ago	1.142***	-0.115										
	(0.393)	(0.195)										
Investment priority in the next three years (omitted category: no investment planned)												
replacing capacity	-0.06	-0.052**										
	(0.037)	(0.021)										
capacity expansion for existing products or services	-0.115***	-0.036										
developing new products, processes or services	(0.036)	(0.023)										
developing new products, processes of services	(0.039)	$(0.030^{-0.030})$										
Source of funds (omitted category: external finance)	(0.038)	(0.023)										
internal funds or retained earnings	0.178***	0.043**										
	(0.030)	(0.019)										
intra-group funding	-0.294**	0.143* [*]										
	(0.123)	(0.061)										
Credit constrained	-0.040	-0.052***										
	(0.032)	(0.018)										
Sample size	11,184	11.101										
R ²	0.527	0.720										
Memorandum												
\mathbb{R}^2 with country × industry × year fixed effects and no X	0.496	0.643										
R^2 with X and no fixed effects	0.155	0.256										
R^2 with X and country fixed effects	0.185	0.389										
\mathbb{R}^2 with X and industry fixed effects	0.342	0.519										
R^2 with X and year fixed effects R^2 with X and second effects in history fixed effects and even fixed by R^2 with X and S a	0.155	0.257										
K^2 with A and country fixed effects, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects \mathbf{P}^2 with V and slongs verying by country	0.3/3	0.019										
\mathbf{R} with \mathbf{A} and slopes varying by country \mathbf{R}^2 with \mathbf{Y} and slopes varying by industry	0.227	0.500										
R^2 with X and slopes varying by industry R^2 with X and slopes varying by vear	0.407	0.323 0.265										
i mai zi and slopes varying by year	0.102	0.205										

Note: The sample is restricted to Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. See notes to Appendix Table A.4 for more details.

		List of fixed effects					
Row	Group of variables	No fixed effects	Country	Industry	Year	Country + Industry + Year	Country × Industry × Year
100		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A: MRPK			(-)		(-)	(-)
(1)	Demographics	0.041	0.035	0.027	0.042	0.024	0.019
(2)	Quality of capital	0.020	0.011	0.015	0.020	0.010	0.007
(3)	Capacity utilization	0.012	0.017	0.005	0.012	0.008	0.008
(4)	Obstacles to investment	0.028	0.025	0.010	0.028	0.009	0.008
(5)	Adjustment	0.073	0.070	0.030	0.073	0.029	0.021
(6)	Source of funds	0.042	0.041	0.028	0.040	0.024	0.022
(7)	"Compensating differentials"	0.103	0.096	0.052	0.103	0.046	0.038
(8)	"Distortions"	0.092	0.086	0.048	0.091	0.044	0.037
(9)	All variables	0.166	0.154	0.091	0.166	0.084	0.071
	Panel B. MRPL						
(10)	Demographics	0.079	0.063	0.059	0.079	0.050	0.034
(11)	Quality of capital	0.001	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.002
12)	Capacity utilization	0.011	0.011	0.006	0.011	0.006	0.004
13)	Obstacles to investment	0.057	0.044	0.023	0.057	0.018	0.016
(14)	Adjustment	0.056	0.048	0.050	0.056	0.044	0.030
(15)	Source of funds	0.050	0.040	0.023	0.050	0.019	0.013
(16)	"Compensating differentials"	0.076	0.068	0.064	0.076	0.058	0.045
17)	"Distortions"	0.126	0.101	0.069	0.126	0.058	0.040
(18)	All variables	0.180	0.150	0.113	0.180	0.098	0.074
	Panel C: MRPL - MRPK						
(19)	Demographics	0.051	0.047	0.019	0.050	0.018	0.011
20)	Ouality of capital	0.017	0.015	0.016	0.017	0.014	0.010
21)	Capacity utilization	0.006	0.008	0.001	0.006	0.003	0.004
22)	Obstacles to investment	0.027	0.028	0.010	0.027	0.010	0.008
23)	Adjustment	0.160	0.151	0.091	0.160	0.080	0.052
24)́	Source of funds	0.014	0.015	0.012	0.013	0.010	0.009
25)	"Compensating differentials"	0.176	0.166	0.104	0.175	0.092	0.061
(26)	"Distortions"	0.084	0.080	0.037	0.082	0.034	0.026
(27)	All variables	0.229	0.222	0.138	0.229	0.129	0.093
	Panel D: Productivity gain						
(28)	Demographics	0.236	0.194	0.156	0.234	0.134	0.088
(29)	Quality of capital	0.010	0.021	0.015	0.013	0.020	0.012
(30)	Capacity utilization	0.028	0.027	0.013	0.028	0.014	0.010
31)	Obstacles to investment	0.160	0.130	0.064	0.160	0.052	0.045
32)	Adjustment	0.285	0.256	0.215	0.285	0.188	0.124
(33)	Source of funds	0.118	0.094	0.055	0.118	0.045	0.030
34)	"Compensating differentials"	0.336	0.308	0.253	0.335	0.227	0.163
35)	"Distortions"	0.363	0.298	0.190	0.361	0.161	0.110
(36)	All variables	0.625	0.547	0.394	0.625	0.349	0.254

Table A.13. Marginal R^2 of adding a group of variables to a specification with fixed effects, EU North/West

Note: The sample is restricted to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. See notes to Table 5 for more details.

		List of fixed effects					
						Country +	Country ×
		No fixed				Industry +	Industry \times
Row	Group of variables	effects	Country	Industry	Year	Year	Year
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A: MRPK		0.000		0.040	0 0 1 -	
(1)	Demographics	0.040	0.036	0.019	0.040	0.015	0.013
(2)	Quality of capital	0.008	0.007	0.005	0.008	0.004	0.005
(3)	Capacity utilization	0.028	0.025	0.018	0.028	0.017	0.016
(4)	Obstacles to investment	0.030	0.029	0.015	0.030	0.014	0.014
(5)	Adjustment	0.057	0.053	0.018	0.056	0.016	0.013
(6)	Source of funds	0.014	0.011	0.005	0.013	0.005	0.003
(7)	"Compensating differentials"	0.092	0.084	0.043	0.092	0.036	0.034
(8)	"Distortions"	0.076	0.069	0.033	0.075	0.030	0.027
(9)	All variables	0.136	0.126	0.068	0.135	0.060	0.057
	Donal D. MDDI						
(10)	ranei D: MIKEL Demographics	0.081	0.086	0.041	0.080	0.040	0.044
(10)	Ouglity of conital	0.001	0.080	0.041	0.080	0.049	0.044
(11)	Quality of capital Capacity utilization	0.010	0.014	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.007
(12)	Capacity utilization	0.014	0.014	0.000	0.015	0.007	0.007
(13)	A division on t	0.033	0.048	0.021	0.033	0.013	0.015
(14) (15)	Adjustment Source of funds	0.084	0.070	0.000	0.085	0.042	0.039
(15)	Source of funds	0.011	0.008	0.010	0.010	0.005	0.005
(16)	"Compensating differentials"	0.125	0.117	0.079	0.124	0.070	0.065
(17)	"Distortions"	0.098	0.088	0.048	0.097	0.037	0.034
(18)	All variables	0.185	0.170	0.108	0.183	0.093	0.085
	Panel C: MRPL - MRPK						
(19)	Demographics	0.094	0.086	0.039	0.094	0.032	0.027
(20)	Quality of capital	0.015	0.012	0.010	0.015	0.009	0.009
(21)	Capacity utilization	0.013	0.009	0.005	0.013	0.004	0.005
(21)	Obstacles to investment	0.013	0.028	0.003	0.013	0.001	0.000
(23)	Adjustment	0.124	0.107	0.063	0.123	0.047	0.034
(24)	Source of funds	0.023	0.014	0.017	0.022	0.007	0.004
		0.1.(1	0 1 4 1	0.000	0.1.00	0.0(0	0.050
(25)	"Compensating differentials"	0.161	0.141	0.080	0.160	0.062	0.050
(26)	"Distortions"	0.122	0.102	0.062	0.121	0.043	0.037
(27)	All variables	0.227	0.200	0.120	0.226	0.095	0.083
	Panel D: Productivity gain						
(28)	Demographics	0.292	0.298	0.138	0.289	0.153	0.136
(29)	Quality of capital	0.053	0.045	0.024	0.053	0.023	0.025
(30)	Capacity utilization	0.034	0.031	0.010	0.031	0.012	0.015
(31)	Obstacles to investment	0.159	0.137	0.061	0.158	0.043	0.039
(32)	Adjustment	0.324	0.271	0.216	0.321	0.152	0.131
(33)	Source of funds	0.046	0.030	0.042	0.043	0.018	0.016
(34)	"Compensating differentials"	0.450	0.412	0 260	0 447	0 229	0 203
(34)	"Distortions"	0.450	0.412	0.209	0.447	0.229	0.203
(35)	All variables	0.540	0.501	0.175	0.343	0.120	0.113
(30)	ALL VALIAULES	0.034	0.390	0.3/4	0.040	0.511	0.2/7

Table A.14. Marginal R^2 of adding a group of variables to a specification with fixed effects, EU South.

Note: The sample is restricted to Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain. See notes to Table 5 for more details.

		List of fixed effects					
Row	Group of variables	No fixed effects	Country	Industry	Year	Country + Industry + Year	Country × Industry × Year
	1	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A: MRPK						
(1)	Demographics	0.063	0.060	0.019	0.063	0.020	0.016
(2)	Quality of capital	0.018	0.011	0.018	0.018	0.011	0.009
(3)	Capacity utilization	0.010	0.012	0.006	0.010	0.007	0.004
(4)	Obstacles to investment	0.020	0.017	0.009	0.020	0.007	0.004
(5)	Adjustment	0.087	0.080	0.027	0.087	0.023	0.018
(6)	Source of funds	0.019	0.016	0.008	0.019	0.008	0.006
(7)	"Compensating differentials"	0.111	0.100	0.049	0.111	0.041	0.029
(8)	"Distortions"	0.093	0.086	0.034	0.093	0.032	0.024
(9)	All variables	0.155	0.142	0.074	0.155	0.063	0.046
(10)	Panel B: MRPL	0 107	0.050	0.106	0 106	0.072	0.050
(10)	Ouglity of capital	0.107	0.039	0.100	0.100	0.075	0.039
(11)	Conscity utilization	0.004	0.029	0.04/	0.003	0.021	0.020
(12)	Capacity utilization	0.029	0.018	0.018	0.029	0.009	0.007
(13)	A division of the state of the	0.039	0.040	0.031	0.039	0.020	0.010
(14)	Aujustinent Source of funds	0.098	0.071	0.087	0.097	0.000	0.048
15)	Source of funds	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.005
16)	"Compensating differentials"	0.175	0.107	0.155	0.175	0.094	0.079
(17)	"Distortions"	0.118	0.076	0.083	0.117	0.063	0.049
(18)	All variables	0.256	0.153	0.198	0.255	0.121	0.101
	Panel C: MRPL - MRPK						
(19)	Demographics	0.136	0.102	0.076	0.135	0.054	0.043
20)	Quality of capital	0.067	0.039	0.055	0.068	0.030	0.026
21)	Capacity utilization	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000
22)	Obstacles to investment	0.032	0.020	0.016	0.032	0.008	0.008
23)	Adjustment	0.209	0.153	0.123	0.208	0.092	0.074
24)	Source of funds	0.025	0.023	0.014	0.025	0.014	0.012
25)	"Compensating differentials"	0.252	0 180	0.165	0.251	0 1 1 4	0.093
(26)	"Distortions"	0.154	0.100	0.105	0.153	0.063	0.055
27)	All variables	0.309	0.220	0.202	0.308	0.136	0.111
,		0.000	0.220	0.202	0.000	0.100	
(20)	Panel D: Productivity gain	0.202	0.000	0.247	0.200	0.007	0 101
28)	Demographics	0.393	0.233	0.347	0.389	0.237	0.191
29)	Quality of capital	0.230	0.113	0.173	0.234	0.082	0.076
30)	Capacity utilization	0.070	0.041	0.042	0.070	0.019	0.015
31)	A dimension	0.1/6	0.115	0.092	0.1/6	0.056	0.048
32)	Aujustment	0.441	0.311	0.349	0.43/	0.246	0.198
33)	Source of funds	0.033	0.030	0.027	0.033	0.024	0.023
(34)	"Compensating differentials"	0.673	0.422	0.558	0.671	0.348	0.292
35)	"Distortions"	0.424	0.282	0.287	0.420	0.215	0.170
(36)	All variables	0.919	0.560	0.695	0.915	0.429	0.359

Table A.15. Marginal R^2 of adding a group of variables to a specification with fixed effects, EU Center/East

Note: The sample is restricted to Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. See notes to Table 5 for more details.

		List of fixed effects							
		Country	Industry	Year	Country + Industry + Year	Country × Industry × Year			
		(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)			
Panel A:	EU North/West								
	Dispersion								
(1)	MRPK	0.019	0.226	0.003	0.240	0.456			
(2)	MRPL	0.065	0.329	0.001	0.370	0.591			
(3)	MRPL - MRPK	0.033	0.199	0.003	0.227	0.482			
(4)	Productivity gain	0.193	0.933	0.004	1.061	1.790			
Panel B:	EU South								
	Dispersion								
(1)	MRPK	0.023	0.264	0.000	0.286	0.432			
(2)	MRPL	0.040	0.371	0.002	0.444	0.574			
(3)	MRPL - MRPK	0.074	0.246	0.002	0.297	0.459			
(4)	Productivity gain	0.174	1.071	0.007	1.303	1.735			
Panel C:	: EU Center/East								
	Dispersion								
(1)	MRPK	0.048	0.277	0.000	0.319	0.496			
(2)	MRPL	0.246	0.349	0.002	0.518	0.643			
(3)	MRPL - MRPK	0.187	0.216	0.002	0.355	0.541			
(4)	Productivity gain	0.816	0.972	0.007	1.540	1.967			

Table A.16. R^2 for various sets of fixed effects, by EU region

Note: The EU North/West sample is restricted to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. The EU South sample is restricted to Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain. The EU Center/East sample is restricted to Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. See notes to Table 4 for more details.

Regressor	Dependen	ıt variable
8	log(MRPK)	log(MRPL)
Demographics		0(
Firm age (omitted category: less than 5 years)		
5-9 years	-0.001	0.045**
	(0.038)	(0.019)
10-19 years	-0.212***	0.063***
	(0.035)	(0.018)
20+ years	-0.335***	0.094***
	(0.034)	(0.017)
log(employment)	0.048***	-0.016***
	(0.006)	(0.003)
Subsidiary	0.323***	0.1/1***
	(0.019)	(0.010)
Exporter	0.132***	0.244***
	(0.016)	(0.009)
Quality of capital and other inputs	0 10/***	0 1/0***
Share of state-of-the art machinery and equipment, including IC1	-0.124***	0.148^{***}
	(0.023)	(0.012)
Share of high energy efficiency commercial building stock	-0.258***	0.059^{***}
	(0.020)	(0.010)
Capacity utilization (omitted category: somewhat below full capacity)	0.240***	0.004***
above maximum capacity	(0.026)	(0.094^{****})
at maximum approxity	(0.020)	(0.013)
at maximum capacity	(0.128^{+++})	(0.044^{****})
substantially balaxy full consoity	(0.014)	(0.007) 0.122***
substantiany below full capacity	-0.313	-0.133
Obstacles to investment (omitted category: not an obstacle at all)	(0.022)	(0.011)
Demand for products or services		
Major	0 070***	0.008
Major	(0.070)	(0.008)
Minor	0.052***	0.011
WINO	(0.016)	(0.001)
Availability of staff with the right skills	(0.010)	(0.000)
Major	0 064***	-0.050***
1114/01	(0.017)	(0,009)
Minor	0.032*	-0.005
	(0.017)	(0,009)
Energy costs	(0.017)	(0.005)
Major	-0.127***	-0.086***
	(0.018)	(0.009)
Minor	-0.091***	-0.055***
	(0.015)	(0.008)
Access to digital infrastructure		× ,
Major	0.036	0.015
·	(0.023)	(0.012)
Minor	0.01	0.035***
	(0.016)	(0.008)
Labor market regulations		
Major	-0.009	-0.070***
	(0.018)	(0.009)
Minor	-0.02	-0.043***
	(0.016)	(0.008)
Business regulations and taxation		
Major	-0.046**	0.027***
	(0.019)	(0.009)
Minor	0.022	0.028***
	(0.017)	(0.009)

Table A.17. Predictors of the dispersion of the marginal revenue products of capital and labor, capital and labor regressands are from Orbis

Availability of adequate transport infrastructure		
Major	-0.024	0.072***
	(0.019)	(0.010)
Minor	0.008	0.048***
	(0.015)	(0.008)
Availability of finance		
Major	-0.051***	-0.086***
•	(0.018)	(0.010)
Minor	-0.003	-0.072***
	(0.015)	(0.008)
Uncertainty about future		. ,
Major	0.059***	0.048***
•	(0.018)	(0.010)
Minor	0.048***	0.035***
	(0.017)	(0.009)
Adjustment		
Investment, $log(1 + investment)$	-0.067***	0.048***
	(0.003)	(0.001)
Percent change in employment in the last three years	0.099***	-0.097***
8 1 5 5	(0.015)	(0.008)
Investment over the last three years (omitted category: about the right amount)	(******)	(0.000)
too much	-0.223***	-0.099***
	(0.030)	(0.016)
too little	-0.065***	-0.070***
	(0.016)	(0,008)
company did not exist three years ago	-0.255	-0.066
company and not exist times years ago	(0.176)	(0.087)
Investment priority in the next three years (omitted category: no investment planned)	(0.170)	(0.007)
replacing capacity	-0.069***	-0.021*
Tephaening capacity	(0.00)	(0.012)
canacity expansion for existing products or services	-0.087***	(0.012)
cupacity expansion for existing products of services	(0.007)	(0.002)
developing new products, processes or services	-0.080***	(0.012)
developing new products, processes of services	(0.025)	(0.012)
Source of funds (omitted category: external finance)	(0.025)	(0.012)
internal funds or retained earnings	0 183***	0 066***
internal runds of retained earnings	(0.020)	(0.000)
intro group funding	(0.020)	0.122***
inda-group funding	-0.099	(0.020)
Cradit constrained	(0.003)	(0.030)
Credit constrained	-0.091	-0.093
	(0.024)	(0.012)
Sample size	27,832	27,627
\mathbb{R}^2	0.527	0.777
Memorandum		
R^2 with country × industry × year fixed effects and no X	0.492	0.736
R^2 with X and no fixed effects	0.144	0.287
R^2 with X and country fixed effects	0.175	0.53
R^2 with X and industry fixed effects	0.304	0.460
R^2 with X and year fixed effects	0.145	0.287
R^2 with X and country fixed effects, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects	0.332	0.677
R^2 with X and slopes varying by country	0.226	0.459
R^2 with X and slopes varying by industry	0.305	0.445
R^2 with X and slopes varying by year	0.147	0.290

Note: In this table, the regressors log(employment) and log(1+investment) use data from the Orbis database. Other variables are from EIBIS. See notes to Appendix Table A.4 for more details.

Table A.18. Predictors of the dispersion of the marginal revenue products of capital and labor, no	sampling
weight.	

Regressor	Dependen	t variable
	log(MRPK)	log(MRPL)
Demographics Firm age (omitted category: less than 5 years)		
5-9 years	-0.025	0.041**
	(0.040)	(0.021)
10-19 years	-0.195***	0.091***
20+ years	-0.352***	(0.020) 0.123***
log(employment)	(0.037) 0.054***	(0.019) -0.029***
log(employment)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Subsidiary	0.404^{***} (0.024)	0.128*** (0.012)
Exporter	0.148***	0.274***
Quality of capital and other inputs	(0.019)	(0.010)
Share of state-of-the art machinery and equipment, including ICT	-0.121***	0.152***
Share of high energy efficiency commercial building stock	(0.027) -0 281***	(0.013) 0.065***
Share of high chergy enherency commercial building stock	(0.023)	(0.011)
Capacity utilization (omitted category: somewhat below full capacity)	0 270***	0.000***
above maximum capacity	(0.279^{+++})	(0.098^{***})
at maximum capacity	0.145***	0.048***
	(0.016)	(0.008)
substantially below full capacity	-0.283***	-0.145***
Obstacles to investment (omitted category: not an obstacle at all)	(0.025)	(0.012)
Demand for products or services		
Major	0.039*	0.029***
	(0.020)	(0.011)
Minor	0.043^{**}	(0.010)
Availability of staff with the right skills	(0.018)	(0.009)
Major	0.052***	-0.061***
	(0.019)	(0.010)
Minor	0.036^{*}	(0.003)
Energy costs	(0.017)	(0.010)
Major	-0.161***	-0.090***
<i></i>	(0.021)	(0.011)
Minor	-0.105^{***}	-0.048^{***}
Access to digital infrastructure	(0.018)	(0.010)
Major	0.064**	0.023*
<i></i>	(0.029)	(0.014)
Minor	(0.025)	0.035^{***}
Labor market regulations	(0.010)	(0.007)
Major	-0.007	-0.093***
Minor	(0.021)	(0.011)
MINO	(0.019)	(0.010)
Business regulations and taxation	(0.01))	(0.010)
Major	-0.085***	0.025**
Maria	(0.022)	(0.011)
Minor	(0.002)	(0.036^{***})
Availability of adequate transport infrastructure	(0.01))	(0.010)
Major	0.017	0.089***
Minor	(0.022)	(0.012)
ΤΟΠΙΙΝ	(0.023)	0.036***
Availability of finance	(0.010)	(0.00))

Major	-0.084***	-0.089***
5	(0.021)	(0.011)
Minor	-0.014	-0.060***
	(0.018)	(0.010)
Uncertainty about future		
Major	0.067***	0.026**
	(0.022)	(0.011)
Minor	0.054***	0.030***
A Production of	(0.020)	(0.010)
Adjustment Investment log(1 + investment)	0.067***	0 052***
mvestment, log(1 + mvestment)	-0.00/	(0.032)
Dereast shange in ampleximent in the last three years	(0.005) 0.110***	(0.002) 0.112***
Fercent change in employment in the last three years	(0.018)	-0.112
Investment over the last three years (omitted category: about the right amount)	_0.260***	_0.110***
too much	(0.034)	(0.018)
	-0.055***	-0.076***
too little	(0.055)	(0.009)
	-0 174	-0.082
company did not exist three years ago	(0.182)	(0.093)
	(0110_)	(0.050)
Investment priority in the next three years (omitted category: no investment planned)	-0.090***	0.013
replacing capacity	(0.026)	(0.013)
	-0.126***	0.027**
capacity expansion for existing products or services	(0.027)	(0.014)
	-0.075***	0.029**
developing new products, processes or services	(0.029)	(0.014)
Source of funds (omitted category: external finance)		
internal funds or retained earnings	0.246***	0.044***
	(0.023)	(0.012)
intra-group funding	-0.166**	0.172***
	(0.073)	(0.037)
Credit constrained	-0.082***	-0.086***
	(0.027)	(0.013)
	20.251	20.021
Sample size	29,351	29,021
<u>K</u> Mamanan dum	0.423	0.724
R^2 with country x industry x year fixed effects and no X	0 385	0.673
R^2 with X and no fixed effects	0.108	0.075
R^2 with X and country fixed effects	0.142	0.472
R^2 with X and industry fixed effects	0 240	0.410
R^2 with X and year fixed effects	0.109	0.251
R^2 with X and country fixed effects, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects	0.270	0.621
R^2 with X and slopes varying by country	0.195	0.437
R^2 with X and slopes varying by industry	0.286	0.431
R^2 with X and slopes varying by year	0.112	0.254

Note: In this table, we use equal (rather than sampling) weights. See notes to Appendix Table A.4 for more details.

Table A.19. Marginal R^2 of adding a group of variables to a specification with fixed effects, no sampling
weight.

		List of fixed effects					
						Country +	Country ×
D	C	No fixed	C	T. 1	V	Industry +	Industry \times
Row	Group of variables	effects (1)	Country	Industry (2)	$\frac{Y \text{ ear}}{(4)}$	Y ear (5)	Year
	Panel A · MRPK	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(3)	(0)
(1)	Demographics	0.030	0.026	0.018	0.030	0.015	0.013
(2)	Quality of capital	0.013	0.007	0.015	0.013	0.008	0.007
(3)	Capacity utilization	0.014	0.014	0.009	0.014	0.009	0.007
(4)	Obstacles to investment	0.021	0.015	0.010	0.021	0.006	0.005
(5)	Adjustment	0.044	0.048	0.017	0.044	0.017	0.014
(6)	Source of funds	0.022	0.021	0.014	0.022	0.011	0.009
(7)	"Compensating differentials"	0.071	0.070	0.041	0.071	0.036	0.029
(8)	"Distortions"	0.060	0.054	0.032	0.060	0.027	0.022
(9)	All variables	0.108	0.103	0.066	0.108	0.058	0.047
	Panal B. MRPI						
(10)	Demographics	0.124	0.041	0.096	0 1 2 4	0.037	0.029
(11)	Ouality of capital	0.027	0.008	0.019	0.027	0.006	0.006
(12)	Capacity utilization	0.016	0.008	0.013	0.016	0.006	0.004
(13)	Obstacles to investment	0.068	0.024	0.046	0.068	0.013	0.010
(14)	Adjustment	0.089	0.035	0.088	0.089	0.035	0.026
(15)	Source of funds	0.030	0.006	0.024	0.030	0.004	0.003
(16)	"Compensating differentials"	0.120	0.057	0.110	0.120	0.053	0.041
(17)	"Distortions"	0.161	0.047	0.122	0.161	0.035	0.026
(18)	All variables	0.251	0.090	0.203	0.250	0.072	0.057
	Panel C: MRPL - MRPK						
(19)	Demographics	0.079	0.048	0.047	0.079	0.023	0.017
(20)	Ouality of capital	0.037	0.017	0.034	0.037	0.016	0.013
(21)	Capacity utilization	0.001	0.003	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001
(22)	Obstacles to investment	0.023	0.013	0.012	0.023	0.005	0.004
(23)	Adjustment	0.140	0.097	0.096	0.140	0.059	0.046
(24)	Source of funds	0.019	0.014	0.013	0.019	0.009	0.007
(25)	"Compensating differentials"	0.167	0.114	0.120	0.167	0.073	0.058
(26)	"Distortions"	0.107	0.064	0.066	0.107	0.032	0.024
(27)	All variables	0.226	0.144	0.166	0.225	0.092	0.074
	Panel D: Productivity gain						
(28)	Demographics	0.390	0.145	0.289	0.390	0.112	0.086
(29)	Ouality of capital	0.104	0.036	0.079	0.104	0.029	0.026
(30)	Capacity utilization	0.033	0.015	0.028	0.033	0.011	0.007
(31)	Obstacles to investment	0.187	0.067	0.125	0.187	0.035	0.027
(32)	Adjustment	0.364	0.173	0.326	0.364	0.148	0.111
(33)	Source of funds	0.085	0.019	0.068	0.085	0.014	0.010
(24)	"Compensating differentials"	0 459	0 226	0 206	0 459	0.109	0 155
(34)	"Distortions"	0.438	0.230	0.390	0.438	0.198	0.133
(36)	All variables	0.838	0 335	0.509	0.834	0 255	0 203
(50)	1111 Yulluuluu	0.050	0.555	0.071	0.0JT	0.233	0.205

Note: In this table, we use equal (rather than sampling) weights. See notes to Table 5 for more details.

		List of fixed effects						
		Country	Industry	Year	Country + Industry + Year	Country × Industry × Year		
		(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
(1) (2) (3)	Dispersion MRPK MRPL MRPL - MRPK	0.041 0.386 0.168	0.179 0.213 0.119	0.001 0.000 0.000	0.216 0.552 0.283	0.385 0.673 0.449		
(4)	Productivity gain	1.155	0.572	-0.001	1.605	2.004		

Table A.20. R^2 for various sets of fixed effects, no sampling weight.

Note: In this table, we use equal (rather than sampling) weights. See notes to Table 4 for more details.

Regressor	Dependent variable			
116100001	log(MRPK)	log(MRPL)		
Demographics				
Firm age (omitted category: less than 5 years)				
5-9 years	-0.009	0.020		
10.10	(0.039)	(0.016)		
10-19 years	-0.218***	0.039^{***}		
	(0.035)	(0.015)		
20+ years	-0.539^{+++}	(0.08/14)		
log(employment)	0.0347	0.005**		
log(employment)	(0.001)	(0.003)		
Subsidiary	0.351***	0.087***		
	(0.019)	(0.008)		
Exporter	0.135***	0.174***		
	(0.016)	(0.007)		
Quality of capital and other inputs				
Share of state-of-the art machinery and equipment, including ICT	-0.123***	0.113***		
	(0.023)	(0.009)		
Share of high energy efficiency commercial building stock	-0.260***	0.031***		
	(0.020)	(0.008)		
Capacity utilization (omitted category: somewhat below full capacity)	0.055***	0.000***		
above maximum capacity	0.255***	0.083***		
	(0.026)	(0.012)		
at maximum capacity	0.134^{***}	0.026^{***}		
	(0.014)	(0.006)		
substantially below full capacity	-0.301^{+++}	-0.063^{+++}		
Obstacles to investment (omitted category: not an obstacle at all)	(0.022)	(0.010)		
Demand for products or services				
Major	0 078***	0.011		
1414,01	(0.078)	(0.008)		
Minor	0.058***	-0.002		
	(0.016)	(0.002)		
Availability of staff with the right skills	(0.010)	(0.007)		
Major	0.065***	-0.035***		
5	(0.017)	(0.007)		
Minor	0.036**	0.010		
	(0.017)	(0.007)		
Energy costs				
Major	-0.132***	-0.070***		
	(0.018)	(0.008)		
Minor	-0.092***	-0.046***		
	(0.015)	(0.007)		
Access to digital infrastructure	0.040*	0.000		
Major	0.040*	0.009		
Minor	(0.023)	(0.009)		
WIIIOF	(0.005)	(0.031)		
Labor market regulations	(0.010)	(0.007)		
Major	0.003	-0 075***		
1viaj01	(0.003)	(0.008)		
Minor	-0.018	-0.043***		
	(0.016)	(0.007)		
Business regulations and taxation	(01010)	(0.007)		
Major	-0.041**	0.007		
	(0.019)	(0.008)		
Minor	0.023	0.022***		
	(0.016)	(0.007)		
Availability of adequate transport infrastructure	× ,	. /		
Major	-0.030	0.041***		
	(0.019)	(0.009)		
Minor	0.013	0.034***		
	(0.015)	(0.007)		

Table A.21. Predictors of the dispersion of the marginal revenue products of capital and labor, firm-level cost shares are used to compute marginal revenue products.

Availability of finance

Major	-0.058***	-0.041***
	(0.018)	(0.008)
Minor	-0.006	-0.028***
	(0.015)	(0.007)
Uncertainty about future	0.052***	0.040***
Major	0.052^{***}	0.040^{***}
Minor	(0.018)	(0.008)
IVIIIIOF	(0.042^{++})	(0.031)
Adjustment	(0.017)	(0.007)
Investment $\log(1 + \text{investment})$	-0.057***	0 032***
investment, log(1 + investment)	(0.03)	(0.001)
Percent change in employment in the last three years	0.090***	-0 156***
i ereent enange in emproyment in the last timee years	(0.015)	(0.007)
Investment over the last three years (omitted category: about the right amount)	-0.232***	-0.075***
too much	(0.030)	(0.013)
	-0.063***	-0.040***
too little	(0.016)	(0.007)
	-0.269	-0.052
company did not exist three years ago	(0.179)	(0.073)
Investment priority in the next three years (omitted category: no investment planned)	-0.054**	0.004
replacing capacity	(0.023)	(0.009)
	-0.068***	0.005
capacity expansion for existing products or services	(0.024)	(0.010)
	-0.056**	0.016
developing new products, processes or services	(0.025)	(0.010)
Source of funds (omitted category: external finance)		
internal funds or retained earnings		
č	0.189***	0.072***
intra-group funding	(0.020)	(0.008)
	-0.124**	0.117***
Credit constrained	(0.062)	(0.024)
	-0.099***	-0.101***
	(0.024)	(0.010)
Sample size	27,816	27,325
<u>R</u> ²	0.527	0.805
Memorandum		
\mathbb{R}^2 with country × industry × year fixed effects and no X	0.492	0.773
R^2 with X and no fixed effects	0.138	0.294
R^2 with X and country fixed effects R^2 with V and inductors fixed effects	0.170	0.685
K^2 with A and industry lixed effects R^2 with V and even fixed effects	0.302	0.338
\mathbf{K}^- with $\mathbf{\Lambda}$ and year lixed effects inductor fixed effects and user fixed effects	0.139	0.294
\mathbf{R} with \mathbf{A} and country fixed effects, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects \mathbf{P}^2 with \mathbf{V} and slopes varying by country	0.529	0.707
\mathbf{R}^2 with \mathbf{X} and slopes varying by country \mathbf{R}^2 with \mathbf{Y} and slopes varying by industry	0.221	0.370
\mathbf{R}^2 with \mathbf{X} and slopes varying by industry \mathbf{R}^2 with \mathbf{X} and slopes varying by year	0.300	0.398
	0.141	0.290

Note: In this table, the outcome variables (marginal revenue products for labor and capital) are computed using firm-level (rather than country×industry) cost shares. See notes to Appendix Table A.4 for more details.

Table A.22. Marginal R^2 of adding a group of variables to a specification with fixed effects, firm-level cost
shares are used to compute marginal revenue products.

		List of fixed effects					
						Country +	Country ×
Dow	Crown of variables	No fixed	Country	Inductor	Vaar	Industry +	Industry ×
Kow	Group of variables	(1)	$\frac{\text{Country}}{(2)}$	(2)	$\frac{Y \text{ ear}}{(4)}$	Y ear (5)	Y ear (6)
	Panel A · MRPK	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(3)	(0)
(1)	Demographics	0.049	0.039	0.022	0.049	0.018	0.013
(2)	Quality of capital	0.016	0.009	0.016	0.016	0.008	0.007
(3)	Capacity utilization	0.016	0.016	0.009	0.016	0.010	0.008
(4)	Obstacles to investment	0.024	0.017	0.011	0.024	0.005	0.004
(5)	Adjustment	0.062	0.064	0.017	0.062	0.017	0.013
(6)	Source of funds	0.027	0.022	0.015	0.027	0.011	0.008
(7)	"Compensating differentials"	0.094	0.088	0.042	0.093	0.036	0.028
(8)	"Distortions"	0.085	0.070	0.038	0.085	0.029	0.021
(9)	All variables	0.138	0.124	0.070	0.138	0.058	0.045
	Panel R. MRPI						
(10)	Demographics	0.147	0.044	0.114	0.147	0.031	0.023
(11)	Quality of capital	0.031	0.004	0.019	0.032	0.003	0.003
(12)	Capacity utilization	0.008	0.003	0.008	0.008	0.003	0.002
(13)	Obstacles to investment	0.066	0.015	0.049	0.066	0.009	0.007
(14)	Adjustment	0.119	0.039	0.099	0.119	0.027	0.021
(15)	Source of funds	0.046	0.005	0.037	0.046	0.004	0.003
(16)	"Compensating differentials"	0.147	0.053	0.115	0.147	0.037	0.029
(17)	"Distortions"	0.191	0.045	0.153	0.191	0.031	0.023
(18)	All variables	0.294	0.073	0.233	0.294	0.051	0.041
	Panel C+ MRPL - MRPK						
(19)	Demographics	0.099	0.068	0.049	0.099	0.024	0.016
(20)	Quality of capital	0.034	0.013	0.031	0.034	0.011	0.010
(21)	Capacity utilization	0.006	0.009	0.002	0.006	0.003	0.002
(22)	Obstacles to investment	0.023	0.013	0.013	0.023	0.004	0.003
(23)	Adjustment	0.181	0.120	0.101	0.180	0.053	0.040
(24)	Source of funds	0.025	0.014	0.015	0.025	0.007	0.006
(25)	"Compensating differentials"	0.211	0.140	0.126	0.210	0.064	0.050
(26)	"Distortions"	0.133	0.081	0.073	0.133	0.033	0.023
(27)	All variables	0.269	0.165	0.171	0.268	0.081	0.064
	Panel D: Productivity gain						
(28)	Demographics	0.460	0.168	0.334	0.460	0.096	0.069
(29)	Quality of capital	0.109	0.020	0.075	0.111	0.016	0.015
(30)	Capacity utilization	0.018	0.008	0.017	0.018	0.005	0.003
(31)	Obstacles to investment	0.180	0.043	0.133	0.180	0.025	0.019
(32)	Adjustment	0.477	0.200	0.360	0.476	0.120	0.092
(33)	Source of funds	0.130	0.016	0.103	0.130	0.012	0.010
(34)	"Compensating differentials"	0 564	0 245	0.415	0 563	0 147	0 115
(35)	"Distortions"	0.590	0.166	0.452	0.590	0.100	0.073
(36)	All variables	0.979	0.303	0.751	0.978	0.189	0.152

Note: In this table, the outcome variables (marginal revenue products for labor and capital) are computed using firm-level (rather than country×industry) cost shares. See notes to Table 5 for more details.

			List of fixed effects					
		Country	Industry	Year	Country + Industry + Year	Country × Industry × Year		
		(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
(1)	Dispersion MRPK	0.053	0.239	0.000	0.275	0.492		
(2)	MRPL	0.621	0.118	0.000	0.662	0.773		
(3)	MRPL - MRPK	0.222	0.215	0.000	0.412	0.594		
(4)	Productivity gain	1.810	0.406	0.000	2.000	2.363		

Table A.23. R^2 for various sets of fixed effects, firm-level cost shares are used to compute marginal revenue
products.

Note: In this table, the outcome variables (marginal revenue products for labor and capital) are computed using firm-level (rather than country×industry) cost shares. See notes to Table 4 for more details.

Regressor	Dependent variable			
	log(MRPK)	log(MRPL)		
Demographics	<u> </u>			
Firm age (omitted category: less than 5 years)				
5-9 years	-0.041	0.014		
	(0.072)	(0.038)		
10-19 years	-0.158**	0.020		
	(0.065)	(0.034)		
20+ years	-0.274***	0.021		
	(0.064)	(0.033)		
log(employment)	0.021**	-0.008		
Subsidient	(0.009)	(0.005)		
Subsidiary	(0.028)	(0.213^{+++})		
Evporter	(0.028)	(0.010) 0.252***		
Exporter	(0.023)	(0.255)		
Quality of capital and other inputs	(0.027)	(0.015)		
Share of state-of-the art machinery and equipment including ICT	-0 257***	0 140***		
Share of state of the art machinery and equipment, metading for	(0.035)	(0.020)		
Share of high energy efficiency commercial building stock	-0.269***	0.070***		
	(0.032)	(0.018)		
Capacity utilization (omitted category: somewhat below full capacity)		()		
above maximum capacity	0.289***	0.119***		
1 2	(0.039)	(0.022)		
at maximum capacity	0.130***	0.050***		
	(0.021)	(0.012)		
substantially below full capacity	-0.225***	-0.063***		
	(0.030)	(0.018)		
Obstacles to investment (omitted category: not an obstacle at all)				
Demand for products or services				
Major	0.111***	0.013		
	(0.027)	(0.014)		
Minor	0.132***	0.031**		
	(0.024)	(0.013)		
Availability of staff with the right skills				
Major	0.005	-0.064***		
	(0.028)	(0.015)		
Minor	0.042	0.015		
	(0.028)	(0.015)		
Energy costs	0.054*	0.002***		
Major	-0.054*	-0.083***		
Miner	(0.029)	(0.01/)		
Minor	-0.086****	-0.030^{+++}		
Access to digital infrastructure	(0.023)	(0.014)		
Major	0.082**	0.002		
Major	(0.035)	(0.002)		
Minor	-0.007	(0.020) 0.054***		
WINO	(0.026)	(0.034)		
Labor market regulations	(0.020)	(0.014)		
Major	-0.060**	-0 077***		
	(0.030)	(0.016)		
Minor	-0.070***	-0.059***		
	(0.026)	(0.014)		
Business regulations and taxation	(0.020)	(
Major	-0.03	0.025		
5	(0.028)	(0.015)		
Minor	0.078***	0.041***		
	(0.025)	(0.014)		
		· /		

Table A.24. Predictors of the dispersion of the marginal revenue products of capital and labor, Manufacturing

Availability of adequate transport infrastructure

Major	-0.03 (0.031)	0.064^{***} (0.018)
Minor	-0.007 (0.024)	0.032** (0.013)
Availability of finance	0.070***	0.00(***
Major	$-0.0/8^{***}$	-0.096^{***}
Minor	(0.027)	(0.010)
WIIIOI	(0.022)	(0.014)
Uncertainty about future	(0.025)	(0.014)
Maior	0.058**	0.026
1120/01	(0.029)	(0.017)
Minor	0.031	0.028*
	(0.026)	(0.016)
Adjustment	× ,	
Investment, $log(1 + investment)$	-0.029***	0.054***
	(0.004)	(0.003)
Percent change in employment in the last three years	0.074***	-0.088***
	(0.022)	(0.013)
Investment over the last three years (omitted category: about the right amount)		
too much	-0.227***	-0.195***
	(0.046)	(0.026)
too little	-0.009	-0.087***
	(0.025)	(0.014)
company did not exist three years ago	-0.055	0.223
The second state of the transmission of the second state of the se	(0.344)	(0.159)
Investment priority in the next three years (omitted category: no investment planned)	0.017	0 070***
replacing capacity	-0.01/	$0.0/0^{***}$
······	(0.043)	(0.025)
capacity expansion for existing products or services	-0.067	0.074***
devialentino neuro duete, nue esercio en contribue	(0.044)	(0.025)
developing new products, processes of services	-0.030	(0.087)
Source of funds (omitted category: external finance)	(0.0++)	(0.023)
internal funds or retained earnings	0 219***	0 121***
internal runds of retained earnings	(0.033)	(0.017)
intra-group funding	0.038	0.212***
initia group functing	(0.085)	(0.044)
Credit constrained	-0.112***	-0.060***
	(0.037)	(0.019)
Sample size	8,278	8,217
\mathbb{R}^2	0.540	0.826
Memorandum		
R^2 with country × industry × year fixed effects and no X	0.508	0.774
R^2 with X and no fixed effects	0.101	0.396
R^2 with X and country fixed effects	0.196	0.688
R^2 with X and industry fixed effects	0.148	0.447
R^2 with X and year fixed effects	0.103	0.180
R^2 with X and country fixed effects, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects	0.230	0.396
K^2 with X and slopes varying by country	0.302	0.654
R^2 with X and slopes varying by industry	0.250	0.513
K ² with X and slopes varying by year	0.111	0.407

Note: In this table, the sample is restricted to firms in manufacturing. See notes to Appendix Table A.4 for more details.

Regressor	Dependent variable		
8	log(MRPK)	log(MRPL)	
Demographics		<u> </u>	
Firm age (omitted category: less than 5 years)			
5-9 years	0.104*	0.018	
	(0.063)	(0.031)	
10-19 years	-0.138**	0.020	
20.	(0.057)	(0.029)	
20+ years	-0.301***	0.035	
	(0.055)	(0.028)	
log(employment)	0.008	-0.054***	
Subsidiant	(0.009) 0.467***	(0.003)	
Subsidiary	$(0.40)^{111}$	(0.018)	
Evporter	(0.055)	0.010)	
Exporter	(0.024)	(0.014)	
Quality of capital and other inputs	(0.024)	(0.014)	
Share of state-of-the art machinery and equipment, including ICT	-0.021	0.211***	
	(0.039)	(0.019)	
Share of high energy efficiency commercial building stock	-0.256***	0.006	
	(0.036)	(0.016)	
Capacity utilization (omitted category: somewhat below full capacity)	· · · · ·	× ,	
above maximum capacity	0.220***	0.103***	
	(0.049)	(0.027)	
at maximum capacity	0.116***	0.060***	
	(0.023)	(0.011)	
substantially below full capacity	-0.337***	-0.130***	
	(0.043)	(0.021)	
Obstacles to investment (omitted category: not an obstacle at all)			
Demand for products or services			
Major	0.018	-0.048***	
	(0.030)	(0.017)	
Minor	-0.02	-0.034***	
	(0.028)	(0.013)	
Availability of staff with the right skills	0 124***	0.007	
Major	(0.028)	-0.007	
Minor	(0.028)	(0.014)	
MIIO	$(0.070^{-0.00})$	(0.011)	
Fnergy costs	(0.020)	(0.014)	
Major	-0 210***	-0 123***	
111401	(0.032)	(0.015)	
Minor	-0.118***	-0.090***	
	(0.025)	(0.014)	
Access to digital infrastructure	· · · · ·	× ,	
Major	-0.002	0.064***	
	(0.037)	(0.018)	
Minor	0.022	0.038***	
	(0.027)	(0.013)	
Labor market regulations			
Major	-0.033	-0.093***	
	(0.030)	(0.015)	
Minor	-0.037	-0.063***	
	(0.028)	(0.013)	
Business regulations and taxation			
Major	-0.068**	0.026*	
	(0.032)	(0.015)	
Minor	0.018	0.045***	
	(0.029)	(0.015)	

Table A.25. Predictors of	f the dispersion of	of the marginal revenu	e products of ca	apital and labor, Services
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Availability of adequate transport infrastructure

Major	0.063**	0.102***
Minor	(0.028) 0.079***	(0.016) 0.073***
Availability of finance	(0.026)	(0.014)
Major	-0.069**	-0.083***
	(0.032)	(0.016)
Minor	-0.011	-0.053***
Uncertainty about future	(0.025)	(0.014)
Maior	0.087***	0 046***
114901	(0.032)	(0.016)
Minor	0.047	0.048***
	(0.029)	(0.014)
Adjustment		
Investment, $log(1 + investment)$	-0.071***	0.041***
	(0.005)	(0.002)
Percent change in employment in the last three years	0.040	-0.157***
	(0.026)	(0.014)
investment over the last three years (omitted category: about the right amount)	0 222***	0 077***
	-0.323	-0.077
too little	(0.049)	(0.020)
	(0.028)	(0.083)
company did not exist three years ago	-0.402	-0.023
company did not exist tinee years upo	(0.341)	(0.133)
Investment priority in the next three years (omitted category: no investment planned)	(010 11)	(0.100)
replacing capacity	0.006	-0.059***
	(0.039)	(0.019)
capacity expansion for existing products or services	0.016	-0.039**
	(0.038)	(0.019)
developing new products, processes or services	0.005	-0.059***
	(0.041)	(0.020)
Source of funds (omitted category: external finance)		
internal funds or retained earnings	0.169***	0.044**
	(0.034)	(0.017)
intra-group funding	-0.185*	0.110**
Cradit constrained	(0.10/) 0.120***	(0.052)
Credit constrained	$-0.139^{-0.13}$	(0.021)
	(0.043)	(0.021)
Sample size	11,691	11,574
\mathbb{R}^2	0.447	0.715
Memorandum		0.660
\mathbb{R}^2 with country × industry × year fixed effects and no X	0.386	0.669
R^2 with X and no fixed effects	0.170	0.291
R^2 with X and country fixed effects R^2 with V and inductry fixed effects	0.194	0.439
\mathbf{R}^2 with \mathbf{X} and year fixed effects	0.204	0.408
\mathbf{R}^2 with X and country fixed effects industry fixed effects and year fixed effects	0.170	0.291
R^2 with X and slones varying by country	0.300	0.030
R^2 with X and slopes varying by industry	0.284	0.445
R^2 with X and slopes varying by year	0.177	0.297
1 1 0 1 1		=

Note: In this table, the sample is restricted to firms in the service sector. See notes to Appendix Table A.4 for more details.

Table A.26. Predictors of the dispersion of the marginal revenue products of capital and labor, Construction and utilities

Regressor	Depender	Dependent variable		
	log(MRPK)	log(MRPL)		
Demographics				
Firm age (omitted category: less than 5 years)				
5-9 years	-0.059	0.023		
	(0.065)	(0.031)		
10-19 years	-0.285***	0.114***		
	(0.059)	(0.029)		
20+ years	-0.400***	0.195***		
	(0.059)	(0.029)		
log(employment)	0.108***	0.022***		
	(0.012)	(0.006)		
Subsidiary	0.479***	0.053***		
	(0.045)	(0.020)		
Exporter	0.088**	0.183***		
	(0.035)	(0.018)		
Quality of capital and other inputs				
Share of state-of-the art machinery and equipment, including ICT	-0.128***	0.028		
	(0.046)	(0.021)		
Share of high energy efficiency commercial building stock	() ,	× ,		
	-0.249***	0.103***		
Canacity utilization (omitted category: somewhat below full capacity)	(0.036)	(0.019)		
above maximum capacity	((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((*****)		
	0.204***	0.084***		
at maximum capacity	(0.046)	(0.023)		
at maximum ouplotty	0.096***	0.019		
substantially below full capacity	(0.027)	(0.01)		
subsumming below run capacity	-0.444***	-0.181***		
Obstacles to investment (omitted category: not an obstacle at all)	(0.044)	(0.021)		
Demand for products or services	(0.044)	(0.021)		
Maior	0.058*	0 056***		
1viajoi	(0.025)	$(0.030^{-1.1})$		
Minor	(0.033)	(0.017)		
Minor	0.04/	0.018		
	(0.029)	(0.010)		
Availability of staff with the right skins	0.077**	0.052***		
Major	0.0//**	-0.052***		
	(0.033)	(0.016)		
Minor	-0.012	0.021		
-	(0.034)	(0.015)		
Energy costs		0.0504444		
Major	-0.200***	-0.050***		
	(0.034)	(0.017)		
Minor	-0.138***	-0.016		
	(0.028)	(0.015)		
Access to digital infrastructure				
Major	0.146***	-0.014		
	(0.045)	(0.022)		
Minor	0.061**	-0.013		
	(0.028)	(0.015)		
Labor market regulations				
Major	0.142***	-0.038**		
	(0.034)	(0.017)		
Minor	0.097***	-0.004		
	(0.031)	(0.016)		
Business regulations and taxation	()	< /		
Maior	-0.114***	0.023		
- · ر	(0.036)	(0.018)		
Minor	_0 077**	-0.001		
	(0.031)	(0.001)		
	(0.031)	(0.01/)		

Availability of adequate transport infrastructure		
Major	-0.174***	0.049**
	(0.041)	(0.021)
Minor	-0.057*	0.027*
	(0.031)	(0.015)
Availability of finance	. ,	. ,
Major	-0.058*	-0.070***
	(0.033)	(0.017)
Minor	-0.036	-0.055***
	(0.029)	(0.016)
Uncertainty about future	()	()
Maior	0.087**	0.040**
5	(0.036)	(0.019)
Minor	0.107***	0.011
	(0.033)	(0.016)
Adjustment	(******)	(0.010)
Investment, $log(1 + investment)$	-0.075***	0.051***
	(0.005)	(0.003)
Percent change in employment in the last three years	0.209***	-0.071***
	(0.026)	(0.014)
Investment over the last three years (omitted category: about the right amount)	(0.020)	(0.011)
too much	-0.156**	-0 101***
	(0.065)	(0.032)
too little	0.02	-0.035**
	(0.02)	(0.033)
company did not exist three years ago	(0.032)	_0.387***
company did not exist three years ago	(0.258)	(0.142)
Investment priority in the next three years (omitted category, no investment planned)	(0.258)	(0.142)
replacing appoints	0 170***	0.020
replacing capacity	-0.1/0	-0.029
comparity expansion for existing and hats on convises	(0.030)	(0.019)
capacity expansion for existing products or services	-0.134	-0.014
11	(0.040)	(0.019)
developing new products, processes or services	-0.09/**	(0.007)
	(0.040)	(0.022)
Source of funds (omitted category: external finance)	0.010+++	0.020
internal funds or retained earnings	0.213***	0.020
	(0.038)	(0.020)
intra-group funding	-0.443***	0.300***
	(0.169)	(0.094)
Credit constrained	0.01	-0.056***
	(0.046)	(0.021)
Sample size	7 863	7 864
R ²	0 543	0.762
Memorandum		
R^2 with country × industry × vear fixed effects and no X	0.492	0.718
R^2 with X and no fixed effects	0.211	0.336
R^2 with X and country fixed effects	0.288	0.684
R^2 with X and industry fixed effects	0.338	0.344
R^2 with X and year fixed effects	0.212	0.336
R^2 with X and country fixed effects, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects	0.400	0.696
R^2 with X and slopes varying by country	0 409	0.638
R^2 with X and slopes varying by industry	0.109	0 390
R^2 with X and slopes varying by wear	0.225	0.346
	0.220	0.010

Note: In this table, the sample is restricted to firms in the construction and utility sectors. See notes to Appendix Table A.4 for more details.

Table A.27. Marginal R^2 of adding a group of variables to a specification with fixed effects, Manufacturing

		List of fixed effects					
						Country +	Country ×
		No fixed				Industry +	Industry ×
Row	Group of variables	effects	Country	Industry	Year	Year	Year
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A: MRPK						
(1)	Demographics	0.016	0.010	0.015	0.016	0.010	0.006
(2)	Quality of capital	0.027	0.009	0.028	0.027	0.011	0.013
(3)	Capacity utilization	0.015	0.017	0.011	0.016	0.013	0.009
(4)	Obstacles to investment	0.030	0.011	0.024	0.030	0.008	0.008
(5)	Adjustment	0.012	0.010	0.012	0.013	0.011	0.009
(6)	Source of funds	0.023	0.010	0.018	0.023	0.007	0.006
(7)	"Compensating differentials"	0.054	0.035	0 049	0.054	0.033	0.029
(7)	"Distortions"	0.054	0.029	0.047	0.057	0.033	0.029
(0)	All variables	0.000	0.063	0.047	0.102	0.024	0.016
())		0.101	0.005	0.000	0.102	0.051	0.010
	Panel B: MRPL						
(10)	Demographics	0.181	0.070	0.140	0.180	0.065	0.048
(11)	Quality of capital	0.038	0.011	0.026	0.039	0.010	0.006
(12)	Capacity utilization	0.010	0.007	0.011	0.010	0.007	0.004
(13)	Obstacles to investment	0.094	0.021	0.068	0.094	0.017	0.015
(14)	Adjustment	0.190	0.074	0.135	0.189	0.063	0.044
(15)	Source of funds	0.050	0.006	0.040	0.050	0.005	0.006
(16)	"Compensating differentials"	0.215	0.092	0.159	0.215	0.081	0.057
(17)	"Distortions"	0.236	0.069	0.179	0.235	0.062	0.048
(18)	All variables	0.396	0.117	0.304	0.395	0.104	0.078
()							
(10)	Panel C: MRPL - MRPK	0.000	0.041	0.076	0.000	0.041	0.024
(19)	Demographics	0.098	0.041	0.070	0.099	0.041	0.034
(20)	Quality of capital	0.058	0.024	0.051	0.057	0.025	0.024
(21)	Capacity utilization Obstaalas to investment	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.001
(22)	A division of the state of the	0.034	0.010	0.024	0.035	0.010	0.010
(23)	Source of funds	0.147	0.072	0.125	0.140	0.005	0.031
(24)	Source of funds	0.025	0.008	0.010	0.025	0.000	0.005
(25)	"Compensating differentials"	0.192	0.096	0.162	0.191	0.088	0.075
(26)	"Distortions"	0.127	0.049	0.095	0.127	0.040	0.033
(27)	All variables	0.283	0.124	0.230	0.283	0.107	0.090
	Panal D. Productivity gain						
(28)	Demographics	0 566	0 220	0.437	0 565	0.207	0.158
(20)	Ouality of capital	0 148	0.051	0.109	0 149	0.048	0.035
(30)	Canacity utilization	0.022	0.013	0.022	0.022	0.012	0.005
(31)	Obstacles to investment	0.261	0.065	0.187	0.260	0.050	0.045
(32)	Adjustment	0.649	0.267	0.483	0.644	0.227	0.166
(33)	Source of funds	0.143	0.019	0.110	0.143	0.015	0.017
< - /		-			-	-	
(34)	"Compensating differentials"	0.739	0.325	0.565	0.738	0.289	0.215
(35)	"Distortions"	0.714	0.215	0.538	0.713	0.190	0.150
(36)	All variables	1.278	0.405	0.991	1.275	0.357	0.276

Note: The sample is restricted to firms in manufacturing. See notes to Table 5 for more details.

Table A.28. Marginal R ²	of adding a group of	variables to a specification	with fixed effects, Services
U		1	

		List of fixed effects						
						Country +	Country ×	
		No fixed				Industry +	Industry ×	
Row	Group of variables	effects	Country	Industry	Year	Year	Year	
	-	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
	Panel A: MRPK							
(1)	Demographics	0.074	0.067	0.041	0.074	0.035	0.027	
(2)	Quality of capital	0.007	0.004	0.010	0.007	0.007	0.005	
(3)	Capacity utilization	0.007	0.008	0.007	0.007	0.009	0.007	
(4)	Obstacles to investment	0.028	0.023	0.011	0.028	0.008	0.007	
(5)	Adjustment	0.072	0.064	0.033	0.072	0.030	0.024	
(6)	Source of funds	0.058	0.051	0.023	0.058	0.020	0.015	
(7)	"Compensating differentials"	0.111	0 000	0.056	0.111	0.050	0.040	
$\binom{7}{8}$	"Distortions"	0.111	0.099	0.050	0.111	0.030	0.040	
(0)	All variables	0.105	0.090	0.055	0.103	0.049	0.037	
(9)	All vallables	0.170	0.155	0.091	0.170	0.085	0.000	
	Panel B: MRPL							
(10)	Demographics	0.177	0.098	0.075	0.177	0.031	0.024	
(11)	Quality of capital	0.019	0.006	0.020	0.020	0.008	0.007	
(12)	Capacity utilization	0.008	0.007	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.004	
(13)	Obstacles to investment	0.078	0.048	0.036	0.078	0.014	0.012	
(14)	Adjustment	0.061	0.026	0.061	0.061	0.023	0.017	
(15)	Source of funds	0.043	0.023	0.028	0.043	0.006	0.006	
(16)	"Compensating differentials"	0.123	0.090	0.085	0 1 2 3	0.046	0.038	
(17)	"Distortions"	0.123	0.090	0.000	0.125	0.018	0.023	
(18)	All variables	0.291	0.163	0.168	0.291	0.066	0.058	
()								
(10)	Panel C: MRPL - MRPK	0.000	0.052	0.000	0.000	0.022	0.02(
(19)	Demographics	0.090	0.052	0.060	0.090	0.032	0.020	
(20)	Quality of capital	0.028	0.013	0.030	0.028	0.014	0.013	
(21)	Capacity utilization	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.002	
(22)		0.025	0.012	0.018	0.023	0.007	0.000	
(23)	Aujustitient Source of funds	0.138	0.097	0.123	0.138	0.071	0.030	
(24)	Source of funds	0.020	0.020	0.025	0.027	0.015	0.012	
(25)	"Compensating differentials"	0.180	0.110	0.145	0.180	0.083	0.063	
(26)	"Distortions"	0.130	0.074	0.095	0.130	0.048	0.038	
(27)	All variables	0.251	0.150	0.198	0.251	0.111	0.091	
	Panel D: Productivity gain							
(28)	Demographics	0.511	0.269	0.236	0.511	0.095	0.075	
(20)	Quality of capital	0.077	0.028	0.080	0.079	0.032	0.075	
(20)	Canacity utilization	0.018	0.026	0.000	0.018	0.013	0.008	
(31)	Obstacles to investment	0 211	0.122	0.106	0.211	0.039	0.033	
(32)	Adjustment	0.296	0 140	0 279	0.296	0.123	0.087	
(33)	Source of funds	0.104	0.051	0.084	0.106	0.021	0.020	
(55)		0.101	0.001	0.001	0.100	0.021	0.020	
(34)	"Compensating differentials"	0.456	0.297	0.352	0.456	0.184	0.146	
(35)	"Distortions"	0.564	0.249	0.335	0.564	0.097	0.080	
(36)	All variables	0.931	0.496	0.604	0.931	0.247	0.214	

Note: The sample is restricted to firms in services. See notes to Table 5 for more details.

Table A.29. Marginal R^2 of adding a group of variables to a specification with fixed effects, Construction and utilities.

		List of fixed effects							
		Country +							
D	Course of consideration	No fixed	Constant	Ter des stores	V	Industry +	Industry ×		
Kow	Group of variables		$\frac{\text{Country}}{(2)}$	(2)	$\frac{Y \text{ ear}}{(4)}$	$\frac{Y \text{ ear}}{(5)}$	Y ear (6)		
	Panal A · MRPK	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(3)	(0)		
(1)	Demographics	0.048	0.042	0.021	0.048	0.018	0.015		
(2)	Quality of capital	0.028	0.017	0.019	0.028	0.010	0.009		
(3)	Capacity utilization	0.021	0.014	0.019	0.020	0.014	0.011		
(4)	Obstacles to investment	0.062	0.045	0.021	0.062	0.010	0.010		
(5)	Adjustment	0.095	0.102	0.024	0.095	0.024	0.017		
(6)	Source of funds	0.023	0.015	0.017	0.023	0.011	0.008		
(7)	"Compensating differentials"	0.145	0.135	0.061	0.144	0.049	0.036		
(8)	"Distortions"	0.110	0.084	0.049	0.110	0.036	0.029		
(9)	All variables	0.211	0.190	0.103	0.211	0.084	0.064		
	Panal B. MRPI								
(10)	Demographics	0.153	0.070	0.150	0 1 5 2	0.045	0.034		
(11)	Ouality of capital	0.030	0.005	0.026	0.031	0.005	0.003		
(12)	Capacity utilization	0.031	0.006	0.031	0.032	0.005	0.004		
(13)	Obstacles to investment	0.077	0.014	0.074	0.077	0.008	0.006		
(14)	Adjustment	0.153	0.070	0.166	0.152	0.045	0.031		
(15)	Source of funds	0.051	0.008	0.045	0.050	0.005	0.003		
(16)	"Compensating differentials"	0.187	0.079	0.195	0.187	0.056	0.041		
(17)	"Distortions"	0.216	0.077	0.210	0.216	0.049	0.034		
(18)	All variables	0.336	0.107	0.329	0.336	0.077	0.056		
	Panel C: MRPL - MRPK								
(19)	Demographics	0.080	0.062	0 049	0.080	0.024	0.019		
(20)	Ouality of capital	0.051	0.022	0.047	0.051	0.013	0.011		
(21)	Capacity utilization	0.005	0.008	0.000	0.005	0.004	0.004		
(22)	Obstacles to investment	0.057	0.048	0.020	0.057	0.011	0.008		
(23)	Adjustment	0.229	0.172	0.124	0.228	0.068	0.057		
(24)	Source of funds	0.023	0.015	0.021	0.023	0.014	0.014		
(25)	"Compensating differentials"	0.267	0.192	0.160	0.266	0.083	0.070		
(26)	"Distortions"	0.147	0.111	0.084	0.146	0.044	0.037		
(27)	All variables	0.352	0.249	0.227	0.350	0.113	0.095		
	Panel D: Productivity gain								
(28)	Demographics	0.454	0.225	0.427	0.452	0.132	0.100		
(29)	Ouality of capital	0.119	0.028	0.110	0.121	0.022	0.015		
(30)	Capacity utilization	0.072	0.016	0.067	0.075	0.009	0.008		
(31)	Obstacles to investment	0.225	0.064	0.199	0.225	0.027	0.019		
(32)	Adjustment	0.599	0.317	0.553	0.596	0.179	0.135		
(33)	Source of funds	0.143	0.029	0.129	0.140	0.022	0.019		
(34)	"Compensating differentials"	0.700	0 343	0.647	0 699	0.210	0 164		
(34)	"Distortions"	0.700	0.345	0.047	0.055	0.210	0.104		
(36)	All variables	1.139	0.447	1.041	1.136	0.277	0.215		
(36)	All variables	1.139	0.447	1.041	1.136	0.277	0.215		

Note: The sample is restricted to firms in the construction and utilities sectors. See notes to Table 5 for more details.

		List of fixed effects							
		Country	Industry	Year	Country + Industry + Year	Country × Industry × Year			
		(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)			
Panel A: Ma	nufacturing								
	Dispersion								
(1)	MRPK	0.135	0.057	0.001	0.178	0.508			
(2)	MRPL	0.594	0.176	0.001	0.621	0.774			
(3)	MRPL - MRPK	0.319	0.115	0.002	0.368	0.630			
(4)	Productivity gain	1.804	0.548	0.004	1.904	2.398			
Panel B: Services									
	Dispersion								
(1)	MRPK	0.043	0.198	0.000	0.229	0.386			
(2)	MRPL	0.288	0.315	0.001	0.571	0.669			
(3)	MRPL - MRPK	0.203	0.116	0.000	0.283	0.462			
(4)	Productivity gain	0.945	0.817	0.003	1.646	2.009			
Panel C: Co	Panel C: Construction and utilities								
	Dispersion								
(1)	MRPK	0.121	0.262	0.002	0.329	0.492			
(2)	MRPL	0.590	0.020	0.000	0.627	0.718			
(3)	MRPL - MRPK	0.228	0.223	0.003	0.441	0.569			
(4)	Productivity gain	1.696	0.151	0.002	1.912	2.194			

Table A.30. R^2 for various sets of fixed effects, by sector

Note: The table report results for marginal contributions of fixed effects by sector. See notes to Table 4 for more details.

			$\sigma(MRPK)$					$\sigma(MRPL)$		
Country b	Own	Germany	Own	Greece	Own	Own	Germany	Own	Greece	Own
Country X	Own	Own	Germany	Own	Greece	Own	Own	Germany	Own	Greece
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Austria	1.38	0.91	1.43	1.62	1.62	0.75	0.62	0.76	0.91	0.83
Belgium	1.43	0.92	1.56	1.65	1.63	0.79	0.63	0.78	0.91	0.88
Bulgaria	1.34	0.98	1.36	1.70	1.56	1.02	0.67	1.01	0.90	1.08
Cyprus	1.72	0.94	1.77	1.75	1.83	1.15	0.67	1.36	0.94	1.38
Czech Rep.	1.15	0.86	1.37	1.68	1.47	0.73	0.62	0.77	0.82	0.79
Germany	0.92	0.92	0.92	1.66	0.94	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.91	0.69
Denmark	1.40	0.88	1.43	1.74	1.55	0.75	0.64	0.75	0.89	0.81
Estonia	1.56	0.98	1.53	1.75	1.70	1.03	0.65	0.97	0.90	1.08
Greece	1.64	0.94	1.66	1.64	1.64	0.91	0.69	0.91	0.91	0.91
Spain	1.04	0.88	1.14	1.59	1.14	0.71	0.64	0.71	0.90	0.78
Finland	1.26	0.93	1.33	1.75	1.56	0.75	0.61	0.80	0.88	0.95
France	1.09	0.91	1.08	1.73	1.07	0.60	0.65	0.59	0.91	0.62
Croatia	1.41	0.94	1.44	1.60	1.61	0.83	0.63	0.82	0.89	0.97
Hungary	1.29	0.93	1.32	1.71	1.41	0.85	0.64	0.84	0.91	0.94
Ireland	1.44	0.90	1.42	1.64	1.45	0.95	0.64	1.00	0.88	1.03
Italy	1.11	0.92	1.06	1.59	1.20	0.67	0.66	0.69	0.91	0.72
Lithuania	1.56	0.96	1.56	1.72	1.61	0.91	0.68	0.91	0.93	1.01
Luxembourg	1.88	0.91	2.39	1.73	2.47	0.88	0.66	1.08	0.93	1.08
Latvia	1.57	0.97	1.62	1.63	1.69	1.05	0.66	0.99	0.89	1.14
Malta	1.84	0.93	1.98	1.71	1.99	0.97	0.64	1.17	0.88	1.27
Netherlands	1.31	0.88	1.43	1.71	1.61	0.71	0.64	0.68	0.94	0.75
Poland	1.10	0.93	1.11	1.56	1.21	0.67	0.61	0.76	0.85	0.81
Portugal	1.41	0.93	1.52	1.57	1.63	0.82	0.65	0.92	0.90	0.90
Romania	1.31	0.96	1.33	1.63	1.43	0.88	0.65	0.92	0.88	0.96
Sweden	1.31	0.92	1.34	1.75	1.45	0.71	0.65	0.62	0.96	0.67
Slovenia	1.27	0.92	1.36	1.62	1.52	0.78	0.62	0.80	0.87	0.89
Slovakia	1.33	0.93	1.38	1.62	1.46	0.98	0.62	1.05	0.87	1.17
UK	1.12	0.89	1.17	1.63	1.20	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.92	0.70

Table A.31. Machado-Mata decomposition of the marginal revenue products of capital and labor

Note: The table reports actual and counterfactual dispersion of marginal revenue products when all variables in X are used for the decomposition. See section V.D for more details.

	Shapley value decomposition of R ²					
Regressor	Dependent variable					
	log(MRPK)	log(MRPL)	log(MRPL) - log(MRPK)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)			
Demographics						
Firm age	0.0079	0.0206	0.0336			
log(employment)	0.0088	0.0127	0.0151			
Subsidiary	0.0077	0.0383	0.0049			
Exporter	0.0006	0.0059	0.0061			
Quality of capital and other inputs						
Share of state-of-the art machinery and equipment, including ICT	0.0023	0.0132	0.0142			
Share of high energy efficiency commercial building stock	0.0099	0.0050	0.0147			
Capacity utilization	0.0136	0.0069	0.0028			
Obstacles to investment						
Demand for products or services	0.0005	0.0008	0.0005			
Availability of staff with the right skills	0.0014	0.0096	0.0086			
Energy costs	0.0101	0.0083	0.0016			
Access to digital infrastructure	0.0008	0.0065	0.0020			
Labor market regulations	0.0008	0.0025	0.0014			
Business regulations and taxation	0.0022	0.0017	0.0009			
Availability of adequate transport infrastructure	0.0009	0.0007	0.0003			
Availability of finance	0.0023	0.0097	0.0024			
Uncertainty about future	0.0005	0.0029	0.0009			
Adjustment						
Investment, $log(1 + investment)$	0.0262	0.0482	0.1014			
Percent change in employment in the last three years	0.0027	0.0011	0.0051			
Investment over the last three years	0.0028	0.0077	0.0040			
Investment priority in the next three years	0.0031	0.0032	0.0053			
Source of funds	0.0128	0.0187	0.0164			
Credit constrained	0.0012	0.0043	0.0005			

Table A.32. Shapley R2 decomposition by variable.

Note: The table reports Shapley decomposition of R2 that is more detailed than in Table 6. See notes to Table 6 for more details.

Appendix Figure A.1. Machado-Mata decomposition of the marginal revenue products of capital and labor for Greece



Panel A. Marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK)

Note: The figures show actual and counterfactual distributions of the log marginal revenue product of capital (Panel A) and marginal revenue product of labor (Panel B) when all variables are used for X.

b from Greece, X from Greeceb from Greece, X from Germanyb from Germany, X from Greece

Appendix B: Derivations for the Hsieh-Klenow model

A. SETUP

The setup follows Hsieh and Klenow (2009). The objective function of the firm is

 $\max \tau_i^Y P_i Y_i - \tau_i^K r K_i - \tau_i^L w L_{it} - \tau_i^X P_X X_i$

Subject to

Demand: $Y_i = Y \left(\frac{P_i}{P}\right)^{-\sigma}$ Production function: $Y_i = A_i K_i^{\alpha} L_i^{\beta} X_i^{1-\alpha-\beta}$

where *i* indexes firms (we skip time index to simplify notation), Y_i is output of firm *i*, *Y* is aggregate output, P_i is the price of firm *i*'s output, *P* is the price index, K_i is capital, L_i is labor, X_i is materials (intermediate input), A_i is productivity, $\tau^Y, \tau^K, \tau^L, \tau^X$ are distortions in product and input market (no distortion corresponds to $\tau = 1$). Aggregate demand is given by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:

$$Y = \left(\int Y_i^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} di\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

We define TFP as $TFP_i \equiv \frac{Y_i}{K_i^{\alpha} L_i^{\beta} X_i^{1-\alpha-\beta}} = A_i$. We define TFPR as $TFPR_i \equiv \frac{P_i Y_i}{\mu^{\alpha} I^{\beta} \chi^{1-\alpha-\beta}}$.

We define TFPR as $TFPR_i \equiv \frac{P_i Y_i}{K_i^{\alpha} L_i^{\beta} X_i^{1-\alpha-\beta}}$. We define aggregate TFP as $A \equiv \frac{Y}{K^{\alpha} L^{\beta} X^{1-\alpha-\beta}}$ where aggregate capital, labor, and materials are $K = \int K_i di$, $L = \int L_i di$, $X = \int X_i di$.

We define marginal revenue product of capital as $MRPK_i \equiv \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \frac{P_i Y_i}{K_i}$ We define marginal revenue product of labor as $MRPL_i \equiv \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \frac{P_i Y_i}{L_i}$ We define marginal revenue product of intermediate inputs as $MRPX_i \equiv \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \frac{P_i Y_i}{X_i}$

Note that using demand for firm i's output and the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator we can find

$$Y = \left(\int Y_i^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} di\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} = \left(\int \left[Y\left(\frac{P_i}{P}\right)^{-\sigma}\right]^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} di\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} = YP^{\sigma} \left(\int P_i^{-(\sigma-1)} di\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

which implies that

$$P = \left(\int P_i^{1-\sigma} di\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

B. OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS

The Lagrangian for the firm is

$$\mathcal{L} = \tau_i^Y P_i Y \left(\frac{P_i}{P}\right)^{-\sigma} - \tau_i^K r K_i - \tau_i^L w L_i - \tau_i^X P_X X_i - \lambda_i \left\{ Y \left(\frac{P_i}{P}\right)^{-\sigma} - A_i K_i^{\alpha} L_i^{\beta} X_i^{1-\alpha-\beta} \right\}$$

Optimality conditions are:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial K_i} = 0 \Rightarrow \tau_i^K r = \lambda_i \alpha \frac{Y_i}{K_i} \Rightarrow K_i = \lambda_i \alpha \frac{Y_i}{\tau_i^K r}$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial L_{i}} = 0 \Rightarrow \tau_{i}^{L} w = \lambda_{i} \beta \frac{Y_{i}}{L_{i}} \Rightarrow L_{i} = \lambda_{i} \beta \frac{Y_{i}}{\tau_{i}^{L} w}$$
$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial X_{i}} = 0 \Rightarrow \tau_{i}^{X} P_{X} = \lambda_{i} (1 - \alpha - \beta) \frac{Y_{i}}{X_{i}} \Rightarrow X_{i} = \lambda_{i} (1 - \alpha - \beta) \frac{Y_{i}}{\tau_{i}^{X} P_{X}}$$
$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial P_{i}} = 0 \Rightarrow P_{i} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{1}{\tau_{i}^{Y}} \lambda_{i}$$

Note that λ_i is the marginal cost for firm *i*. Using the production function and the optimality conditions for L_i, K_i, X_i , we can find

$$Y_{i} = A_{i}K_{i}^{\alpha}L_{i}^{\beta}X_{i}^{1-\alpha-\beta} = A_{i}\left(\lambda_{i}\alpha\frac{Y_{i}}{\tau_{i}^{K}r}\right)^{\alpha}\left(\lambda_{i}\beta\frac{Y_{i}}{\tau_{i}^{L}w}\right)^{\beta}\left(\lambda_{i}(1-\alpha-\beta)\frac{Y_{i}}{\tau_{i}^{X}P_{X}}\right)^{1-\alpha-\beta}$$
$$= A_{i}Y_{i}\lambda_{i}\left(\frac{\alpha}{\tau_{i}^{K}r}\right)^{\alpha}\left(\frac{\beta}{\tau_{i}^{L}w}\right)^{\beta}\left(\frac{(1-\alpha-\beta)}{\tau_{i}^{X}P_{X}}\right)^{1-\alpha-\beta}$$

which implies that

$$\lambda_{i} = \frac{1}{A_{i}} \left(\frac{\tau_{i}^{K}r}{\alpha}\right)^{\alpha} \left(\frac{\tau_{i}^{L}w}{\beta}\right)^{\beta} \left(\frac{\tau_{i}^{X}P_{X}}{(1-\alpha-\beta)}\right)^{1-\alpha-\beta} = \left[\left(\frac{r}{\alpha}\right)^{\alpha} \left(\frac{w}{\beta}\right)^{\beta} \left(\frac{P_{X}}{(1-\alpha-\beta)}\right)^{1-\alpha-\beta}\right] \frac{(\tau_{i}^{K})^{\alpha} (\tau_{i}^{L})^{\beta} (\tau_{i}^{X})^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{A_{i}} = B \frac{(\tau_{i}^{K})^{\alpha} (\tau_{i}^{L})^{\beta} (\tau_{i}^{X})^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{A_{i}} = B \frac{(\tau_{i}^{K})^{\alpha} (\tau_{i}^{L})^{\beta} (\tau_{i}^{X})^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{A_{i}}$$

where $\boldsymbol{B} \equiv \left(\frac{r}{\alpha}\right)^{\alpha} \left(\frac{w}{\beta}\right)^{\beta} \left(\frac{P_X}{(1-\alpha-\beta)}\right)^{1-\alpha-\beta}$ does not depend on firm-specific distortions. It follows that

$$P_{i} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{1}{\tau_{i}^{Y}} \frac{1}{A_{i}} \left(\frac{\tau_{i}^{K}r}{\alpha}\right)^{\alpha} \left(\frac{\tau_{i}^{L}w}{\beta}\right)^{\beta} \left(\frac{\tau_{i}^{X}P_{X}}{(1 - \alpha - \beta)}\right)^{1 - \alpha - \beta} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \boldsymbol{B} \frac{1}{\tau_{i}^{Y}} \frac{(\tau_{i}^{K})^{\alpha} (\tau_{i}^{L})^{\beta} (\tau_{i}^{X})^{1 - \alpha - \beta}}{A_{i}}$$

We can also find expressions for marginal revenue products

$$MRPK_{i} \equiv \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \alpha \frac{P_{i}Y_{i}}{K_{i}} = \frac{\tau_{i}^{K}}{\tau_{i}^{Y}}R$$
$$MRPL_{i} \equiv \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \beta \frac{P_{i}Y_{i}}{L_{i}} = \frac{\tau_{i}^{L}}{\tau_{i}^{Y}}W$$
$$MRPX_{i} \equiv \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} (1 - \alpha - \beta) \frac{P_{i}Y_{i}}{X_{i}} = \frac{\tau_{i}^{X}}{\tau_{i}^{Y}}P^{X}$$

C. AGGREGATION

Aggregate capital in the economy is given by $p = \frac{1}{2}$

$$\begin{split} K &= \int K_{i} di = \int \lambda_{i} \alpha \frac{Y_{i}}{\tau_{i}^{K} r} di = \int \lambda_{i} \alpha \frac{Y\left(\frac{P_{i}}{P}\right)^{-\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{K} r} di = YP^{\sigma}\left(\frac{\alpha}{r}\right) \int \frac{1}{\tau_{i}^{K}} \lambda_{i} P_{i}^{-\sigma} di \\ &= YP^{\sigma}\left(\frac{\alpha}{r}\right) \int \frac{1}{\tau_{i}^{K}} \lambda_{i} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{1}{\tau_{i}^{Y}} \lambda_{i}\right)^{-\sigma} di = YP^{\sigma}\left(\frac{\alpha}{r}\right) \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \int \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{K}} \lambda_{i}^{1-\sigma} di \\ &= YP^{\sigma}\left(\frac{\alpha}{r}\right) \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \int \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{K}} \left(\mathbf{B} \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{K}\right)^{\alpha} \left(\tau_{i}^{L}\right)^{\beta} \left(\tau_{i}^{X}\right)^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{A_{i}} \right)^{1-\sigma} di \\ &= YP^{\sigma}\left(\frac{\alpha}{r}\right) \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \mathbf{B}^{1-\sigma} \int \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{K}} \left(\frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{K}\right)^{\alpha} \left(\tau_{i}^{L}\right)^{\beta} \left(\tau_{i}^{X}\right)^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{A_{i}} \right)^{1-\sigma} di \end{split}$$

Note that $YP^{\sigma}\left(\frac{\alpha}{r}\right)\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\boldsymbol{B}^{1-\sigma}$ does not depend on firm-specific outcomes. Aggregate labor in the economy is given by

$$\begin{split} L &= \int L_{i} di = \int \lambda_{i} \beta \frac{Y_{i}}{\tau_{i}^{L} w} di = \int \lambda_{i} \beta \frac{Y\left(\frac{P_{i}}{P}\right)^{-\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{L} w} di = YP^{\sigma}\left(\frac{\beta}{w}\right) \int \frac{1}{\tau_{i}^{L}} \lambda_{i} P_{i}^{-\sigma} di \\ &= YP^{\sigma}\left(\frac{\beta}{w}\right) \int \frac{1}{\tau_{i}^{L}} \lambda_{i} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{1}{\tau_{i}^{Y}} \lambda_{i}\right)^{-\sigma} di = YP^{\sigma}\left(\frac{\beta}{w}\right) \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \int \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{L}} \lambda_{i}^{1-\sigma} di \\ &= YP^{\sigma}\left(\frac{\beta}{w}\right) \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \int \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{L}} \left(B \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{K}\right)^{\alpha} \left(\tau_{i}^{L}\right)^{\beta} \left(\tau_{i}^{X}\right)^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{A_{i}}\right)^{1-\sigma} di \\ &= YP^{\sigma}\left(\frac{\beta}{w}\right) \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} B^{1-\sigma} \int \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{L}} \left(\frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{K}\right)^{\alpha} \left(\tau_{i}^{L}\right)^{\beta} \left(\tau_{i}^{X}\right)^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{A_{i}}\right)^{1-\sigma} di \end{split}$$

Aggregate intermediate input in the economy is given by

$$\begin{aligned} X &= \int X_{i} di = \int \lambda_{i} (1 - \alpha - \beta) \frac{Y_{i}}{\tau_{i}^{X} P_{X}} di = \int \lambda_{i} (1 - \alpha - \beta) \frac{Y\left(\frac{P_{i}}{P}\right)^{-\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{X} P_{X}} di \\ &= Y P^{\sigma} \left(\frac{1 - \alpha - \beta}{P_{X}}\right) \int \frac{1}{\tau_{i}^{X}} \lambda_{i} P_{i}^{-\sigma} di \\ &= Y P^{\sigma} \left(\frac{1 - \alpha - \beta}{P_{X}}\right) \int \frac{1}{\tau_{i}^{X}} \lambda_{i} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{1}{\tau_{i}^{Y}} \lambda_{i}\right)^{-\sigma} di = Y P^{\sigma} \left(\frac{1 - \alpha - \beta}{P_{X}}\right) \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \int \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{X}} \lambda_{i}^{1 - \sigma} di \\ &= Y P^{\sigma} \left(\frac{1 - \alpha - \beta}{P_{X}}\right) \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \int \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{X}} \left(\mathbf{B} \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{K}\right)^{\alpha} \left(\tau_{i}^{L}\right)^{\beta} \left(\tau_{i}^{X}\right)^{1 - \alpha - \beta}}{A_{i}}\right)^{1 - \sigma} di \\ &= Y P^{\sigma} \left(\frac{1 - \alpha - \beta}{P_{X}}\right) \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \mathbf{B}^{1 - \sigma} \int \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{X}} \left(\frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{K}\right)^{\alpha} \left(\tau_{i}^{L}\right)^{\beta} \left(\tau_{i}^{X}\right)^{1 - \alpha - \beta}}{A_{i}}\right)^{1 - \sigma} di \end{aligned}$$

Aggregate price index is given by

$$P = \left(\int P_i^{1-\sigma} di\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} = \left(\int \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \boldsymbol{B} \frac{1}{\tau_i^Y} \frac{(\tau_i^K)^{\alpha} (\tau_i^L)^{\beta} (\tau_i^X)^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{A_i}\right)^{1-\sigma} di\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$
$$= \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \boldsymbol{B} \left(\int \left(\frac{1}{\tau_i^Y} \frac{(\tau_i^K)^{\alpha} (\tau_i^L)^{\beta} (\tau_i^X)^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{A_i}\right)^{1-\sigma} di\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

D. AGGREGATE TFP

Using our definition of aggregate TFP, we have

$$A \equiv \frac{Y}{K^{\alpha}L^{\beta}X^{1-\alpha-\beta}}$$

Let's compute the denominator of this expression:

$$K^{\alpha}L^{\beta}X^{1-\alpha-\beta} = \left(YP^{\sigma}\left(\frac{\alpha}{r}\right)\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\boldsymbol{B}^{1-\sigma}\int\frac{(\tau_{i}^{Y})^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{K}}\left(\frac{(\tau_{i}^{K})^{\alpha}(\tau_{i}^{L})^{\beta}(\tau_{i}^{X})^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{A_{i}}\right)^{1-\sigma}di\right)^{\alpha}$$

$$\times \left(YP^{\sigma}\left(\frac{\beta}{w}\right)\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\boldsymbol{B}^{1-\sigma}\int\frac{(\tau_{i}^{Y})^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{L}}\left(\frac{(\tau_{i}^{K})^{\alpha}(\tau_{i}^{L})^{\beta}(\tau_{i}^{X})^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{A_{i}}\right)^{1-\sigma}di\right)^{\beta}$$

$$\times \left(YP^{\sigma}\left(\frac{1-\alpha-\beta}{P_{X}}\right)\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\boldsymbol{B}^{1-\sigma}\int\frac{(\tau_{i}^{Y})^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{X}}\left(\frac{(\tau_{i}^{K})^{\alpha}(\tau_{i}^{L})^{\beta}(\tau_{i}^{X})^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{A_{i}}\right)^{1-\sigma}di\right)^{1-\alpha-\beta}$$

$$= \left[YP^{\sigma}\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\boldsymbol{B}^{1-\sigma}\left(\frac{\alpha}{r}\right)^{\alpha}\left(\frac{\beta}{w}\right)^{\beta}\left(\frac{1-\alpha-\beta}{P_{X}}\right)^{1-\alpha-\beta}\right]\times\left(\int\frac{(\tau_{i}^{Y})^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{K}}\left(\frac{(\tau_{i}^{K})^{\alpha}(\tau_{i}^{L})^{\beta}(\tau_{i}^{X})^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{A_{i}}\right)^{1-\sigma}di\right)^{\alpha}\times$$

$$\left(\int\frac{(\tau_{i}^{Y})^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{L}}\left(\frac{(\tau_{i}^{K})^{\alpha}(\tau_{i}^{L})^{\beta}(\tau_{i}^{X})^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{A_{i}}\right)^{1-\alpha-\beta}\right)^{1-\alpha-\beta}$$
and so we can simplify this correspondence by the many.

Note that we defined $\mathbf{B} \equiv \left(\frac{r}{\alpha}\right)^{\alpha} \left(\frac{w}{\beta}\right)^{\beta} \left(\frac{P_X}{(1-\alpha-\beta)}\right)^{1-\alpha-\beta}$ and so we can simplify this expression a bit more:

$$K^{\alpha}L^{\beta}X^{1-\alpha-\beta} = \left[YP^{\sigma}\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\boldsymbol{B}^{-\sigma}\right] \times \left(\int \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{K}} \left(\frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{K}\right)^{\alpha}\left(\tau_{i}^{L}\right)^{\beta}\left(\tau_{i}^{X}\right)^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{A_{i}}\right)^{1-\sigma}di\right)^{\alpha}di\right)^{\alpha}$$

$$\times \left(\int \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{L}} \left(\frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{K}\right)^{\alpha}\left(\tau_{i}^{L}\right)^{\beta}\left(\tau_{i}^{X}\right)^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{A_{i}}\right)^{1-\sigma}di\right)^{\beta} \times \left(\int \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{X}} \left(\frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{K}\right)^{\alpha}\left(\tau_{i}^{L}\right)^{\beta}\left(\tau_{i}^{X}\right)^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{A_{i}}\right)^{1-\sigma}di\right)^{1-\alpha-\beta}di$$
Received V expresses in the numerator and denominator of A, it follows that

Because Y appears in the numerator and denominator of A, it follows that $A \equiv \frac{Y}{K^{\alpha}L^{\beta}X^{1-\alpha-\beta}} =$

$$= \left[P^{-\sigma} \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \mathbf{B}^{\sigma}\right] \times \left(\int \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{K}} \left(\frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{K}\right)^{\alpha} \left(\tau_{i}^{L}\right)^{\beta} \left(\tau_{i}^{X}\right)^{1 - \alpha - \beta}}{A_{i}}\right)^{1 - \sigma} di\right)^{-\alpha}$$
$$\times \left(\int \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{L}} \left(\frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{K}\right)^{\alpha} \left(\tau_{i}^{L}\right)^{\beta} \left(\tau_{i}^{X}\right)^{1 - \alpha - \beta}}{A_{i}}\right)^{1 - \sigma} di\right)^{-\beta}$$
$$\times \left(\int \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{X}} \left(\frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{K}\right)^{\alpha} \left(\tau_{i}^{L}\right)^{\beta} \left(\tau_{i}^{X}\right)^{1 - \alpha - \beta}}{A_{i}}\right)^{1 - \sigma} di\right)^{-(1 - \alpha - \beta)}$$

E. APPROXIMATION TO AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY

Hsieh and Klenow (2009) assume log-normal distribution of firm-specific variables $A_i, \tau_i^Y, \tau_i^K, \tau_i^L, \tau_i^X$. We can use this assumption to derive exact formulae for output lost due to frictions $\tau_i^Y, \tau_i^K, \tau_i^L, \tau_i^X$. Assume that each of these variables are distributed independently (zero covariance):

$$\log A_i \sim N(\mu_A, V_A)$$
$$\log \tau_i^Y \sim N(0, V_{\tau Y})$$
$$\log \tau_i^K \sim N(0, V_{\tau K})$$
$$\log \tau_i^L \sim N(0, V_{\tau L})$$
$$\log \tau_i^X \sim N(0, V_{\tau X})$$

Consider the aggregate price level:

$$P^{-\sigma} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \boldsymbol{B} \left(\int \left(\frac{1}{\tau_i^Y} \frac{\left(\tau_i^K\right)^{\alpha} \left(\tau_i^L\right)^{\beta} \left(\tau_i^X\right)^{1 - \alpha - \beta}}{A_i} \right)^{1 - \sigma} di \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}}$$

Then using $\int z_i di = E(z_i)$ (that is a cross-sectional average is equal to the mathematical expectation of random variable z_i) and the property of log-normal variable $E(z) = \exp\left(mean_z + \frac{1}{2}variance_z\right)$,¹ we have

$$-\sigma \log P = \log \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \boldsymbol{B} + \frac{\sigma}{1 - \sigma} \log \left(\int \left(\frac{1}{\tau_i^Y} \frac{\left(\tau_i^K\right)^{\alpha} \left(\tau_i^L\right)^{\beta} \left(\tau_i^X\right)^{1 - \alpha - \beta}}{A_i} \right)^{1 - \sigma} di \right)$$

= $constant + \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \log \left(E \left[\exp\{(1 - \sigma)\alpha \log \tau_i^K + (1 - \sigma)\beta \log \tau_i^L + (1 - \sigma)(1 - \alpha - \beta) \log \tau_i^X - (1 - \sigma) \log \tau_i^Y -$

¹ Note that
$$E(z^a) = \exp\left(a \times mean_z + \frac{a^2}{2}variance_z\right)$$
.

$$\begin{split} &= constant + \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \log \left(\left[exp \left\{ \frac{\left[(\sigma - 1)a \right]^2}{2} V_{rK} + \frac{\left[(\sigma - 1)\beta \right]^2}{2} V_{rL} + \frac{\left[(\sigma - 1)(1 - \alpha - \beta) \right]^2}{2} V_{rX} + \frac{\left[(\sigma - 1) \right]^2}{2} V_{rY} + \frac{(\sigma - 1)^2}{2} V_{rY} + \frac{(\sigma - 1)^2}{2} V_{rX} + \frac{\left[(\sigma - 1)a \right]^2}{2} V_{rX} + \frac{\left[(\sigma - 1)a \right]^2}{2} V_{rX} + \frac{\left[(\sigma - 1)a \right]^2}{2} V_{rX} + \frac{(\sigma - 1)^2}{2} V_{rY} + (\sigma - 1)\mu_A + \frac{(\sigma - 1)^2}{2} V_{rY} + (\sigma - 1)\mu_A + \frac{(\sigma - 1)^2}{2} V_{rX} + \frac{\sigma(\sigma - 1)}{2} V_{rX} + \frac{\sigma(\sigma - 1)}{2} V_{rX} + \frac{\sigma(\sigma - 1)}{2} V_{rY} + \sigma(\sigma - 1)\mu_A + \frac{(\sigma - 1)^2}{2} V_{rY} + \sigma(\sigma - 1)\mu_A + \frac{(\sigma - 1)^2}{2} V_{rX} + \frac{\sigma(\sigma - 1)}{2} V_{rY} + \sigma(\sigma - 1)\mu_A + \frac{\sigma(\sigma - 1)}{2} V_{rY} + \sigma(\sigma - 1)\mu_A + \frac{\sigma(\sigma - 1)}{2} V_{rY} + \sigma(\sigma - 1) V_{rY} +$$

Now we can put together to compute the log of aggregate TFP $\log A = \log \left[P^{-\sigma} \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \mathbf{B}^{\sigma} \right] + \log Green + \log Red + \log Blue$ $= constant - \sigma \log P + \log Green + \log Red + \log Blue$

$$= constant + \left\{ \frac{\sigma(\sigma-1)\alpha^{2}}{2} V_{\tau K} + \frac{\sigma(\sigma-1)\beta^{2}}{2} V_{\tau L} + \frac{\sigma(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha-\beta)^{2}}{2} V_{\tau X} + \frac{\sigma(\sigma-1)}{2} V_{\tau Y} + \sigma\mu_{A} + \frac{\sigma(\sigma-1)}{2} V_{A} \right\}$$

$$- \alpha \left(\frac{(\alpha(1-\sigma)-1)^{2}}{2} V_{\tau K} + \frac{(\beta(1-\sigma))^{2}}{2} V_{\tau L} + \frac{((1-\alpha-\beta)(1-\sigma))^{2}}{2} V_{\tau X} + \frac{\sigma^{2}}{2} V_{\tau Y} + (\sigma-1)\mu_{A} + \frac{(\sigma-1)^{2}}{2} V_{A} \right)$$

$$- \beta \left(\frac{(\alpha(1-\sigma))^{2}}{2} V_{\tau K} + \frac{(\beta(1-\sigma)-1)^{2}}{2} V_{\tau L} + \frac{((1-\alpha-\beta)(1-\sigma))^{2}}{2} V_{\tau X} + \frac{\sigma^{2}}{2} V_{\tau Y} + (\sigma-1)\mu_{A} + \frac{(\sigma-1)^{2}}{2} V_{A} \right)$$

$$- (1-\alpha-\beta) \left(\frac{(\alpha(1-\sigma))^{2}}{2} V_{\tau K} + \frac{(\beta(1-\sigma))^{2}}{2} V_{\tau L} + \frac{((1-\alpha-\beta)(1-\sigma)-1)^{2}}{2} V_{\tau X} + \frac{\sigma^{2}}{2} V_{\tau Y} + (\sigma-1)\mu_{A} + \frac{(\sigma-1)^{2}}{2} V_{A} \right)$$

$$= constant - \left\{ \frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)}{2} + \frac{\alpha^{2}\sigma}{2} \right\} V_{\tau K} - \left\{ \frac{\beta(1-\beta)}{2} + \frac{\beta^{2}\sigma}{2} \right\} V_{\tau L} - \left\{ \frac{(1-\alpha-\beta)(\alpha+\beta)}{2} + \frac{(1-\alpha-\beta)^{2}\sigma}{2} \right\} V_{\tau X} - \frac{\sigma}{2} V_{\tau Y} + \mu_{A} + \frac{(\sigma-1)}{2} V_{A} \right\}$$

Note that TFP is increasing in the variance of productivity V_A and it is decreasing in the variable of distortions $V_{\tau K}, V_{\tau L}, V_{\tau X}, V_{\tau Y}$

F. IDENTIFICATION OF DISTORTIONS τ

Using the optimality condition for capital and the expression for the optimal price

$$MRPK_{i} \equiv \frac{P_{i}Y_{i}}{K_{i}} = P_{i}\frac{Y_{i}}{K_{i}} = P_{i} \times \frac{\tau_{i}^{K}r}{\lambda_{i}\alpha} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\frac{1}{\tau_{i}^{Y}}\lambda_{i} \times \frac{\tau_{i}^{K}r}{\lambda_{i}\alpha} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\frac{\tau_{i}^{K}r}{\tau_{i}^{Y}\alpha}$$

Using the same logic, we have

$$MRPL_{i} \equiv \frac{P_{i}Y_{i}}{L_{i}} = P_{i}\frac{Y_{i}}{L_{i}} = P_{i} \times \frac{\tau_{i}^{L}w}{\lambda_{i}\beta} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\frac{1}{\tau_{i}^{Y}}\lambda_{i} \times \frac{\tau_{i}^{L}w}{\lambda_{i}\beta} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\frac{\tau_{i}^{L}w}{\tau_{i}^{Y}\beta}$$
$$MRPX_{i} \equiv \frac{P_{i}Y_{i}}{X_{i}} = P_{i}\frac{Y_{i}}{X_{i}} = P_{i} \times \frac{\tau_{i}^{X}P_{X}}{\lambda_{i}(1-\alpha-\beta)} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\frac{1}{\tau_{i}^{Y}}\lambda_{i} \times \frac{\tau_{i}^{X}P_{X}}{\lambda_{i}(1-\alpha-\beta)} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\frac{\tau_{i}^{X}}{\tau_{i}^{Y}}\frac{P_{X}}{\lambda_{i}(1-\alpha-\beta)}$$

We have four unknowns τ_i^Y , τ_i^K , τ_i^L , τ_i^X and three moments $MPRK_i$, $MRPL_i$, $MRPX_i$. The system is not identified. We need to impose an identifying assumption.

The Hsieh-Klenow framework assumes that $\tau_i^L = 1$ for all *i* and hence, one can find

$$\log MRPL_i = constant - \log(\tau_i^Y)$$

so that one can estimate $V_{\tau Y} \equiv var(\log(\tau_i^Y)) = var(\log MRPL_i) = V_{MRPL}$. Then one can note that
$$\log MRPK_i = constant + \log(\tau_i^K) - \log(\tau_i^Y) = constant + \log(\tau_i^K) + \log MRPL_i$$
and hence

an

$$log(\tau_{i}^{K}) = constant + log MRPK_{i} - log MRPL_{i}$$
$$V_{\tau K} \equiv var \left(log(\tau_{i}^{K})\right) = var (log MRPK_{i} - log MRPL_{i})$$
$$= var \left(log MRPL_{i}\right) + var \left(log MRPK_{i}\right) - 2cov (log MRPL_{i}, log MRPK_{i})$$
$$= V_{MRPL} + V_{MRPK} - 2V_{MRPL,MRPK}$$

One can alternatively assume that $\tau_i^K = 1$ for all *i* and τ_i^L is varying across firms. Then $V_{\tau Y} \equiv var\left(\log(\tau_i^Y)\right) = var\left(\log MRPK_i\right) = V_{MRPK}$

$$V_{\tau L} \equiv var \left(\log(\tau_i^L) \right) = var \left(\log MRPL_i - \log MRPK_i \right)$$

= $var \left(\log MRPL_i \right) + var \left(\log MRPK_i \right) - 2cov \left(\log MRPL_i \right) \log MRPK_i \right) =$
= $V_{MRPL} + V_{MRPK} - 2V_{MRPL,MRPK}$

Note that we do not have materials in the EIBIS. Is this a problem? The answer is not necessarily. We know that $V_{\tau X} \ge 0$ and hence a distortion in the intermediate input market will lower aggregate TFP. If we do not observe *MRPX*, we likely understate the effect of the distortions and thus our estimate is conservative.

If we make the assumption as in Hsieh and Klenow, then the (conservative) loss in aggregate TFP (and hence aggregate output) is

$$loss = -\left\{\frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)}{2} + \frac{\alpha^2\sigma}{2}\right\}V_{\tau K} - \frac{\sigma}{2}V_{\tau Y} = -\left\{\frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)}{2} + \frac{\alpha^2\sigma}{2}\right\}\left[V_{MRPL} + V_{MRPK} - 2V_{MRPL,MRPK}\right] - \frac{\sigma}{2}V_{MRPL}$$

If we make the other assumption, then

$$loss = -\left\{\frac{\beta(1-\beta)}{2} + \frac{\beta^{2}\sigma}{2}\right\}V_{\tau L} - \frac{\sigma}{2}V_{\tau Y} = -\left\{\frac{\beta(1-\beta)}{2} + \frac{\beta^{2}\sigma}{2}\right\}\left[V_{MRPL} + V_{MRPK} - 2V_{MRPL,MRPK}\right] - \frac{\sigma}{2}V_{MRPK}$$

G. CORRELATED DISTORTIONS

The assumption of uncorrelated distortions τ simplifies algebra but empirically the distortions may be correlated. To keep the derivations concise, we focus on the case where we set $\tau_i^L = \tau_i^X = 1$ for all *i* and we abstract from productivity shocks A_i (set $A_i = 1$ for all *i*) without loss of generality. Let $\rho \equiv corr(\log(\tau_i^Y), \log(\tau_i^K))$.

Consider first the expression for the level of prices in the economy:

$$\begin{aligned} -\sigma \log P &= \log \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \boldsymbol{B} + \frac{\sigma}{1 - \sigma} \log \left(\int \left(\frac{1}{\tau_i^Y} \frac{\left(\tau_i^K\right)^\alpha \left(\tau_i^L\right)^\beta \left(\tau_i^X\right)^{1 - \alpha - \beta}}{A_i} \right)^{1 - \sigma} di \right) \\ &= \log \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \boldsymbol{B} + \frac{\sigma}{1 - \sigma} \log \left(\int \left(\frac{1}{\tau_i^Y} \left(\tau_i^K\right)^\alpha \right)^{1 - \sigma} di \right) \\ &= constant + \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \log \left(E \left[\exp\{-(\sigma - 1)\alpha \log \tau_i^K + (\sigma - 1) \log \tau_i^Y\} \right] \right) \\ &= constant + \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \log \left(\left[\exp\{\frac{\left[(\sigma - 1)\alpha\right]^2}{2} V_{\tau K} + \frac{\left[(\sigma - 1)\right]^2}{2} V_{\tau Y} - \rho \sqrt{V_{\tau K} V_{\tau Y}} \sigma(\sigma - 1)\alpha \right\} \right] \right) \\ &= constant + \left\{ \frac{\sigma(\sigma - 1)\alpha^2}{2} V_{\tau K} + \frac{\sigma(\sigma - 1)}{2} V_{\tau Y} - \rho \sqrt{V_{\tau K} V_{\tau Y}} \sigma(\sigma - 1)\alpha \right\} \end{aligned}$$

Now consider the green, red and blue terms:

$$\log\left[\left(\int \frac{\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}}{\tau_{i}^{K}}\left(\left(\tau_{i}^{K}\right)^{\alpha}\right)^{1-\sigma}di\right)^{-\alpha}\right] = -\alpha\log E\left(\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}\left(\tau_{i}^{K}\right)^{\alpha(1-\sigma)-1}\right)$$
$$= -\alpha\left(\frac{(\alpha(1-\sigma)-1)^{2}}{2}V_{\tau K} + \frac{\sigma^{2}}{2}V_{\tau Y} + \rho\sqrt{V_{\tau K}V_{\tau Y}}\sigma(\alpha(1-\sigma)-1)\right)$$
$$\log\left[\left(\int \left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}\left(\left(\tau_{i}^{K}\right)^{\alpha}\right)^{1-\sigma}di\right)^{-\beta}\right] = -\beta\log E\left(\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}\left(\tau_{i}^{K}\right)^{\alpha(1-\sigma)}\right)$$
$$= -\beta\left(\frac{(\alpha(1-\sigma))^{2}}{2}V_{\tau K} + \frac{\sigma^{2}}{2}V_{\tau Y} + \rho\sqrt{V_{\tau K}V_{\tau Y}}\sigma(1-\sigma)\alpha\right)$$
$$\log\left[\left(\int \left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}\left(\left(\tau_{i}^{K}\right)^{\alpha}\right)^{1-\sigma}di\right)^{-(1-\alpha-\beta)}\right] = -(1-\alpha-\beta)\log E\left(\left(\tau_{i}^{Y}\right)^{\sigma}\left(\tau_{i}^{K}\right)^{\alpha(1-\sigma)}\right)$$
$$= -(1-\alpha-\beta)\left(\frac{\left(\alpha(1-\sigma)\right)^{2}}{2}V_{\tau K} + \frac{\sigma^{2}}{2}V_{\tau Y} + \rho\sqrt{V_{\tau K}V_{\tau Y}}\sigma(1-\sigma)\alpha\right)$$

It follows that the productivity loss is given by

 $loss = \log \left[P^{-\sigma} \frac{\sigma^{-1}}{\sigma} \mathbf{B}^{\sigma} \right] + \log Green + \log Red + \log Blue$ $(\alpha(1-\alpha) - \alpha^{2}\sigma) = \sigma$

$$= constant - \left\{\frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)}{2} + \frac{\alpha^2\sigma}{2}\right\} V_{\tau K} - \frac{\sigma}{2} V_{\tau Y} - \rho \sqrt{V_{\tau K} V_{\tau Y}} \sigma \alpha$$

In our data, $\rho > 0$ so that ignoring the correlation between τ_i^K and τ_i^Y understates productivity losses from the distortions.

We can also note that this expression can be mapped into the marginal R^2 framework. Recall that

$$log(\tau_{it}^{Y}) = constant - log(MRPL_{it}),$$

$$log(\tau_{it}^{K}) = constant + log(MRPK_{it}) - log(MRPL_{it}).$$

so that

$$\log(\tau_{it}^{K}) - \log(\tau_{it}^{Y}) = constant + \log(MRPK_{it})$$

We can write the expression for productivity loss

$$\begin{aligned} loss &= -\left\{\frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)}{2} + \frac{\alpha^2\sigma}{2}\right\} V_{\tau K} - \frac{\sigma}{2} V_{\tau Y} - \rho \sqrt{V_{\tau K} V_{\tau Y}} \sigma \alpha \\ &= -\left\{\frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)}{2} + \frac{\alpha^2\sigma}{2}\right\} V_{\tau K} - \frac{\sigma}{2} V_{\tau Y} + \frac{\sigma\alpha}{2} V_{\tau Y} + \frac{\sigma\alpha}{2} V_{\tau K} - \rho \sqrt{V_{\tau K} V_{\tau Y}} \sigma \alpha - \frac{\sigma\alpha}{2} V_{\tau Y} - \frac{\sigma\alpha}{2} V_{\tau K} = \\ &= -\left\{\frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)}{2} + \frac{\alpha(1+\alpha)\sigma}{2}\right\} V_{\tau K} - \frac{\sigma(1+\alpha)}{2} V_{\tau Y} + \frac{\sigma\alpha}{2} var(\log(\tau_{it}^K) - \log(\tau_{it}^Y)) = \\ &= -\left\{\frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)}{2} + \frac{\alpha(1+\alpha)\sigma}{2}\right\} var(\log(MRPK_{it}) - \log(MRPL_{it})) - \frac{\sigma(1+\alpha)}{2} var(\log(MRPL_{it})) \\ &+ \frac{\sigma\alpha}{2} var(\log(MRPK_{it})) \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the gains from removing a vector of distortions can be computed as

$$loss = -\left\{\frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)}{2} + \frac{\alpha(1+\alpha)\sigma}{2}\right\} \times var(\log(MRPK_{it}) - \log(MRPL_{it})) \times (marginal \ R^2) \\ - \frac{\sigma(1+\alpha)}{2} \times var(\log(MRPL_{it})) \times (marginal \ R^2) + \frac{\sigma\alpha}{2} var(\log(MRPK_{it})) \times (marginal \ R^2) + \frac{\sigma\alpha}{2} var(\log(MRPK$$

Appendix C: Additional derivations

A. COST SHARES

Note that in a steady state, when adjustment costs are zero, the costs of capital and labor are given by

$$R_i(U_i)K_i = \left((1 - \sigma^{-1})\alpha \frac{S_i}{K_i}\right)K_i = (1 - \sigma^{-1})\alpha S_i$$
$$W_i(E_i)L_i = \left((1 - \sigma^{-1})\beta \frac{S_i}{L_i}\right)L_i = (1 - \sigma^{-1})\beta S_i$$

where we drop the time index to underscore that this is a steady state. Hence, the steady-state cost shares for capital and labor are

$$s_{i}^{K} = \frac{R_{i}(U_{i})K_{i}}{R_{i}(U_{i})K_{i} + W_{i}(E_{i})L_{i} + P_{i}^{X}X_{i}} = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta + \omega} = \frac{\alpha}{\gamma} \Leftrightarrow \alpha = \gamma s^{K},$$

$$s_{i}^{L} = \frac{W_{i}(E_{i})L_{i}}{R_{i}(U_{i})K_{i} + W_{i}(E_{i})L_{i} + P_{i}^{X}X_{i}} = \frac{\beta}{\alpha + \beta + \omega} = \frac{\beta}{\gamma} \Leftrightarrow \beta = \gamma s^{L}.$$

In the same spirit, $\omega = \gamma s^X$. We use these expressions to replace β , α , and ω in the expressions for marginal revenue products to obtain

$$MRPK_{it} = (1 - \sigma^{-1})\gamma s^{K} \frac{S_{it}}{K_{it}},$$
$$MRPL_{it} = (1 - \sigma^{-1})\gamma s^{L} \frac{S_{it}}{L_{it}},$$
$$MRPX_{it} = (1 - \sigma^{-1})\gamma s^{X} \frac{S_{it}}{X_{it}}.$$

Since markup $\mu = (\sigma - 1)/\sigma$,

$$(1-\sigma^{-1})\gamma = \frac{1}{\mu}\gamma = (1-s_{\pi}) \approx 1$$

given that the share of pure economic profit in total revenue s_{π} is approximately zero in the data (e.g., Basu and Fernald, 1997).² Hence, we can further simplify the expressions for marginal revenue products to obtain

$$MRPK_{it} \approx s^{K} \frac{S_{it}}{K_{it}},$$
$$MRPL_{it} \approx s^{L} \frac{S_{it}}{L_{it}},$$
$$MRPX_{it} \approx s^{X} \frac{S_{it}}{X_{it}}.$$

² Weaker assumptions may suffice. For example, to study a cross-sectional dispersion of marginal revenue products, it is enough to have γ/μ constant across industries and countries. If even this assumption is not satisfied, one ought to consider using country and/or industry fixed effects to control for the variation in market power and in returns to scale.

B. QUALITY ADJUSTMENT FOR CAPITAL

Although it is conventional to define marginal products for physical units (e.g., number of employees and/or hours worked), capital is typically measured in dollars such as the replacement value of capital or the book value of fixed assets. In other words, in a typical survey (including our survey) we measure

$$\widetilde{MRPK}_{it} \equiv (1 - \sigma^{-1})\alpha \frac{S_{it}}{\widetilde{R}_{it}K_{it}} \approx \frac{R_{it}(U_{it})}{\widetilde{R}_{it}} \left\{ 1 + \phi_K \left(\frac{K_{it}}{K_{i,t-1}} - 1 \right) - \frac{\phi_K}{1 + r_{t+1}} \times \left(\frac{K_{i,t+1}}{K_{it}} - 1 \right) \right\}$$

where \tilde{R}_{it} is a measure of the capital price used in constructing the replacement value or the balance sheet value of fixed assets. In the case of replacement value of capital, we may have $R_{it}(U_{it}) \approx \tilde{R}_{it}$. With the balance sheet value of fixed asset, \tilde{R}_{it} likely reflects the historical price rather than the current market price. Given technical change and inflation, the difference between the market and historical prices can be large, especially for assets that were acquired a long time ago (e.g., buildings).

For example, suppose that capital is bought at time t_0 and, for simplicity that capital also does not depreciate, so that the balance sheet value is $p_{\tau}K_{\tau}$ at the time of purchase. $p_{t_0}K_{t_0}$ is also the balance-sheet value of fixed assets. The market price of capital at time t is given by $p_t = p_{t_0} \left(\frac{\Pi}{A}\right)^{t-t_0}$, where Π and A are gross rates of inflation and technical change. Hence,

$$(1-\sigma)\alpha \frac{S_t}{p_{t_0}K_{t_0}} = (1-\sigma)\alpha \frac{S_t}{p_t K_{t_0}} \times \left(\frac{A}{\Pi}\right)^{t-t_0}.$$

If $\Pi > A$, a large share of state-of-the-art capital means a lower $MRPK_{it}$ measured with the balance-sheet value of fixed assets. With depreciation, we obtain similar results but in this case the outcome also depends on whether the book value of capital depreciates faster on paper or de facto.

We are fortunate to have proxy information that enables us to try to correct for this effect. In particular, from EIBIS we know the share of capital (including machinery, equipment and ICT) that the management considers to be "state-of-the-art", which presumably means capital that has been obtained recently. Thus, for firms with a large share of state-of-the-art capital we can expect $R_{it}(U_{it}) \approx \tilde{R}_{it}$.

Appendix D: R^2 for OLS vs. Instrumental Variables

Appendix D derives and compares R^2 for ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable (IV) estimators under various assumptions.

A. STRUCTURAL MODEL

Consider the following system:

$$y = \alpha x + u \tag{D.1}$$

 $x = z + e \tag{D.2}$

where z is an instrumental variable (without loss of generality we can assume that the coefficient on z is equal to one; we can always normalize z so that this is the case), y is an outcome variable, x is a (potentially endogenous) regressor, u and e are error terms which could be correlated (x is endogenous) or uncorrelated (x is exogenous). We assume that z is a valid instrument and is uncorrelated with e and u. Note that the system in (D.1)-(D.2) can also be used to represent the relationships between variables after partialling out other factors and thus the logic developed below extends to marginal R^2 and multivariate contexts as well.

B. OLS

When we run an OLS regression for equation (D.1), we find that R^2 is given by

$$R_{OLS}^2 \equiv 1 - \frac{var(\hat{u}_{OLS})}{var(y)} \tag{D.3}$$

where \hat{u}_{OLS} is the residual of the regression. Note that by construction of OLS regression we have

$$var(y) = var(\hat{\alpha}_{OLS}x) + var(\hat{u}_{OLS})$$
(D.4)

and so it does not matter whether we use equation (D.3) to compute R^2 or instead we use

$$R_{OLS}^2 = \frac{var(\hat{\alpha}_{OLS}x)}{var(y)} = \frac{\hat{\alpha}_{OLS}^2 var(x)}{var(y)}.$$
(D.5)

We can find that

$$\hat{u}_{OLS} \equiv y - \hat{\alpha}x = (\alpha x + u) - \frac{cov(y,x)}{var(x)}x = (\alpha x + u) - \frac{cov(\alpha x + u,x)}{var(x)}x$$
$$= (\alpha x + u) - \alpha x - \frac{cov(u,x)}{var(x)}x = u - \frac{cov(u,x)}{var(x)}x$$
(D.6)

It follows that

$$var(\hat{u}_{OLS}) = var\left(u - \frac{cov(u,x)}{var(x)}x\right)$$
$$= var(u) + \left[\frac{cov(u,x)}{var(x)}\right]^2 var(x) - 2cov(u,x)\frac{cov(u,x)}{var(x)}$$
$$= var(u) - \frac{[cov(u,x)]^2}{var(x)} < var(u)$$
(D.7)

Thus, OLS understates the variance of the error term and so OLS will inflate R^2 : $var(\hat{u}_{OLS}) < var(u)$. Also notice that cov(x, u) = cov(z + e, u) = cov(e, u) and so we can alternatively write

$$var(\hat{u}_{OLS}) = var(u) - \frac{[cov(u,e)]^2}{var(x)}$$
(D.7')

C. INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES (IV)

Now consider the IV regression where the first stage is given by equation (D.2). In this case, we can show that we can recover a consistent estimate of α . In this case, we can compute the *structural* error term in equation (1) as

$$\hat{u}_{IV} = y - \hat{\alpha}_{IV} x \tag{D.8}$$

Because the estimate is consistent, we have also the correct estimate of the variance of the error term u as the sample size increases to infinity:

$$var(\hat{u}_{IV}) = var(u). \tag{D.9}$$

But this means that $R_{IV}^2 \equiv 1 - \frac{var(\hat{u}_{IV})}{var(y)} \le R_{OLS}^2$.

If cov(u, x) = 0 (or equivalently cov(e, u) = 0), we have $R_{IV}^2 = R_{OLS}^2$. However, notice that with the IV regression we can no longer use equations (D.3) and (D.5) equivalently because:

$$var(y) = var(\hat{\alpha}_{IV}x + u) = \hat{\alpha}_{IV}^2 var(x) + var(u) + 2\hat{\alpha}_{IV}cov(x,u)$$
(D.10)

and hence

$$\frac{\hat{a}_{IV}^{2}var(x)}{var(y)} \neq 1 - \frac{var(\hat{u}_{IV})}{var(y)}.$$
(D.11)

As a result, R_{IV}^2 can be negative.

While we can guarantee that $1 - \frac{var(\hat{u}_{IV})}{var(y)} \le 1 - \frac{var(\hat{u}_{OLS})}{var(y)}$, we cannot guarantee that

$$\frac{\hat{a}_{IV}^2 var(x)}{var(y)} \le \frac{\hat{a}_{OLS}^2 var(x)}{var(y)}.$$
(D.12)

D. PREDICTIVE ERROR

To address this issue, Pesaran and Smith (1994) propose using *predictive* error in IV regressions to do model comparisons and model selection. In contrast to structural errors, these errors can be used for model selections because they have a well-defined measure of fit: generalized R^2 (or GR^2) which is calculated as follows

$$\tilde{u}_{IV} = y - \hat{\alpha}_{IV} \hat{x} \tag{D.13}$$

where \hat{x} is the predicted value of x in the first-stage regression (D.2). Effectively, computing this residual amounts to regressing y on z, i.e., running a reduced-form regression. In this case, because z is uncorrelated with e or u, we have

$$var(y) = var(\hat{\alpha}_{IV}z + u) = \hat{\alpha}_{IV}^2 var(z) + var(u)$$
(D.14)

What is the relation of $var(\tilde{u}_{IV})$ to $var(\hat{u}_{OLS})$? Using the logic of equation (D.7) and the fact that $\hat{\alpha}_{IV} \rightarrow_p \alpha$, we can find

$$var(\tilde{u}_{IV}) = var(y - \hat{\alpha}_{IV}\hat{x}) = var(y - \alpha z) = var(y - \alpha(x - e))$$
$$= var(\alpha x + u - \alpha(x - e)) = var(u + \alpha e)$$
$$= var(u) + \alpha^{2}var(e) + 2\alpha cov(e, u)$$
(D.15)

The second term in equation (D.15) is positive (and so we push R^2 down) but the third term is ambiguous: the sign depends how x influences y (the sign of α) and how the error terms are correlated.

Now using equation (D.7'), we compute

$$var(\hat{u}_{OLS}) - var(\tilde{u}_{IV}) = \left\{ var(u) - \frac{[cov(u,e)]^2}{var(x)} \right\} - \left\{ var(u) + \alpha^2 var(e) + 2\alpha cov(e,u) \right\}$$
$$= -\frac{[cov(u,e)]^2}{var(x)} - \alpha^2 var(e) - 2\alpha cov(e,u)$$
(D.16)

The first two terms are negative (and so this helps us ensure that R_{OLS}^2 is greater that GR_{IV}^2) but the last term is ambiguous because we need to know more about the nature of the omitted variable that gives a non-zero correlation between *e* and *u* as well as how *x* influences *y*.

One special case to guarantee $R_{OLS}^2 \ge GR_{IV}^2$ is when the omitted variable moves y and x in the same direction (i.e., cov(u, e) > 0) as x moves y. For example, cov(u, e) > 0 and $\alpha > 0$. Alternatively, cov(u, e) < 0 and $\alpha < 0$. If $\alpha cov(e, u) \ge 0$, OLS overstates the contribution of x to variable of y and hence R_{OLS}^2 continues to be an upper bound for the variation in y due to x.

One may expect condition $\alpha cov(e, u) = cov(x, u) \ge 0$ to be satisfied in our setting: more productive firms are more likely to run into distortionary constraints (e.g., red tape) and these constraints are likely to raise the marginal revenue product of an input (red tape makes firms employ too little of the input). Consider the following model as an illustration of this point. Suppose that a firm is maximizing profits subject to a size constraint:

$$\max_{E,L} A(EL)^{\alpha} - w(E)L \ s.t. \ L \leq \overline{L}$$

where *L* is labor input, \overline{L} is the maximum firm size allowed by red tape, *E* is effort of workers, w(E) is the wage function for effort, *A* is productivity (entrepreneurial talents of the firm's manager). We will assume that the wage function is increasing and convex: w'(E) > 0, w''(E) > 0. The parameter $\alpha < 1$ measures returns to scale. Firms are heterogenous in their draws of *A*.

The Lagrangian is $\mathcal{L} = A(EL)^{\alpha} - w(E)L - \lambda(L - \overline{L})$ where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the size constraint. Optimality conditions for *E* and *L* are respectively:

$$\alpha A E^{\alpha - 1} L^{\alpha} = w'(E)L,$$
$$MRPL \equiv \alpha A E^{\alpha} L^{\alpha - 1} = w(E) + \lambda$$

Note that when the size constraint is not binding, $\lambda = 0$ and hence the optimal level of effort E^* is given by

$$\frac{w'(E^*)E^*}{w(E^*)} = 1$$

and so effort does not depend on productivity A. If the size constraint is not binding, the marginal revenue product of labor is

$$MRPL = w(E^*).$$

If the size constraint is binding, the optimal effort is given by

$$\alpha A(E^*)^{\alpha-1}\overline{L}^{\alpha} = w'(E^*)\overline{L} \Leftrightarrow A = \frac{\overline{L}^{1-\alpha}}{\alpha}w'(E^*)(E^*)^{1-\alpha}.$$

Because w''(E) > 0 and $\alpha < 1$, it follows that E^* is increasing in productivity A. To determine λ in this case, we note that

$$\alpha A(E^*) \stackrel{\alpha}{E} \stackrel{\alpha}{L} \stackrel{\alpha-1}{=} w(E^*) + \lambda \Longrightarrow w'(E^*)E^* = w(E^*) + \lambda \Longrightarrow \lambda = w'(E^*)E^* - w(E^*)$$

Given our assumptions about the wage function, we have

$$\frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial E^*} = w''(E^*)E^* + w'(E^*) - w'(E^*) = w''(E^*)E^* > 0,$$

that is, the Lagrange multiplier on the size constraint is increasing in effort. Trivially, *MRPL* is increasing in effort.

Now suppose we have a measure of how binding the size constraint is (e.g., in the survey, we ask firms to report how binding various constraints are: major issue, minor issue, not an issue) but we do not observe effort. We regress *MRPL* on λ . The optimality condition for labor implies that the regression takes the following form:

$$MRPL = \lambda + w(E) = \lambda + error,$$

where the error term *error* absorbs unobserved effort w(E). Clearly the structural coefficient on λ is positive and $cov(\lambda, error) = cov(\lambda, w(E)) > 0$. Thus, the condition for $R_{OLS}^2 \ge R_{IV}^2$ and $R_{OLS}^2 \ge GR_{IV}^2$ is satisfied.

E. MEASUREMENT ERROR

Suppose we do not have the right measure of x and instead have two imperfect measures of x: $x_1^* = x + \eta_1$ and $x_2^* = x + \eta_2$. To keep algebra simple, we assume that:

- 1) η is uncorrelated with u and e
- 2) η_1 is uncorrelated with η_2 .
- 3) $var(\eta_1) = var(\eta_2) = var(\eta)$

Also, to focus on the measurement error, we assume that cov(u, e) = 0 and so we do not have endogeneity considered above.

Using x_1^* (or x_2^*) in estimating equation (D.1) yields

$$\hat{\alpha}_{ME}^{OLS} = \alpha \frac{var(x)}{var(x) + var(\eta)} \tag{D.17}$$

$$\hat{u}_{ME,OLS} = y - \hat{\alpha}_{ME}^{OLS} x_1^* = (\alpha x + u) - \alpha \frac{var(x)}{var(x) + var(\eta)} (x + \eta_1)$$
$$= u + \alpha \frac{var(\eta)}{var(x) + var(\eta)} x - \alpha \frac{var(x)}{var(x) + var(\eta)} \eta_1$$
(D.18)

Because u, x, η_1 are assumed to be uncorrelated, we have

$$var(\hat{u}_{ME,OLS}) = var(u) + \alpha^{2} \left[\frac{var(\eta)}{var(x) + var(\eta)} \right]^{2} var(x) + \alpha^{2} \left[\frac{var(x)}{var(x) + var(\eta)} \right]^{2} var(\eta)$$
$$= var(u) + \alpha^{2} \frac{var(\eta)var(x)}{(var(x) + var(\eta))^{2}} \{var(x) + var(\eta)\} =$$
$$= var(u) + \alpha^{2} \frac{var(x)}{var(x) + var(\eta)} var(\eta)$$
(D.19)

Because $var(\hat{u}_{ME,OLS}) > var(u)$, it follows that

$$R_{ME,OLS}^{2} = 1 - \frac{var(\hat{u}_{ME,OLS})}{var(y)} < R_{true}^{2} = 1 - \frac{var(u)}{var(y)}$$
(D.20)

Furthermore, one can show that

$$R_{ME,OLS}^{2} = 1 - \frac{var(\hat{u}_{ME,OLS})}{var(y)} = 1 - \frac{var(u) + \alpha^{2} \frac{var(x)}{var(x) + var(\eta)} var(\eta)}{var(y)}$$
$$= \left(1 - \frac{var(u)}{var(y)}\right) - \frac{\alpha^{2} var(x)}{var(y)} \times \frac{var(\eta)}{var(x) + var(\eta)} = R_{true}^{2} - R_{true}^{2} \frac{var(\eta)}{var(x) + var(\eta)}$$
$$= R_{true}^{2} \frac{var(x)}{var(x) + var(\eta)}$$
(D.21)

where $R_{true}^2 \equiv 1 - \frac{var(u)}{var(y)} = \frac{\alpha^2 var(x)}{var(y)}$.

We can use x_2^* as an instrument to x_1^* because η_1 and η_2 are uncorrelated. This IV regression will give us $\hat{\alpha}_{IV} \rightarrow_p \alpha$.

However, having an IV estimate does not help here, because the structural error in this regression will still have measurement error

$$\hat{u}_{ME,IV} = y - \hat{\alpha}_{IV} x_1^* = y - \alpha x_1^* = \alpha x + u - \alpha (x + \eta_1) = u - \alpha \eta_1$$
(D.22)

and hence

$$var(\hat{u}_{ME,IV}) = var(u) + \alpha^2 var(\eta). \tag{D.23}$$

Because $var(\hat{u}_{ME,IV}) > var(u)$, we have

$$R_{ME,IV}^2 = 1 - \frac{var(\hat{u}_{ME,IV})}{var(y)} < R_{true}^2$$

Because $var(\hat{u}_{ME,IV}) > var(\hat{u}_{ME,OLS})$, we also have $R^2_{ME,IV} < R^2_{ME,OLS}$.

Now consider using a predictive IV error term $\tilde{u}_{IV} = y - \hat{\alpha}_{IV}\hat{x}_1^*$ where $\hat{x}_1^* = \hat{\psi}x_2^*$ and $\hat{\psi} = \frac{cov(x_1^*, x_2^*)}{var(x_2^*)} = \frac{var(x)}{var(x) + var(\eta)}$. Because x_2^* also has measurement error, we obtain

$$\tilde{u}_{IV} = y - \hat{\alpha}_{IV}\hat{x}_1^* = y - \alpha\hat{\psi}x_2^*$$

$$= \alpha x + u - \alpha \hat{\psi}(x + \eta_2) = u + \alpha (1 - \hat{\psi}) x - \alpha \hat{\psi} \eta_2$$
(D.24)

Because u, x, η_2 are uncorrelated, we have

$$var(\tilde{u}_{IV}) = var(u) + \alpha^{2} \left(1 - \hat{\psi}\right)^{2} var(x) + \alpha^{2} \hat{\psi}^{2} var(\eta) =$$

$$= var(u) + \alpha^{2} \left(\frac{var(\eta)}{var(x) + var(\eta)}\right)^{2} var(x) + \alpha^{2} \left(\frac{var(x)}{var(x) + var(\eta)}\right)^{2} var(\eta) =$$

$$= var(u) + \alpha^{2} \frac{var(\eta)var(x)}{[var(x) + var(\eta)]^{2}} \{var(x) + var(\eta)\} =$$

$$= var(u) + \alpha^{2} \frac{var(x)}{var(x) + var(\eta)} var(\eta) \qquad (D.25)$$

Because $var(\tilde{u}_{IV}) > var(u)$, we know

$$GR_{ME,IV}^2 \equiv 1 - \frac{var(\tilde{u}_{IV})}{var(y)} < R_{true}^2.$$
(D.26)

When we compare $GR_{ME,IV}^2$ (equation D.26) and $R_{ME,OLS}^2$ (equation D.19), we can see that $GR_{ME,IV}^2 = R_{ME,OLS}^2$. Thus, OLS continues to provide an upper bound for predictive power of x in explaining y.

We can do a little better even when we have multiple measurements of x. Notice that we can use $\bar{x}^* = (x_1^* + x_2^*)/2$ as a regressor. In this case, the measurement error is reduced: $var(\bar{x}^*) = var\left(x + \frac{\eta_1}{2} + \frac{\eta_2}{2}\right) = var(x) + \frac{1}{4}var(\eta) + \frac{1}{4}var(\eta) = var(x) + \frac{1}{2}var(\eta)$. As a result,

$$R_{ME,OLS}^2 = R_{true}^2 \frac{var(x)}{var(x) + \frac{1}{2}var(\eta)}$$
(D.27)

and hence $R_{ME,OLS}^2$ is less biased. Thus, by running a regression with average values of x^* , we can reduce the size of measurement errors and try to improve the upper bound for R^2 .

Appendix E: EIBIS Questionnaire



EIB Group Survey of Investment and Investment Finance

General module questionnaire - 2016

INTRODUCTION

READ OUT TO ALL

Hello, my name is and I'm calling from [NETWORK PARTNER] on behalf of the European Investment Bank (EIB Group).

IF NAMED RESPONDENT IN SAMPLE: Could I speak to [NAME FROM SAMPLE]?

IF NO NAMED RESPONDENT IN SAMPLE OR NAMED RESPONDENT NOT AVAILABLE:

We're conducting a survey to better understand business investment decisions. Can I speak to the most senior person at [INSERT COMPANY NAME FROM SAMPLE] with responsibility for investment decisions and how these are financed? IF NECESSARY This person could be the owner, a Finance Manager, the Finance Director or Head of Accounts, the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) or the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)?

READ OUT TO ALL

Your business has been selected to participate in this survey on business investment in [COUNTRY OF INTERVIEW] to help policy-makers identify ways to support businesses like yours.

Your co-operation will ensure that the views expressed are representative of businesses in [COUNTRY OF INTERVIEW].

Information already held about your company from the Bureau van Dijk Orbis database will be appended to your survey answers for analysis purposes, but your confidentiality will be maintained and all linked data will be anonymised.

I would like to send you some information on the type of questions that we will ask in the survey. Could I have your email address to send it to you? If you don't receive the email promptly please check your junk folder. EMAIL DATASHEET TO RESPONDENT

If you would like, the European Investment Bank will email you a summary report of the findings as a thank you for taking part in the research.

The survey will take about 15 to 20 minutes of your time. Would it be convenient to conduct the interview now? SINGLE CODE ONLY

REASSURANCES TO USE IF NECESSARY:

- Everything you say will be treated in the strictest confidence and your answers will only be reported at the aggregate level together with all the other organisations taking part.
- It doesn't matter if you have not invested in the past year we need to talk to a wide range of organisations in this survey and you will not be asked irrelevant questions.
- The survey is not technical and you don't need any specific financial knowledge to take part.
- We can share some of the questions with you by email, to help you find the right person to take part.
- Findings from the survey will be published on the <u>www.eib.org</u> website at the end of 2016, in order to help businesses like yours.
- Details of the survey are on the European Investment Bank (www.eib.org/) website and the Ipsos website www.ipsos.com)
- If respondent wishes to confirm validity of survey or get more information about aims and objectives, they can visit the website or call:
 - MRS: Market Research Society on XXXX

- EIB: eibis@eib.org
- NETWORK PARTNER: XXXX

SCREENER

READ OUT TO ALL

I'd like to ask you some questions about your business.

ASK ALL

- 1. Can I check how long [INSERT COMPANY NAME] has been operating? READ OUT IF NECESSARY In the case of a past acquisition, please refer to when the acquiring enterprise was registered or, in the case of a merger, to the largest enterprise involved in terms of employees? SINGLE CODE ONLY
- Less than 2 years
- o 2 years to less than 5 years
- 5 years to less than 10 years
- \circ 10 years to less than 20 years
- o 20 years or more
- o Company has ceased trading/been sold/passed on CLOSE INTERVIEW
- Don't know CLOSE INTERVIEW
- Refused CLOSE INTERVIEW

ASK ALL

- 2. How many people does your company employ either full or part time at all its locations, including yourself? READ IF NECESSARY: Please include freelancers working regularly for your company. Full-time and part-time employees should each count as one employee. Employees working less than 12 hours per week should be excluded. WRITE IN NUMBER
 - WRITE IN NUMBER CLOSE IF LESS THAN 5 EMPLOYEES
 - $\circ \quad Don't \, know GO \; TO \; Q3$
 - $\circ \quad Refused-GO\ TO\ Q3$

ASK IF DON'T KNOW OR REFUSED AT Q2

- 3. What is the approximate number? SINGLE CODE ONLY
 - Less than 5 employees CLOSE INTERVIEW
 - o 5-9 employees
 - o 10-49 employees
 - o 50-99 employees
 - o 100-249 employees
 - o 250-499 employees
 - o 500-999 employees
 - \circ 1,000+ employees
 - O Don't know PROMPT USING SAMPLE INFORMATION AND IF STILL DON'T KNOW, CLOSE INTERVIEW
 - Refused PROMPT USING SAMPLE INFORMATION AND IF STILL DON'T KNOW, CLOSE INTERVIEW

SCRIPT: ALLOCATE Q2/Q3 TO QUOTA

ASK ALL

4. IF SECTOR IN SAMPLE Can I check [INSERT SECTOR] is the main sector of activity of this company?

IF SECTOR NOT IN SAMPLE What is the main sector of activity of this company? SINGLE CODE ONLY

• NACE 4 list

SCRIPT: ALLOCATE Q4 TO QUOTA

ASK ALL

- 5. Can I just check is [INSERT NAME OF COMPANY] a subsidiary of another company? SINGLE CODE ONLY
 - o Yes
 - o No

- o Don't know
- o Refused

SECTION A: BACKGROUND

READ OUT TO ALL SUBSIDIARIES (CODE 1 AT Q5) In your replies to all of the following questions, please respond on behalf of the subsidiary only and not the parent company.

ASK ALL

- 6. Thinking about the number of people employed by your company, by how much has it changed in the last three years? READ IF NECESSARY: Please include both full-time and part-time employees working 12 hours or more. Please include freelancers working regularly for your company. Full-time and part-time employees should each count as one employee. Employees working less than 12 hours per week should be excluded. SCRIPTING: ALLOW NUMBER OR PERCENTAGE
 - NUMBER more than 3 years ago
 - NUMBER less than 3 years ago
 - PERCENTAGE more than 3 years ago
 - PERCENTAGE less than 3 years ago
 - No change in number of people employed in last three years
 - Company didn't exist three years ago
 - Don't know
 - Refused

ASK ALL

- 7. Can I check was your organisation's last financial year [ENTER STANDARD COUNRTY DATES]? SINGLE CODE ONLY
 - 0 Yes
 - o No
 - Don't know
 - o Refused

ASK IF NO OR DON'T KNOW AT Q7

8. Can I confirm in which month and year did the organisation's last full, finalised accounting period end? IF NECESSARY: The accounting period is the period for which the full financial statements are prepared and balanced. Generally the accounting period is 12 months long, but it can be shorter or longer. INTERVIEWER NOTE: WE ARE INTERESTED IN THE LAST FINANCIAL YEAR EVEN IF THE ORGANISATION IS STILL TO FILE A FINANCIAL STATEMENT FOR THAT YEAR. CODE MONTH AND YEAR

SINGLE CODE MONTH

- o January
- February
- o March
- o April
- o May
- o June
- o July
- August
- September
- October
- o November
- December
- Don't know

SINGLE CODE YEAR

- o 2015
- o 2016
- $\,\circ\,$ Don't know
- Refused

ASK IF NO OR DON'T KNOW AT Q7

9. And can I check your organisation's financial year is 12 months? SINGLE CODE ONLY

- Yes 12 months
- No longer/shorter than 12 months WRITE IN NUMBER OF MONTHS IF NOT 12 MONTHS
- Don't know
- \circ Refused

<u>SCRIPT CHECK:</u> IF RESPONDENT SAYS LESS THAN 12 MONTHS, THE ANSWER AT Q8 CANNOT BE JANUARY TO CURRENT MONTH MINUS ONE

SCRIPT:

- IF ACCOUNTING PERIOD IS JANUARY TO DECEMBER 2015 PLEASE REFER TO '2015' AT THE FOLLOWING RELEVANT QUESTIONS
- ALL OTHERS REFER TO 'THE 2015/16 FINANCIAL YEAR' <u>EXCEPT</u> THOSE WHO SAY ACCOUNTING PERIOD ENDED JANUARY TO NOVEMBER 2015 AT Q8 WHICH SHOULD REFER TO 'THE 2014/15 FINANCIAL YEAR'
- IF DON'T KNOW OR REFUSED REFER TO COUNTRY STANDARD DATES

ASK ALL

- 10. What was the approximate turnover of the company in [ADD AS APPROPRIATE 2015 OR the 2015/16 financial year OR the 2014/15 financial year]? ADD AS NECESSARY: This is the total amount received in respect of sales of goods and services. WRITE IN AMOUNT
 - O WRITE IN AMOUNT IN EUROS OR LOCAL CURRENCY
 - $\,\circ\,$ Don't know
 - \circ Refused

ASK IF DON'T KNOW OR REFUSED AT Q10 11. Was it approximately? SINGLE CODE ONLY

ASK ALL

12. In [ADD AS APPROPRIATE 2015 OR the 2015/16 financial year OR the 2014/15 financial year], was your company operating at its maximum capacity attainable under normal conditions? READ OUT SCALE. SINGLE CODE ONLY.

INTERVIEWER EXPLAIN IF NECESSARY: By normal conditions, I mean your company's general practices regarding the utilisation of machines and equipment, overtime, work shifts, holidays etc.

- Above maximum capacity
- o At maximum capacity
- Somewhat below full capacity
- Substantially below full capacity
- Don't know
- o Refused

SECTION B: MAIN INVESTMENT

READ OUT TO ALL

The following questions are about your investment and associated expenditure in all your company's locations.

ASK ALL

- 13. In [ADD AS APPROPRIATE 2015 OR the 2015/16 financial year OR the 2014/15 financial year], how much did your business invest in each of the following with the intention of maintaining or increasing your company's future earnings? READ OUT A TO F. ROTATE ORDER OF A TO WRITE IN AMOUNT IN EUROS OR LOCAL CURRENCY FOR EACH. RECORD ZERO IF NO INVESTMENT MADE
 - A. Land, business buildings and infrastructure
 - B. Machinery and equipment
 - C. Research and Development (including the acquisition of intellectual property)
 - D. Software, data, IT networks and website activities
 - E. Training of employees

- F. Organisation and business process improvements INTERVIEWER ADD IF NECESSARY such as restructuring and streamlining
- WRITE IN EUROS OR LOCAL CURRENCY FOR EACH. RECORD ZERO IF NO INVESTMENT MADE
- Don't know
- Refused

ASK ALL WHO DON'T KNOW OR REFUSED AT Q13

- 14. Can you estimate what the business' <u>total</u> investment spend was in these areas [ADD AS APPROPRIATE IF INVESTED IN LAST FINANCIAL YEAR 2015 OR the 2015/16 financial year OR the 2014/15 financial year] with the intention of maintaining or increasing your company's future earnings? WRITE IN AMOUNT IN EUROS OR LOCAL CURRENCY
 - 0 WRITE IN AMOUNT IN EUROS OR LOCAL CURRENCY
 - No investment made
 - Don't know
 - 0 Refused

ASK IF DON'T KNOW AT Q14

15. Was it approximately? SINGLE CODE ONLY

ASK IF DID NOT INVEST IN ANY AREA AT Q13 (ZERO FOR ALL A TO F) OR IF TOTAL INVESTMENT ZERO AT Q14 OR Q15

- 16. And did you invest in [ADD AS APPROPRIATE 2014 OR the 2014/15 financial year OR the 2013/14 financial year] in any of these areas with the intention of maintaining or increasing your company's future earnings? SINGLE CODE ONLY
 - o Yes
 - o No
 - o Don't know
 - 0 Refused

ASK ALL WHO HAVE INVESTED AT Q13, Q14 OR Q15

- 17. Overall, was this more, less or about the same amount of investment as in the previous year? SINGLE CODE ONLY
 - o More investment than the previous year
 - o Investment broadly stayed the same to the previous year
 - Less investment than in the previous year
 - o Don't know
 - o Refused

ASK ALL WHO HAVE INVESTED AT Q13, Q14 OR Q15

- 18. What proportion of the total investment in [ADD AS APPROPRIATE IF INVESTED IN LAST FINANCIAL YEAR AT Q20 2015 OR the 2015/16 financial year OR the 2014/15 financial year] was for READ OUT A TO C? WRITE IN PERCENTAGES. SCRIPT CHECK ADDS UP TO 100%
 - A. Replacing existing buildings, machinery, equipment and IT
 - B. Expanding capacity for existing products/services
 - C. Developing or introducing new products, processes or services
 - Other (SPECIFY)
 - Don't know
 - Refused

ASK IF DEVELOPED OR INTRODUCED NEW PRODUCTS, PROCESSES OR SERVICES AT Q18C

19. Were the new products, process or services... READ OUT A TO C? SINGLE CODE ONLY INTERVIEWER NOTE: IF MORE THAN ONE PRODUCT, PROCESS OR SERVICE HAS BEEN INTRODUCED PLEASE CODE TO THE HIGHEST BAND (E.G. IF PRODUCT NEW TO THE COMPANY AND SERVICE NEW TO THE COUNTRY CODE THE COUNTRY)

- A. New to the company
- B. New to the country
- C. New to the global market
- Don't know

• Refused

ASK ALL WHO HAVE INVESTED AT Q13, Q14 OR Q15

20. How much, if at all, do you expect the number of employees in your business to increase or decrease as a direct effect of your investment in the last financial year? Please count employees who were and will be recruited as a direct result of your investment and subtract all employees who were and will be rationalised. WRITE IN NUMBER OR PERCENTAGE

INTERVIEWER ADD IF NECESSARY: Full-time and part-time employees should each count as one employee. Employees working less than 12 hours should be excluded.

- o (NUMBER) higher due to investment
- o (NUMBER) lower due to investment
- o (PERCENTAGE) higher due to investment
- (PERCENTAGE) lower due to investment
- No change
- Don't know
- Refused

SECTION C: INVESTMENT PLAN AND PIPELINE

ASK ALL WHO HAVE INVESTED AT Q13, Q14 OR Q15

- 21. For the <u>current</u> financial year, do you expect your total investment spend to be ... READ OUT A TO D? SINGLE CODE ONLY
 - A. More than last year
 - B. Around the same amount as last year
 - C. Less than last year
 - D. No investment planned
 - o Don't know
 - o Refused

ASK ALL WHO HAVE <u>NOT</u> INVESTED AT Q13, Q14 OR Q15 (INCLUDING DON'T KNOW/REFUSALS] 22. Have you already invested, or do you expect to invest, in the <u>current</u> financial year? SINGLE CODE ONLY

- o Yes
- o No
- o Don't know
- o Refused

ASK ALL WHO HAVE PLANNED TO INVEST AT Q21 (CODE 1 TO 3) OR Q22 (CODE 1)

- 23. How do each of the following affect your ability to carry out your planned investment. Does it affect it positively or negatively, or make no difference at all? READ OUT A TO E. SINGLE CODE ONLY FOR EACH
 - A. Availability of internal finance within the company (e.g. internal funds like cash)
 - B. Availability of external finance (e.g. bank financing, private or public equity)
 - C. Business prospects specific to your sector or industry
 - **D.** Overall economic climate
 - E. Political and regulatory climate
 - o Positively affect the ability to carry out planned investment
 - Make no difference to the ability to carry out planned investment
 - o Negatively affect the ability to carry out planned investment
 - o Don't know
 - Refused

ASK ALL

- 24. Looking back at your investment over the last three years, was it too much, too little, or about the right amount to ensure the success of your business going forward? SINGLE CODE ONLY
 - \circ Too much

- About the right amount
- Too little
- Company didn't exist three years ago
- Don't know
- o Refused

ASK ALL

- 25. And looking ahead to the next three years, which of the following is your investment priority [READ OUT A TO D]? SINGLE CODE ONLY
 - A. Replacing existing buildings, machinery, equipment and IT
 - B. Capacity expansion for existing products/services
 - C. Developing or introducing new products, processes or services
 - D. Or do you have no investment planned?
 - Don't know
 - o Refused

SECTION D: INVESTMENT FINANCE

ASK ALL WHO HAVE INVESTED AT Q13, Q14 OR Q15

I now want to ask you some questions about the financing of your investment activities in [ADD AS APPROPRIATE 2015 OR the 2015/16 financial year OR the 2014/15 financial year].

ASK IF SUBSIDIARY (CODE 1) AT Q5

- 26. Firstly can you tell me to what extent is your company involved in decisions about seeking <u>external finance</u> for your investment activities? READ OUT A TO D. SINGLE CODE ONLY
 - A. To a great extent
 - B. To some extent
 - C. Hardly at all
 - D. Not at all
 - o Don't know
 - \circ Refused

SCRIPTING NOTE: SUBSIDIARIES WHO ARE INVOLVED HARDLY/NOT AT ALL/DON'T KNOW/REFUSED CODES 3 TO 6 AT Q26) GO TO Q37

ASK ALL WHO HAVE INVESTED AT Q13, Q14 OR Q15 <u>EXCEPT</u> SUBSIDIARIES INVOLVED HARDLY/NOT AT ALL/DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

27. Approximately what proportion of your investment in [ADD AS APPROPRIATE 2015 OR the 2015/16 financial year OR the 2014/15 financial year] was financed by each of the following? READ OUT A TO C. WRITE IN PERCENTAGES. SCRIPT CHECK = 100%

А.	Internal funds or retained earnings (e.g. cash, profits)	%
В.	External Finance (e.g. financing from banks, private or public equity)	%

- C. SUBSIDIARIES ONLY Intra-group Funding e.g. Loan from parent company %
- O Don't know
- Refused

ASK IF USED EXTERNAL FINANCE AT Q27

28. Which of the following types of external finance did you use for your investment activities in [ADD AS APPROPRIATE 2015 OR the 2015/16 financial year OR the 2014/15 financial year]? READ OUT A TO H. MULTICODE OK

- A. Bank loans excluding subsidised bank loans, overdrafts and other credit lines
- B. Other terms of bank finance including overdrafts and other credit lines
- C. Newly issued bonds [READ OUT IF NECESSARY: These are debt obligations that a company sells to financial investors with the legal commitment to repay at a later stage with interest]
- D. Newly issued equity [READ OUT IF NECESSARY: This includes quoted or unquoted shares]

- E. Leasing or hire purchase [READ OUT IF NECESSARY: Obtaining the use of a fixed asset, for example cars or machinery, in exchange for regular payments, but without the immediate ownership of the asset]
- F. Factoring/invoice discounting [READ OUT IF NECESSARY: Selling your invoices to a factoring company. This company gets your debt and has to collect it. It will make a profit by paying you less cash than the face value of the invoicel
- G. Loans from family/friends/business partner
- H. Grants [READ OUT IF NECESSARY: Involving for example support from public sources]
- Other (Specify) 0
- o Don't know
- Refused 0

IF USED MORE THAN ONE SOURCE OF FINANCE AT Q28

- 29. Approximately what proportion of your external finance does each of the following represent READ OUT A TO H IF USED AT Q28]? WRITE IN PERCENTAGES. SCRIPT CHECK = 100%
 - A. Bank loans excluding subsidised bank loans, overdrafts and other credit lines
 - B. Other terms of bank finance including overdrafts and other credit lines
 - C. Newly issued bonds [READ OUT IF NECESSARY: These are debt obligations that a company sells to financial investors with the legal commitment to repay at a later stage with interest]
 - D. Newly issued equity [READ OUT IF NECESSARY: This includes quoted or unquoted shares
 - E. Leasing or hire purchase [READ OUT IF NECESSARY: Obtaining the use of a fixed asset, for example cars or machinery, in exchange for regular payments, but without the immediate ownership of the asset]
 - F. Factoring/invoice discounting [READ OUT IF NECESSARY: Selling your invoices to a factoring company. This company gets your debt and has to collect it. It will make a profit by paying you less cash than the face value of the invoice]
 - G. Loans from family/friends/business partner
 - H. Grants [READ OUT IF NECESSARY: Involving for example support from public sources]
 - Other (Specify)
 - Don't know 0
 - Refused 0

ASK IF USED EXTERNAL FINANCE AT O27

- 30. Thinking about all of the external finance you obtained, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with it in terms of ...? READ OUT A TO E. READ OUT SCALE. SINGLE CODE ONLY FOR EACH
- A. The amount you obtained
- B. The cost of the external finance you obtained
- C. The length of time over which it has to be repaid
- D. The collateral required
- E. The type of external finance you obtained
- Very satisfied •
- Fairly satisfied
- Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
- Fairly dissatisfied
- Very dissatisfied
- Don't know
- Refused .

ASK ALL WHO SAID EQUITY (CODE D/4) AT Q28

- 31. For the equity you obtained, how much was from a private equity firm/venture capitalists/business angels? READ OUT A TO C. SINGLE CODE ONLY
 - A. All
 - B. Some
 - C. None
 - Don't know
 - Refused

ASK ALL WHO DID NOT USE ANY EXTERNAL FINANCING (CODE B/2 AT Q27 = ZERO)

32. Did you <u>seek</u> any external financing for your investment activities in [ADD AS APPROPRIATE 2015 OR the 2015/16 financial year OR the 2014/15 financial year]? SINGLE CODE ONLY

- o Yes
- o No
- o Don't know
- Refused

ASK IF DID NOT SEEK EXTERNAL FINANCING AT Q32

33. What was your <u>main reason</u> for not applying for external finance for your investment activities? DO NOT READ OUT. SINGLE CODE ONLY

- o No need as were not planning to undertake large investments
- Thought we'd be turned down
- Thought it would be too expensive
- Preferred not to take on additional risk
- The current economic conditions made it a bad time to access bank loans
- Did not know where to find the appropriate finance we needed
- Was happy to use internal finance/didn't need the finance
- Was happy with existing external finance/lines of credit
- We have a parent company which we get funding from
- It wasn't our decision
- Other (SPECIFY)
- Don't know
- Refused

ASK IF USED A BANK LOAN (CODE A/1) AT Q28

34. Which bank provided you with the loan? INTERVIEWER NOTE IF MORE THAN ONE BANK ASK RESPONDENT FOR MAIN BANK. SINGLE CODE ONLY

- LIST OF BANKS [USING BANKSCOPE INSTITUTES]
- Other (SPECIFY)
- Don't know
- o Refused

ASK IF DID NOT USE A BANK LOAN (NOT CODE A/1) AT Q28

- 35. For the last bank loan that you obtained, which bank provided you with the loan? INTERVIEWER NOTE IF MORE THAN ONE BANK ASK RESPONDENT FOR MAIN BANK. SINGLE CODE ONLY
 - LIST OF BANKS [USING BANKSCOPE INSTITUTES]
 - Other (SPECIFY)
 - Never had a bank loan
 - Don't know
 - Refused

ASK IF USED EXTERNAL FINANCE AT Q27

36. If you were to seek external finance over the next three years, which type of finance would you want to play a more prominent role in your financing mix? DO NOT PROMPT. SINGLE CODE ONLY

INTERVIEWER NOTE: IF RESPONDENT MENTIONS A GRANT PROBE FURTHER AND RECORD OTHER TYPE OF EXTERNAL FINANCE **What else?**

- Bank loan
- 0 Overdraft
- Bond issuance
- Newly issued equity
- Leasing or hire purchase
- Factoring/invoice
- \circ Other (specify)
- o Don't know
- o Refused

ASK IF SUBSIDIARY NOT INVOLVED/INVOLVED HARDLY AT ALL IN FINANCE DECISIONS (Q26 CODE 3 to 6) <u>OR</u> IF SUBSIDIARY AND NOT RECEIVED INTRA-GROUP FINANCE (CODE C AT Q27 = ZERO)

37. Have you tried to obtain intra-group finance for your investment activities in [ADD AS APPROPRIATE 2015 OR the 2015/16 financial year OR the 2014/15 financial year]? By this I mean finance from your parent company or another group member.

IF YES FOR SUBSIDIARY NOT INVOLVED/INVOLVED HARDLY AT ALL IN FINANCING DECISIONS (Q26 CODE 3 to 6): **Did you receive it?** SINGLE CODE ONLY

- Yes, and received it [SHOW ONLY FOR Q26 CODE 3 to 6]
- Yes, but did not receive it [SHOW ONLY FOR Q26 CODE 3 to 6]
- Yes [SHOW ONLY FOR CODE C AT Q27 = ZERO]
- o No
- o Don't know
- Refused

SECTION E: OBSTACLES TO INVESTMENT

READ OUT TO ALL

I would now like to ask you about any obstacles you face in your investment activities in general.

ASK ALL

- 38. Thinking about your investment activities in [ADD COUNTRY OF INTERVIEW], to what extent is each of the following an obstacle? Is a major obstacle, a minor obstacle or not an obstacle at all? READ OUT A TO I. ROTATE ORDER. STATEMENT I SHOULD ALWAYS BE ASKED LAST. SINGLE CODE ONLY
 - A. Demand for products or services
 - B. Availability of staff with the right skills
 - C. Energy costs
 - **D.** Access to digital infrastructure
 - E. Labour market regulations
 - F. Business regulations (READ IF NECESSARY e.g. licences, permits, bankruptcy) and taxation
 - G. Availability of adequate transport infrastructure
 - H. Availability of finance
 - I. Uncertainty about the future
 - o A major obstacle
 - A minor obstacle
 - Not an obstacle at all
 - o Don't know
 - Refused

SECTION F: INNOVATION

READ OUT TO ALL

Now I would like to ask you some questions about your company.

ASK ALL

- 39. What proportion, if any, of your machinery and equipment, including ICT, would you say is state-of-the-art? By stateof-the-art I mean cutting edge or developed from the most recent ideas or methods. INTERVIEWER EXPLAIN THE PROPORTION SHOULD BE BASED ON AN ESTIMATE OF THE MARKET VALUE OF THE COMPANY'S MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT. WRITE IN PERCENTAGE. IF NONE OF THE MACHINERY OR EQUIPMENT IS STATE OF THE ART RECORD 0%
 - WRITE IN PERCENTAGE
 - o Don't know
 - 0 Refused

ASK IF DON'T KNOW AT Q39

40. Could you estimate the percentage? PROMPT WITH BANDS. SINGLE CODE ONLY

- Less than 25%
- \circ 25% to less than 50%
- \circ 50% to less than 75%
- \circ 75% or more
- o Don't know
- Refused

ASK ALL

41. What proportion, if any, of your commercial building stock satisfies high or highest energy efficiency standards? IF NONE RECORD 0%

INTERVIEWER NOTE: THIS INCLUDES BOTH OWNED AND RENTED BUILDING STOCK

- WRITE IN PERCENTAGE
- o Don't know
- Refused

ASK IF DON'T KNOW AT Q41

42. Could you estimate the percentage? PROMPT WITH BANDS. SINGLE CODE ONLY

- o Less than 25%
- \circ -25% to less than 50%
- \circ 50% to less than 75%
- $\circ \quad 75\% \text{ or more}$
- o Don't know
- Refused

SECTION G: INTERNATIONALISATION

ASK ALL

- 43. In [ADD AS APPROPRIATE 2015 OR the 2015/16 financial year OR the 2014/15 financial year], has your company READ OUT A AND B? MULTICODE OK FOR A AND B
 - A. Directly exported goods and services to another country
 - B. Invested in another country
 - Don't know
 - Refused

SECTION H: FIXED ASSETS

READ OUT TO ASK ALL

The following questions are to understand the economic value added (EVA) of your company. By this, I mean the difference between the value of all inputs and the price at which the products/ services of your company when they are sold.

ASK ALL

- 44. In [ADD AS APPROPRIATE 2015 OR the 2015/16 financial year OR the 2014/15 financial year], what was the value of the business' total fixed assets. Please include tangible assets (e.g. buildings, equipment, vehicles) and intangible assets (e.g. patents, trademarks and copyright) but exclude financial assets such as cash or bank accounts. WRITE IN AMOUNT
 - WRITE IN AMOUNT IN EUROS OR LOCAL CURRENCY
 - Don't know
 - \circ Refused

ASK IF DON'T KNOW AT Q44

- Was it approximately? READ OUT BANDS. SINGLE CODE ONLY
- Up to EUR 50,000
- More than EUR 50,000 and up to EUR 100,000

- More than EUR 100,000 and up to EUR 500,000
- More than EUR 500,000 and up to EUR 1 million
- More than EUR 1 million and up to EUR 2 million
- More than EUR 2 million and up to EUR 10 million
- More than EUR 10 million and up to EUR 50 million
- More than EUR 50 million
- Don't know
- Refused

ASK ALL

- 45. How much did the company spend on wages in [ADD AS APPROPRIATE 2015 OR the 2015/16 financial year OR the 2014/15 financial year]? SINGLE CODE ONLY
- WRITE IN AMOUNT
- o Don't know
- Refused

ASK IF DON'T KNOW AT Q46

46. Was it approximately ...? SINGLE CODE ONLY

• ADD APPROPRIATE BANDS DEPENDING ON SIZE OF COMPANY

ASK ALL

- 47. Taking into account all sources of income in [ADD AS APPROPRIATE 2015 OR the 2015/16 financial year OR the 2014/15 financial year], did your company generate a profit or loss before tax, or did you break even? SINGLE CODE ONLY
 - o Profit
 - 0 Loss
 - \circ Break even
 - Don't know
 - \circ Refused

ASK IF GENERATED A PROFIT/LOSS AT Q48

- 48. If you don't mind me asking, approximately how much [ADD AS APPROPRIATE profit/loss] before tax did you make as a percent of your turnover? ADD AS NECESSARY I can assure that that your answer will be treated as confidential and remain anonymous. SINGLE CODE ONLY
- o Under 2%
- 2% to 4%
- o 5% to 9%
- $\circ \quad 10\%$ to 14%
- \circ 15% or more
- Don't know
- Refused

ASK ALL

49a. How do you expect the outcome of the UK referendum on EU membership to affect your investment activities in the coming year? [INTERVIEWER ADD IF NECESSARY: The outcome of the UK referendum in June 2016 was for the UK to leave the European Union] READ OUT A TO E. SINGLE CODE ONLY.

- A. Very positively
- B. Fairly positively
- C. Make no difference
- D. Fairly negatively
- E. Very negatively
- o Don't know
- o Refused

SECTION I: ONLINE AND RECONTACT

ASK ALL WITH INVESTMENT PRIORITY IN THE NEXT THREE YEARS (CODE 1 TO 3) AT Q25

49. We would like to email you a link to a short online survey to complete any time in the few weeks. Would you be happy for me to do this now [AT/CY/CZ/DE/SE/SK: in the next 2-3 days] if I can take your email address?

IF NECESSARY: The survey will ask you to choose between different hypothetical financing offers so the EIB can assess how businesses evaluate the attractiveness of different financing offers. It should only take 5-10 minutes to complete.

- Yes (email address: _____)
- o No

ASK ALL

51. This survey will be repeated in the next one to two years. Your input is an important part of the findings that the European Investment Bank uses to inform its policies towards improving access to investment for companies like yours. May Ipsos/we contact you for your views on this topic again? SINGLE CODE ONLY

- o Yes
- o No

ASK IN ALL COUNTRIES EXCEPT GERMANY

52. Finally, I mentioned earlier that with your consent the EIB Group would email you a summary of the research findings for your country. Please confirm whether you would like to receive this report, and for Ipsos to let the EIB know you took part in the survey?

IF NECESSARY: Your survey answers and email address will not be linked but your email address will be passed to the EIB Group in order that they can send you the report.

- Yes (same email address as QXX)
- Yes (different email address: _____)
- o No

ASK IN GERMANY

53. Finally, I mentioned earlier that with your consent we would email you a summary of the research findings for your country. Would you like to receive this report?

- Yes (same email address as QXX)
- Yes (different email address: _____)
- o No

THANK AND CLOSE