This course is reorganized relative to previous years. I still make use a lot of the book by T. Persson and G. Tabellini “Political Economics. Explaining Economic Policy”, MIT PRESS 2000 which synthesizes the large literature that has been growing analyzing the interaction between economic and political processes. However, I have reorganized the course in a way that I think is better.

Students are supposed to do the problem sets after each lecture. The exam will be based on problem sets.

**Lecture 1. From Social Choice to Political Economics.**


**Lectures 2, 3 and 4. Median voter models, their applicability and applications to general interest politics.**


Other readings:


**Lecture 5. Probabilistic models of voting.**


**Lecture 6 and 7. Agency models of politics.**


**Lecture 8. Partisan Politicians.**


**Lecture 9, 10 and 11. Special Interest Politics.**


**Lecture 12. Political Regimes.**

Persson-Tabellini (2000): chapter 10

**Lectures 13: Democratization.**

Students are recommended to read other chapters of the book.

**Lecture 14: Optimal majority rules.**


GRADE: final exam based on problem sets.