Microeconomics III

Nash equilibrium III
Auction
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Auctions

From Babylonia to eBay, auctioning has a very long history.

• Babylon:
  - women at marriageable age.

• Athens, Rome, and medieval Europe:
  - rights to collect taxes,
  - dispose of confiscated property,
  - lease of land and mines,
  - and more...
• Auctions, broadly defined, are used to allocate significant economics resources.

  Examples: works of art, government bonds, offshore tracts for oil exploration, radio spectrum, and more.

• Auctions take many forms. A game-theoretic framework enables to understand the consequences of various auction designs.

• Game theory can suggest the design likely to be most effective, and the one likely to raise the most revenues.
Types of auctions

Sequential / simultaneous

Bids may be called out sequentially or may be submitted simultaneously in sealed envelopes:

- **English (or oral)** – the seller actively solicits progressively higher bids and the item is soled to the highest bidder.

- **Dutch** – the seller begins by offering units at a “high” price and reduces it until all units are soled.

- **Sealed-bid** – all bids are made simultaneously, and the item is sold to the highest bidder.
First-price / second-price

The price paid may be the highest bid or some other price:

- **First-price** – the bidder who submits the highest bid wins and pay a price equal to her bid.

- **Second-prices** – the bidder who submits the highest bid wins and pay a price equal to the second highest bid.

**Variants**: all-pay (lobbying), discriminatory, uniform, Vickrey (William Vickrey, Nobel Laureate 1996), and more.
Bidders can be certain or uncertain about each other’s valuation:

- In private-value auctions, valuations differ among bidders, and each bidder is certain of her own valuation and can be certain or uncertain of every other bidder’s valuation.

- In common-value auctions, all bidders have the same valuation, but bidders do not know this value precisely and their estimates of it vary.
First-price auction (with perfect information)

To define the game precisely, denote by \( v_i \) the value that bidder \( i \) attaches to the object. If she obtains the object at price \( p \) then her payoff is \( v_i - p \).

Assume that bidders’ valuations are all different and all positive. Number the bidders 1 through \( n \) in such a way that

\[
v_1 > v_2 > \cdots > v_n > 0.
\]

Each bidder \( i \) submits a (sealed) bid \( b_i \). If bidder \( i \) obtains the object, she receives a payoff \( v_i - b_i \). Otherwise, her payoff is zero.

Tie-breaking – if two or more bidders are in a tie for the highest bid, the winner is the bidder with the highest valuation.
In summary, a first-price sealed-bid auction with perfect information is the following strategic game:

- **Players**: the \( n \) bidders.

- **Actions**: the set of possible bids \( b_i \) of each player \( i \) (nonnegative numbers).

- **Payoffs**: the preferences of player \( i \) are given by

\[
  u_i = \begin{cases} 
    v_i - \bar{b} & \text{if } b_i = \bar{b} \text{ and } v_i > v_j \text{ if } b_j = \bar{b} \\
    0 & \text{if } b_i < \bar{b}
  \end{cases}
\]

where \( \bar{b} \) is the highest bid.
The set of Nash equilibria is the set of profiles \((b_1, \ldots, b_n)\) of bids with the following properties:

\[ 1\] \quad v_2 \leq b_1 \leq v_1 \\
\[ 2\] \quad b_j \leq b_1 \quad \text{for all } j \neq 1 \\
\[ 3\] \quad b_j = b_1 \quad \text{for some } j \neq 1

It is easy to verify that all these profiles are Nash equilibria. It is harder to show that there are no other equilibria. We can easily argue, however, that there is no equilibrium in which player 1 does not obtain the object.

\[\Rightarrow\] The first-price sealed-bid auction is socially efficient, but does not necessarily raise the most revenues.
Second-price auction (with perfect information)

A second-price sealed-bid auction with perfect information is the following strategic game:

– **Players**: the $n$ bidders.

– **Actions**: the set of possible bids $b_i$ of each player $i$ (nonnegative numbers).

– **Payoffs**: the preferences of player $i$ are given by

\[
    u_i = \begin{cases} 
    v_i - \bar{b} & \text{if } b_i > \bar{b} \text{ or } b_i = \bar{b} \text{ and } v_i > v_j \text{ if } b_j = \bar{b} \\
    0 & \text{if } b_i < \bar{b}
    \end{cases}
\]

where $\bar{b}$ is the highest bid submitted by a player other than $i$. 
First note that for any player $i$ the bid $b_i = v_i$ is a (weakly) dominant action (a “truthful” bid), in contrast to the first-price auction.

The second-price auction has many equilibria, but the equilibrium $b_i = v_i$ for all $i$ is distinguished by the fact that every player’s action dominates all other actions.

Another equilibrium in which player $j \neq 1$ obtains the good is that in which

\begin{align*}
[1] \quad & b_1 < v_j \text{ and } b_j > v_1 \\
[2] \quad & b_i = 0 \text{ for all } i \neq \{1, j\}
\end{align*}
Common-value auctions and the winner’s curse

Suppose we all participate in a sealed-bid auction for a jar of coins. Once you have estimated the amount of money in the jar, what are your bidding strategies in first- and second-price auctions?

The winning bidder is likely to be the bidder with the largest positive error (the largest overestimate).

In this case, the winner has fallen prey to the so-called the winner’s curse. Auctions where the winner’s curse is significant are oil fields, spectrum auctions, pay per click, and more.