

OUTLINE — October 9, 2019

- Moral Hazard, briefly, wrapping up (reader helpful)
- Externalities (*also: a helpful video on Olney youtube*)
 - Definitions
 - Coase Theorem
 - Taxes & Subsidies (and what is “optimal”)
 - Cap and Trade

MT reflection (look in “quizzes”) due on bcourses tonight, 7 pm
PS3 due Gradescope & bcourses, Thurs 10/24 8 pm

See Tuesday afternoon email from Olney re possible shutdown

Moral Hazard

- When one party to a contract changes behavior after the contract is signed
 - Part of a transaction that takes time to complete
- Occurs after contract is signed
- *How careful will you be to not lose your cell phone?*

	No insurance	With insurance
Extremely	82	6
Very	13	22
Somewhat	2	46
Not too careful	0	24

Moral Hazard Externalities

Moral Hazard

- **Insurance**
 - More careful or less careful?
 - Effect on cost of insurance?
- **Bank Bailouts**
 - More careful or less careful with risk?
 - Effect on likelihood of bank failure?
- **Mortgage Rescue Plans**
 - More careful or less careful with \$ commitments?
 - Effect on likelihood of mortgage default?

Moral Hazard Externalities

Solution: Monitoring

- **Monitoring** is a solution to moral hazard
 - Low-cost way to monitor behavior
 - Cancel contracts that are low-quality high-cost
 - Maintain contracts that are high-quality low-cost
 - Note: With perfect monitoring, there is no asymmetry in information

Moral Hazard Externalities

Market Failure: Externalities

- Your activity affects someone else
- Negative externality
 - Cost borne by someone else
- Positive externality
 - Benefit received by someone else


Moral Hazard Externalities

Positive Externality

- Benefits accrue to people who are neither the buyer nor the seller
 - *Education !*
- Private Marginal Benefit
- External Benefit (or, marginal external benefit)
- Social Marginal Benefit (or, marginal social benefit)

Moral Hazard Externalities

Positive Externality



Moral Hazard Externalities

Negative Externality

- Marginal Private Cost (or, private marginal cost)
- Marginal Damage Cost (or, external cost)
- Marginal Social Cost (or, social marginal cost)

Moral Hazard Externalities

Negative Externality



Moral Hazard Externalities

Coase Theorem

- Solution without government possible
- Requires
 - Well-defined property rights
 - No costs to bargaining
 - Only a few people
- Otherwise: government intervention

Moral Hazard Externalities

Encourage behavior with subsidy


- Private market produces too little when there are positive externalities
- Encourage with subsidies
- Example: Prof. Olney buys \$48 Bart ticket each month, paid through pre-tax payroll deduction
 - \$3 paid by Bart
 - \$10 paid by UC Berkeley
 - \$10 paid by federal government
 - \$3 paid by state government
 - Which means just \$22 is paid by Prof. Olney

Moral Hazard Externalities

Externalities & Taxes or Subsidies

- The challenge: what is the **right (or, optimal) size** of tax (negative externality) or subsidy (positive externality)?
 - It's positive (not normative) analysis
 - "Right" or "optimal" means generating socially optimal quantity



Moral Hazard Externalities



Externalities & Taxes or Subsidies

- The challenge: what is the *right (or, optimal) size* of tax or subsidy?
 - It's positive (not normative) analysis
 - "Right" or "optimal" means generating socially optimal quantity
- Taxes discourage activity generating negative externalities
 - If Tax > MDC, then
 - If Tax < MDC, then
 - Only if tax = MDC, then
- What should the tax revenue be used for?
 - Offset (or, cover) costs represented by MDC

Moral Hazard Externalities



Alternative Approach: Cap & Trade

- A market-based solution addressing negative externalities
- Authority determines total allowable pollution – the “cap”
 - Issues permission-to-pollute permits to manufacturers
 - One permit required for each “unit of pollution” generated
- Permits can be bought & sold – the “trade”
- Key assumption: manufacturers face different costs of reducing pollution
- Key characteristic: the price of permits will vary with S&D
- Key result: as cap is reduced (and price of permits rises), firms have economic incentive to reduce (abate) pollution rather than pay for increasingly expensive permits

Moral Hazard

Externalities

Cap & Trade: Pollution

- Suppose permits cost \$500 per unit of pollution
- Firm A: Cost to abate (reduce pollution) = \$200 per unit
 - What will they do?
 - Effect on profit?
- Firm B: Cost to abate = \$900 per unit
 - What will they do?
 - Effect on profit?
- In the long run, which firms likely to exit industry?

Moral Hazard

Externalities

Costs of Abatement

- As price of permit rises...
 - Quantity demanded of permits (firms that will pollute)
 - Quantity supplied of permits (firms that will abate)

Moral Hazard

Externalities

Cap & Trade: Pollution



Moral Hazard

Externalities