

OUTLINE — October 14, 2019

- Moral Hazard (**skipping this**)
 - Read 10/9 slides & reader article; Questions to Piazza
- Externalities (*required: Olney youtube video*)
 - Definitions
 - Taxes & Subsidies (what is “optimal” & graphs in video)
 - Coase Theorem
 - Cap and Trade
- Labor Market (most of this is left to Chap. 9)
- Income Distribution (will continue this on 10/16)

PS3 due Gradescope & bcourses, Thurs 10/24 8 pm

Market Failure: Externalities

- Your activity affects someone else
- Negative externality
 - Cost borne by someone else
- Positive externality
 - Benefit received by someone else

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Positive Externality

- Benefits accrue to people who are neither the buyer nor the seller
 - **Education !**
- Private Marginal Benefit
- External Benefit (or, marginal external benefit)
- Social Marginal Benefit (or, marginal social benefit)

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Positive Externality



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Encourage behavior with subsidy

- Private market produces too little when there are positive externalities
- Encourage with subsidies
- Example: Prof. Olney buys \$48 Bart ticket each month, paid through pre-tax payroll deduction
 - \$3 paid by Bart
 - \$10 paid by UC Berkeley
 - \$10 paid by federal government
 - \$3 paid by state government
 - Which means just \$22 is paid by Prof. Olney


Moral Hazard Externality Labor Markets Income Distribution

Externalities & Taxes or Subsidies

- The challenge: what is the **right (or, optimal) size** of subsidy in the presence of a positive externality?
 - It's positive (not normative) analysis
 - "Right" or "optimal" means generating socially optimal quantity

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Positive
Externality:
Policy
Solution is
a Subsidy



Negative Externality

- Marginal Private Cost (or, private marginal cost)
- Marginal Damage Cost (or, external cost)
- Marginal Social Cost (or, social marginal cost)


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Negative Externality



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Negative
Externality:
Policy
Solution is
a Tax



Negative Externalities & Taxes

- Taxes discourage activity generating negative externalities
 - If Tax > MDC, then Market equilibrium quantity < $Q_{OPTIMAL}$
 - If Tax < MDC, then Market equilibrium quantity > $Q_{OPTIMAL}$
 - Only if tax = MDC, then Market equilibrium quantity = $Q_{OPTIMAL}$
- What should the tax revenue be used for?
 - Offset (or, cover) costs represented by MDC

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When $q=0$ is socially optimal



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Coase Theorem

- Solution without government possible
- Requires
 - Well-defined property rights
 - No costs to bargaining
 - Only a few people
- Otherwise: government intervention

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Alternative Approach: Cap & Trade

- A market-based solution addressing negative externalities
- Authority determines total allowable emissions – the “cap”
 - Issues permission-to-emit-carbon permits to manufacturers
 - One permit required for each ton of CO₂ emitted
- Permits can be bought & sold – the “trade”
- Key assumption: manufacturers face different costs of reducing carbon emissions
- Key characteristic: the price of permits will vary with S&D
- Key result: as cap is reduced (and price of permits rises), firms have economic incentive to reduce (abate) CO₂ emissions rather than pay for increasingly expensive permits

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Cap & Trade: Pollution

- Suppose every refinery is given permits, which they can use or sell. For each ton of CO₂ emitted, a firm needs 1 permit. Permits currently sell for \$20 each.
- **Firm A**: Cost to abate (reduce emissions) = \$8 per ton of CO₂
 - What will they do?
 - Effect on profit?
- **Firm B**: Cost to abate = \$35 per ton of CO₂
 - What will they do?
 - Effect on profit?
- In the long run, which refineries are likely to exit industry?

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Definitions of Wealth & Income

Wealth (or, Net Worth)
= Assets – Liabilities

Income

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Focus: Income Distribution

- Distinctions:
 - Household versus Individual
 - Pre-tax versus post-tax
 - Pre-tax distribution reflects only income
 - Post-tax distribution reflects both income & tax policy

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Perfect Competition & Income

- In perfect competition, worker income depends upon “marginal revenue product” (MRP)
 - MRP = increase in total revenue from hiring 1 more worker
 - Depends upon [1] marginal product (= marginal return) and [2] price of output
 - Assumes perfect competition [in market for labor](#)
 - Lots of workers, all exactly the same,
 - So, no discrimination (legal or illegal) by employers
 - Lots of employers, none with large share of market
 - No barriers to entry or exit

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
Policy Implications

- If assumptions of perfect competition are satisfied. . .
 - Resulting distribution of income reflects
 - Worker skills & talents
 - Output price
 - Policy implication: no market intervention called for
- But are the assumptions of perfect competition applicable to markets for labor?
 - Hardly

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Distribution of Income

- Divide population into fifths:



- Gini Coefficient: A measure of evenness of distribution
 - $Gini = 0$ means perfectly equal distribution
 - $Gini = 1$ means perfectly unequal distribution

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Choose a Country to Live In : You don't know what income group you'll be in. You have a 20% chance of being in the richest 20%, a 20% change of being in the poorest 20%, an 0.1% chance of being in the top 0.1%, and so on.

	A	B	C	D	E
Income per person per year					
In top 0.1%	\$1,122,000	\$404,000	\$424,000	\$459,000	\$379,000
In top 20%	\$47,300	\$27,900	\$28,600	\$31,100	\$13,400
Mean	\$20,400	\$16,200	\$16,000	\$15,800	\$4,200
In bottom 20%	\$5,300	\$7,800	\$8,500	\$5,900	\$500
Life expectancy from birth	77 yrs	75.5 yrs	80.5 yrs	79 yrs	67 yrs
Deaths before age 5 (per 1,000 newborns)	8	6	5	7	40
Gini coefficient of income inequality	0.408	0.247	0.249	0.315	0.600

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CEO to worker pay

- <http://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-pay-continues-to-rise/> and video which is at
- <https://youtu.be/zbH66IGRfil>

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U.S. Household Income, 2018

	Lowest 20%	Second 20%	Third 20%	Fourth 20%	Top 20%
If even distribution	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%
Actual share in 2018					
Dollar cut-offs (rounded)					

Source: <https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2019/demo/p60-266.html> , Tables A-3 & A-4

"income" is money income before taxes & transfers

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