Civil Society, Institutional Change and the Politics of Reform: The Great Transition[∇]

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Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between differences in civil society development under communism and divergence in the nature and pace of political and economic reform and transformation after 1989. We put together a unique data set on dissident activities for the 27 former centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during the years immediately preceding the collapse of communism: 1985 to 1989 for Central and Eastern Europe and 1985 to 1991 for the former Soviet Union. Our data measure the nature and intensity of political opposition to the communist regime, and the communist governments response to such opposition. We relate the data to subsequent political and economic developments in the post-communist countries. We find that political opposition was considerably more intense in the Central and Eastern European countries than in the former Soviet Union. Moreover, the frequency of government reaction, and the probability that the reaction was violent, was substantially higher in the former Soviet Union. This rich data allows tests of conflicting hypotheses on the politics of institutional change and economic reform. Both the extent of political opposition and the frequency and severity of government reaction help explain the choice of political regime after 1989/1991, the concentration of power in the executive branch of government. The vibrancy of civil societies and their level of organization before the collapse of communism is an important factor in explaining the nature and pace of market oriented reforms.

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1. Introduction

Nearly two decades after the start of economic and political reforms in the former communist countries, the economic and political outcomes are very diverse. On the one hand, the countries of Central Europe and the Baltics were able, for the most part, to stabilize their economies after a few years of output fall and to recover their pre-1989 output level. On the other hand, the countries of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia (with the exception of Slovenia) experienced a much more severe and protracted output fall and slower subsequent recovery (Figure 1). Furthermore, market reforms were faster and deeper in the former group of countries while the countries of the former Soviet Union lagged behind (EBRD, 2007; Kaufmann et al.2003). The progress with respect to political liberalization was similar. Some post-communist countries, again mostly those in Central Europe and the Baltics, quickly introduced free elections and political freedoms and stabilized their democracies. Former Yugoslavia went through a horrible war experience before any substantial democratization could be observed. In contrast, most countries of the former Soviet Union went through a period of limited democratization but then drifted towards autocratic rule (Figure 2).

INSERT FIGURES 1 and 2

The wide range of outcomes of the post-communist transition, on the economic or political front, gave rise to large literature on determinants of transition success. There is by now a consensus that proximate causes such as the outcomes of the very first democratic elections, or differences in economic policies alone (speed and sequencing of reforms, type of privatization policies, conduct of stabilization policies, etc..), cannot explain in full the observed divergence and that differences in the institutional setups provide a better explanation (see among others Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 1999, Hellman, 1998, Ekiert and Hanson 1998; Moeller, 2009). However, how do we explain the differences in the institutional evolution in different countries? Taking institutions as exogenous cannot be a satisfactory answer as all transition countries have been undergoing rapid and profound institutional change following the end of communism.

Various explanations for the institutional divergence in Central and Eastern Europe have been proposed relying on different geopolitical and accession effects (see Roland and Verdier, 2003; Berglöf and Roland, 1998 for a discussion). There were also several attempts at explaining post-communist divergence based on legacies in economic, political or cultural structures (see Kitschelt, 2003; Kitschelt and Malesky, 2000; Moeller, 2009 for a discussion). Surprisingly, a potentially important causal channel has been neglected, certainly in the economics literature: differences in the development of civil society and in the patterns of interactions between civil society activists and the power-holders prior to the fall of communism.

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In the 1990s, political scientists and sociologists debated how societal factors might affect the pace and nature of reforms or the choice of institutions. These debates, however, were not followed up by detailed empirical research that could have allowed for testing of conflicting hypotheses. Some of the participants in these debates argued that the societal legacies of the former communist regimes were similar everywhere, and based on these similarities they did not expect significant variation in the pace and nature of reforms across the region. According to this view, the former regime everywhere left behind similar flat social structures (e.g Przeworski, 1991) or similar 'leninist' social-cultural legacies (Jowitt, 1992) and based on these similarities, the dilemmas and the politics of reform were expected to differ little across all these countries.

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Others argued that as a result of differences in the organization of civil societies before regime change, communist regimes fell apart in different ways in these countries leaving behind widely diverging political initial conditions for institutional change and reform (Bruszt and Stark, 1991; Linz and Stepan, 1996, Ekiert and Hanson 2003; Bunce, 2000). The argument was made, but has never been tested, that civil society development prior to transition may explain important differences in institutional choices, which in turn may have consequences for the economy and further institutional developments.

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Several of the participants in these debates also argued that the study of variation in the properties of civil societies before regime change might offer a bridge between the various structural and institutional accounts of divergence in policy choices and institutional transformation after 1989. More concretely, it was suggested that the study of the evolution of civil societies up to 1989 might help overcome a key weakness in the various structural explanations of post-communist divergence. The representatives of the latter approach make a direct link between structural legacies of previous regimes (such as the level of economic, cultural or political development), and post-regime-change institutional choice (e.g. Kitschelt, 2000). However, the causal argument of the structural analysis remained shallow because it lacked the description and analysis of the agent and the mechanism that could translate structural legacies to choice of institutions and policies (see Ekiert and Hanson, 2000; Bunce, 2000; Moeller, 2009 for a discussion).

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The analysis provided in this paper fills exactly this gap by observing the breadth and depth of pre-transition civil society and investigating its impact on the subsequent institutional, economic and political developments. In countries where a more active civil society has exploited the political opportunity of communist collapse, demand for institutionalizing and consolidating political pluralism was certainly stronger than in countries where civil society developments were weaker. Also, in countries with a more vibrant civil society the incentives

of incumbents to introduce encompassing and sustainable economic reforms were certainly different from the incentives of incumbents facing a silenced civil society.

These issues were discussed in a broader framework and directly linked to the issues of economic transformation in the debate among students of the politics of economic reform in post-communist countries. Throughout the 1990s two opposing positions were formulated about the political conditions that were conducive to the success of economic reforms. According to the first approach, represented both by political scientists and economists, success of reform depended on factors that could diminish the chances of politicizing issues of economic transformation, like strong power concentration, insulation of reformers from political pressures, or a speed of reforms that does not allow time for the potential opponents of reforms to get organized and resist change (Przeworski, 1991; Holmes, 1995;Fisher and Stanley 1991, Boycko et al. 1995; Lipton and Sachs, 1990). According to the economists and political scientists in the second camp, the presence of actors and institutions that could put issues of reform in a contested and plural political frame represented the ideal conditions for lasting reforms (Dewatripont and Roland, 1992a,b; 1995, Roland, 2000, Murrell, 1992; Bresser-Pereira et al.1993; Linz and Stepan, 1996).

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In this paper we are interested in the relationship between the characteristics of civil societies at the time when political and economic reforms were only starting and the outcomes of these reforms. Here we use the political concept of civil society in the same way as this notion is used in the 'transitology' literature referring to the presence of organized actors who are independent of the state and are ready and capable to politicize issues of change (for the discussion of the concept in the transitology literature see O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986 and Linz and Stepan, 1996). Note that in this conceptualization the stress is on contentious *action* and not on the representation of specific *values.* The concept encompasses contentious actors and action that aim at advancing more general, universal values like democratization or extension of human rights. It also includes action directed at advancing more particularistic issues like diverse economic goals or nationalistic values. Civil societies have differed at the dawn of the state-socialist regimes not solely by their strengths or vibrancy, but also by the goals dominating civic action in these countries. From a dynamic and relational perspective, civil societies have also differed in their capacity to carve out some autonomous space for contentious political action. In some of these countries, civil societies were in ascendancy by the time of the starting of regime change, in others they were in retreat, weakened by growing state repression.

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In the literature on political transitions, variation in the properties of civil societies is one of the key factors used to account for differences in the characteristics of regime change (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986 and Linz and Stepan, 1996). The more specific literature

dealing with the choice of political institutions also uses the argument that differences in the balance of power between autocratic rulers and diverse organized actors are behind variation in institutional choices during regime change (e.g. Kitschelt and Malesky, 2000, Elster, 1994). Explicitly, or implicitly, the above-mentioned literature on the politics of market reforms also attaches independent explanatory power to variation in the properties of civil societies. None of these literatures could yet, however, quantify and measure the variation in the properties of civil societies in the dying days of the state-socialist regimes and test hypotheses related to variation in the characteristics of civil societies.

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This is precisely what we attempt to do in this paper. We use a new and unique data set covering the period between the start of Glasnost and the fall of communism (i.e., from 1985 to 1989) for the 27 former centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The data we collected from the Open Society Archives in Budapest inform on various aspects of political opposition events. These events were reported by Radio Free Europe and other news sources that specialized in reporting on dissident activities. Our database contains quantitative information – the number of events, dates and number of participants – as well as qualitative information on type of events (strike, demonstration, etc.), motivation for the event, and whether and how severely the government reacted. While these data obviously only measure very partial civil society developments, they nevertheless have several advantages. First of all, they contain some of the most relevant information relative to what we are interested in, namely the level, form and content of dissident activity. Indeed, we expect a stronger level of dissident activity to be associated with greater citizen involvement in the shaping of the new democratic institutions and thus with stronger checks and balances later on. On the other hand, while mobilization for human rights and political change might have positive effects on the characteristics of the new institutions, we do not expect the same from large-scale mobilization for direct economic or nationalistic demands.

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A second advantage of our data is that we measure civil society by observing actual actions rather than organizational membership or density of inter-organizational ties (the later being organizational features that are assumed to determine the propensity to act for change). Our paper thus deviates from the neo-Tocquevillian approach that would define and measure civil society by density of civic ties and participation in diverse non-political associations (e.g. Putnam, 1993). Our concept and measure are closer to the way the social movement literature defines contentious action (della Porta, 1999; Tarrow, 1998). We study political action in authoritarian state socialist regimes that had no freedom of association and assembly and no guaranteed political rights. In such regimes, any non-licensed gathering of people or non-authorized public speech act could count as contentious and illegal action. As we will demonstrate, before the regime change countries have greatly varied in the propensity of their societies to enter into any type of contentious action and politicize diverse issues of change.

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The cross-country comparison could however be biased if the data sources we used were biased towards reporting more activities from some countries than others (on the problems of data reliability in protest event analysis, see Koopmans and Rucht, 1999). We have good reasons to believe this is not the case. News agencies like Radio Free Europe were closely related to the CIA and given the context of the Cold War had no interest in reporting less dissident activities from the Soviet Union than from its satellite countries. To overcome the problems of potential bias of specific sources, RFE used a big variety of sources ranging from newspaper reports or news smuggled through the borders by dissident activist to reports of various human rights organizations. Dissident organizations also did their best to have close contacts in the West so that their protest activities could be reported and propagated and it was this publicity that could give them time to time some defense from the harsher forms of repression. This incentive existed even for dissident organizations who did not necessarily share Western political values such as nationalist or religious extremist organizations. We are thus quite confident that the data we put together allows for a meaningful comparison across countries.

We find that political opposition before 1989 was much more intense in Central Europe than in the Soviet republics. This is true even for countries like Czechoslovakia where the regime was more repressive than in Poland or Hungary. Closely related to a lower level of dissident activity in the Former Soviet Union is a higher rate of repression of dissident activity. Not only was the probability of government reaction higher in the latter, but so was the probability that the government resorted to physical violence. Further, we document that differences in civil society development in the eighties play an important role in explaining whether the country adopts a political regime based on distributed power with checks and balances or a political regime with high power concentration. Moreover, our findings support the claim that having a more vibrant and organized civil society at the start of economic reforms was an asset both for the launching and the implementation of these reforms.

The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief overview on the 1990s debates on the politics of economic reform. This is followed by the discussion of the construction of our data set. In section 4, we discuss the stylized facts coming from our data collection efforts. Section 5 presents our main econometric results on the link between civil society development and institutional change. Section 6 concludes.

2. Civil society and the politics of reform

Throughout the 1990s, two diametrically opposing positions were formulated about the political conditions that were thought to be conducive to the success of economic reforms. Ac-

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cording to the first approach, success of reform depends on factors that could diminish the chances of politicizing the economic transformation; strong power concentration, insulation of reformers from political pressures, or a speed of reforms that does not allow time for the potential opponents of reforms to get organized and resist change (see Haggard and Kaufman, 1996; Greskovits, 1998; Przeworski, 1991; Holmes, 1995; Fisher and Stanley 1991, Boycko et al. 1995, and Lipton and Sachs, 1990). From the perspective of this approach, the presence of actors and institutions that could politicize issues of reform was seen as a hindrance to initiate and to sustain market-oriented reform. According to the second approach, political pluralism and political support for economic reform were key factors for the success of reforms (see Dewatripont and Roland, 1992a,b; 1995, Roland, 2000, Murrell, 1992; Bresser-Pereira et al, 1993, Remmer, 1993; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Hellman, 1998). Representatives of this approach saw an advantage in stronger and more effective civil societies, describing them as 'enabling constraints' (Stark and Bruszt, 1998), allowing for introduction of more encompassing and more durable reforms.

One of the key arguments used by the representatives of the first approach was that post-communist countries lacked the societal basis on which economies and polities could be transformed simultaneously. The core elements of their argument were the following. Reforms will impose temporary hardships on large number of social actors and will result in rapid increase in inequality. The losers will not tolerate these effects of the reform and they will use their newly acquired democratic political rights to resist and stop the reform (Elster, 1991; Offe, 1992). Because these societies have inherited flat social structures with very low level of initial inequalities, the number of temporary losers will be very high, and the number of winners (potential supporters of reform), will be low and uncertain (Przeworski, 1991). The potential welfare effects of economic reforms will be diluted as the short-term losers of reforms will seek to redistribute the gains to themselves. The dilemma of economic reforms from this perspective was that the political constituency for the introduction and consolidation of economic reforms would come about only after the reforms have already altered societal structures. The remedy suggested was to use shock therapy, neutralize potential resistance and change the societal bases of support for democratic capitalism via fast reforms (for a recent extended discussion of the representatives and the arguments for shock-therapy see Fish, 2007.) Proponents of shock therapy among economists have made similar arguments, stressing the inability of short-term losers to make inter-temporal trade-offs and the dangers of allowing the organization of resistance against reforms. From this perspective, the presence of actors and institutions that could politicize issues of reform was seen as a hindrance to initiate and/or to make progress in market reform (see e.g. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).

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In sharp contrast with the first view, the second approach saw the presence of a vibrant and organized civil society and of political institutions preventing power concentration as highly conducive to successful reforms. The core elements of the argument were the following. Short-term losers should not be seen as myopic actors. Actors evaluated economic policies not solely on the basis of short-term consequences but based also on expected mid- and longer-term gains. Democratic institutions increasing the possibilities of political participation, contributing to the credibility of reforms and institutions extending the accountability of incumbents were seen as mechanisms that could stabilize the expectations of societal actors, extend their time horizon and increase/stabilize the political basis of reforms. According to the representatives of this approach, the same mechanisms allowed for stronger legitimacy of reform and gave bigger room for more resolute reforms. The crux of the argument was simple: democracy and participation were not part of the problem; they were part of the solution (Dewatripont and Roland, 1992a,b; Bresser-Pereira et al.1993; Remmer, 1993, Linz and Stepan, 1996; Stark and Bruszt, 1998).

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The redistributive danger, in this approach was driven not by the short-term losers but by the early winners of reform (Hellman, 1998). Privatization and liberalization, it was argued, will result in the rapid redistribution of economic power from the state to a smaller number of private actors. In the absence of counterweighing powers within the society, and checks and balances within the state, the emerging concentration of economic power will be used by the early winners to slow down and halt reforms in order to extract rents from unregulated markets (Sonin, 2003). If not constrained, early winners might prevent fuller liberalization and regulation of markets and might try to capture the state to use it for extracting rents and redistributing wealth and opportunities to themselves (Hellman, 1998; Ganev, 200x). In the absence of stronger and better-organized civil society, the overall welfare effects of reform will be limited as the distribution of the costs and gains of reform will be highly unequal (Collier and Handlin, 2005; Karl, 2008).

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In this approach the absence of societal and political pluralism represented the biggest danger for the success of introducing and consolidating market reforms. In that, this approach was closer to the perspective first represented by Max Weber who saw the presence of counterweighing societal powers as one of the key conditions for the emergence of capitalism in the West (Weber, 19xx). It was also closer to the views represented by the authors of the Federalist Papers who saw the presence of checks and balances and mechanism preventing power concentration as the condition most conducive to the extension of market economy across the United States.

3. Data collection and documentation

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Our analysis is based on the long tradition in history, political sociology and in the study of social movements of using event catalogs to trace the evolution of diverse forms of collective/contentious action and their effects (for an excellent overview see Tilly, 2002). Such event catalogues, data sets on multiple social and/or political interactions, are used, in the first place, to describe in a more formal way the properties of more general phenomena like evolution of civil society or patterns of state-society interactions. It allows for the quantification of various properties of contentious actions like timing, frequency, size, forms, goals, as well as the immediate reactions of the repressive apparatus of the state (Koopmans and Rucht, 2001). Going beyond descriptions, event catalogues are also used to account for the causes and longer-term effects of the phenomena traced this way (see among others Tilly, 2002.)

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While by now there is a relatively extensive literature on protest event analysis in the more established democracies (see among others Tarrow, Tilly, McAdam, Rucht, della Porta), there are only a handful of studies on the forms and effects of contentious civic action in the pre- or the post-transition countries of Eastern and Central Europe. The most encompassing studies that deal with this part of the world discuss either a single country or compare some characteristically different cases. The pioneers in the comparative event analysis in the post-communist world, Ekiert and Kubik have used data from just four Central European countries (Ekiert and Kubik, 1998). Several other excellent studies focus on the evolution of contentious action in a single country (e.g. Szabo, 1996, Ekiert and Kubik, 1999). None has yet undertaken a cross-country data collection as comprehensive as we did.[1]

Building on the concepts and methods of this research tradition, in our data collection we have focused on tracing different patterns of interactions between civil society and the socialist regime. We have collected detailed data on the various properties of civil society actions, their size, frequency, timing, type, form and content. We were, on the other hand, interested not only in the comparison of the differences in the strength of the various civil societies and the patterns of civic activities across these countries. At least as important as comparing civil societies to each other, we also wanted to trace the evolution of the balance of power between states and civil societies within these countries in the period leading to regime change. In order to be able to compare countries from this perspective, we have collected data on the frequency, form and content of the reaction of the state.

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Data collection was based on the sources of the Open Society Archives. The Archive was created by the Information Resources Department of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Re-

[1] The by now classic work of Beissinger '*Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*' provides the deepest event data set on the former Soviet State using 150 different sources.

search Institute (East European Archives). It collects comprehensive information on political, economic, religious, media, social and cultural issues in the former socialist bloc countries, between 1945/9 and 1994. The Archive records include news agency releases (mostly from Reuters, AP, UPI, AFP, DPA and national agencies), excerpts from foreign and national press, transcripts of national radio broadcasts, abstracts of media reports about the countries and copies of articles from scientific publications. Importantly, they also contain the RFE's Research Reports (Background and Situation Reports), which elaborate on a specific topic (village razing in Romania, for instance), with several references to news agency releases and their own research work, interviews, etc.

In order to capture political dissident activities, first a selection was made according to the list of archival boxes (container list), which listed all the available records in an alphabetical order (from "agriculture" to "youth" example). Quite often the record "dissident(s)" or "opposition", etc. was not available as a distinctive category. In such cases those boxes were selected and processed which could have contained events of the researchers' interest (like parties, persecution and purges, ethnic minorities, terrorism, exile, resistance to and criticism of the regime, etc.). The container list is available on the Internet at www.osa.ceu.hu. The language of the processed materials is English. The selected countries are the following: Albania, Bulgaria, former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the fifteen Republics of the former Soviet Union and the by now independent states of the former Yugoslavia. The time span is 1985-1989 for the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, and 1985-91 for the former Soviet Union (FSU). The period that applies to the FSU countries is longer in order to account of the fact that political and economic changes were initiated later in these countries. Importantly, in the case of former Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the data were collected separately for the various constituent Republics.

If a record was identified as *dissident activity* (or repression induced by the state against dissidents or dissident activity, see later), the following variables that help characterize this event were identified, collected and coded:

- Date of event: in most cases it was possible to identify the exact date of event (day/month/year). However, sometimes only the year or the month was available. In some few cases, only have the date when the news of an event was published. In the cases for which we have less information in this dimension, we have the exact year in which the event took place.
- Source of information: the name of the news agency (or agencies as quite often more than one reported the event) or any other source (like RFE's Situation Report, Amnesty International's, Helsinki Watch Report or a country's domestic and/or exile dissident source/samizdat/news agency). Furthermore, the person(s) who informed the

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agencies (or any other body), if available, was recorded as well (however, this did not happen too often as it was very dangerous to publish the name of the informant).

- Actor(s): name (or in the case of minorities their ethnicity) of the persons involved (if available, the profession of the person was recorded as well). Sometimes, the list of the names is not complete or the actors' names were simply not available. In the latter case at least their "party" affiliation (their interest) was indicated (e.g. member of *Charter 77* for instance).
- Location of event: region/city/village or if available the street or square or the name of the owner of an apartment/house.
- Intensity of event: the number of participants is recorded. Sometimes the number of persons involved in a certain activity (street demonstration for instance) is not evident or controversial – in this case a range (an estimate) is given.
- Type of activity: (i) demonstration or rally, (ii) meeting, (iii) foundation of an organization, club, etc, (iv) mass disorder, disturbance, (v) strike, (vi) hunger strike, (vii) terrorist activity, (viii) emigration, (ix) dissident literature (publishing or distribution), (x) petition (appeal, statement, open letter). Quite often a record contains several types of activities because a dissident gathering with the aim of establishing a protest organization involves a meeting, a setting up of an organization and drafting of a petition or declaration which was published in a dissident journal. In our data we would code such as event as having multiple aspects so as to conserve (in our data set) the information on the various aspects of each event.
- Motivation for the event: in order to clarify the reasons of a certain activity, motives were recorded also if available. With this it was possible to get a clearer picture about the intentions of dissident activity (religious, ethnic, cultural, ecological or human rights concerns). Some events have more than one motive and our data set record this as well.
- Reactions of the authorities: immediate and ultimate reactions were recorded (detentions or prison sentences, for instance), including severity of the response. It is worth mentioning that often the "reaction" was made public first by foreign news agencies and only after a while (days, months) – if ever – was the "action" or to be precise the circumstances and details of the "action" identified by the local news agencies.
- Counter-reaction: if the reaction of the state authorities generated a response from the side of the "punished" (the dissidents).
- Separately, repression, induced by government authorities against dissidents, was also recorded by identifying the time, place, intensity, type and motives.

4. Depth and Nature of Civil Society: What Do the Data Say?

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There are stark differences between the three main groups of countries: Central Europe, former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union (FSU). In some cases, data from the Baltic countries are different from the FSU countries in important aspects as well. We present the main trends in our data for these different groups of countries and when relevant, isolate the Baltic countries from the other FSU countries.

A look at the average number of events (figure 3) shows these to be substantially higher in Central Europe and the former Yugoslavia than in the former Soviet Union (including the Baltics). It is only in 1988 that we see a slight increase in the number of events in the FSU. This was during the height of the Glasnost period under Gorbachev. There is no reason to think that this would be due to a reporting bias from the archive sources. Most of these sources had a keen interest in reporting *any* dissident activity taking place in the Soviet Union. In contrast to the FSU, there is a very strong upward trend in dissident activities in the Baltics and former Yugoslavia. As can be seen from figure 4, the median number of participants is higher in the Baltics and former Yugoslavia than in other countries. There is a spike in 1988 in the FSU but for the other years, median participation in the FSU is lower than elsewhere.

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INSERT FIGURES 3 AND 4

Table 1 shows the composition of dissident activities in the different groups of countries. Specifically, it shows the overall average number of dissident events per country over the 1985-89 period so that it reveals both the absolute number and relative importance of different types of dissident activities. The main types in the Former Soviet Union were demonstrations, marches and rallies: 12 events out of 19 on average per country. The same category came in second place in Central and Eastern although the absolute number, 62 out of 256 events, dwarfs that recorded in the FSU. The leading type of event in Central and Eastern Europe were statements, declarations and petitions, of which the average country reports 82, and meetings with 33 occurrences. Demonstrations, marches and rallies come first in the Baltic countries, with 10 events out of 11 on average per country (note that the Baltic Republics nearly match the FSU countries in this category despite the former's much smaller average size). Finally, the most important category of dissident activities in the former Yugoslavia is strikes (45 events out of 137 per country), followed by demonstrations (43 events) and petitions (29 instances). With the prevalence of political declarations and meetings, Central Europe had a more politicized form of protest. In the former Yugoslavia, on the other hand, dissent was largely driven by economic considerations.

INSERT TABLE 1

This is confirmed also by the information on the motives for dissident activity, reported (Table 1 as well as in Figures 5-9). Human rights motivation was very important in all countries. Political change played an important role also in Central and Eastern Europe, Baltic countries and former Yugoslavia. These two motives, however, display different dynamics: while the importance of human rights tends to decline over time, the demand for political change rises. This suggests that as protests intensify, the human rights motivation is gradually replaced by direct demands for political change. Interestingly, we see again that economic motivation was by far the strongest in the former Yugoslavia, especially towards the end of the 1980s. This is consistent with the prevalence of strikes as main form of protest activity. Nationalist motivation was also quite strong in former Yugoslavia as well as in the Baltics (where it took the form of pro-independence movements). In Central Europe, its importance was relatively minor.

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INSERT FIGURES 5-9

There were also important differences with respect to government reaction to dissident events. Figure 10 shows the percentage of events to which the government reacted with repression. One sees clearly that the government reaction to events is low and decreasing in Central Europe from around 40% in 1985 to 20% in 1989. Repression in the FSU (including the Baltics), in contrast, shows an increasing trend during the same period, although it declines in 1990-91. Figure 11 shows the percentage of events that were met with violent government reaction. Again, it was stronger in the FSU and Baltics compared to Central Europe and former Yugoslavia. Note in particular the dramatic increase in violent repression in the Baltics.

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INSERT FIGURES 10-11

Not surprisingly, there seems to be a negative correlation between repression and dissident activity: the more repressive countries display less dissident activity. Figures 11a-d document this pattern for Poland, Czech Republic, Russia and Serbia and Montenegro. Note that dissident activities were not much less numerous in the Czech Republic compared to Poland despite the more repressive character of the Czechoslovak regime. Note however that repression was still much stronger in Gorbachev's Russia than in Husak's Czechoslovakia.

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A consistent picture emerges from these data. Central Europe had a very active level of dissident activity and communist regimes that were somewhat less repressive. Protest activity in Central Europe was more politicized, aiming directly at political change. There was a lot of dissent in former Yugoslavia too which was also less repressive. Yet, it took mostly the form of strikes and had a clear economic motivation. Nationalism was also an important motiva-

tion there. There were fewer dissident events and more repression in the former Soviet Union. Protest took mainly the form of demonstrations for the defense of human rights and only became more politicized later on. An exception is presented by the Baltics where very strong and massive nationalist (pro-independence) activities were recorded in the late eighties. Given these data, we would expect civil society to have more influence on the design of institutional change in Central Europe compared to the FSU.

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Until now, we were treating the pre-transition civil society as exogenously given although historical legacies and cultural factors are likely to have played a role in shaping and forming it. In Table 2, we regress the average number of dissident events on a number of plausible country-specific indicators. The analysis suggests that countries that spent less time under a communist regime and those that are closer to Western Europe in turn experienced more dissident activity. Having more liberal political conditions before 1989 helped as well. Interestingly enough, large countries do not necessarily report more dissident events than small countries. Moreover, more favorable economic conditions, measured by indices of initial liberalization, do not play a robustly significant role.

INSERT TABLE 2

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5. Institutional and Economic Impact of Pre-transition Civil Society

We now turn to the regression analysis of the impact of civil society on institutional and economic outcomes during transition. We conjecture that the nature and depth of the pre-transition dissident movement has laid important foundations for the subsequent political and institutional change and policy choices. Table 3 considers the choice between presidential and parliamentary systems. Given that the electoral regime rarely changes , the analysis is carried out in cross-sectional framework. All countries in Central Europe opted for a parliamentary regime. In contrast, most countries in the FSU apart from the Baltics opted for a presidential regime. Presidential regimes can come in different guises and some feature a very good system of checks and balances. However, in the former Soviet Union presidential regimes tend to concentrate a large amount of power with the president and tend to have few checks and balances.

We see in the various specifications of Table 3 a clear and significant negative association between the number of dissident activities and the choice of a presidential regime (in all columns except the last the number of events is significant at least at the 10% level). In some specifications, the repression rate and the frequency of violent repression also correlate positively with the dependent variable. The only motive variable that appears significant is “economic motivation” which carries a negative sign.

INSERT TABLE 3.

Table 4 performs a similar exercise with a more refined measure of the strength of the executive taken from the Polity database, which ranges between 1 and 4, with higher values indicating a stronger executive or greater centralization of power in the hands of the president. The regression is estimated as an ordered logit. The results are very similar: the number of events is negatively associated with choosing a strong executive, government repression and violent repression increase the probability of having a strong executive (the last two effects are not significant, however).

INSERT TABLE 4.

In Table 5, finally, we used Timothy Frye's index of presidential powers, which also reflects the degree of concentration of powers of the president. This index identifies 29 executive powers that can be held either by the president or the legislature. The index correspondingly ranges between 0 (very weak presidency) and 29 (strong presidential system with highly centralized power). The actual range represented in our data is between 3 (Slovenia) and 19 (Azerbaijan and, from 1996 onwards, Belarus). Since a few countries amended their constitution during the period covered by our analysis (Albania, Belarus, Croatia and Moldova), we consider both the index value corresponding to the first post-communist constitution and the final index value. The results are essentially the same and therefore we only report the former. Again, a familiar pattern emerges: countries with greater number of events are less likely to adopt a strongly centralized political system whereas government repression has the opposite effect.

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INSERT TABLE 5.

Hence, these regression results suggest that countries with a broad and active civil society are more likely to espouse broadly representative regimes. Countries with little in a way of pre-transition civil society or with a high rate of repression, on the other hand, tend to implement strongly centralized presidential regimes.

Next, we consider the impact of civil society on policy choices. Specifically, we look at the progress in implementing market oriented reform and political liberalization. We proxy economic reform by the eight progress-in-transition indicators compiled and published annually by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). These indicators measure the depth and breadth of economic reform in the following areas: price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange, competition policy, small-scale privatization, large-scale privati-

zation, governance and enterprise restructuring, banking reform and interest-rate liberalization, and securities markets and non-bank financial institutions. The EBRD reports these indicators every year for 27 post-communist countries. The indicators range between 1 (unreformed centrally-planned economy) and 4.33 (fully liberalized market economy). Our dependent variable is the average value of these indicators. To measure political liberalization, we use the Freedom House indicators of political freedoms and civil liberties. We again use the average of these sub-indicators as a composite index of democratization.

Unlike the political-regime variables used above, progress in implementing economic and political reforms varies from year to year, sometimes substantially. We can therefore carry out our analysis in a panel-data framework. However, by definition, our measures of pre-transition civil society are time-invariant. We therefore combine cross-sectional analysis with panel-data analysis, with the latter allowing for time-varying effects of civil society. Specifically, we interact civil society with time trend (including, in some regressions, a quadratic time term) defined so that the last year of the communist regime, 1989, is set as year 0. This effectively allows for the effect of dissident activity to vary (to dissipate or strengthen) over time, whereas the time-invariant effect of civil society, if any, is captured by the country fixed effects in these regressions.

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The cross-section results are reported in Table 6: economic reform in columns (1) through (5) and democratization in columns (6) through (10). We regress the level of each index on civil society at five-year intervals, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005 as well as for 2007 (the last year in our data). This allows us to see whether pre-transition civil society has had an impact on the progress in economic reform and democratization at five discrete points spanning the entire transition period. Finding statistically significant results is necessarily an uphill struggle in this case as we have a multitude of civil-society indicators and altogether only 25 observations. Nevertheless, we can observe that countries where dissident activity was motivated mainly by the desire for political change tend to progress further in terms of both economic and political liberalization (the effect on economic reform, however, is only significant for 1990 although it remains positive throughout). The effect of human rights and economic motivation is similar though less consistently significant. Finally, the greater the number of distinct dissident organizations, the greater is the level of reform implemented in 1990, although the effect ceases to be significant in subsequent years. Hence, it appears that it is not only the extent of the dissident activity and its motives but also the density of the pre-transition civil society as measured by the number of organizations which matters for the subsequent policy choices.[2]

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[2] This echoes with the argument put forward by Putnam (1993) on the importance of social capital for economic and political outcomes.

INSERT TABLE 6.

In Table 7, we present results obtained in a panel framework. Here the initial effect of pre-transition civil society is captured by the country-specific fixed effect, along with any other time-invariant factors. The regressions include, nevertheless, time-varying effects of civil society, using the interaction effects described above. For progress in economic reform, we include also the democratization index in column one; this is in line with Fidrmuc's (2003) finding that democratization fosters economic liberalization in the post-communist countries. For comparison, however, column (2) presents regression results obtained omitting the democratization index and these two sets of results are very similar.

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INSERT TABLE 7.

We find that countries with many dissident events tend to experience sustained economic liberalization and democratization: the interaction term between the number of events and time trend is positive (although only marginally significant). Hence, dissident activity appears to leave a legacy that is long lasting and becomes translated into policy gradually. Government response to such events reinforces this effect: the fraction of events that received a government reaction also has a positive effect on economic and political reforms (and this effect may be non-linear, leveling off with the passing of time). Violent repression of dissident activity has the opposite effect on democratization: the fraction of repressed dissident events leads to political liberalization is decelerating over time (note this effect is only marginally significant). Similarly, countries where dissident events were attended by large numbers of people see economic liberalization slowing down over time. Note, however, that this says nothing about the size of the initial economic liberalization; in Table 6 we found the number of participants to have no effect at all on market oriented reforms.

The effect of the motives for dissident activity changes over time as well. Countries with protest events driven mainly by human rights concern and desire for political change experience sustained economic and political liberalization. Again, we can combine this result with our finding from the cross-section analysis above: human rights and political-change concerns lead to rapid initial liberalization followed by further improvements over time. The effect of economic motives is different for economic and political liberalization: economic concerns are associated with large initial economic liberalization (with little effect on initial political change), followed by slower economic reform but faster democratization subsequently. The effect of nationalistic motives appears positive only for economic reform while religious motives tend to suppress the pace of subsequent market-oriented reform. Finally, the density of the civil society (reflected in the number of distinct dissident organizations), has a positive

effect on the initial level of economic reform, while it translates into slower pace of economic and political liberalization over time. Hence, while civil society density may help cement the initial consensus on the need for change, it may later make it more difficult to arrive at such consensual decisions.

In summary, we find strong evidence that the level and nature of civil society as measured by dissident activity during the late 1980s has had an impact on institutional developments and policy choices, including the speed of economic and political reform, during transition. As a last step in our analysis, we consider whether pre-transition civil society has had any effect on subsequent economic performance, namely economic growth. Our analysis estimates a stylized version of the Solow model of growth[3], which relates economic growth to accumulation of physical capital and population growth[4], augmented to include progress in implementing market-oriented reform (measured by the average progress-in-transition index described above) as well as our civil-society measures. The baseline (fixed-effects) equation that we estimate takes the form:

$$\Delta y_{it} = \beta_1 s_{it}^K + \beta_2 (g_{it} + n_{it} + \delta_{it}) + \beta_3 r_{it} + \beta_4 w_t + \beta_5 w_{t-1} + \mu_i + \nu_{it} \qquad (1)$$

where all variables are in logs and (omitting country and time subscripts) Δy is the first difference in output per person, s^K is the ratio of investment to GDP, n is population growth, g and δ are technological progress and depreciation, respectively, and we proxy their sum with a constant term equal to 0.06, r is the average reform index, and w is a dummy variable indicating that a country is caught up in a military conflict (internal or external). We estimate this model, as before, in cross section and panel settings, with fixed effects (μ_i) included in the latter case.

Let us turn first to the cross-section results summarized in Table 8. As before, we estimate the effect on growth in individual years, reporting the regression results for 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005 as well as for 2007. The reform index is found to have no significant effect on growth: this is generally in line with the literature, the predominant finding of which is the wide range of estimated effects of reform and the lack of consensus on its sign (see Babetskii and Campos, 2007). Investment has mainly a positive and population growth negative effect on growth, as predicted by the model (although these effects are not always statistically significant).

[3] See Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Islam (1995).

[4] The Solow model predicts that technological progress and depreciation also play a role but in absence of reliable measures on them we follow the literature in replacing them with a constant term.

Civil society characteristics again appear important, especially for economic growth in 1990. Larger number of protest events translates into lower growth but high participation in such events in turn improves growth. Violent repression by the communist government depresses growth. Dissident activity motivated by economic or environmental concerns translates into better growth outcomes whereas those motivated by the desire for political change or nationalism lower it. Finally, having a diverse civil society (as measured by the number of dissident groups) fosters growth in 1990.

INSERT TABLE 8.

Results of our panel data analysis are summarized in Table 9. First, in column (1), we present the baseline model that corresponds to equation (1). Column (2) presents the same model but treating the reform index and investment as endogenous. This is because countries' progress in implementing market-oriented reforms can be affected by their economic performance: for example, countries that fare better can find it easier to implement costly reforms, or, conversely, countries may be induced to undertake reform by on-going economic hardship. Investment, similarly, can respond to economic performance. We therefore use the following instruments: quadratic time trend, lagged index of democracy (described above) and second lag of the war dummy. We find that while economic reform helps foster growth in both specifications, its effect strengthens when we control for its endogeneity. The impact of investment on growth similarly rises with 2SLS but it remains insignificant.

INSERT TABLE 9.

Columns (3) and (4) then present results of regressions augmented to include time-varying effects of civil society, again estimated with OLS and 2SLS, respectively. However, there is little indication that the effects change over time. Given that we found above that civil society helps shape progress in implementing economic reform even beyond its initial effect, it might qualify as an instrument for economic reform. Column (5) explores this possibility. However, the instruments are rejected by the significant Sargan-Hansen statistic. Using GMM instead of 2SLS (because relatively short time-series dimension and large cross-section dimension, so-called short T/large N panels, can produce biased estimates and therefore GMM, or Arellano-Bond, is more appropriate) yields very similar results (columns 6-8). Hence, despite the near absence of significant results, it appears that civil society measures cannot be excluded from the main regression and hence that they do have an effect on growth also in time-varying fashion.

Note that these estimates only measure the marginal effect of civil society on growth, after controlling for progress in economic reform. As we report above, the nature and extent of

dissident activities before the end of the communist regime had an impact on the pace of economic reform at the outset of transition and continued to exert influence on the reform progress thereafter. As we find economic reform to have a strong effect on growth, civil society does have an indirect effect on economic performance, even if the estimation of this direct effect is not straightforward.

Conclusions

The demise of communism did not follow a uniform scenario across the former Soviet block. In some countries, communism collapsed amidst wide-spread public protests and was replaced by broadly based dissident groups. Elsewhere, the former regimes ceased to pay lip service to the communist ideology but otherwise largely remained in place. We document the variation in the depth and breadth of the pre-transition civil society in the communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We then utilize this variation to explain the diversity of outcomes in terms of institutional change, policy choices and economic performance.

Our results suggest that the emergence of strong presidential regimes in the former Soviet Union, which subsequently proved to have worse human right records as compared to parliamentary and more genuinely democratic regimes in Central Europe and the Baltics, can be directly related to the lower frequency of political opposition in the pre-transition period, its nature, and to the nature of government repression. Similarly, we find that the pre-transition civil society has had also an effect on the subsequent nature and pace of market-oriented reform and democratization. We find that the progress in economic liberalization in turn has helped foster growth, so that pre-transition civil society has also had an indirect effect on subsequent economic growth.

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These results highlight the importance of differences in civil society development and collective action processes in societies before the beginning of the post-communist transition process. The success or failure of institutional change, reform and political liberalization is strongly linked to the political events that unfolded during the last years of communism. Countries with a vibrant pre-transition civil society have embarked on a path towards sound political institutions, economic reforms and democratization. Countries that had little in a way of civil society and/or whose governments repressed it in turn have introduced more authoritarian regimes and at best dragged their feet on economic and political liberalization.

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Figure 1.



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

Notes: The index represents the simple average of political rights and civil liberties indicators compiled by the Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org/).

Figure 3.



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

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

Figure 6.



Figure 7.



Figure 8.



Figure 9.



Figure 10.



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
Government reaction violent
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
CEE
BALT
FSU
FYUG

Figure 11a.



Figure 11b.



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Figure 11c.



Figure 11d.



Table 1 Summary Statistics on Pre-transition Civil Society

	Central/Eastern Europe	Baltic States	Former Soviet Union	Former Yugoslavia
Summary:				
Events per year	52.0	2.3	3.6	31.8
Participants per event	20	2043	828	265
Government response (%)	29%	17%	23%	14%
Government repression (%)	5%	15%	9%	2%
Unique organizations	33.9	3	10.6	4%
Motives				
Human rights motive (%)	53%	45%	22%	21%
Political change motive (%)	18%	15%	3%	13%
Economic motive (%)	7%	0%	2%	44%
Environmental motive (%)	3%	9%	2%	1%
Nationalistic motive (%)	8%	10%	8%	11%
Religious motive (%)	8%	0%	2%	3%
Events by type (overall, 1985-89)				
Demonstration	62	10	12	43
Strike	19	0	0	45
Hunger strike	10	0	1	4
Petition	82	1	1	29
Meeting	33	0	1	2
New organization	18	0	1	3
Dissident literature published	17	0	2	10
Terrorism/sabotage	1	0	1	1
Giving interview to press	9	0	0	0
Emigration	5	0	0	0

Table 2 Determinants of Pre-transition Civil Society

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
GNP per capita	0.001	0.004								
in 1989	(0.003)	(0.003)								
Years under	-3.293		-1.238							
communism	(1.328)*		(0.447)*							
Distance from	0.011			-0.015						
Vienna	(0.009)			(0.005)*						
Average Liberalization	-620.225				149.966					
in 1989	(216.64)*				(103.28)					
Average Democracy	173.977					63.488				
in 1989	(34.91)**					(49.516)				
EBRD Initial	7.427						7.854			
conditions index	(6.061)						(2.807)*			
Polity IV score	-2.251							3.046		
average over 1918-38	(1.765)							(2.080)		
Independent state	-37.859								24.336	
in 1918-38	(27.986)								(13.688)	
Population	0.001									0
in 1985 ths	(0.000)**									(0.000)
Constant	160.751	-3.133	88.757	33.353	15.326	3.993	18.016	32.457	12.224	18.58
	(83.843)	(14.263)	(30.10)**	(11.00)**	(6.562)*	(14.992)	(5.151)**	(12.464)*	(7.24)	(6.872)*
Observations	24	24	25	25	27	27	25	27	27	27
R-squared	0.71	0.07	0.28	0.2	0.1	0.07	0.35	0.17	0.12	0.02

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.

Table 3 Determinants of Presidential System

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Number of events	-0.083	-0.124	-0.179	-0.343	-0.03
	(0.064)	(0.064)§	(0.087)*	(0.181)§	(0.040)
Frequency of government reaction		3.883	6.676	5.267	
		(3.087)	(4.145)	(3.964)	
Median number of Participants			0	-0.001	
			0.000	(0.001)	
Frequency of violent reaction				17.813	
				(13.634)	
Human rights motive					-0.437
					(2.366)
Political change motive					-14.461
					(9.801)
Economic motive					-9.141
					(3.624)*
Nationalistic motive					2.412
					(5.021)
Religious motive					-8.464
					(7.695)
Constant	0.574	0.015	0.116	0.449	1.89
	(0.530)	(0.734)	(0.706)	(0.830)	(1.139)§
Wald χ^2 (p-value)	1.69 (0.19)	4.53 (0.10)	4.86 (0.18)	4.40 (0.35)	12.6 (0.05)
Observations	25	25	25	25	25

Notes: Estimated with logit. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable takes value of 1 if the country has a presidential system of government and 0 if parliamentary. Significance levels: § significant at 10%, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.

Table 4 Determinants of Political System

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Number of events	-0.07	-0.076	-0.109	-0.113	-0.019
	(0.032)*	(0.029)**	(0.037)**	(0.044)**	(0.017)
Frequency of government		0.914	2.989	2.323	
reaction		(2.664)	(2.791)	(3.572)	
Median number of			0	-0.001	
Participants			0	0	
Frequency of violent				2.173	
reaction				(5.710)	
Human rights					-3.861
motive					(3.218)
Political change					-15.595
motive					(6.934)*
Economic					-10.966
motive					(4.266)*
Nationalistic					-4.446
motive					(4.546)
Religious					11.036
motive					(8.697)
Wald χ^2 (p-value)	4.73 (0.03))	6.74 (0.03)	8.95 (0.03)	6.99 (0.14)	30.3 (0.00)
Observations	25	25	25	25	25

Notes: Estimated with ordered logit. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable takes value of 1 if the country has a parliamentary system of government, 2 in case of a mixed system, 3 for a weak presidential system and 4 for a strong presidential system. Significance levels: § significant at 10%, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.

Table 5 Determinants of Presidential System (using Tim Frye's index of presidential powers)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Number of events	-0.016	-0.019	-0.023	-0.023	0.002
	(0.008)*	(0.008)*	(0.009)**	(0.009)**	(0.011)
Frequency of government		2.63	3.48	4.331	
reaction		(2.441)	(2.236)	(4.286)	
Median number of			0	0	
Participants			0	0	
Frequency of violent				-2.299	
reaction				(8.557)	
Human rights					-6.121
motive					(4.227)
Political change					-2.3
motive					(5.293)
Economic					-6.216
motive					(5.804)
Nationalistic					2.421
motive					(2.887)
Religious					10.946
motive					(8.884)
Wald χ^2 (p-value)	4.06 (0.04)	6.07 (0.05)	8.42 (0.04)	7.86 (0.10)	14.3 (0.03)
Observations	25	25	25	25	25

Notes: Estimated with ordered logit. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is increasing in the strengths of the president's authority. The possible range of the index is between 0 and 29. The regressions are estimated with the index reflecting the first post-communist constitution; results with the last post-communist constitution are very similar (the constitutionally mandated presidential powers have changed only in Albania, Belarus, Croatia and Moldova during the period we consider). Significance levels: § significant at 10%, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.

Table 6 Determinants of Progress in Market-oriented Reform and Democratization, Cross-Section Model

	(1) Reform 1990	(2) Reform 1995	(3) Reform 2000	(4) Reform 2005	(5) Reform 2007	(6) Democracy 1990	(7) Democracy 1995	(8) Democracy 2000	(9) Democracy 2005	(10) Democracy 2007
Events	-0.004	0	0.006	0.007	0.007	0.016	0.018	0.025	0.03	0.03
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.024)
Participants	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Government reaction	-0.733	-0.987	0.023	-0.305	-0.189	0.73	-5.666	-1.539	-0.787	-0.932
	(0.796)	(1.568)	(1.796)	(2.028)	(2.046)	(2.660)	(4.648)	(4.883)	(4.442)	(5.216)
Government	-1.001	-0.616	-1.008	0.51	0.558	-2.312	5.459	0.929	-1.57	-0.403
Repression	(1.244)	(2.449)	(2.805)	(3.168)	(3.195)	(4.154)	(7.260)	(7.627)	(6.937)	(8.146)
Human-rights	-0.248	0.66	0.679	0.859	0.882	-1.523	5.384	3.475	4.165	4.57
motive	(0.275)	(0.542)	(0.621)	(0.701)	(0.707)	(0.919)	(1.607)**	(1.688)	(1.535)*	(1.803)*
Political-change	1.561	1.894	2.695	3.039	3.011	5.296	6.144	9.686	9.542	10.803
motive	(0.631)*	(1.242)	(1.422)§	(1.606)§	(1.620)§	(2.106)*	(3.681)	(3.867)*	(3.517)*	(4.130)*
Economic	1.518	0.901	0.601	0.323	0.384	-1.666	1.302	1.602	2.483	1.467
motive	(0.346)**	(0.682)	(0.781)	(0.882)	(0.890)	(1.157)	(2.022)	(2.124)	(1.932)	(2.268)
Environmental	0.539	3.789	3.224	2.042	2.132	1.76	-4.183	2.078	5.769	0.822
motive	(1.53)	(3.00)	(3.44)	(3.89)	(3.919)	(5.095)	(8.904)	(9.355)	(8.508)	(9.992)
Nationalistic	0.297	-0.9	-0.019	0.91	0.974	1.016	5.75	3.761	2.942	3.989
motive	(0.676)	(1.331)	(1.524)	(1.722)	(1.736)	(2.257)	(3.946)	(4.145)	(3.770)	(4.427)
Religious	-0.033	0.663	-0.627	-0.976	-1.080	-6.227	-4.392	-4.977	-4.662	-7.344
motive	(1.441)	(2.838)	(3.249)	(3.670)	(3.701)	(4.812)	(8.410)	(8.835)	(8.036)	(9.437)
No. distinct dissident	0.014	0.009	-0.004	-0.008	-0.009	0.013	-0.015	-0.036	-0.044	-0.052
groups	(0.006)*	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.042)
Constant	1.044	2.199	2.382	2.532	2.556	3.623	2.598	2.561	2.445	2.686
	(0.096)**	(0.188)**	(0.216)**	(0.244)**	(0.246)**	(0.319)**	(0.558)**	(0.586)**	(0.533)**	(0.626)**
Observations	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
R-squared	0.81	0.68	0.65	0.61	0.61	0.75	0.73	0.73	0.81	0.75

Notes: Estimated with OLS. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: § significant at 10%, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The dependent variable are the average of EBRD progress-in-transition indicators (Reform) and the average of Freedom House indicators of political rights and civil liberties (Democracy), re-scaled so that higher values correspond to greater freedom.

Table 7 Determinants of Progress in Market-oriented Reform and Democratization, Panel Fixed Effects Model with Time-varying Effects of Civil Society

	(1) Reform	(2) Reform	(3) Democracy
Democracy (log)	0.128 (0.020)**		
Time	0.28 (0.015)**	0.266 (0.016)**	-0.113 (0.037)**
Time squared	-0.01 (0.001)**	-0.01 (0.001)**	0.003 (0.002)§
Events/1000	0.477 (0.335)	0.637 (0.351)	1.251 (0.842)§
Events squared/1000	-0.011 (0.015)	-0.011 (0.016)	0.000 (0.038)
Government reaction/1000	73.472 (63.895)	143.141 (66.111)*	544.726 (158.665)**
Government reaction squared/1000	-0.368 (2.699)	-2.623 (2.809)	-17.629 (6.742)**
Government repression/1000	48.668 (58.276)	13.656 (60.897)	-273.749 (146.152)
Participants/1000	-0.008 (0.003)**	-0.008 (0.003)**	-0.003 (0.008)
Human-rights motive/1000	15.78 (13.053)	30.778 (13.484)*	117.262 (32.362)**
Political-change motive/1000	14.037 (30.379)	63.007 (30.892)*	382.881 (74.141)**
Economic motive /1000	-72.525 (16.359)**	-55.962 (16.959)**	129.497 (40.702)**
Environmental motive/1000	5.555 (71.538)	50.544 (74.726)	351.758 (179.341)
Nationalistic motive/1000	79.187 (31.550)*	77.889 (33.109)*	-10.147 (79.461)
Religious motive/1000	-157.523 (67.289)*	-173.96 (70.567)*	-128.517 (169.359)
No. distinct dissident Groups/1000	-0.817 (0.310)**	-1.291 (0.317)**	-3.7 (0.760)**
Constant	0.472 (0.088)**	0.993 (0.038)**	4.075 (0.090)**
Observations	450	450	450
Number of Countries	25	25	25
R-squared	0.89	0.88	0.40

Notes: . Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: § significant at 10%, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The dependent variable are the average of EBRD progress-in-transition indicators (Reform) and the average of Freedom House indicators of political rights and civil liberties (Democracy), rescaled so that higher values correspond to greater freedom. Civil society characteristics are interacted with time trend (and quadratic time trend, where indicated), to make them time-varying.

Table 8 Determinants of Growth, Cross-Section Model

	(1) Growth 1990	(2) Growth 1995	(3) Growth 2000	(4) Growth 2005	(5) Growth 2007
Reform index	-0.258	0.207	-0.025	-0.028	-0.003
(log)	(0.049)**	(0.209)	(0.052)	(0.042)	(0.062)
Investment	0.085	-0.017	0.054	0.131	0.083
(log)	(0.037)§	(0.063)	(0.037)	(0.041)**	(0.085)
g + n + δ	-0.191	-0.131	-0.085	-0.046	-0.032
(log)	(0.081)*	(0.147)	(0.097)	(0.114)	(0.132)
War	-0.045	0.005			
	(0.030)	(0.139)			
War lagged		0.026			
		(0.060)			
Events	-0.002	0.001	-0.001	0	-0.001
	(0.000)**	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Participants	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Government reaction	-0.185	0.011	-0.188	-0.104	-0.123
	(0.092)§	(0.293)	(0.133)	(0.142)	(0.183)
Government	-0.442	0.077	0.239	0.172	0.418
Repression	(0.154)*	(0.413)	(0.184)	(0.201)	(0.247)
Human-rights	-0.209	0.096	-0.039	-0.044	-0.057
motive	(0.054)**	(0.119)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.061)
Political-change	0.11	-0.029	-0.068	-0.04	0.2
motive	(0.091)	(0.265)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.218)
Economic	0.282	0.101	-0.023	-0.05	-0.066
motive	(0.072)**	(0.132)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.066)
Environmental	0.492	0.048	-0.065	-0.109	-0.319
motive	(0.179)*	(0.520)	(0.259)	(0.256)	(0.397)
Nationalistic	-0.296	-0.006	0.033	0.068	0.144
motive	(0.122)*	(0.238)	(0.128)	(0.117)	(0.140)
Religious	0.319	0.238	0.341	0.275	0.339
motive	(0.195)	(0.520)	(0.340)	(0.335)	(0.426)
No. distinct dissident	0.005	-0.002	0.001	0.001	0.000
groups	(0.001)**	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Constant	-0.361	-0.656	-0.044	0.177	0.108
	(0.198)	(0.511)	(0.251)	(0.315)	(0.321)
Observations	23	24	25	25	19
R-squared	0.93	0.76	0.58	0.76	0.82

Notes: Estimated with OLS. . Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: § significant at 10%, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is the log-difference of GDP per capita.

Table 9 Determinants of Growth, Panel Fixed Effects Model with Time-varying Effects of Civil Society

	(1) OLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) OLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) GMM	(7) GMM	(8) GMM
Reform index	0.159	0.229	0.095	0.214	0.277	0.229	0.224	0.207
(log)	(0.012)**	(0.034)**	(0.017)**	(0.044)**	(0.019)**	(0.034)**	(0.021)**	(0.046)**
Investment	0.024	0.142	0.000	-0.272	0.013	0.142	0.026	-0.297
(log)	(0.014)§	(0.094)	(0.015)	(0.154)§	(0.030)	(0.094)	(0.034)	(0.154)§
$g + n + \delta$	-0.004	-0.055	0	0.072	-0.012	-0.055	-0.015	0.076
(log)	(0.019)	(0.037)	(0.019)	(0.045)	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.015)	(0.041)§
War	-0.144	-0.135	-0.152	-0.1	-0.112	-0.135	-0.095	-0.106
	(0.021)**	(0.029)**	(0.021)**	(0.030)**	(0.023)**	(0.029)**	(0.039)*	(0.044)*
War lagged	-0.017	0.057	-0.021	-0.087	0.012	0.057	-0.023	-0.097
	(0.021)	(0.042)	(0.020)	(0.058)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.064)
Events			-0.065	-0.009				-0.003
			(0.055)	(0.083)				(0.072)
Government reaction			7.591	12.949				10.259
			(11.690)	(17.429)				(20.399)
Government			-11.366	-11.255				-5.899
Repression			(17.747)	(24.794)				(30.397)
Participants			0.002	0.003				0.003
			(0.001)§	(0.002)*				(0.002)*
Human-rights			8.064	16.257				18.955
motive			(3.925)*	(10.097)				(9.487)*
Political-change			-1.533	10.427				13.001
motive			(9.291)	(14.907)				(14.169)
Economic			-2.298	-9.711				-10.393
motive			(4.576)	(6.423)				(5.803)§
Environmental			-6.238	-56.457				-65.458
motive			(22.042)	(38.989)				(37.049)§
Nationalistic			14.6	20.765				23.444
motive			(9.537)	(16.089)				(18.239)
Religious			-18.797	-20.894				-18.774
motive			(20.536)	(29.122)				(39.716)
No. distinct dissident			0.058	-0.164				-0.195
groups			(0.094)	(0.200)				(0.186)
Constant	-0.099	-0.138	-0.107	-0.46	-0.26			
	(0.053)§	(0.101)	(0.053)*	(0.153)**	(0.060)**			
Observations	436	413	436	413	413	413	413	413
Number of Countries	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
R-squared	0.52	0.43	0.56	0.30	0.54	0.35	0.55	0.24
F-stat reform		234.5		113.0	113.0	178.5	118.3	118.3
F-stat investment		15.35		12.72	12.72	9.03	10.99	10.99
Sargan test		1.79		2.29	23.97	2.02	37.6	0.74
(p-value)		(0.41)		(0.32)	(0.03)	(0.37)	(0.00)	(0.69)

Notes: Estimated with OLS. . Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: § significant at 10%, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is the log-difference of GDP per capita. Civil society characteristics are interacted with time trend (and quadratic time trend, where indicated), to make them time-varying. Sargan test statistic is the Sargan-Hansen statistic in regressions estimated with 2SLS (obtained with xtivreg and xtoverid commands in Stata) and Hansen J statistic (obtained with the xtivreg2 routine). In regressions estimated with 2SLS and GMM, the reform index and investment are treated as endogenous, using quadratic time trend, lagged democracy and 2nd lag of the war dummy as instruments, except in columns (5) and (7) where the list of instruments includes also the civil society measures.

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Charta

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having gone through thousands of records, the following categories seem to be relevant:

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Not just the type of reactions but also their intensity (the degree of brutality and the degree of punishment) was recorded