

Generic Local Uniqueness of Equilibrium

Comparative Statics: In what direction does the equilibrium move if the underlying parameters of the economy change?

A Foundation for Comparative Statics:

1. *Local Uniqueness:* For every equilibrium price $p^* \in \Delta$, there exists $\delta > 0$ such that there is no equilibrium price $q^* \in \Delta$ such that

$$q^* \neq p^*, |q^* - p^*| < \delta$$

2. For a sufficiently small change in the parameters of the economy, the number of equilibria is unchanged and each equilibrium moves

$$\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{continuously} \\ \text{differentiably} \end{array} \right)$$

as the parameter changes.

Remark 1 If local uniqueness fails, lattice-theoretic methods may still allow us to establish comparative statics results. We can look at an equilibrium correspondence and we may be able to say that the *set* of equilibria moves in a particular direction in response to a change in the underlying parameters (Milgrom, Shannon, others).

Two-Good Economy: Consider a 2-good economy, normalized prices $p \in \Delta^0$,

$$z(p) = \sum_{i=1}^I D_i(p) - \bar{\omega}$$

- Walras' Law with Equality implies that

$$z(p)_1 = 0 \Rightarrow z(p)_2 = 0$$

so we can capture the situation in a diagram in \mathbf{R}^2 ; let

$$\hat{z}(p_1) = z(p_1, 1 - p_1)_1$$

and plot \hat{z} as a function of p_1 .

- In Diagram I, a small shift in \hat{z} results in a small shift of the equilibrium price; comparative statics are locally meaningful. Notice that

$$\hat{z}(p_1) = 0 \Rightarrow \hat{z}'(p_1) \neq 0$$

\hat{z} cuts cleanly through 0, so we expect an odd number of equilibria.

- In Diagram II, there are two equilibria p_L^* and p_R^* .
 - A small shift in \hat{z} results in a small shift in p_L^*
 - A small upward shift in \hat{z} causes p_R^* to split in two; one moves left, the other moves right, so no local comparative statics.
 - A small downward shift in \hat{z} cause p_R^* to disappear!
 - Notice that

$$\hat{z}(p_R^*) = 0 \text{ but } \hat{z}'(p_R^*) = 0$$

- Diagram III shows we could even have a whole interval of equilibrium prices. A small change in \hat{z} results in a *discontinuous* shift in equilibrium price.


Multi-Good Case:

- Normalize $p_L = 1$ rather than $p \in \Delta$. Price is represented by

$$\hat{p} = (p_1, \dots, p_{L-1}) \in \mathbf{R}_{++}^{L-1}$$

$\hat{z}(P_1)$

DIAGRAM I



$\hat{z}(P_1)$

DIAGRAM II





DIAGRAM III



- Let

$$\hat{z}(\hat{p}) = (z_1(\hat{p}, 1), \dots, z_{L-1}(\hat{p}, 1))$$

- Walras' Law with Equality and $p \gg 0$ implies that

$$\hat{z}(\hat{p}) = 0 \Leftrightarrow z(\hat{p}, 1) = 0$$

- Observe that

$$\hat{z} : \mathbf{R}_{++}^{L-1} \rightarrow \mathbf{R}^{L-1}$$

so $D\hat{z}$, the Jacobian matrix of \hat{z} , is $(L-1) \times (L-1)$

- *Definition:* An equilibrium price p^* is *regular* if

$$\det D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} \neq 0$$

This is equivalent to

$$\text{rank } Dz|_{p^*} = L-1$$

A *regular economy* is an economy for which every equilibrium price is regular.

- *Maintained Hypotheses for Remainder of 17.D:*

- z satisfies the hypotheses of the Debreu-Gale-Kuhn-Nikaido Lemma.
- z is homogeneous of degree zero, i.e.

$$\forall_{p \in \mathbf{R}_{++}^L, \lambda > 0} z(\lambda p) = z(p)$$

Caution: \hat{z} is *not* homogeneous because it is a representation of a normalized price ($p_L = 1$).

- z is C^1 . This appears technical, but it's strong and has economic consequences because it rules out boundary consumptions: demand necessarily has a kink at the price where demand first hits boundary. This can be weakened to allow boundary consumptions, and the theorems more or less hold.

Proposition 2 (17.D.1) *In a regular economy, (normalized) Walrasian Equilibrium prices are locally unique, and there are only finitely many equilibria.*

Proof: Suppose $\hat{z}(\hat{p}^*) = 0$. Since the economy is regular, $D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*}$ is nonsingular. By the Inverse Function Theorem, there is a neighborhood U of \hat{p}^* and a neighborhood V of 0 and a C^1 function $h : V \rightarrow U$, h is one-to-one and onto such that

$$\forall v \in V \quad \hat{z}(h(v)) = v, \quad \forall u \in U \quad h(\hat{z}(u)) = u$$

If $u \in U$ and $\hat{z}(u) = 0$,

$$\begin{aligned} u &= h(\hat{z}(u)) \\ &= h(0) \\ \hat{p}^* &= h(\hat{z}(\hat{p}^*)) \\ &= h(0) \end{aligned}$$

Since h is a function, $u = \hat{p}^*$, so Equilibrium is locally unique.

Now, we show that there are a finite number of equilibria.

Claim: There is a compact set $\hat{K} \subset \mathbf{R}_{++}^{L-1}$ such that if $\hat{z}(\hat{p}^*) = 0$, then $\hat{p}^* \in \hat{K}$.

Suppose the claim is not true. Define $\phi : \mathbf{R}_{++}^{L-1} \rightarrow \Delta^0$ by

$$\phi(\hat{p}) = \frac{(\hat{p}, 1)}{|\hat{p}_1 + \dots + \hat{p}_{L-1} + 1|}$$

Observe that ϕ is one-to-one and onto, is continuous, and has continuous inverse. Let

$$K_n = \left\{ p \in \Delta^0 : p_\ell \geq \frac{1}{n} \ (1 \leq \ell \leq L) \right\}$$

Then $\phi^{-1}(K_n)$ is the continuous image of a compact set, hence a compact subset of \mathbf{R}_{++}^{L-1} , so the set of equilibrium prices cannot be contained in $\phi^{-1}(K_n)$. Thus, we may find a sequence \hat{p}_n^* of equilibrium prices such that $\phi(\hat{p}_n^*) \notin K_n$, hence

$$\phi(\hat{p}_n^*) \rightarrow p \in \Delta \setminus \Delta^0$$

By the Boundary Condition,

$$|z(\phi(\hat{p}_n^*))| \rightarrow \infty$$

but

$$\begin{aligned} z(\phi(\hat{p}_n^*)) &= z(\hat{p}_n^*, 1) \text{ (homogeneity of degree zero)} \\ &= 0 \text{ (since } \hat{z}(\hat{p}_n^*) = 0) \end{aligned}$$

a contradiction which proves the claim.

Since \hat{z} is continuous,

$$\begin{aligned} E &= \left\{ \hat{p} \in \mathbf{R}_{+++}^{L-1} : \hat{z}(\hat{p}) = 0 \right\} \\ &= \hat{z}^{-1}(\{0\}) \\ &= \mathbf{R}_{+++}^{L-1} \setminus \hat{z}^{-1}(\mathbf{R}^{L-1} \setminus \{0\}) \end{aligned}$$

is closed; since E is a closed subset of the compact set K , E is compact. For each $\hat{p} \in E$, we may find $\delta_{\hat{p}} > 0$ such that

$$E \cap B(\hat{p}, \delta_{\hat{p}}) = \{\hat{p}\}$$

The collection

$$\{B(\hat{p}, \delta_{\hat{p}}) : \hat{p} \in E\}$$

is an open cover of E , hence has a finite subcover. Since each element of this finite subcover contains exactly one element of E , E is finite. ■

The Index Theorem

- Throughout, we will denote a price in $\Delta = \{p \in \mathbf{R}_+^L : \sum_{\ell=1}^L p_\ell = 1\}$ by p , and the associated price in \mathbf{R}_{++}^{L-1} (with the assumption that the price of good L has been normalized to 1) by \hat{p} .
- *Definition:* If p^* is a regular equilibrium price, define

$$\text{index}(p^*) = (-1)^{L-1} \text{sign} \det D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*}$$

- For $L = 2$,





$$\begin{aligned} \text{index}(p^*) &= (-1)^1 \text{sign} \det D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} \\ &= -\text{sign} \hat{z}'(\hat{p}^*) \end{aligned}$$

1. $\text{index}(p^*) = +1$ means that $\hat{z}'(\hat{p}^*) < 0$; that means demand is downward sloping, so we are in the “normal” case in which an increase in \hat{z} , the excess demand for good 1, results in an increase in the equilibrium price of good 1.
2. $\text{index}(p^*) = -1$ means that $\hat{z}'(\hat{p}^*) > 0$; that means demand is upward sloping, so we are in the “abnormal” case in which an increase in \hat{z} , the excess demand for good 1, results in a decrease in the equilibrium price of good 1.

- For $L = 3$,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{index}(p^*) &= (-1)^2 \text{sign} \det D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} \\ &= \text{sign} \det D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} \end{aligned}$$

The sign of the determinant is +1 if orientation is preserved, -1 if orientation is reversed:



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$$\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} \text{ is obtained from } \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

by a counterclockwise rotation.

$$D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} \text{ is obtained from } D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

by a rotation; counterclockwise (orientation preserved) if

$$\det D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} > 0, \text{ index } (\hat{p}^*) = +1$$

and clockwise (orientation reversed) if

$$\det D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} < 0, \text{ index } (\hat{p}^*) = -1$$

- For $L = 4$,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{index } (p^*) &= (-1)^3 \text{sign } \det D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} \\ &= -\text{sign } \det D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} \end{aligned}$$

The sign of the determinant is +1 if orientation is preserved, -1 if orientation is reversed:

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
$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

is a right-handed system.

$$\det D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \det D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \det D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

is right-handed (orientation preserved) if

$$\det D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} > 0, \text{ index } (\hat{p}^*) = -1$$



L First Finger

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

Left-handed

$\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$ L Index Finger

$\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$ L. Thumb

and left-handed (orientation reversed) if

$$\det D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} < 0, \text{ index } (\hat{p}^*) = +1$$

- *Connection to Tatonnement Stability:* Consider the Tatonnement Price Dynamics

$$\frac{d\hat{p}}{dt} = \hat{z}(\hat{p}) \tag{1}$$

- This is a nonlinear differential equation, but we can approximate its behavior near an equilibrium price \hat{p}^* by considering the linear differential equation

$$\frac{d\hat{p}}{dt} = D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} (\hat{p} - \hat{p}^*) \tag{2}$$

- Let $\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_{L-1}$ be the eigenvalues of $D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*}$.

– *Fact:*

$$\det D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} = \prod_{\ell=1}^{L-1} \lambda_\ell$$

This is obvious if the matrix is diagonalizable, but is true in general.

* Some of the eigenvalues are real; the others come in conjugate pairs.

* If $a + bi$ and $a - bi$ are a conjugate pair of eigenvalues

$$(a + bi)(a - bi) = a^2 + b^2 > 0$$

* Thus,

$$\text{sign } \det D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} = \prod_{\lambda_\ell \in \mathbf{R}} \text{sign } (\lambda_\ell)$$

is the product of the signs of the real eigenvalues.

* Each complex eigenvalue represents a rotation, which does not change orientation.

- * Each real, negative eigenvalue represents a change of orientation. Orientation is unchanged if there are an even number of real, negative eigenvalues.
- Equation (1) is locally asymptotically stable near \hat{p}^* if all solutions to Equation (2) converge to \hat{p}^* , which is true if and only if

$$\Re(\lambda_1) < 0, \dots, \Re(\lambda_{L-1}) < 0$$

If $\Re(\lambda_\ell) > 0$ for any ℓ , then Equation (1) is not locally asymptotically stable.

Suppose $L - 1$ is odd. Since there are an even number of complex eigenvalues, there are an odd number of real eigenvalues, so if all of them are negative, the determinant is negative and

$$\text{index}(\hat{p}^*) = (-1)^{L-1} \text{sign} \det D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} = +1$$

On the other hand, suppose $L - 1$ is even. Since there are an even number of complex eigenvalues, there are an even number of real eigenvalues, so if all of them are negative, the determinant is positive and

$$\text{index}(\hat{p}^*) = (-1)^{L-1} \text{sign} \det D\hat{z}|_{\hat{p}^*} = +1$$

Thus, we have

$$\text{Tatonnement Stability near } \hat{p}^* \Rightarrow \text{index}(\hat{p}^*) = +1$$

but the converse is false. Thus, the Index Theorem lets us quickly determine that some equilibria are unstable, and allow us to concentrate a search for stable equilibria on those with index +1, which *might* be stable.

Theorem 3 (Index Theorem) For any regular economy,

$$\sum_{\hat{p}^* \in \mathbf{R}_{++}^{L-1}, \hat{z}(\hat{p}^*)=0} \text{index}(\hat{p}^*) = +1$$

Corollary 4 For any regular economy, there are an odd number of equilibria. Since 0 is even, every regular economy has an equilibrium.

Intuition behind Index Theorem: $\text{index}(\hat{p}^*)$ indicates the direction in which \hat{z} passes through zero near \hat{p}^* .

The Boundary Condition implies that \hat{z} starts on one side of zero and ends up on the other side of zero, so every equilibrium price with index -1 must be paired with an equilibrium price with index +1, and exactly one equilibrium price with index +1 must be left unpaired.

Genericity: Almost All Economies are Regular

Review notion of Lebesgue measure zero from 204: This is a natural formulation of the notion that A is a small set:

“If you choose $x \in \mathbf{R}^n$ at random,
the probability that $x \in A$ is zero.”

Regular and Critical Points and Values:

Suppose $X \subseteq \mathbf{R}^n$ is open. Suppose $f : X \rightarrow \mathbf{R}^m$ is differentiable at $x \in X$. Then $df_x \in L(\mathbf{R}^n, \mathbf{R}^m)$, so

$$\text{rank}(df_x) \leq \min\{m, n\}$$

- x is a *regular point* of f if $\text{rank}(df_x) = \min\{m, n\}$.
- x is a *critical point* of f if $\text{rank}(df_x) < \min\{m, n\}$.
- y is a *critical value* of f if there exists $x \in X$, $f(x) = y$, x is a critical point of f .

- y is a *regular value* of f if y is not a critical value of f (notice this has the counterintuitive implication that if $y \notin f(X)$, then y is automatically a regular value of f).

A function may have many critical points; for example, if a function is constant on an interval, then every element of the interval is a critical point. But it can't have many critical *values*.

Theorem 5 (2.4, Sard's Theorem) *Let $X \subseteq \mathbf{R}^n$ be open, $f : X \rightarrow \mathbf{R}^m$, f is C^r with $r \geq 1 + \max\{0, n - m\}$. Then the set of all critical values of f has Lebesgue measure zero.*

Recall that our definition of critical point differed from de la Fuente's in the case $m > n$. If $m > n$, then every $x \in X$ is critical using de la Fuente's definition, because

$$\text{rank } Df(x) \leq n < m$$

Consequently, every $y \in f(X)$ is a critical value, using de la Fuente's definition. This does not contradict Sard's Theorem, since one can show that $f(X)$ is a set of Lebesgue measure zero when $m > n$ and $f \in C^1$. The Transversality Theorem is a particularly convenient formulation of Sard's Theorem for our purposes:

Theorem 6 (2.5', Transversality Theorem) *Let*

$$X \subseteq \mathbf{R}^n \text{ and } \Omega \subseteq \mathbf{R}^p \text{ be open}$$

$$F : X \times \Omega \rightarrow \mathbf{R}^m \in C^r$$

$$\text{with } r \geq 1 + \max\{0, n - m\}$$

Suppose that

$$F(x, \omega) = 0 \Rightarrow DF(x, \omega) \text{ has rank } m.$$

Then there is a set $\Omega_0 \subseteq \Omega$ such that $\Omega \setminus \Omega_0$ has Lebesgue measure zero such that

$$\omega \in \Omega_0, F(x, \omega) = 0 \Rightarrow D_x F(x, \omega) \text{ has rank } m$$

In particular, if $m = n$, and $\omega_0 \in \Omega_0$,

- there is a local implicit function

$$x^*(\omega)$$

characterized by

$$F(x^*(\omega), \omega) = 0$$

where x^* is a C^r function of ω

- the equilibrium correspondence

$$\omega \rightarrow \{x : F(x, \omega) = 0\}$$

is lower hemicontinuous at ω_0 .

Remark: If $n < m$, $\text{rank } D_x F(x, \omega) \leq \min\{m, n\} = n < m$. Therefore,

$$(F(x, \omega) = 0 \Rightarrow DF(x, \omega) \text{ has rank } m)$$

\Rightarrow for all ω except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero

$$F(x, \omega) = 0 \text{ has no solution}$$