

Economics 201b
 Spring 2010
 Problem Set 4
 Due Thursday April 15

1. **Robinson-Crusoe in U.S.S.R.** Consider a “Robinson-Crusoe” economy with two-goods, one consumer and one firm. Firm is labor-oriented: it maximizes the profits per unit of labor, given the wage rate w and price of potatoes p (i.e. it maximizes $\frac{\pi(p,w)}{\ell}$ where ℓ is an amount of labor).
 - (a) What is the definition of competitive equilibrium in this case? Give a formal definition. Call it P (“Proletariat”) equilibrium. (Yes, P equilibria of the whole world, unite!).
 - (b) When production function $f(z)$, where z is labor input, is strictly concave what is the set of all Pareto optimal allocations?
 - (c) Continue to assume that $f(z)$ is strictly concave, under what condition on utility function does the P equilibrium exist? Give the description of the equilibrium in this case.
 - (d) For an arbitrary production function check whether P equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
 - (e) Now, suppose that in recognition of such great management innovation, firm receives an award from *Politburo* of the economy (i.e. local social planner). Thus, the firm maximizes now $\frac{\pi(p,w)+a}{\ell}$ where $a > 0$ is the fixed award amount. If the utility function U is quasi-concave, continuous and strictly monotone, are there any conditions on the production function such that P equilibrium exist? Prove or give counterexample.

2. **Robinson-Crusoe: back to Berkeley.** Consider again following “Robinson-Crusoe” economies with two-goods, one consumer and one firm. For each case, compute all Pareto optimal allocations and check whether or not the Second Welfare Theorem holds. Justify your answer.
 - (a) $U(x_1, x_2) = \log x_1 + \log x_2$, $\omega = (24, 0)$,
 $Y = \{(-y_1, y_2) : y_2 \leq e^{y_1-1}, y_1 \geq 0\}$
 - (b) $U(x_1, x_2) = \log x_1 + \log x_2$, $\omega = (24, 0)$,
 $Y = \{(-y_1, y_2) : y_2 \leq \begin{cases} \frac{3}{4}y_1 & \text{if } 0 \leq y_1 \leq 20 \\ y_1^2 + 15 & \text{if } 20 < y_1 \end{cases}\}$
 - (c) $U(x_1, x_2) = 3x_1^2 + e^{x_2}$, $\omega = (24, 0)$,
 $Y = \{(-y_1, y_2) : y_2 \leq \log(y_1 + 1), y_1 \geq 0\}$

3. **Quasi-equilibrium to equilibrium in economy with production.** In lecture we have shown that with strict monotonicity of preferences any price quasi-equilibrium is also a price equilibrium in pure exchange economy. Now, you

need to prove that under our assumptions on preferences (continuous, convex and strongly monotone) as well as an additional assumption that $\exists y_j \in Y_j : \sum_j y_j + \bar{\omega} \gg 0$ this claim is also true in the Arrow-Debreu economy with production.

4. **“Tricky” Boundary Conditions.** A common misconception about the boundary condition on excess demand is to think that it says that if the price of a good goes to zero, then excess demand for *that good* goes to infinity. Although intuitively plausible, this is false even for very well-behaved preferences, since relative prices matter. Working this problem should help you avoid this misconception.

Consider the preference relation on \mathbb{R}_+^3 represented by the utility function $U(x_1, x_2, x_3) = \sqrt{x_1} + \sqrt{x_2} + x_2 + \frac{x_3}{1+x_3}$, and let the consumer’s initial endowment be $\omega = (1, 1, 1)$.

- (a) Show that U is strongly monotone, strictly concave, and continuous.
 - (b) If $(x_1, x_2, x_3) \in \mathbb{R}_+^3$ and $x_3 > 0$, show that $U(x_1, x_2 + x_3, 0) > U(x_1, x_2, x_3)$
 - (c) If $p = (p_1, p_2, p_3) \gg 0$ and $p_2 = p_3$, show that $x_3(p) = 0$.
 - (d) For each n , let $p^n = (1 - \frac{2}{n}, \frac{1}{n}, \frac{1}{n})$. Show that $x_3(p^n) = 0$ for each n (and thus that demand for x_3 remains bounded even though $p_3^n \rightarrow 0$).
 - (e) Show that $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} x_2(p^n) = \infty$.
5. **Importance of Assumptions.** Consider a two good economy, and illustrate graphically four examples of functions $z : \Delta^\circ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^2$ which demonstrate that if any one of the conditions

- (a) continuity,
- (b) Walras’ Law,
- (c) boundedness below ($\exists x \in \mathbb{R}$ s.t. $z(p) \geq x \forall p \in \Delta^\circ$),
- (d) boundary condition (if $p^n \rightarrow p \in \Delta \setminus \Delta^\circ$, then $|z_i(p^n)| \rightarrow \infty$)

fails, then there may not be a solution to $z(p) = 0$. That is, each function you draw should violate only one of the four conditions, and have the property that $\nexists p$ s.t. $z(p) = 0$.

6. **Continuity of correspondences.** Let $\psi : \Delta \rightarrow 2^\Delta$ is a correspondence. Show that ψ is uhc if it has a closed graph. Demonstrate graphically an example of correspondence $\psi : X \rightarrow 2^X$ such that ψ has a closed graph but ψ is not uhc.