

Appendix for "Offshoring in a Ricardian World"

This Appendix presents the proofs of Propositions 1 - 6 and the derivations of the results in Section IV.

Proof of Proposition 1

We want to show that

$$\left(\frac{T_m}{L_m}\right)^\kappa (T_m w_m^{-\theta} + \Phi_{-m})^{1/\theta} \geq \left(\frac{T_1}{L_1}\right)^\kappa (T_1 w_1^{-\theta} + T_2 w_2^{-\theta} + \Phi_{-m})^{1/\theta}$$

Since $\left(\frac{T_1}{L_1}\right)^\kappa > \left(\frac{T_m}{L_m}\right)^\kappa$, it is enough to prove the inequality for $\Phi_{-m} = 0$. Thus, using $w_i = \delta (T_i/L_i)^\kappa$ for $i = 1, 2, m$ then we need to show that

$$\begin{aligned} \left(\frac{T_m}{L_m}\right)^\kappa \left(T_m \delta^{-\theta} \left(\frac{L_m}{T_m}\right)^{\kappa\theta}\right)^{1/\theta} &= \frac{(T_m)^{1/\theta}}{\delta} \\ &\geq \left(\frac{T_1}{L_1}\right)^\kappa \left(T_1 \delta^{-\theta} \left(\frac{L_1}{T_1}\right)^{\kappa\theta} + T_2 \delta^{-\theta} \left(\frac{L_2}{T_2}\right)^{\kappa\theta}\right)^{1/\theta} \\ &= \left(\frac{T_1}{L_1}\right)^\kappa \frac{\left(T_1 \left(\frac{L_1}{T_1}\right)^{\kappa\theta} + T_2 \left(\frac{L_2}{T_2}\right)^{\kappa\theta}\right)^{1/\theta}}{\delta} \end{aligned}$$

We have

$$\left(\frac{T_1}{L_1}\right)^\kappa \frac{\left(T_1 \left(\frac{L_1}{T_1}\right)^{\kappa\theta} + T_2 \left(\frac{L_2}{T_2}\right)^{\kappa\theta}\right)^{1/\theta}}{\delta} \geq \left(\frac{T_1}{L_1}\right)^\kappa \frac{\left(T_1 \left(\frac{L_1}{T_1}\right)^{\kappa\theta} + T_2 \left(\frac{L_1}{T_1}\right)^{\kappa\theta}\right)^{1/\theta}}{\delta} = \frac{(T_m)^{1/\theta}}{\delta}.$$

Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 2

We have

$$\begin{aligned} w_1(\alpha) &= (1 + \alpha)\tilde{w}_1(\alpha) - \alpha w_2(\alpha) \\ &= \delta \left(\frac{T_1}{L_1}\right)^\kappa (1 + \alpha)^{1-\kappa} - \delta (T_2)^\kappa \frac{\alpha}{(L_2 - \alpha L_1)^\kappa} \end{aligned}$$

This implies that

$$w'_1(\alpha) = \delta \left(\frac{T_1}{L_1}\right)^\kappa \frac{(1 - \kappa)}{(1 + \alpha)^\kappa} - \frac{\delta (T_2)^\kappa}{(L_2 - \alpha L_1)^\kappa} \left(1 + \frac{\alpha \kappa L_1}{L_2 - \alpha L_1}\right)$$

Obviously $\delta \left(\frac{T_1}{L_1}\right)^\kappa \frac{(1 - \kappa)}{(1 + \alpha)^\kappa}$ is decreasing, while $\frac{\delta (T_2)^\kappa}{(L_2 - \alpha L_1)^\kappa} \left(1 + \frac{\alpha \kappa L_1}{L_2 - \alpha L_1}\right)$ is increasing in α . To determine the sign of $w'_1(\alpha)$ on $[0, \bar{\alpha}]$ we should then compare

$w'_1(0)$ and $w'_1(\bar{\alpha})$ with zero. Focusing first on $w'_1(\bar{\alpha})$, using the definition of $\bar{\alpha}$, we get

$$w'_1(\bar{\alpha}) = \frac{\kappa T_2^\kappa \delta (1 + \eta L_1/L_2)^\kappa}{(L_2 + L_1)^\kappa} \left(-1 - \frac{(\eta - 1)L_1}{L_2 + L_1} \right) < 0$$

Turning to $w'_1(0)$, note that

$$\begin{aligned} w'_1(0) &= \delta \left(\frac{T_1}{L_1} \right)^\kappa (1 - \kappa) - \frac{\delta T_2^\kappa}{L_2^\kappa} \\ &= \delta \left(\frac{T_2}{L_2} \right)^\kappa (\eta^\kappa (1 - \kappa) - 1) > 0 \iff \eta > (1 - \kappa)^{-1/\kappa} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, if $\eta \leq (1 - \kappa)^{-1/\kappa}$, then $w_1(\alpha)$ is always decreasing on $[0, \bar{\alpha}]$. If $\eta > (1 - \kappa)^{-1/\kappa}$, then $w_1(\alpha)$ is shaped like an inverted U on $[0, \bar{\alpha}]$. **Q.E.D.**

Proof of Proposition 3

Recall that $\Phi \equiv \sum_k T_k c_k^{-\theta}$. Thus, it is useful to use

$$\Phi = T_1 c_1^{-\theta} + T_2 w_2^{-\theta} + \Phi_{-m}$$

where Φ_{-m} is not affected by α . We know that $c_1 = \delta \left(T_1/\tilde{L}_1 \right)^\kappa$ and $w_2 = \delta \left(T_2/\tilde{L}_2 \right)^\kappa$, so

$$T_1 c_1^{-\theta} + T_2 w_2^{-\theta} = \delta^{-\theta} \left(T_1^\kappa L_1^{\theta\kappa} (1 + \alpha)^{\theta\kappa} + T_2^\kappa (L_2 - \alpha L_1)^{\theta\kappa} \right)$$

This implies that

$$\left(T_1 c_1^{-\theta} + T_2 w_2^{-\theta} \right)'_\alpha = \delta^{-\theta} \theta \kappa L_1 \left[\left(T_1/L_1 \right)^\kappa (1 + \alpha)^{-\kappa} - T_2^\kappa (L_2 - \alpha L_1)^{-\kappa} \right]$$

We need to compare $f(\alpha) \equiv \left(\frac{T_1}{L_1} \right)^\kappa (1 + \alpha)^{-\kappa} - T_2^\kappa (L_2 - \alpha L_1)^{-\kappa}$ with zero on $[0, \bar{\alpha}]$. Obviously, $f(0) = \left(\frac{T_1}{L_1} \right)^\kappa - \left(\frac{T_2}{L_2} \right)^\kappa > 0$, while simple algebra reveals that $f(\bar{\alpha}) = 0$. Since $f'(\alpha) < 0$, then $f(\bar{\alpha}) = 0$ implies that $f(\alpha) > 0$ for any $\alpha \in [0, \bar{\alpha}[$. This means that $\left(T_1 c_1^{-\theta} + T_2 w_2^{-\theta} \right)'_\alpha > 0$, or $\Phi'_\alpha > 0$. But given $P = \gamma \Phi^{-1/\theta}$ then this implies that $P'_\alpha < 0$. **Q.E.D.**

Proof of Proposition 4

We know that the sign of $\left(\frac{w_1}{P} \right)'_\alpha$ is the same as the sign of $\frac{w'_1}{w_1} - \frac{P'}{P}$. But simple differentiation and simplification reveals that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{w'_1}{w_1} &= G(x, \alpha) \equiv \frac{x(1 - \kappa) \left(\frac{f(\alpha)}{1 + \alpha} \right)^\kappa - \left(1 + \frac{\alpha \kappa L_1/L_2}{f(\alpha)} \right)}{x(1 + \alpha) \left(\frac{f(\alpha)}{1 + \alpha} \right)^\kappa - \alpha} \\ \frac{P'}{P} &= F(x, \alpha) \equiv -\kappa \frac{x \frac{1}{(1 + \alpha)^\kappa} - \frac{1}{(f(\alpha))^\kappa}}{x(1 + \alpha)^{\theta\kappa} + \frac{L_2}{L_1} (f(\alpha))^{\theta\kappa} + \frac{\delta^\theta \Phi^*}{L_1}} \end{aligned}$$

where $x \equiv \eta^\kappa$, $f(\alpha) = 1 - \alpha L_1/L_2$. Let $x_F(\alpha)$ and $x_G(\alpha)$ be defined implicitly by $F(x, \alpha) = 0$ and $G(x, \alpha) = 0$, respectively. The following lemma, whose proof is simple and therefore omitted, summarizes a number of properties of these functions:

Lemma 1 $F(x, \alpha)$ is decreasing in x , $G(x, \alpha)$ is increasing in x ,

$$x_F(\alpha) = \left(\frac{1 + \alpha}{f(\alpha)} \right)^\kappa > 1, \quad \text{and} \quad x_G(\alpha) = \frac{\left(1 + \frac{\alpha \kappa L_1/L_2}{f(\alpha)} \right)}{(1 - \kappa) \left(\frac{f(\alpha)}{1 + \alpha} \right)^\kappa} > 1.$$

Also, $x_F(\alpha) < x_G(\alpha)$, $x'_F(\alpha) > 0$, $x'_G(\alpha) > 0$.

Let $x_M(\alpha)$ be defined implicitly by $G(x, \alpha) = F(x, \alpha)$. Such a solution necessarily exists since $x_F(\alpha) < x_G(\alpha)$ and $F(x, \alpha)$ is decreasing in x and $G(x, \alpha)$ is increasing in x . Also, it is clear that $1 < x_F(\alpha) < x_M(\alpha) < x_G(\alpha)$. Since $x > x_M(\alpha)$ implies $G > F$ then it also implies that w_1/P is increasing. Similarly, $x < x_M(\alpha)$ implies that w_1/P is decreasing. The following lemma (whose proof is long and tedious and therefore provided in a separate online Appendix) is critical:

Lemma 2 $x_M(\alpha)$ is increasing

Let $\hat{\eta}$ be equal to $x_M(0)^{1/\kappa}$. If $\eta \leq \hat{\eta}$, then $x = \eta^\kappa \leq x_M(0) \leq x_M(\alpha)$ for any α . This implies that $F(x) > G(x)$ (except the case when $x = \hat{\eta}^\kappa$ and $\alpha = 0$), so w_1/P is decreasing. This establishes the first part of the proposition. To establish the second part, we need the following lemma:

Lemma 3 For any $\eta > \hat{\eta} = (x_M(0))^{1/\kappa}$ we have $x = \eta^\kappa < x_M(\bar{\alpha}(\eta))$.

Proof. The proof relies on showing that $F(\eta^\kappa, \bar{\alpha}(\eta)) = 0$, which implies that $\eta^\kappa = x_F(\bar{\alpha}(\eta))$. If this is true then $x_M(\bar{\alpha}(\eta)) > \eta^\kappa$, because since $x_F(\alpha) < x_M(\alpha)$ for all α then $\eta^\kappa = x_F(\bar{\alpha}(\eta)) < x_M(\bar{\alpha}(\eta))$, which establishes the result. But from the definition of $\bar{\alpha}$ we see that

$$\eta = \frac{1 + \bar{\alpha}}{f(\bar{\alpha})}$$

and plugging this into $F(\eta^\kappa, \bar{\alpha})$ shows that $F(\eta^\kappa, \bar{\alpha}(\eta)) = 0$. ■

This lemma implies that if $\eta > \hat{\eta}$ then w_1/P is increasing for $\alpha = 0$ and decreasing just before $\alpha = \bar{\alpha}(\eta)$, with a unique point α for which $x_M(\alpha) = x$ at which $G = F$ and hence $(w_1/P)'_\alpha = 0$. This implies that the curve w_1/P as a function of α in the interval $\alpha \in [0, \bar{\alpha}]$ is shaped like an inverted U .

Proof of Proposition 5

The only thing left to show is that steady state P is decreasing in α . It is sufficient to show that $\Phi_{mt} = T_{1t}c_{1t}^{-\theta} + T_{2t}w_{2t}^{-\theta}$ is decreasing in α . But

$$\Phi_{mt} = (1/L_{2t}^F g_L) (\phi_1 r_1 \varphi c_{1t}^{-\theta} + \phi_2 r_2 w_{2t}^{-\theta})$$

Using $c_1^{1-\kappa} = \left(\frac{\phi_1/\phi_N}{w_1}\right)^\kappa$ and $w_2 = (\phi_2/\phi_N)^\kappa$ then

$$\begin{aligned}\Phi_{mt} &= (1/L_{2t}^F g_L) \left(\phi_1 r_1 \varphi \left(\frac{\phi_1/\phi_N}{w_{1t}} \right)^{-\kappa\theta/(1-\kappa)} + \phi_2 r_2 (\phi_2/\phi_N)^{-\kappa\theta} \right) \\ &= (\phi_N/L_{2t}^F g_L) (\varphi r_1 w_1 + w_2 r_2)\end{aligned}$$

But plugging in from the equations (24) and (25) we get that

$$\varphi r_1 w_1 + w_2 r_2 = \varphi w_1 + w_2$$

which is increasing in α . **Q.E.D.**

Proof of Proposition 6

I first show that $x = \alpha w_2/w_1$ is increasing in α . From (29) we get $(\phi_1/\phi_N)^\kappa = z(1+x)^{1-\kappa} = z^\kappa(z+w_2\beta(1-\beta)^{-\kappa})^{1-\kappa}$, where $z \equiv (1-\beta)^{1-\kappa}w_1$. Since $\beta(1-\beta)^{-\kappa}$ is increasing in α then z must be decreasing in α . In turn, this implies that x must be increasing in α .

Now, recall that r_1 is determined as the solution of $r_1 = r(1+\alpha(1-r_1)w_2/w_1)$. Both the LHS and the RHS are linear functions in r_1 , with the LHS increasing and the RHS decreasing. An increase in α moves the RHS schedule upward because $\alpha w_2/w_1$ increases with α , while the LHS schedule remains the same. This implies that r_1 increases.

In the text, before stating proposition 6 I also stated that $\alpha(1-r_1)w_2/w_1$ is increasing in α . To see this, note that since r_1 is increasing in alpha, then the RHS of $r_1 = r(1+\alpha(1-r_1)w_2/w_1)$ must be increasing in α , so $\alpha(1-r_1)w_2/w_1$ is increasing in α .

Finally, to prove that r_2 is decreasing in α , from (25) I need to show that $\alpha(1-r_1)$ is increasing in α . But we know that $\alpha(1-r_1)w_2/w_1$ is increasing in α while w_2 is constant and w_1 is increasing. This implies that $\alpha(1-r_1)$ must be increasing in α . **Q.E.D.**

Equilibrium with offshoring costs: 2 countries

Let

$$C(w_1, w_2, \lambda) \equiv w_2 F(1, \lambda) + \int_{w_2}^{w_1} x dF(x, \lambda/w_2) dx + w_1(1 - F(w_1, \lambda/w_2))$$

Integration and simplification yields

$$C(w_1, w_2, \lambda) = w_2 - (w_2/\lambda) \exp(-\lambda w_1/w_2) + (w_2/\lambda) \exp(-\lambda)$$

Letting $s(w_1, w_2, \lambda) \equiv F(w_1/w_2, \lambda)$ and $\sigma(w_1, w_2, \lambda) = \Gamma(w_1, w_2, \lambda)s(w_1, w_2, \lambda)$, or

$$\sigma(w_1, w_2, \lambda) \equiv 1 - (1/\lambda) \exp(-\lambda w_1/w_2) - w_1/w_2 \exp(-\lambda w_1/w_2) + (1/\lambda) \exp(-\lambda)$$

then an equilibrium for $\lambda < \lambda_m$ is determined by the following equations:

$$C(w_1, w_2, \lambda) = \delta \left(\frac{T_1}{L_1/(1-s(w_1, w_2, \lambda))} \right)^\kappa \quad (1)$$

and

$$w_2 = \delta \left(\frac{T_2}{L_2 - \sigma(w_1, w_2, \lambda)L_1/(1-s(w_1, w_2, \lambda))} \right)^\kappa \quad (2)$$

Totally differentiating above yields equation (1) yields

$$\frac{dC}{d\lambda} = \frac{\partial C}{\partial w_1} \frac{dw_1}{d\lambda} + \frac{\partial C}{\partial w_2} \frac{dw_2}{d\lambda} + \frac{\partial C}{\partial \lambda} = -\delta(T_1/L_1)^\kappa \kappa (1-s)^{\kappa-1} \frac{ds}{d\lambda}$$

As $\lambda \rightarrow 0$ then $s \rightarrow 0$, hence $\partial C/\partial w_2 \rightarrow 0$ and

$$\frac{\partial C}{\partial w_1} \frac{dw_1}{d\lambda} + \frac{\partial C}{\partial \lambda} = -\delta(T_1/L_1)^\kappa \kappa \frac{ds}{d\lambda}$$

Now,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{ds}{d\lambda} &= \frac{\partial s}{\partial w_1} \frac{dw_1}{d\lambda} + \frac{\partial s}{\partial w_2} \frac{dw_2}{d\lambda} + \frac{\partial s}{\partial \lambda} \\ &= (\lambda/w_2) \exp(-\lambda w_1/w_2) - (\lambda w_1/w_2^2) \exp(-\lambda w_1/w_2) + (w_1/w_2) \exp(-\lambda w_1/w_2) \end{aligned}$$

When $\lambda \rightarrow 0$ then $ds/d\lambda \rightarrow w_1/w_2$. Noting that $w_1 \rightarrow \delta(T_1/L_1)^\kappa$ as $\lambda \rightarrow 0$, we see that

$$\frac{\partial C}{\partial w_1} \frac{dw_1}{d\lambda} = -\kappa \frac{w_1^2}{w_2} - \frac{\partial C}{\partial \lambda}$$

Simple differentiation reveals that

$$\frac{\partial C}{\partial \lambda} = \frac{w_2 \exp(-\lambda w_1/w_2) - w_2 \exp(-\lambda) + w_1 \lambda \exp(-\lambda w_1/w_2) - w_2 \lambda \exp(-\lambda)}{\lambda^2}$$

Since both the numerator and denominators converge to 0 as $\lambda \rightarrow 0$ then we can use L'Hopital's Theorem to find that

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} \frac{\partial C}{\partial \lambda} &= \lim_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} \frac{w_1(-\lambda)(w_1/w_2) \exp(-\lambda w_1/w_2) + w_2 \lambda \exp(-\lambda)}{2\lambda} \\ &= \frac{w_2 - w_1^2/w_2}{2} \end{aligned}$$

Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} \lim \left(-\kappa \frac{w_1^2}{w_2} - \frac{\partial C}{\partial \lambda} \right) &= -\kappa w_2 \left(\frac{w_1}{w_2} \right)^2 - (w_2/2) \left(1 - \left(\frac{w_1}{w_2} \right)^2 \right) \\ &= (w_2/2) \left[(w_1/w_2)^2 (1 - 2\kappa) - 1 \right] \end{aligned}$$

This implies that $\lim_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} dw_1/d\lambda > 0$ if and only if $(w_1/w_2)^2 > 1/(1 - 2\kappa)$.

To show that $\partial C/\partial \lambda < 0$, note that this is equivalent to

$$(1 + w_1 \lambda/w_2) \exp(-\lambda w_1/w_2) < (1 + \lambda) \exp(-\lambda)$$

This inequality holds since the function $f(x) \equiv (1 + x) \exp(-x)$ is clearly decreasing.

Equilibrium with offshoring costs: 3 countries

I first characterize an equilibrium in which $w_1 > w_3 > w_2$. In this case the distribution of c_1 is

$$\Pr(C_1 \leq c_1) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } c_1 < w_2 \\ F(c_1, \lambda/w_2) & \text{if } c_1 \in [w_2, w_3[\\ F(c_1, \varphi) & \text{if } c_1 \in [w_3, w_1[\\ 1 & \text{if } c_1 \geq w_1 \end{cases}$$

where $\varphi \equiv \lambda/w_2 + \lambda/w_3$, and unit cost of the common input in country 1 is

$$\begin{aligned} c_1(w_1, w_2, w_3) \equiv & w_2 F(1, \lambda) + \int_{w_2}^{w_3} dF(x, \lambda/w_2) \\ & + w_3 (F(w_3, \varphi) - F(w_3, \lambda/w_2)) + \int_{w_3}^{w_1} dF(x, \varphi) + w_1 (1 - F(w_1, \varphi)) \end{aligned}$$

The equilibrium condition for country 1 is

$$c_1(w_1, w_2, w_3) = \delta \left(\frac{T_1(1-s)}{L_1} \right)^\kappa$$

where $s = 1 - \exp(-\varphi w_1)$ is the total share of services offshored. This share is distributed between countries 2 and 3 as follows:

$$s_{12} = F(w_3, \lambda/w_2) + [F(w_1, \varphi) - F(w_3, \varphi)] \left(\frac{\lambda/w_2}{\varphi} \right)$$

and

$$s_{13} = F(w_3, \lambda/w_2 + \lambda/w_3) - F(w_3, \lambda/w_2) + [F(w_1, \varphi) - F(w_3, \varphi)] \left(\frac{\lambda/w_3}{\varphi} \right)$$

Note that $s = s_{12} + s_{13}$.

On the other hand, we have that

$$\Pr(C_3 \leq c_3) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } c_3 < w_2 \\ F(c_3, \lambda/w_2) & \text{if } c_3 \in [w_2, w_3[\\ 1 & \text{if } c_3 \geq w_3 \end{cases}$$

and

$$c_3(w_1, w_2, w_3) \equiv w_2 F(1, \lambda) + \int_{w_2}^{w_3} x dF(x, \lambda/w_2) + w_3 (1 - F(w_3, \lambda/w_2))$$

and

$$s_{32}(w_2, w_3) = F(w_3, \lambda_2/w_2)$$

The equilibrium conditions for countries 2 and 3 are $c_i(w_1, w_2, w_3) = \delta \left(T_i / \tilde{L}_i \right)^\kappa$ for $i = 2, 3$, with $c_2(w_1, w_2, w_3) = w_2$. To derive \tilde{L}_3 , note that country 1 uses $L_1/(1-s)$ of every service, and if the offshoring cost of a service in country 3 is ζ_3 then it takes $\zeta_3 L_1/(1-s)$ units of labor to produce $L_1/(1-s)$ units of a service delivered in country 1. The expectation of ζ_3 for services offshored by country 1 to country 3 is

$$\sigma_{13}(w_1, w_2, w_3) \equiv F(w_3, \varphi) - F(w_3, \lambda/w_2) + (1/w_3) \left(\frac{\lambda/w_3}{\varphi} \right) \int_{w_3}^{w_1} x dF(x, \varphi)$$

This implies that $L_3 - \left(\frac{\sigma_{13}}{1-s} \right) L_1$ units of labor are left in country 3 for final good production. But this country will offshore s_{32} services to country 2, so it will use $\left(L_3 - \left(\frac{\sigma_{13}}{1-s} \right) L_1 \right) \left(\frac{1}{1-s_{32}} \right)$ of each service for domestic production. This implies that

$$\tilde{L}_3 = \left(L_3 - \left(\frac{\sigma_{13}}{1-s} \right) L_1 \right) \left(\frac{1}{1-s_{32}} \right)$$

On the other hand, country 2 export services to countries 1 and 3. The labor it takes to export services to country 1 is $\left(\frac{\sigma_{12}}{1-s} \right) L_1$, where σ_{12} is the expectation of ζ_2 for services offshored by country 1 to country 2, and is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_{12}(w_1, w_2, w_3) \equiv & (1 - \exp(-\lambda)) + (1/w_2) \int_{w_2}^{w_3} x dF(x, \lambda/w_2) \\ & + (1/w_2) \left(\frac{\lambda/w_2}{\varphi} \right) \int_{w_3}^{w_1} x dF(x, \varphi) \end{aligned}$$

Country 2 also exports services to country 3, and by the reasoning above, we know that it takes $\left(L_3 - \left(\frac{\sigma_{13}}{1-s} \right) L_1 \right) \left(\frac{\sigma_{32}}{1-s_{32}} \right)$ units of labor to do so, with σ_{32} representing the expectation of ζ_2 for services offshored by country 3 to country 2, given by

$$\sigma_{32}(w_1, w_2, w_3) \equiv (1 - \exp(-\lambda)) + (1/w_2) \int_{w_2}^{w_3} x dF(x, \lambda/w_2)$$

Thus, we find that

$$\tilde{L}_2 = L_2 - \left(\frac{\sigma_{12}}{1-s} \right) L_1 - \left(L_3 - \left(\frac{\sigma_{13}}{1-s} \right) L_1 \right) \left(\frac{\sigma_{32}}{1-s_{32}} \right)$$

If the previous system yields wages that do not respect $w_1 > w_3 > w_2$ then it is not an equilibrium. Other possible equilibrium configurations have

$w_1 > w_2 = w_3$, $w_1 = w_3 > w_2$, and $w_1 = w_2 = w_3$. The last case entails full offshoring. Such an equilibrium satisfies

$$\frac{T_m}{L_m} = \frac{T_1(1-s)}{L_1} = \frac{T_2}{L_2 - \left(\frac{s_{12}}{1-s}\right)L_1 - \left(L_3 - \left(\frac{s_{13}}{1-s}\right)L_1\right)\left(\frac{s_{32}}{1-s_{32}}\right)} = \frac{T_3(1-s_{32})}{L_3 - \left(\frac{s_{13}}{1-s}\right)L_1}$$

with $s = s_{12} + s_{13}$. For every s_{32} these equations determine s_{12} and s_{13} , so these variables are not uniquely pinned down in equilibrium: there is no uniqueness because of the absence of offshoring costs for the services that are traded, but all equilibria entail the same wages.¹ If one can find a solution with $s < F(1, 2\lambda)$ and $s_{12}, s_{13}, s_{32} < F(1, \lambda)$, then this solution corresponds to an equilibrium with full offshoring. Since $F(1, 2\lambda)$ and $F(1, \lambda)$ both converge to 1 as $\lambda \rightarrow \infty$ then necessarily there is some critical value of λ such that for higher values of λ the equilibrium entails full offshoring.

I now establish the equilibrium conditions when wages entail $w_1 > w_2 = w_3$ and $w_1 = w_3 > w_2$. If $w_1 > w_2 = w_3$ then countries 2 and 3 are integrated and their wage should be the same as the one we would get in a two country system, with

$$w_2 = w_3 = w_{23} = \delta \left(\frac{T_2 + T_3}{L_2 + L_3 - \left(\frac{\sigma}{1-s}\right)L_1} \right)^\kappa$$

but with countries 2 and 3 drawing their offshoring cost from $F(\zeta, 2\lambda)$, and with $s = F(w_1/w_{23}, 2\lambda)$ and

$$\sigma = F(1, 2\lambda) + \int_1^{w_1/w_{23}} x dF(x, 2\lambda)$$

This equilibrium has σ_{12} and σ_{13} and s_{32} such that

$$w_{23} = \delta \left(\frac{T_2}{L_2 - \left(\frac{\sigma_{12}}{1-s}\right)L_1 - \left(L_3 - \left(\frac{\sigma_{13}}{1-s}\right)L_1\right)\left(\frac{s_{32}}{1-s_{32}}\right)} \right)^\kappa$$

and

$$w_{23} = \delta \left(\frac{T_3}{L_3 - \left(\frac{\sigma_{13}}{1-s}\right)L_1 - \left(\frac{1}{1-s_{32}}\right)L_1} \right)^\kappa$$

with the restriction that $\sigma_{32} = s_{32} \leq F(1, \lambda)$ and

$$\sigma_{12}, \sigma_{13} \leq F(1, \lambda) + (1/2) \int_1^{w_1/w_{23}} x dF(x, 2\lambda)$$

¹Although there are 3 equations for 3 unknowns (s_{12} , s_{13} and s_{32}), these equations are linearly dependent, so they determine only two unknowns.

The first term on the RHS is the measure of services for which ζ_2 or ζ_3 are equal to 1, while the second term is the offshoring cost for services with $\zeta_i \in]1, w_1/w_3]$.

Now consider the case with $w_1 = w_3 > w_2$. This entails

$$w_1 = w_3 = w_{13} = \delta \left(\frac{(T_1 + T_3)(1 - s)}{L_1 + L_3} \right)^\kappa$$

and

$$w_2 = \delta \left(\frac{T_2}{L_2 - \left(\frac{\sigma}{1-s}\right)(L_1 + L_3)} \right)^\kappa$$

where $s = F(w_{13}/w_2, \lambda)$ and

$$\sigma = F(1, \lambda) + \int_1^{w_{13}/w_2} x dF(x, \lambda)$$

For this to be an equilibrium, we need that $\sigma_{13} = s_{13} \leq F(1, \lambda)$, have $s_{32} = s_{12} = F(w_{13}/w_2, \lambda)$ and

$$\sigma_{32} = \sigma_{12} = F(1, \lambda) + \int_1^{w_{13}/w_2} x dF(x, \lambda)$$

and the equations of the full system.

For the long run equilibrium, we have $c_i(w_1, w_2, w_3)^{1-\kappa} = \left(\frac{\phi_i/\phi_N}{w_i}\right)^\kappa$ for $i = 1, 2, 3$, with $c_2(w_1, w_2, w_3) = w_2$. This equation for $i = 2$ can be solved directly to yield $w_2 = (\phi_2/\phi_N)^\kappa$, as in (28). Plugging this into the equation for $i = 3$ yields an equation that can be solved for the equilibrium wage in country 3, w_3 . We can easily check that w_3 is increasing in λ . Finally, plugging the solution $w_3(\lambda)$ into the equation for $i = 1$ yields the equilibrium $w_1(\lambda)$. I have not been able to show that $w_1(\lambda)$ is increasing.