

Tax policy for innovation

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Introduction – questions asked

- ▶ *Very brief overview of innovation expenditure components*
- ▶ Do countries provide enough to support private R&D?
- ▶ Are patent boxes a good way to spur innovation?
- ▶ How should R&D tax credits be designed?
- ▶ Should there be coordination across countries?

As time permits, possibly for discussion:

- ▶ *What about a super deduction scheme of 150% for R&D?*
- ▶ *How much extra growth could countries achieve if they were to expand support for private R&D? That is, what are the social returns?*



What does innovative activity consist of?

- ▶ R&D
 - ▶ Research – basic and applied
 - ▶ Development (sometimes modified by “experimental”)
- ▶ Purchase of external IP (patents, knowhow, etc.)
- ▶ Purchase, installation, and use of new (technologically advanced) equipment
- ▶ Training of employees in new processes, or in supporting new products
- ▶ Marketing new goods and services
- ▶ Preparation for organizational innovations

The extent of spillovers clearly varies across these, as does patentability



Rationale(s) for innovation support

- ▶ Innovative activity generates spillovers to other firms and the economy broadly
 - ▶ Some of these may be local to a region or economy
- ▶ Resources for innovation may be undersupplied because of
 - ▶ (relative) ease of imitation
 - ▶ high cost of financing (esp. for SMEs)
- ▶ Remedies
 - ▶ Property rights (at the cost of restricted output)
 - ▶ Subsidies (often targetted; high administration costs)
 - ▶ Tax credits of various kinds



Do countries provide enough support for R&D?

- ▶ Lots of evidence that social returns are much higher than private (Kao et al 1999, Keller 1998, Coe and Helpman 1995).
Some nuances:
 - ▶ Domestic spillovers larger than those from other countries (Branstetter 2001, Peri 2004)
 - ▶ Spillovers from foreign R&D more important for smaller open economies than for countries like US, Japan, and Germany (Park 1995, van Pottelsberghe 1997)
 - ▶ Absorptive capacity of recipient country important for making use of R&D spillovers (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 2001)
 - ▶ Typical social rates of return are quite large, but imprecise
- ▶ Jones and Williams (1998) – using endogenous growth model, argue that socially optimal R&D investment 2-4 times actual in US



The financing channel

- ▶ **Hall (1993, 2002)** – reasons why equity is preferred to debt for intangible R&D investment
 - ▶ **Williamson (1988)** – assets not “redeployable” - lack of resale market, partly mitigated now by patents (but extent of that market questionable)
 - ▶ R&D and debt finance compete for smooth cash flow in firm
 - ▶ Leverage negatively correlated with R&D intensity in US
- ▶ **Brown & Martinsson (2016)** - empirical test
 - ▶ Taxes on corporate payouts (dividends & capital gains) raise the cost of equity financing
 - ▶ Investments that depend on equity finance (e.g., R&D) may suffer
 - ▶ 1990-2008, 29 industries in 21 countries – equity dependent industries reduce R&D more when payout tax rate high



R&D tax incentives & patent boxes

- ▶ Is the widespread adoption of patent or IP boxes in Europe a good development to spur innovation?

NO

- ▶ Why not?
 - ▶ Better to subsidize expense directly rather than patented output (which may have cost almost nothing)
 - ▶ Incentives for cost-shifting between patent income and non-patent income would be large
 - ▶ Incentive to choose projects with high non-R&E expenses
 - ▶ Incentive to choose patentable projects, which are more easily appropriable anyway – targets strictly private returns, not social
 - ▶ A tax subsidy for patent trolling
 - ▶ An incentive to use zombie patents to reduce taxes
 - ▶ Arbitrage across firm country, size and profitability possible



Evidence on patent boxes *(Not much yet)*

- ▶ **Alstadsaeter et al. 2015** – MNEs shift patents more than R&D in response
- ▶ **Gaessler, Hall, & Harhoff (in process)** – firms transfer patent ownership in response to corporate tax differentials as well as patent boxes, effects may be small
- ▶ **Koethenbueger et al. (2016)** – profit rates at European subs that acquire patents after the patent box are 3% higher than at subs that do not have patents, or where the box limits the use of transferred patents
- ▶ Lots of evidence that patent location responds to corporate tax rates already (even before the boxes)



International coordination

- ▶ Should these policies be better coordinated between countries
 - ▶ To exploit cross-border spillovers? **Maybe**
 - ▶ To avoid wasteful tax competition? **YES**
- ▶ Evidence
 - ▶ **Bloom & Griffith (2001)** find domestic R&D responds to foreign cost of R&D with an elasticity of \sim unity (roughly equal and opposite to domestic cost response) – 8 large OECD economies, 1981-1999
 - ▶ **Corrado et al. (2016)** find similar results for 10 EU countries, 1995-2007
 - ▶ **Wilson (2009)** finds similar, but even larger, results for US states
- ▶ **Implication: R&D moves in response to differential incentives, however, note that equal and opposite elasticities does not imply zero-sum**




R&D tax incentive design

- ▶ Incremental schemes are cheaper but more difficult to design and administer
 - ▶ Avoid basing on recent firm R&D spending
- ▶ If they are targeted, should be towards larger spillovers or credit constraints:
 - ▶ Small or **new** firms
 - ▶ Collaboration with universities or non-profit research institutions
- ▶ Loss carry-forwards, esp. for new firms
- ▶ Debt vs equity taxation?
- ▶ Why a ceiling?



For discussion

- ▶ What do you think of the R&D incentive included in the recent EU proposal for a common corporate tax base in Europe - super deduction of 150 percent, to replace patent boxes and existing R&D tax credit schemes
- ▶ Good idea but effectiveness depends on corporate tax rate



- ▶ One caveat: costs of adjustment of supply of S&Es; wage impacts



For discussion

- ▶ How much extra growth could countries achieve if they were to expand support for private R&D?
 - ▶ Very difficult to answer, especially given the other factors that influence growth
 - ▶ Typical numbers for “back of envelope” computation:
 - ▶ elasticity of R&D wrt cost about 1.0
 - ▶ Elasticity of output wrt R&D about 0.1
 - ▶ => 20% fall cost => 2% larger output
 - ▶ Partial equilibrium, not general

