Most empirical papers in economics focus on two aspects of their results: whether the estimates are statistically significantly different from zero and the interpretation of the point estimates. This focus obscures important information about the implications of the results for economically interesting hypotheses about values of the parameters other than zero, and in some cases, about the strength of the evidence against values of zero. This limitation can be overcome by reporting confidence intervals for papers’ main estimates and discussing their economic interpretation.

There has been a revolution in econometric practice in recent decades. The intense focus on identification, the emphasis on economic as well as statistical significance, the attention to ensuring that standard errors are correct, and the development of new techniques to deal with dynamics, heterogeneity, and nonlinearities are enormous advances over the empirical research of previous generations.

The thesis of this paper is that there is at least one dimension on which there is still considerable room for improvement. As I document, most modern empirical papers concentrate on two characteristics of their findings: whether the point estimates are statistically significantly different from zero, and the economic interpretation of the point estimates. But in almost all applications, there are potential values of the parameters other than the point estimates and zero that are of interest. Focusing on point estimates and statistical significance obscures the
implications of the findings for those values. In addition, as discussed below, this focus also leaves out important information even about the strength of the evidence against a parameter value of zero.

This problem can be solved easily. Reporting confidence intervals for key estimates and discussing their economic interpretation allows a researcher to communicate the essence of the missing information.

I. Some Evidence

I suspect most economists will find the statement that current empirical papers generally emphasize point estimates and statistical significance uncontroversial. Nonetheless, to provide systematic evidence on this issue, I examine empirical papers published in 2019 in the three leading nonspecialized general interest journals in economics: the American Economic Review (AER), the Journal of Political Economy (JPE), and the Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE). Specifically, I start by examining all papers in the QJE in 2019 that estimate parameters statistically (rather than being entirely theoretical or reporting only descriptive statistics). There are 35 such papers. I then consider the first 35 papers in 2019 that estimate parameters statistically in each of the AER and the JPE, for a total of 105 papers.

I classify the papers into five groups: (1) Ones that discuss confidence intervals prominently (for example, by reporting a confidence interval in the abstract, introduction, or conclusion, or reporting multiple confidence intervals elsewhere in the text), or otherwise discuss the implications of the results for parameter values other than point estimates or zero; (2) ones that report standard errors (or $t$-statistics) prominently in the text but do not discuss confidence intervals; (3) ones that mention confidence intervals in passing (for example, a single brief mention of a confidence interval in the text); (4) ones that mention standard errors or $t$-statistics in passing but do not mention confidence intervals; (5) ones that do not mention either
confidence intervals or standard errors in the text.\footnote{There are two reasons for not considering information reported only in tables and figures in classifying papers. First, and most importantly, what authors put in the text indicates what they consider important and shapes how their findings are understood. Second, confidence intervals often appear in tables and figures as an artifact of the presentation. For example, the most natural way to convey point estimates and standard errors in figures is by showing point estimates and confidence bands. My classification also ignores any information reported in online appendixes, again on the grounds that authors’ choices of what to report in the main text indicates what they consider important. The online appendix describes the specifics of the sample selection rules and criteria for classifying papers. It also discusses marginal cases and the considerations that lead me to classify those papers as I do. As described there, for the most part I err on the side of placing papers in groups that reflect greater discussion of confidence intervals and standard errors.}

Table 1 reports the results. Only 14 percent of the papers (15 out of 105) report confidence intervals at all prominently. An additional 10 percent discuss standard errors somewhat prominently. 6 percent mention confidence intervals in passing, and 7 percent mention standard errors in passing.

The remaining 64 percent of the papers make no mention of confidence intervals or standard errors in the text. Some of these papers report only that the estimates are statistically significant; some provide qualitative information about statistical significance (such as “strongly” or “moderately”); others report information on $p$ values (such as “at the 5 percent level” or “$p < .01$,” or sometimes, actual $p$ values); and some do not even say whether the estimates are statistically significant. In these papers, it is usually clear from the text that the standard errors on the focal estimates are less than half the size of the point estimates, but there is little information beyond that. The tone is often that once it is known that estimates are significantly different from zero, the only aspect of the results that matters is the point estimates—almost as though when an estimate is significantly different from zero, it can be treated as exact.\footnote{Manski (2019) provides a broader discussion of the temptations of overstating the degree of certainty associated with empirical findings and the dangers of such unwarranted certitude.}

The sample size in Table 1 is large enough that the results are unlikely to be greatly affected by random variation in which empirical papers are in the sample. For example, the upper end of the 2-standard error confidence interval for the fraction of papers that report confidence intervals prominently is 21 percent, and the lower end of the 2-standard error confidence interval for the fraction that do not mention confidence intervals or standard errors at all is 54 percent.
II. Why Do We Care?

Knowing only a point estimate and that it is significantly different from zero is not enough to know what values of the parameter other than zero the data provide strong evidence against, and what values they provide little reason to object to. Since in almost all applications there are hypotheses of interest other than that a parameter is zero, this is an important omission.

To see this concretely, consider two classic examples, one from microeconomics and one from macroeconomics. The microeconomic example is the rate of return to education—the percent increase in earnings from an additional year of schooling. In most contexts, the possibility that this rate of return is zero is not of great interest: it would make little sense for individuals to devote so much of their lives to education if it had no economic benefit, and the vast previous work in this area already provides overwhelming evidence that the rate of return is positive.

Thus if a new dataset or empirical strategy provides new evidence on the rate of return, most readers’ interest will be in how consistent or inconsistent that evidence is with various values of the return other than zero. For example, they might want to know whether it casts strong doubt on the view that the return is 9.4 percent, which is the median estimate from the numerous instrumental variables estimates using U.S. data surveyed by Card (2001, Table II). Or they might want to know what it tells us about the values of 6 percent for men and 7 percent for women suggested by Trostel, Walker, and Woolley (2002, p. 15) based on an analysis of data from 28 countries. Individuals considering more schooling and policymakers considering new projects to promote education might be interested in the implications of the new evidence for whether the return is above whatever they view as the cutoff for moving forward. And so on. Knowing the point estimate from a new study and that it is statistically significantly different from zero provides little information about the implications for these various candidate values of the rate of return.

The second example is the fiscal multiplier—the short-run output effect of a one-unit increase in government purchases with the economy in a specific set of circumstances (for example, with
output below normal and with a particular assumption about the behavior of monetary policy). There are some models where the multiplier is zero (notably, flexible price models with inelastic supply), so here the null hypothesis of zero is an interesting one. But other values are also potentially important. One focal value is a multiplier of one, which is both the value predicted by some models under certain conditions (Woodford 2011) and the boundary between stimulus increasing or decreasing private economic activity. A policymaker designing a stimulus package might be interested in comparisons with results from prior work about multipliers for various types of tax cuts. And, as with the return to education, values obtained in previous work, such as the figure of 1.8 suggested in a recent survey of cross-sectional research by Chodorow-Reich (2019), are also of interest. Again, a focus on the point estimate and whether it is statistically significantly different from zero is misplaced if a reader’s interest is in knowing what the evidence tells us about any of these various other possible values.  

III. When a Value of Zero Is the Relevant Null

One can take the argument a step further. Even when the issue is whether a parameter is zero, focusing on point estimates and statistical significance is problematic. Consider a paper that reports only that an estimate is significantly different from zero, or that a $p$ value is less than some focal level, such as 0.05 or 0.01. Such an approach conveys very little about whether the $t$-statistic is, on the one hand, only slightly or moderately above 2 (for example, 2.1, which corresponds to $p = 0.036$, or 2.6, which corresponds to $p = 0.009$), or, on the other, far above 2 (for example, 4.0, which corresponds to $p = 0.0001$). But these two cases have quite different

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3 Although a central argument of this paper is that taking zero as the focal null hypothesis is generally not appropriate in most economic applications, there are other contexts in which it is appropriate. Indeed, one reason for the common emphasis on statistical significance and point estimates may be that this focus made considerable sense in some of the settings where statistical inference was developed. Consider, for example, a simplified view of old-fashioned drug development: a company synthesizes chemical compounds more or less at random, and then tests their efficacy against a previously untreatable disease. In that setting, there are strong reasons to expect most of the compounds to have essentially no effect on the disease. Further, a key issue is whether the compound has any effectiveness; and once there is strong evidence that a compound is effective (which, given the large number of compounds tested, would require a $p$ value far below 0.05), one of the most important aspects of the results is the point estimate.
implications concerning the hypothesis that the parameter is zero. There are several reasons.

First, absent any concerns with the estimates and standard errors, a $t$-statistic of 2.1 or 2.6 is merely strong evidence against a value of zero, while a $t$-statistic of 4.0 is overwhelming evidence.

Second, although the smaller $t$-statistics provide strong evidence against a value of zero, they provide only moderate evidence against many values that are much closer to zero than to the point estimate. In many cases, this means that the smaller $t$-statistics provide only moderate evidence against values of the parameter that are economically small.

Third, and crucially, it is rare for there to be no issues or concerns with the estimates and standard errors. There may be grounds for thinking that there is some bias, so that an unbiased estimate is somewhat closer than the point estimate to zero. There may be reasons to fear that the standard errors are somewhat understated. There may be concerns about external validity; that is, there may be factors suggesting that the situation being studied is unusual, so that again the best estimate in most relevant circumstances is somewhat closer than the point estimate to zero. And there is the possibility of reporting and publication bias, so that the results are more extreme than a typical examination of the issue would find.

Collectively, these concerns can easily change the apparently strong evidence against the null of zero provided by a $t$-statistic somewhat above 2 into only moderate evidence. But in the absence of some large identifiable problem with a study’s econometrics, they are unlikely to turn the seemingly overwhelming evidence against the null of zero provided by a $t$-statistic far above 2 into anything less than very strong evidence.

IV. Possible Alternatives

The previous sections argue that a common approach to discussing empirical results often leaves out important information about the results’ implications. At a general level, addressing this omission is straightforward. What is need is information about the implications of the results for hypotheses of interest. And although there are various ways of providing this information, a natural one is to report and discuss a confidence interval. In contrast to reporting a point estimate
and whether it is statistically significantly different from zero, reporting a confidence interval provides information about the full range of possible values of the parameter.

Although the key point is that reporting and discussing confidence intervals would often convey much more about the implications of papers’ findings than the usual approach, this leaves the smaller issue of which confidence interval is the best choice. Importantly, it is not obvious that it is the usual 2-standard error interval. A common shortcut way of interpreting a confidence interval is that the results provide strong evidence against parameter values outside the interval and are essentially equally supportive of all values inside it. But when that shortcut interpretation is applied to a 2-standard error confidence interval (or, almost equivalently, the 95 percent interval), it leads to an exaggerated sense of the uncertainty associated with the results. For example, suppose initially researchers viewed the point estimate and a value at the boundary of the 2-standard error confidence interval as equally likely. Ex post (assuming normality for simplicity), they should view the point estimate as roughly 7 times as likely as the value at the boundary. That is, even though both values are in the confidence interval, the results are considerably more supportive of the point estimate than of the value at the boundary.

The fact that the standard shortcut interpretation applied to the usual confidence interval produces an overstated sense of uncertainty may be a reason researchers tend not to report confidence intervals. Consider, for example, a paper where the $t$-statistic on the focal estimate is 2.5. The authors may be reluctant to report the 2-standard error confidence interval because that may cause readers to think the results provide “no evidence” against a value only one-fifth the size of the point estimate.

One way to obtain the advantages of reporting confidence intervals without the disadvantages caused by the shortcut interpretation would be to report somewhat narrower intervals than the usual 2-standard error bands. Since some papers already report 90 percent (1.645-standard error) bands, they appear to be the most natural alternative to the traditional 2-standard error ones. With a 90 percent interval, for a researcher who initially viewed the point estimate and the
value at the boundary of the interval as equally likely, ex post the point estimate would be roughly 4 times (rather than 7 times) as likely as the value at the boundary.

Even better would be to report both 1-standard error and 2-standard error bands for papers’ key estimates (something that is now sometimes done in figures). Ex post, a researcher who started with flat priors would view the point estimate as only moderately more likely than the other values in the 1-standard error band (concretely, considerably less than twice as likely). Thus in this case, the natural, and roughly correct, shortcut interpretation would be that the results provide little information about the relative merits of different values within the 1-standard error interval, moderate evidence against values in the 2-standard error but not the 1-standard error interval relative to the point estimate, and strong evidence against values outside the 2-standard error band relative to the point estimate.4

V. Conclusion

Consider two possible papers estimating the multiplier for government purchases. In both, the point estimate is 3.0. In one, the standard error is 1.3, while in the other it is 0.7. With the usual current approach to discussing empirical results, the two papers would describe their findings in similar terms. Both would observe that the estimate is statistically significant and would focus on the economic interpretation of a multiplier of 3.

In fact, however, the two results would have very different implications for most questions about the multiplier economists are interested in. With an emphasis on confidence intervals, the papers’ discussions would reflect those differences. The one that obtained a standard error of 1.3 (implying a 1-standard error confidence interval of (1.7, 4.3) and a 2-standard error interval of

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4 Of course, the factors that may cause stated confidence intervals to be narrower than the true intervals mean that reporting a 90 percent confidence interval or discussing both the 1-standard error and 2-standard error intervals may understate the amount of uncertainty associated with the estimates. But addressing this by focusing on 95 percent confidence intervals would amount to trying to correct one problem (the stated confidence intervals may be narrower than the true ones) with another (readers may draw misleading conclusions from wide confidence intervals if the reported intervals are correct). It seems better for researchers to strive to avoid econometric problems, so their reported confidence intervals are close to the true ones, and then report results in ways that do not cause simple shortcut interpretations to be misleading.
would, as before, observe that the hypothesis of a multiplier of zero is rejected. But it would go on to emphasize that the estimate was not very precise: the results provide little evidence against more conventional values of the multiplier such as 1.8, only moderate evidence against a multiplier of 1 or slightly below, and very strong but not overwhelming evidence against a multiplier of zero. The paper with a standard error of 0.7 (and thus a 1-standard error confidence interval of (2.3, 3.7) and a 2-standard error interval of (1.6, 4.4)), in contrast, would observe that a multiplier of zero was not merely rejected, but rejected overwhelmingly, And it would proceed to point out that the results provide quite strong evidence against not just zero but against values of 1 and below, and that they even provide moderately strong evidence against recent estimates in the vicinity of 1.8.

All this could be accomplished with the addition of a sentence or two reporting confidence intervals, a few adjectives (“imprecise,” “overwhelming,” “moderate,” and so on), and a few sentences describing the confidence intervals’ implications for key candidate values of the multiplier. Expanding the papers by a very small amount so that two sets of results that imply very different conclusions are presented differently would surely pass a cost-benefit test overwhelmingly.

The thesis of this paper is that these issues are not specific to this pair of possible papers, but common. Because a parameter value of zero is rarely the only one of interest, focusing on statistical significance and point estimates usually leaves out important information about the implications of papers’ findings. In some other fields, such as medicine, reporting and discussing confidence intervals is routine. Doing the same in economics could have considerable value: a practice of reporting the confidence intervals for papers’ focal estimates and briefly discussing their key implications would add only trivially to papers’ length, and would often greatly increase the amount of information conveyed about the economic implications of the findings.

5 For example, the submission guidelines for the *New England Journal of Medicine* (https://www.nejm.org/author-center/new-manuscripts) state, “Significance tests should be accompanied by confidence intervals for estimated effect sizes, measures of association, or other parameters of interest.” I am grateful to Amy Finkelstein for this point.
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Standard errors are in parentheses. See text for details.
REFERENCES


