ENLARGEMENT AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT.

Abdul Noury, ECARES-ULB

and

Gérard Roland, UC Berkeley, ECARES, CEPR and WDI.

1. Introduction

Important institutional changes are expected to take place in Europe in the very near future. The Laeken Council of December 2001 decided to set up a European Convention presided by former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to make proposals for reforms of Europe's political institutions. The issue of the reform of European institutions has become an urgent matter with the pending historical enlargement of the European Union to 17 additional countries, 15 of which are formerly satellite states of the Soviet empire. A major concern is how to adapt institutions created for an initial core of 6 countries to a quasi-continent. There is indeed a widespread belief that, under the current institutional rules, an enlarged EU may not function at all, creating the risk of collapse of what has been a major success story on the European continent. The Nice Treaty contains institutional decisions relative to enlargement, setting the weights of the 12 potential new entrants in the European Council (and also in the Parliament and in the Commission) and deciding on the majority rules in the Council. There is however a large consensus that the Nice Treaty did not really address the issues of the necessary reforms of the European Union to make it governable with 27 countries.

Much of the research on the effects of enlargement on the functioning of the European Union has focused on the dangers of paralysis of decision-making in the Council. Thus for example, Baldwin et al. (2001) showed that with enlargement to 27 EU

countries, the passage probability[1] of a decision in the Council would go from 7.8% under the current rules with 15 EU countries to 2.1% under the Nice rules, a clear deterioration. However, there has hardly been any focus on the effects of enlargement on the functioning of the European Parliament (EP). This neglect is certainly due to the fact that the main decision-making body in the EU is the Council. The power of the EP in European legislative decision-making has remained so far very limited compared to the powers of normal parliaments. However, its powers have increased quite steadily over time. The co-decision procedure by which both the EP and the Council must agree on a legislative proposal before it is adopted already covers a great deal of EU legislation albeit with the important exceptions of EMU, agriculture, fisheries and fiscal harmonization. Its powers are expected to increase even more, possibly to the level of national European parliaments, in the aftermath of the current convention. European political heavyweights like Gerhard Schroeder and Joshka Fischer have strongly advocated a more important role for the European Parliament. Understanding the effect of enlargement on the functioning of the European Parliament is thus becoming an increasingly important issue. Paradoxically, even though the European Parliament is the only directly elected body in the EU, its activities and functioning are not well known outside a small group of experts. However, this gap is being closed with the establishment of a database covering roll call votes in the European Parliament (Noury-Roland, 2002; Hix-Noury-Roland, 2002). In this paper we use roll call votes for the fourth and the Fifth Parliament (1989-1994 and 1994-1999) to shed light on the issue of the effect of enlargement on the EP.

---

[1] The passage probability is the share of winning coalitions among all possible coalitions of countries in the EU Council. It is an abstract indication of the difficulty of passing a bill.

To do this, we ask several questions to the data. In section 2, we ask whether coalition formation in the EP is mainly based on cross-European party groups along the traditional left-right dimension or on basis of country coalitions. This is important to understand the effect of enlargement on the functioning of the EP. If voting in the EP occurs mostly along ideological party lines, enlargement will mainly increase the size of the EP and possibly affect its ideological composition but it would not fundamentally threaten its ability to operate. On the other hand, if the Euro-deputies vote mainly on the basis of national interests, more power to the EP is likely to increase the number of possible country coalitions and make voting highly unpredictable. The data lead us to conclude unambiguously that voting occurs along party lines which gives ground to be optimistic about the effect of enlargement on the EP.

One reason why cohesion in the EP may be strong is because of the strength of the democratic tradition in member states and the long experience with party systems in national parliaments. One may wonder whether postcommunist countries lacking such long experience will be able to show as strong a party cohesion when entering the EP. This is why in section 3, we give some facts about cohesion of party voting in Poland and the Czech republic for which we were able to gather data. The purpose is to evaluate to what extent the party system has developed in these young democracies and to compare party cohesion in those countries with what we observe in the EP. The data show that party cohesion in those countries is even higher than in the EP.

In section 4, we use the past experience of enlargement to get a feeling of some of the effects of enlargement on the EP. We ask whether MEPs from Sweden, Austria, and Finland voted more with their European party group when they entered the EP or more

with the other MEPs from their country. We find that MEPs from those countries were not less disciplined in terms of voting with their European party groups than MEPs from other countries. We also address the question of whether MEPs from poor countries vote more with their country or with their party on issues of structural funds where one might expect Portuguese, Spanish, Greek and Irish MEPs to vote together. We find once again that party loyalty is more important than country loyalty, even in the case of structural funds.

In section 5, we ask whether enlargement may add new dimensions to coalition formation in the EP. Here we find, using the Poole-Rosenthal scaling method, that the previous enlargement tended to create a North-South dimension with the entry of Finland and Sweden. That dimension plays however a minor role compared to the left-right dimension that plays the major role in the EP. This suggests that the coming enlargement may lead to a new East-West dimension in the European Parliament but such a new dimension may not play a very important role..

2. Party or country loyalty?

A crucial question in order to understand the effect of enlargement in the EP is whether coalitions are formed on the basis of country coalitions or on the basis of the traditional left-right divide. Indeed, if coalitions are cross-border and based mostly on the logic of the left-right divide, then enlargement should not substantially change the nature of politics and coalition formation in the EP. On the other hand, if coalitions are based

mostly on national interests, then coalitions will more likely be like those that form in the European Council but the high number of European representatives and the higher diversity of interests involved is likely to make it more difficult to form majority coalitions. Increased powers to such a body is very likely to lead to paralysis in decision-making and make it less stable and predictable.

On institutional grounds alone, one has good reasons to believe that MEPs vote more with their European party than with MEPs from their own country. MEPs are not organized in country groups but in political groups. The seatings in the hemicycle are like in national Parliaments with parties ranked from left to right according to their ideology. In the current Parliament, the seating is as follows. At the extreme left, one has the radical left which regroups many of the communist, former communist or extreme left parties plus the Nordic Green Left parties from Scandinavia. Then, from left to right there is the Party of the European Socialists (PES), the Greens and allies regrouping regional parties mostly from Spain, but also from Wales, the liberal ELDR (European Liberal Democrat and Reformists), the European People's Party (mostly Christian Democratic and conservative parties)(EPP-ED), Eurosceptic gaullist and rightist groups and non affiliated. The names of the groups change over time across legislatures and sometimes within legislatures reflecting defections from some national parties. Table 1 gives the party groups with the denominations they had over time. In subsequent tables, we will use the common abbreviation listed in the second column to the left of Table 1.

INSERT TABLE 1.

It is not by coincidence that MEPs are ranked according to ideology. The party groups to which they belong have a real existence and internal organization. The EP allocates budgets to party groups. Each group has a Chair, a secretariat and staff working for them. Members of Groups meet in Brussels and during plenary sessions in Strasbourg to make joint voting decisions. Groups have "whips" who check the attendance and voting behavior of group members even though groups have limited means to sanction their members. Such structures do not exist at all for the national delegations in the EP (for more details, see Corbett et al. 2002).

The main measure we use is the cohesion index CI_i for a given group i of voters (where the group can be party or country). Note by Y_i the number of Yes votes expressed by group i on a given vote and N_i the number of No votes. The cohesion index is defined as follows:

$$CI_i = \frac{\max\{Y_i, N_i\} - [(Y_i + N_i) - \max\{Y_i, N_i\}]}{(Y_i + N_i)} \qquad (1)$$

Thus, for example if deputies of a Party (country) cast 100 ballots on a given vote and if all vote Yes, then the cohesion index will be equal to 1. However, if they are completely divided and 50 vote Yes and 50 vote No, then the cohesion index will be equal to 0. The cohesion index is a variant of what is usually called the Rice Agreement index following Rice (1928).

Tables 2 and 3 give the mean weighted cohesion index of parties and countries and their standard deviations respectively for the third and for the fourth parliament. The reason we do not simply computed the average cohesion index is that many votes in the

7

EP are by unanimity. Indeed, many votes in the EP reflect the position of the Parliament relative to Commission proposals or Council decisions or even Parliament initiatives. These votes pass often by unanimity or near unanimity. Despite representing different ideologies and countries, MEPs generally share the objective of increasing the power of the EP. There is thus a concerted effort in the EP, whenever possible, to appear united in front of the Council and the Commission, especially in case of a conflict between these three bodies. In order to mitigate the effect of these unanimity votes on our average cohesion index, our "weighted" cohesion index takes the cohesion index divided by the observed majority in the European Parliament multiplied by two. Thus a vote with a narrow majority of 50% gets a weight of one and a unanimity vote gets a weight of ½. When computing the average of those weighted cohesion indexes, we divide them by the average index a perfectly cohesive party would obtain so that a perfectly cohesive group would still get an average of 100%.

INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3.

We clearly see that cohesion is much stronger for parties than for countries. The cohesion index for partiesis around 83% in the third parliament and is higher for most parties in the fourth parliament while the cohesion index for countries is around 65% in the third parliament and is lower in the fourth. There is thus roughly a 20% point difference in cohesion. The cohesion of countries is even biased upwards because many national

delegations are dominated by one party.[2] Similarly, the large cohesion for Greece, Spain and Luxembourg can be explained by the fact they are mainly affiliated to the two largest political groups. Note however that the cohesion index for France is the lowest of all countries! French representatives are thus the most divided country in the EP, a fact that maybe runs counter to the intuition of many. Note also that cohesion is the highest among the party families reflecting the usual political cleavages in advanced democracies: socialists (PES), christian-democrats and conservatives (EPP), greens (GR) and liberals (ELDR). Note however that the Greens and the Radical Alliance (RAD) have the highest cohesion in the Fourth parliament. Only the Gaullists and the radical left, as well as the anti-EU parties have had a lower cohesion in the Fourth Parliament. Only the UK has a higher cohesion in the Fourth Parliament. All other countries see their cohesion decline.

3. Party cohesion in accession countries.

It is useful to compare party cohesion in the European Parliament with the observations we have from party cohesion in accession countries. We give here figures for the Czech and the Polish Parliament using data from Mielcova and Noury, (1997) and Dobrowolski, Mazurkiewicz and Noury (1999). Tables 4 and 5 give the composition of parties in the Czech and Polish Parliament between 1993 and 1997.

INSERT TABLES 4AND 5.

Compared to countries of the EU, one can see that the party system has not yet really stabilized. There were 7 main parties in the Polish Parliament in 1993-97 and 9

---

[2] The first past the post electoral rule sent mostly U.K. Labor party representatives to the EP.

main parties in the Czech republic between 1993 and 1996. However, after the 1996 elections in the Czech republic, only 6 parties were left. Also, many politicians change parties. Old parties disappear and new ones are formed. We however see a tendency towards the traditional European party cleavage system. The SLD has been the largest party in Polish politics for many years. President Kwasniewski is from the SLD. Initially composed of reform communists, it has become a social democratic party and is expected to join the PES. The PSL, Polish peasant party, is rural and catholic conservative. The role of this party has been declining. The Union of Freedom is a liberal party but it was not represented in the Sejm in 2001. A new party, the Civic Platform, gathered votes and candidates on the right. Apart from the SLD, there is thus quite a lot of reshuffling going on. In the Czech republic, the conservative liberal ODS party of Vaclav Klaus was the main party in the period considered. The Social Democratic party was picking up strength and there were a number of smaller parties to the right and to the left. Some parties on the right formed a new bloc but it has proved rather unstable. Apart from ODS and the Social Democrats, the rest of the party system has not stabilized yet.

Despite a relative lack of stability of the party system, the cohesion figures based on roll call votes between 1993 and 1997 in those two countries give us a rather optimistic picture. In both Poland and the Czech republic, the cohesion indices are high. They are even higher than those for the European Parliament. Note however that the relative cohesion indices do not vary much from party to party. Quite remarkably, in Poland, the biggest party, the SLD has the highest cohesion of all parties. This is not the case for the ODS in the Czech republic.

INSERT TABLES 6 and 7.

It may seem a puzzle to observe that cohesion is higher in the young democracies of former communist countries as compared to the European Parliament. It is however not a real surprise. Contrary to the EU system, those countries have a parliamentary system where party voting tends to be very cohesive. Governments are formed by a majority coalition in the Parliament. The threat of a vote of confidence can always be used to bring down the coalition. This acts as a disciplining device (Huber, 1996; Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998; Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2000). The EU is not a parliamentary system and voting is therefore necessarily less cohesive, such as in the US.

4. Behavior of new entrants. The lessons from past experience.

In this section, we investigate the effects of enlargement by looking at the voting behavior of MEPs from the previous enlargement: Sweden, Finland and Austria who entered the EP in 1995. Focusing on the behavior of these MEPs from new entrant countries is potentially insightful in terms of what may happen with the next enlargement. Of course, one must be careful in drawing firm conclusions from such an exercise. The future accession countries do not have the same economic, cultural and historical background as the countries from the previous enlargement. Moreover, the number of entrants in the future enlargement will be much higher than in the previous one. Nevertheless, countries from the previous enlargement did have distinct characteristics from the EU. Two out of three were Nordic countries and all had a richer economy than the EU average. It is thus useful to see how MEPs from those countries behaved. In order to do this, we computed for each MEP a "discipline index" measuring the frequency of

votes with his or her party group. The discipline index is different from the cohesion index in that it focuses on the voting behavior of individuals rather than groups. Table 8 gives the average frequency of vote of a MEP from a given country with his or her party. The last column looks at the average frequency of vote with the national delegation. The idea is to compare the relative loyalty of MEPs to their party and to their party group. This is done for the whole of the Fourth parliament since the enlargement to those three countries. The discipline index thus allows to see whether MEPs from new entrants behave differently from other MEPs.

INSERT TABLE 8

We immediately see that MEPs from Finland, Sweden and Austria do not behave in a less disciplined way toward their party group. Finnish socialists and liberals are among the most disciplined in their group. Swedish socialists are less disciplined than the other socialists but only slightly so and Swedish conservatives are very disciplined. Austrian MEPs are not less disciplined than the others. More importantly, for new entrants the discipline with the national delegation is significantly lower than the discipline with all the party groups. Moreover, the country discipline of the new entrants is not higher than for other countries. It is even among the lowest of all! This tends to strongly suggest that new entrants immediately follow the discipline of their group and do not follow country discipline more than other MEPs. The highest country discipline index is the one for the U.K. It must however be noted that over half of the British MEPs were Labor MEPs and that this explains to a great extent the greater cohesion. Other countries' distribution of MEPs over party groups is more dispersed. Note that France has the lowest national discipline index. The evidence from table 8 is encouraging because it

tells us that new entrants do not display a different voting behavior than MEPs from other EU countries. In other words, the Parliament is capable of absorbing new members and integrate them quickly to party groups.

A major difference between the next enlargement and the previous one is that in the latter case entrants were rich countries whereas the accession countries are poorer than Portugal, with the exception of Slovenia. In order to get a feel of the effect of poorer countries entering, it is useful to look at the behaviour of the "current poor" in the EU. In particular, one wants to know whether MEPs from poor countries remain more loyal to their party than to their country whenever there are votes on cohesion and structural funds which benefit poor countries. Here, we may expect national solidarity to be stronger than party loyalty for votes related to these issues. This is an important issue because entry of poorer countries from Central Europe will reinforce the political power of poor countries within the EU. How is this likely to be reflected in the EP? Table 9 shows the discipline index calculated only for votes related to structural funds and cohesion.

INSERT TABLE 9

We unambiguously see that MEPs from Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland do not have lower party discipline than MEPs from the other countries. Party discipline thus tends to dominate even on issues where country interests would seem to take the upper hand. We looked further at the discipline of MEPs on the different issues (tables available upon request from the authors). We found that in general, across issues, party discipline remained stronger than country discipline with a few exceptions. The Greens are not always cohesive, especially the Danish ones. On the issue of drugs, the Swedes have separate country views and small party discipline. On legal issues, party discipline is

weak for Swedes and Austrians. Austrian liberals have weak party discipline for issues related to industry and technology. Belgian liberals are divided on agro-food, nature and drugs. German liberals are divided on agro-food and industry and technics. German greens are divided on foreign policy. Danish liberals have special views on drugs. Danes themselves are rather divided compared to the Germans for example. Spanish liberals are divided w.r.t. drugs and the legal system. In general, the French are not disciplined at all w.r.t. their country. Italian liberals are divided on nature. Irish conservatives are divided on drugs. Luxemburg socialists and liberals are very divided on votes related to industry and technics. On the whole however, discipline remains rather strong. Further analysis of specific issues should allow in particular to detect the possible effect of interest group politics on specific votes.

5. New dimensions with enlargement?

So far, our analysis did not pick up any effect from enlargement. Here the spatial analysis developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) proves useful.

The evidence we showed so far indeed only allows to pick up a single dimension of the political space in the European Parliament. However, one of the main findings of the empirical studies of the EU policy making is that there are at least two dimensions to the EU political space (e.g. Hix, 2001, Noury, 2002). These studies use the spatial framework developed by Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) for use in the electoral arena and by Black (1948) for use in legislative analysis. The spatial model has become the workhorse theory of modern legislative studies. In particular, the spatial model of voting has been extensively applied to the analysis of roll-call votes in the US Congress

(Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Heckman and Snyder, 1997). The goal of the spatial model of roll-call voting is to estimate the ideal points of each legislator in a multi-dimensional policy space as well as the 'yes' and 'no' locations or the cutting lines for each vote on different dimensions of the policy space.

The spatial model assumes that each voter (legislator i) has an ideal position or bliss point (x_i) on different dimensions of a multi-dimensional policy space. It also assumes that in this space each roll call (vote j) is represented by two points ($z_{j,yes}$ and $z_{j,no}$) corresponding to the policy consequences of the voting outcomes (i.e. the 'yes' and 'no' outcomes). The legislator's utility has two components, a deterministic and a stochastic component. For example, legislator $i's$ utility when voting on roll call j can be represented by

$$u(x_{i,} z_j) = f(\delta(x_{i,} z_j)) + \varepsilon_{i,j} \tag{1}$$

where $\delta(x_{i,} z_j)$ is the distance between the ideal point of legislator and the vote outcome. The first term on the right-hand side of equation (1), the deterministic component of the utility, is a negative function of the distance between the legislator's ideal point and the 'yes' and 'no' outcomes of the vote. Therefore, the legislator is assumed to choose the vote (yes or no) closest to his or her ideal point alternative. The second term on the right-hand side of equation (2) is the stochastic component or the error term. It is a random variable and captures the effect of idiosyncratic 'shock' specific to legislator i when voting on roll call j, (i.e. the omitted attributes affecting the legislator's choice).

To estimate the spatial model, one must define a specific functional form for the deterministic component of the utility function and a probability distribution for the error term. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) have developed a procedure called NOMINATE to

estimate the spatial model of roll call voting. NOMINATE postulates a bell-shape utility function for the deterministic part of the utility and a logit distribution for the error component. NOMINATE is very similar to standard factor models but given that there are a large number of parameters to be estimated and the utility function is bell-shaped, it uses a three-step estimation algorithm.[3]

Noury (2002) has used the Poole-Rosenthal model to estimate the ideal position of each MEP and to analyze the dimensions of EP voting space for the third and fourth parliaments (see Noury, 2002 for a more detailed analysis). Different statistical criteria that measure the goodness-of-fit of the estimates suggest that there are at least two dimensions to the EU policy space. The first dimension that predicts correctly about 90% of MEP votes can easily be interpreted as the traditional left-right dimension. The second dimension adds only 2% more correct vote prediction and can also easily be interpreted as related to European integration. Parties in favor of European integration are located on the upper part of the space whereas anti-Europeans are located on the lower part.

Using this methodology, we asked what the effect of new entrants is on the dimensionality of politics in the EP. What we did was to see whether we could make sense of higher dimensions than the first 2 dimensions (left-right and pro- and anti-Europe). Figures 1 and 2 show a projection of the left-right dimension and a higher dimension for the Third and the Fourth Parliament. MEPs from Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, Denmark) are indicated with a N, MEPs from the poorer and Southern countries with a S (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Italy), MEPs from the UK with a X and MEPs from all other countries with a dot. The projection for the Third Parliament

---

[3] Note that in the EP there are thousands of parameters to be estimated as there are 626 MEP and more than 2700 votes in each legislature.

does not show any particular sorting of MEPs in the North-South dimension whereas the Fourth Parliament clearly does show such a sorting with Nordic MEPs in the top and Southern MEPs below. On that basis, we thus conclude that enlargement to Nordic countries did lead to the crystallization of a North-South dimension. This dimension is however very modest compared to the left-right dimension. The latter predicts 90% correct votes and the former adds a mere 1.2% correct votes.

INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2

The lesson from the previous enlargement is thus that MEPs from the new countries behaved like MEPs from other countries and were not less disciplined. However, enlargement to Nordic countries did tend to create a dimension of politics that was not present before, i.e. the North-South dimension. It is quite plausible that something similar will happen with the enlargement to the East. A new East-West dimension may appear or the North-South dimension may transform into a divide between rich and poor countries. The left-right dimension is however likely to remain dominant. Politicians from Central Europe are very eager to integrate the mainstream of Europe, and in particular its traditional party families. It is thus very unlikely that the importance of the left-right dimension will be substantially reduced.

6. Conclusions.

We are modreately optimistic about the effect of enlargement on the European Parliament. Our empirical analysis shows that the European parties have a high level of cohesion. MEPs vote with their European party rather than with their countrymen. New

MEPs from accession countries are likely to behave in the same way. We can expect many new MEPs from those countries to behave as zealots for their Europarty given their keenness to integrate the EU. The experience of the EP may also be very positive for MEPs from the new democracies and contribute to help stabilize the pary system in their own country. We have nevertheless seen that despite instability in the party system, the Czech and Polish Parliament show a high level of party cohesion, even higher than in the EP, showing that their parliamentary systems function relatively well, despite their limited experience. The existing experience of cohesion in their own country should thus not be a handicap for voting behavior in the EP.

The experience from the past enlargement however suggests that a new East-West dimension may appear in debates in the EP. That dimension will however in all likelihood remain modest in comparison to the traditional left-right dimension that dominates the European Parliament, and most other national parliaments.

References

Baldwin, R. E. Berglöf, F. Giavazzi and M. Widgrén (2001), *Nice Try: Should the Treaty of Nice be Ratified? Monitoring European Integration 11 (MEI)*, London: CEPR.

Black, D. (1948) "On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making." *Journal of Political Economy* 56:23–34.

Corbett, R., F. Jacobs and M. Shackleton, (2000) *The European Parliament*, Fourth edition Harper London.

Diermeier, D. and T. Feddersen (1998), "Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure" *American-Political-Science-Review,* 92(3).

Downs, A. (1957) *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, New York: Harper and Row.

Heckman, J. and J. Snyder (1997) "Linear Probability Models of the Demand for Attributes with An Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators", *Rand Journal of Economics,* 28(1).

Hix, S. (2001) "Legislative Behavior and Party Competition in the EP", *Journal of Common Market Studies, 39*(4).

Hotelling, H. (1929) "Stability in Competition." *Economic Journal* 39:41–57.

Huber, John (1996) 'The Impact of Confidence Votes on Legislative Politics in Parliamentary Systems', *American Political Science Review*, 90: 269-282.

Noury, A. and E. Mielcova (1998) "Roll Call Voting in a Multi-Party Parliament: the Case of the Czech republic", CERGE-EI Discussion Paper.

Noury, A. W. Dobrowolski and M. Mazurkiewicz, "Voting Behavior in the Polish Parliament"mimeo, Free University of Brussels.

Noury, A. (2002) "Ideology, Nationality and Euro-parliamentarians", *European Union Politics, 3*(1).

Noury, A. and G. Roland (2002) "More Power to the European Parliament?", *Economic Policy* October.

Persson T., G. Roland and G. Tabellini (2000), "Comparative Politics and Public Finance", *Journal-of-Political-Economy,* 108 (6).

Poole, K. and H. Rosenthal (1997) *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rice, Stewart, (1928) *Quantitative Methods in Politics*, New York, Knopf.

TABLE 1 . Party Families in the European Parliament

Party Family	Abbreviation	Party Group Name(s) used across time	Size in the 3rd EP (1989)	Size in the 4th EP (1994)
Party of European Socialists	PES	PES	180 (34.7%)	198 (34.9%)
European People's Party – Christian Democrats and Conservatives	EPP	EPP, ED, EPP-ED	155[1] (29.9%)	157 (27.7%)
European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party	ELDR	ELD, ELDR groups	49 (9.5%)	43 (7.6%)
Greens and allies	GR	RBW, G, G/EFA	30 (5.8%)	23 (4.1%)
Gaullists and allies	GAUL	EPD, EDA, UFE, UEN	20 (3.9%)	53 (9.3%)
Radical Left and Italian Communists and allies	LEFT	COM, LU, EUL/NGL, EUL	42 (8.1%)	28 (4.9%)
Radicals and Regionalists	RAD	ERA	13 (2.5%)	19 (3.4%)
Anti-Europeans	ANTI-EU	EN, I-EN, EDD	17 (3.3%)	19 (3.4%)
Non-attached and Independents	NA	IND	12 (2.3%)	27 (4.8%)

Table 2. Weighted Cohesion Index in the European Parliament (Parties)

Party	3rd EP	4th EP
PES	0.870	0.883
EPP	0.854	0.882
ELDR	0.783	0.825
GR	0.859	0.926
GAUL	0.814	0.780
LEFT	0.848	0.826
RAD	0.854	0.904
ANTI-EU	0.754	0.685
NA	0.826	0.665

Table 3. Weighted Cohesion Index in the European Parliament (Countries)

Country	3rd EP	4th EP
France	0.511	0.490
UK	0.672	0.761
Italy	0.617	0.571
Ireland	0.673	0.570
Finland	-	0.578
Sweden	-	0.552
Germany	0.593	0.588
Greece	0.704	0.621
Netherlands	0.632	0.600
Spain	0.701	0.604
Belgium	0.569	0.536
Portugal	0.672	0.580
Austria	-	0.597
Denmark	0.685	0.605
Luxembourg	0.788	0.652

TABLE 4.Political parties in the Czech Parliament

Party	(LABEL)	1st leg. Seats(%)	2nd leg. Seats(%)
Civic Democratic Party	(ODS)	66 (33)	68 (34)
Civic Democratic Alliance	(ODA)	14 (7)	13 (6.5)
Christian Democratic Union	(KDU)	15 (7.5)	18 (9)
Christian Democratic Party	(KDS)	10 (5)	-
Republic Party of the Czech Republic	(SPR-RSC)	8 (4)	18 (9)
Czech Social Democratic Party	(CSSD)	18 (9)	58 (29)
The Left Block	(LB)	35 (17.5)	22 (11)
Liberal Social Union	(LSU)	13 (6.5)	-
Liberal National Social Party	(LSNS)	5 (2.5)	-
Others		16 (8)	3 (1.5)
Total		200 (100)	200 (100)

TABLE 5. Political parties in the Polish Parliament (Sejm)

Party	(Label)	Seats	Seat Share in %
Democratic Left Alliance	(SLD)	171	37.17
Polish Peasant Party	(PSL)	132	28.69
Union of Freedom	(UW)	74	16.08
Labor Union	(UP)	41	8.91
Confederation for Independent Poland	(KPN)	22	4.78
Non-Party Bloc to Support Reform	(BBWR)	16	3.47
German Minority	(MN)	3	0.65
Independent	(IND)	1	0.21
Total		460	100

Table 6. Weighted Cohesion Index in the Czech Parliament

Party	(LABEL)	Weighted cohesion indexI
Civic Democratic Party	(ODS)	0.909
Civic Democratic Alliance	(ODA)	0883
Christian Democratic Union	(KDU)	0.903
Christian Democratic Party	(KDS)	0.926
Republic Party of the Czech Republic	(SPR-RSC)	0.992
Czech Social Democratic Party	(CSSD)	0.876
The Left Block	(LB)	0.884
Liberal Social Union	(LSU)	0.902
Liberal National Social Party	(LSNS)	0.894

Based on a sample of roll call votes from 1993-1997 Czech parliament.

Table 7. Weighted Cohesion Index in the Polish Parliament (Sejm)

Party	(Label)	Rel_AI
Democratic Left Alliance	(SLD)	0.934
Polish Peasant Party	(PSL)	0.902
Union of Freedom	(UW)	0.880
Labor Union	(UP)	0.890
Confederation for Independent Poland	(KPN)	0.877
Non-Party Bloc to Support Reform	(BBWR)	0.868
German Minority	(MN)	0.970

Based on a sample of roll call votes from 1993-1997 Polish parliament.

TABLE 8. The Discipline index of MEP's The average frequency of vote of a MEP with party group or national delegation. (The number of MEP's are below each discipline index)

	PES	EPP	ELDR	GR	GAUL	LEFT	RAD	ANTI-EU	NA	National delegation
F	**92.18**	**88.2**	**51.19**	**97.02**	**93.78**	**94.04**	**96.46**	**87.18**	**88.26**	**76.2**
	37	20	12	18	31	8	14	15	14	170
UK	**95**	**93.52**	**96.2**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**92.33**	**72.44**	**72.16**	**89.64**
	69	39	2	0	0	0	3	1	1	115
I	**95.46**	**93.32**	**90.44**	**92.9**	**82.7**	**92.82**	**93.06**	**-**	**69.65**	**80.08**
	25	44	6	11	25	12	3	0	17	144
IRL	**97.33**	**95.1**	**98.15**	**96.38**	**89.87**	**100**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**83.95**
	2	4	2	3	11	2	0	0	0	24
FND	**97.36**	**93.43**	**92.31**	**97**	**-**	**83.57**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**78.14**
	6	9	10	1	0	4	0	0	0	30
SW	**90.47**	**96.21**	**87.57**	**89.17**	**-**	**79.81**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**78.55**
	16	7	4	4	0	4	0	0	0	35
D	**95.64**	**97.57**	**90.08**	**98.36**	**-**	**-**		**-n.r.****	**n.r***	**84.18**
	53	61	6	17	0	0	0	5	1	143
GR	**94.14**	**96**	**-**	**-**	**87.25**	**93.52**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**84.59**
	18	16	0	0	2	5	0	0	0	41
NL	**97.54**	**96.37**	**95.72**	**98.04**	**83.22**	**-**	**-**	**76.04**	**-**	**82.71**
	11	12	11	3	2	0	0	3	0	42
E	**95.62**	**93.87**	**85.09**	**84.09**	**n.r***	**95.72**	**94.43**	**-**	**n.r***	**83.04**
	32	42	6	5	1	11	4	0	1	102
B	**94.25**	**95.63**	**90.32**	**99.45**	**-**	**-**	**92.13**	**-**	**86.72**	**79.89**
	12	10	10	4	0	0	2	0	3	41
P	**95.91**	**88.81**	**78.27**	**n.r***	**86.87**	**94.99**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**84.09**
	20	11	6	1	5	6	0	0	0	49
AST	**93.16**	**93.7**	**93.99**	**97.44**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**79.13**	**79.38**
	11	12	2	1	0	0	0	0	12	38
DK	**91.12**	**97.73**	**94.98**	**n.r***	**-**	**80.87**	**-**	**71.03**	**-**	**78.06**
	5	6	8	1	0	1	0	4	0	25
L	**95.43**	**96.32**	**91.53**			**-**	**89.4**	**-**	**-**	**82.12**
	3	3	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	10

n.r*: Member never voted Yes or No on any issue (either mostly absent or abstained).

TABLE 9. Discipline index for votes on cohesion and structural funds(average frequency of vote with party group or country) in bold. Number of deputies present in the votes are below each discipline index

	PES	EPP	ELDR	GR	GAUL	LEFT	RAD	ANTI-EU	NA	National delegation
F	**91.77**	**87.81**	**81.85**	**100**	**97.47**	**92.55**	**97.95**	**90.37**	**82.2**	**76.33**
	35	19	10	16	29	9	14	14	13	
UK	**94.67**	**80.41**	**100-**	**-**	**-**		**94.93**	**70.18**	**71.43**	**82.32**
	72	38	2	0	0	0	3	1	1	
I	**96.7**	**90.78**	**95.32**	**96.45**	**82.59**	**87.71**	**95.5-**		**60.95**	**83.42**
	33	42	7	11	24	14	3	0	16	
IRL	**95.45**	**88.62**	**95.55**	**86.73**	**91.61**	**96.15-**	**-**	**-**		**80.23**
	2	4	2	3	11	2	0	0	0	
FND	**96.28**	**97.47**	**91.67**	**82.05-**		**50.67-**	**-**	**-**		**85.38**
	6	9	9	1	0	3	0	0	0	
SW	**92.05**	**92.63**	**82.54**	**70.64-**		**46.13-**	**-**	**-**		**78.26**
	9	5	3	4	0	3	0	0	0	
D	**85.28**	**93.9**	**92.5**	**97.11-**	**-**	**-**		**86.06**	**100**	**81.68**
	54	62	6	17	0	0	0	5	1	
GR	**92.59**	**89.28-**	**-**		**86.48**	**92.7-**	**-**	**-**		**85.63**
	21	17	0	0	3	5	0	0	0	
NL	**87.57**	**92.97**	**89.03**	**98.85**	**80-**		**-**	**72.19-**		**79.95**
	12	12	11	3	2	0	0	3	0	
E	**95.95**	**84.05**	**95.62**	**76.19**	**100**	**91.34**	**97.5-**		**50**	**84.82**
	35	42	8	5	1	10	4	0	3	
B	**97.24**	**94.01**	**98.94**	**99.43-**	**-**		**92.5-**		**78.06**	**81.4**
	12	10	9	4	0	0	2	0	3	
P	**88.79**	**78.67**	**88.24**	**85**	**98.11**	**88.89-**	**-**	**-**		**86.2**
	16	11	6	1	4	7	0	0	0	
AST	**79.42**	**94**	**100**	**97.62-**	**-**	**-**	**-**		**83.09**	**87.81**
	8	11	2	1	0	0	0	0	10	
DK	**98.5**	**95.54**	**96.37**	**0-**	**-**	**-**		**64.4**	**0**	**79.72**
	5	7	8	1	0	0	0	4	1	
L	**98.15**	**98.67**	**100-**	**-**	**-**		**100-**	**-**		**80.85**
	3	3	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	

n.r*: Member never voted Yes or No on any issue (either mostly absent or abstained).

FIGURE 1

MEPs' Ideal Points, EP 3 (1989-1994)

Symbols representing MEPs as follows: 'S'= Southern MEPs, 'N'=Northern MEPs, 'x'=UK Members.
'.'=other Members

FIGURE 2.

MEPs' Ideal Points, EP 4 (1994-1999)

Symbols representing MEPs as follows: 'S'= Southern MEPs, 'N'=Northern MEPs, 'x'=UK Members.
'.'=other Members