This course has been reorganized relative to recent years. I make less than before use of the book by T. Persson and G. Tabellini Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press 2000, which synthesizes the large literature that has been growing analyzing the interaction between economic and political processes. I have also reorganized the course following less individual chapters but organized more by class of models when appropriate. I also use Grossman Helpman Special Interest Politics MIT PRESS 2001 and Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, CUP 2006, Besley and Persson Pillars of Prosperity PUP 2011 for specific lectures as well as other papers on newer themes such as behavioral models of politics, political economy of autocracy and state capacity.

Students are supposed to do the problem sets after each lecture. The exam will be based on problem sets.

Lecture 1 (August 28). From Social Choice to Political Economics.


Problem set: given in class.

Lectures 2 and 3 (September 11 and 18). Median voter models, their applicability and applications to general interest politics.


Other readings:


**Lecture 4 (September 25). Probabilistic models of voting.**


**Lecture 5 (October 2). Agency models of politics.**


**Lecture 6 (October 9). Partisan Politicians.**


**Lecture 7 and 8 (October 16, and 23). Special Interest Politics.**


**Lecture 9 (October 30 (to be moved)): Behavioral Models of Politics.**


**Lecture 10 (November 6). Political Regimes.**

Persson-Tabellini (2000): chapter 10


**Lectures 11 (November 13): Democratization.**

Chapters 6 and 7.

Students are recommended to read other chapters of the book.

**Lecture 12 (November 20 (to be moved)): Political Economy of Autocracy**


**Lecture 13 (November 27): Political Economy of Weak States**

Students are recommended to read other chapters of the book.

GRADE: 1/4 based on problem sets delivered on time, ¾ final exam based on problem sets.