Preliminaries
(some ‘simple’ games and Nash equilibrium)

Block 1
Sep 9-11, 2021
– Logistics...

– 4 ‘simple’ games

  “... everything should be made as simple as possible, but no sim-
  pler...” – Albert Einstein –

– Nash equilibrium

– The tragedy of the commons

– Oligopolistic competition

– Food for thought...
It must be fun (and most of it must also be useful)

Feedback, Feedback, Feedback!
Guys, it’s time for some game theory...
What’s game theory?
Game theory

- Game theory is about what happens when decision makers (spouses, workers, managers, presidents) interact.

- In the past fifty years, game theory has gradually become a standard language in economics.

- The power of game theory is its generality and (mathematical) precision.
• Because game theory is rich and crisp, it could unify many parts of social science.

• The spread of game theory outside of economics has suffered because of the misconception that it requires a lot of fancy math.

• Game theory is also a natural tool for understanding complex social and economic phenomena in the real world.
The paternity of game theory
Sep 11, 2001
What is game theory good for?

Q Is game theory meant to predict what decision makers do, to give them advice, or what?

A The tools of analytical game theory are used to predict, postdict (explain), and prescribe.

Remember: even if game theory is not always accurate, descriptive failure is prescriptive opportunity!
As Milton Friedman said famously observed “theories do not have to be realistic to be useful.” A theory can be *useful* in three ways:

A. descriptive (how people actually choose)

B. prescriptive (as a practical aid to choice)

C. normative (how people ought to choose)
Aumann (1987):

“Game theory is a sort of umbrella or ‘unified field’ theory for the rational side of social science, where ‘social’ is interpreted broadly, to include human as well as non-human players (computers, animals, plants).”
Adam Brandenburger:

There is nothing so practical as a good [game] theory. A good theory confirms the conventional wisdom that “less is more.” A good theory does less because it does not give answers. At the same time, it does a lot more because it helps people organize what they know and uncover what they do not know. A good theory gives people the tools to discover what is best for them.
FEATURE

How Data (and Some Breathtaking Soccer) Brought Liverpool to the Cusp of Glory

The club is finishing a phenomenal season — thanks in part to an unrivaled reliance on analytics.
Farhan Zaidi, the General Manager of the SF Giants and previously the LA Dodgers (PHD in economics from UC Berkeley), and the person Billy Beane called “absolutely brilliant.”
Four ‘simple’ games
Four examples

Example I: Hotelling’s electoral competition game

– There are two candidates and a continuum of voters, each with a favorite position on the interval \([0, 1]\).

– Each voter’s distaste for any position is given by the distance between the position and her favorite position.

– A candidate attracts the votes off all citizens whose favorite positions are closer to her position.
Hotelling with two candidates class experiment
Hotelling with three candidates class experiment

![Graph showing the distribution of fractions at different positions. The x-axis represents the position, and the y-axis represents the fraction. The graph displays two peaks at positions 0.5 and 0.55, with a smaller peak at 0.35, and a few smaller peaks at positions 0.25, 0.45, and 0.65.]
John Maynard Keynes
1883-1946
Example II: Keynes’s beauty contest game

– Simultaneously, everyone choose a number (integer) in the interval $[0, 100]$.

– The person whose number is closest to $2/3$ of the average number wins a fixed prize.
John Maynard Keynes (1936):

“It is not a case of choosing those [faces] that, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those that average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.”

⇒ self-fulfilling price bubbles!
## Beauty contest results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Portfolio Managers</th>
<th>Economics PhDs</th>
<th>CEOs</th>
<th>Caltech students</th>
<th>Caltech trustees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median</strong></td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fraction choosing zero</strong></td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
<th>UCLA</th>
<th>Wharton</th>
<th>High school (US)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median</strong></td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fraction choosing zero</strong></td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Example III: the centipede game (graphically resembles a centipede insect)
The centipede game class experiment

- Down 0.311
- Continue, Down 0.311
- Continue, Continue, Down 0.267
- Continue, Continue, Continue 0.111

Eye movements can tell us a lot about how people play this game (and others).
Example IV: auctions

From Babylonia to eBay, auctioning has a very long history.

Babylon:
- women at marriageable age.

Athens, Rome, and medieval Europe:
- rights to collect taxes, dispose of confiscated property, lease of land and mines,

and many more...
The word “auction” comes from the Latin *augere*, meaning “to increase.”

The earliest use of the English word “auction” given by the *Oxford English Dictionary* dates from 1595 and concerns an auction “when will be sold Slaves, household goods, etc.”

In this era, the auctioneer lit a short candle and bids were valid only if made before the flame went out – Samuel Pepys (1633-1703) –
• Auctions, broadly defined, are used to allocate significant economics resources.

  Examples: works of art, government bonds, offshore tracts for oil exploration, radio spectrum, and more.

• Auctions take many forms. A game-theoretic framework enables to understand the consequences of various auction designs.

• Game theory can suggest the design likely to be most effective, and the one likely to raise the most revenues.
Types of auctions

Sequential / simultaneous

Bids may be called out sequentially or may be submitted simultaneously in sealed envelopes:

- **English (or oral)** – the seller actively solicits progressively higher bids and the item is soled to the highest bidder.

- **Dutch** – the seller begins by offering units at a “high” price and reduces it until all units are soled.

- **Sealed-bid** – all bids are made simultaneously, and the item is sold to the highest bidder.
First-price / second-price

The price paid may be the highest bid or some other price:

- **First-price** – the bidder who submits the highest bid wins and pay a price equal to her bid.

- **Second-prices** – the bidder who submits the highest bid wins and pay a price equal to the second highest bid.

**Variants:** all-pay (lobbying), discriminatory, uniform, Vickrey (William Vickrey, Nobel Laureate 1996), and more.
Private-value / common-value

Bidders can be certain or uncertain about each other’s valuation:

- In private-value auctions, valuations differ among bidders, and each bidder is certain of her own valuation and can be certain or uncertain of every other bidder’s valuation.

- In common-value auctions, all bidders have the same valuation, but bidders do not know this value precisely and their estimates of it vary.
Nash equilibrium
Types of games

We study four groups of game theoretic models:

I strategic games

II extensive games (with perfect and imperfect information)

III repeated games

IV coalitional games
Strategic games

A strategic game consists of

– a set of players (decision makers)

– for each player, a set of possible actions

– for each player, preferences over the set of action profiles (outcomes).

In strategic games, players move simultaneously. A wide range of situations may be modeled as strategic games.
A two-player (finite) strategic game can be described conveniently in a so-called bi-matrix.

For example, a generic $2 \times 2$ (two players and two possible actions for each player) game

$$
\begin{array}{c|cc}
  & L & R \\
  \hline
  T & A_1, A_2 & B_1, B_2 \\
  B & C_1, C_2 & D_1, D_2 \\
\end{array}
$$

where the two rows (resp. columns) correspond to the possible actions of player 1 (resp. 2).
Applying the definition of a strategic game to the $2 \times 2$ game above yields:

- **Players**: $\{1, 2\}$

- **Action sets**: $A_1 = \{T, B\}$ and $A_2 = \{L, R\}$

- **Action profiles (outcomes)**:

  $$A = A_1 \times A_2 = \{(T, L), (T, R), (B, L), (B, R)\}$$

- **Preferences**: $\succeq_1$ and $\succeq_2$ are given by the bi-matrix.
Rock-Paper-Scissors
(over a dollar)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$R$</th>
<th>$P$</th>
<th>$S$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$R$</td>
<td>0, 0</td>
<td>−1, 1</td>
<td>1, −1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P$</td>
<td>1, −1</td>
<td>0, 0</td>
<td>−1, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S$</td>
<td>−1, 1</td>
<td>1, −1</td>
<td>0, 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each player’s set of actions is $\{\text{Rock, Papar, Scissors}\}$ and the set of action profiles is

$\{RR, RP, RS, PR, PP, PS, SR, SP, SS\}$. 
In rock-paper-scissors

\[ PR \sim_1 SP \sim_1 RS \succ_1 PP \sim_1 RR \sim_1 SS \succ_1 PS \sim_1 SR \sim_1 PS \]

and

\[ PR \sim_2 SP \sim_2 RS \preceq_2 PP \sim_2 RR \sim_2 SS \preceq_2 PS \sim_2 SR \sim_2 PS \]

This is a zero-sum or a strictly competitive game.
Classical $2 \times 2$ games

- The following simple $2 \times 2$ games represent a variety of strategic situations.

- Despite their simplicity, each game captures the essence of a type of strategic interaction that is present in more complex situations.

- These classical games “span” the set of almost all games (strategic equivalence).
**Game I: Prisoner’s Dilemma**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Goof</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>0,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goof</td>
<td>4,0</td>
<td>1,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A situation where there are gains from cooperation but each player has an incentive to “free ride.”

Examples: team work, duopoly, arm/advertisement/R&D race, public goods, and more.
Game II: Battle of the Sexes (BoS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ball</th>
<th>Show</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ball</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Battle of the Sexes models a wide variety of situations.

Examples: political stands, mergers, among others.
### Game III-V: Coordination, Hawk-Dove, and Matching Pennies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ball</th>
<th>Show</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ball</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>1,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dove</th>
<th>Hawk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dove</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>1,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawk</td>
<td>4,1</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Head</th>
<th>Tail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>1,−1</td>
<td>−1,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tail</td>
<td>−1,1</td>
<td>1,−1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Best response and dominated actions

Action $T$ is player 1’s *best response* to action $L$ player 2 if $T$ is the optimal choice when 1 *conjectures* that 2 will play $L$.

Player 1’s action $T$ is *strictly* dominated if it is never a best response (inferior to $B$ no matter what the other players do).

In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, for example, action *Work* is strictly dominated by action *Gooft*. As we will see, a strictly dominated action is not used in any Nash equilibrium.
Nash equilibrium

Nash equilibrium ($NE$) is a steady state of the play of a strategic game – no player has a profitable deviation given the actions of the other players.

Put differently, a $NE$ is a set of actions such that all players are doing their best given the actions of the other players.
"LORETTA'S DRIVING BECAUSE I'M DRINKING,
AND I'M DRINKING BECAUSE SHE'S DRIVING."
Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the BoS

Suppose that, each player can randomize among all her strategies so choices are not deterministic:

\[
\begin{array}{c|cc}
    & L & R \\
    \hline 
    T & p & 1-q \\
    B & (1-p)q & (1-p)(1-q) \\
\end{array}
\]

Let \( p \) and \( q \) be the probabilities that player 1 and 2 respectively assign to the strategy *Ball*. 
Player 2 will be indifferent between using her strategy \( B \) and \( S \) when player 1 assigns a probability \( p \) such that her expected payoffs from playing \( B \) and \( S \) are the same. That is,

\[
1p + 0(1 - p) = 0p + 2(1 - p)
\]

\[
p = 2 - 2p
\]

\[
p^* = 2/3
\]

Hence, when player 1 assigns probability \( p^* = 2/3 \) to her strategy \( B \) and probability \( 1 - p^* = 1/3 \) to her strategy \( S \), player 2 is indifferent between playing \( B \) or \( S \) any mixture of them.
Similarly, player 1 will be indifferent between using her strategy \( B \) and \( S \) when player 2 assigns a probability \( q \) such that her expected payoffs from playing \( B \) and \( S \) are the same. That is,

\[
2q + 0(1 - q) = 0q + 1(1 - q) \\
2q = 1 - q \\
q^* = 1/3
\]

Hence, when player 2 assigns probability \( q^* = 1/3 \) to her strategy \( B \) and probability \( 1 - q^* = 2/3 \) to her strategy \( S \), player 2 is indifferent between playing \( B \) or \( S \) any mixture of them.
In terms of best responses:

\[
B_1(q) = \begin{cases} 
  p = 1 & \text{if } p > 1/3 \\
  p \in [0, 1] & \text{if } p = 1/3 \\
  p = 0 & \text{if } p < 1/3 
\end{cases}
\]

\[
B_2(p) = \begin{cases} 
  q = 1 & \text{if } p > 2/3 \\
  q \in [0, 1] & \text{if } p = 2/3 \\
  q = 0 & \text{if } p < 2/3 
\end{cases}
\]

The BoS has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies \{\((B, B), (S, S)\)\} and one in mixed strategies \{\((2/3, 1/3)\)\}. In fact, any game with a finite number of players and a finite number of strategies for each player has Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950).
The tragedy of the commons
William Forster Lloyd (1833)

- Cattle herders sharing a common parcel of land (the commons) on which they are each entitled to let their cows graze. If a herder put more than his allotted number of cattle on the common, overgrazing could result.

- Each additional animal has a positive effect for its herder, but the cost of the extra animal is shared by all other herders, causing a so-called “free-rider” problem. Today’s commons include fish stocks, rivers, oceans, and the atmosphere.
The Tragedy of the Commons

The population problem has no technical solution; it requires a fundamental extension in morality.

Garrett Hardin
Garrett Hardin (1968)

- This social dilemma was populated by Hardin in his article “The Tragedy of the Commons,” published in the journal Science. The essay derived its title from Lloyd (1833) on the over-grazing of common land.

- Hardin concluded that “...the commons, if justifiable at all, is justifiable only under conditions of low-population density. As the human population has increased, the commons has had to be abandoned in one aspect after another.”
— “The only way we can preserve and nurture other and more precious freedoms is by relinquishing the freedom to breed, and that very soon. “Freedom is the recognition of necessity” — and it is the role of education to reveal to all the necessity of abandoning the freedom to breed. Only so, can we put an end to this aspect of the tragedy of the commons.”

“Freedom to breed will bring ruin to all.”
Let’s put some game theoretic analysis (rigorous sense) behind this story:

– There are $n$ players, each choosing how much to produce in a production activity that ‘consumes’ some of the clean air that surrounds our planet.

– There is $K$ amount of clean air, and any consumption of clean air comes out of this common resource. Each player $i = 1, ..., n$ chooses his consumption of clean air for production $k_i \geq 0$ and the amount of clean air left is therefore

\[
K - \sum_{i=1}^{n} k_i.
\]
The benefit of consuming an amount $k_i \geq 0$ of clean air gives player $i$ a benefit equal to $\ln(k_i)$. Each player also enjoys consuming the reminder of the clean air, giving each a benefit

$$\ln \left( K - \sum_{i=1}^{n} k_i \right).$$

Hence, the value for each player $i$ from the action profile (outcome) $k = (k_1, \ldots, k_n)$ is give by

$$v_i(k_i, k_{-i}) = \ln(k_i) + \ln \left( K - \sum_{j=1}^{n} k_j \right).$$
To get player $i$'s best-response function, we write down the first-order condition of his payoff function:

$$\frac{\partial v_i(k_i, k_{-i})}{\partial k_i} = \frac{1}{k_i} - \frac{1}{K - \sum_{j=1}^{n} k_j} = 0$$

and thus

$$BR_i(k_{-i}) = \frac{K - \sum_{j \neq i} k_j}{2}.$$
The two-player Tragedy of the Commons

- To find the Nash equilibrium, there are $n$ equations with $n$ unknowns that need to be solved. We first solve the equilibrium for two players. Letting $k_i(k_j)$ be the best response of player $i$, we have two best-response functions:

$$k_1(k_2) = \frac{K - k_2}{2} \quad \text{and} \quad k_2(k_1) = \frac{K - k_1}{2}.$$

- If we solve the two best-response functions simultaneously, we find the unique (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium

$$k_1^{NE} = k_2^{NE} = \frac{K}{3}.$$
Can this two-player society do better? More specifically, is consuming \( \frac{K}{3} \) clean air for each player too much (or too little)?

- The ‘right way’ to answer this question is using the Pareto principle (Vilfredo Pareto, 1848-1923) – can we find another action profile \( k = (k_1, k_2) \) that will make both players better off than in the Nash equilibrium?

- To this end, the function we seek to maximize is the social welfare function \( w \) given by
  \[
  w(v_1, v_2) = v_1 + v_2 = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \ln(k_i) + 2 \ln \left( K - \sum_{i=1}^{2} k_i \right).
  \]
The first-order conditions for this problem are

\[
\frac{\partial w(k_1, k_2)}{\partial k_1} = \frac{1}{k_1} - \frac{2}{K - k_1 - k_2} = 0
\]

and

\[
\frac{\partial w(k_1, k_2)}{\partial k_2} = \frac{1}{k_2} - \frac{2}{K - k_1 - k_2} = 0.
\]

Solving these two equations simultaneously result the unique Pareto optimal outcome

\[
k_1^{PO} = k_2^{PO} = \frac{K}{4}.
\]
The $n$-player Tragedy of the Commons

– In the $n$-player Tragedy of the Commons, the best response of each player $i = 1, \ldots, n$, $k_i(k_{-i})$, is given by

\[ BR_i(k_{-i}) = \frac{K - \sum_{j \neq i} k_j}{2}. \]

– We consider a symmetric Nash equilibrium where each player $i$ chooses the same level of consumption of clean air $k^*_i$ (it is subtle to show that there cannot be asymmetric Nash equilibria).
Because the best response must hold for each player \( i \) and they all choose the same level \( k_{SNE}^i \) then in the symmetric Nash equilibrium all best-response functions reduce to

\[
k_{SNE}^i = \frac{K - \sum_{j \neq i} k_{SNE}^j}{2} = \frac{K - (n - 1)k_{SNE}^i}{2}
\]

or

\[
k_{SNE}^i = \frac{K}{n + 1}.
\]

Hence, the sum of clean air consumed by the firms is \( \frac{n}{n + 1} K \), which increases with \( n \) as Hardin conjectured.
What is the socially optimal outcome with \( n \) players? And how does society size affect this outcome?

- With \( n \) players, the social welfare function \( w \) given by

\[
w(v_1, \ldots, v_n) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} v_i = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \ln(k_i) + n \ln(K - \sum_{i=1}^{n} k_i).
\]

And the \( n \) first-order conditions for the problem of maximizing this function are

\[
\frac{\partial w(k_1, \ldots, k_n)}{\partial k_i} = \frac{1}{k_i} - \frac{n}{K - \sum_{j=1}^{n} k_j} = 0
\]

for \( i = 1, \ldots, n. \)
Just as for the analysis of the Nash equilibrium with \( n \) players, the solution here is also symmetric. Therefore, the Pareto optimal consumption of each player \( k^{PO} \) can be found using the following equation:

\[
\frac{1}{k^{PO}} - \frac{n}{K - nk^{PO}} = 0
\]

or

\[
k^{PO} = \frac{K}{2n}
\]

and thus the Pareto optimal consumption of air is equal \( \frac{K}{2} \), for any society size \( n \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, n \).
Finally, we show there is no asymmetric equilibrium.

To this end, assume there are two players, \( i \) and \( j \), choosing two different \( k_i \neq k_j \) in equilibrium.

Because we assume a Nash equilibrium the best-response functions of \( i \) and \( j \) must hold simultaneously, that is

\[
\begin{align*}
\bar{k}_i &= \frac{K - \bar{k} - k_j}{2} \quad \text{and} \quad k_j = \frac{K - \bar{k} - k_i}{2}
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \bar{k} \) be the sum of equilibrium choices of all other players except \( i \) and \( j \).
— However, if we solve the best-response functions of players $i$ and $j$ simultaneously, we find that

$$ k_i = k_j = \frac{K - \bar{k}}{3} $$

contracting the assumption we started with that $k_i \neq k_j$. 

Oligopoly
Cournot’s oligopoly model (1838)

− A single good is produced by two firms (the industry is a “duopoly”).

− The cost for firm $i = 1, 2$ for producing $q_i$ units of the good is given by $c_i q_i$ (“unit cost” is constant equal to $c_i > 0$).

− If the firms’ total output is $Q = q_1 + q_2$ then the market price is

$$P = A - Q$$

if $A \geq Q$ and zero otherwise (linear inverse demand function). We also assume that $A > c$. 
The inverse demand function

\[ P = A - Q \]
To find the Nash equilibria of the Cournot’s game, we can use the procedures based on the firms’ best response functions.

But first we need the firms payoffs (profits):

\[ \pi_1 = Pq_1 - c_1q_1 \]
\[ = (A - Q)q_1 - c_1q_1 \]
\[ = (A - q_1 - q_2)q_1 - c_1q_1 \]
\[ = (A - q_1 - q_2 - c_1)q_1 \]

and similarly,

\[ \pi_2 = (A - q_1 - q_2 - c_2)q_2 \]
Firm 1’s profit as a function of its output
(given firm 2’s output)

Profit 1

Output 1

\[ A - c_1 - q_2 \]

\[ A - c_1 - q'_2 \]

\[ q'_2 < q_2 \]
To find firm 1’s best response to any given output $q_2$ of firm 2, we need to study firm 1’s profit as a function of its output $q_1$ for given values of $q_2$.

Using calculus, we set the derivative of firm 1’s profit with respect to $q_1$ equal to zero and solve for $q_1$:

$$q_1 = \frac{1}{2}(A - q_2 - c_1).$$

We conclude that the best response of firm 1 to the output $q_2$ of firm 2 depends on the values of $q_2$ and $c_1$. 
Because firm 2’s cost function is $c_2 \neq c_1$, its best response function is given by

$$q_2 = \frac{1}{2}(A - q_1 - c_2).$$

A Nash equilibrium of the Cournot’s game is a pair $(q_1^*, q_2^*)$ of outputs such that $q_1^*$ is a best response to $q_2^*$ and $q_2^*$ is a best response to $q_1^*$.

From the figure below, we see that there is exactly one such pair of outputs

$$q_1^* = \frac{A + c_2 - 2c_1}{3} \quad \text{and} \quad q_2^* = \frac{A + c_1 - 2c_2}{3}$$

which is the solution to the two equations above.
The best response functions in the Cournot's duopoly game

Output 2

\[ A - c_1 \]

\[ BR_1(q_2) \]

\[ A - c_2 \]

\[ \frac{A - c_2}{2} \]

\[ BR_2(q_1) \]

Nash equilibrium

Output 1

\[ A - c_1 \]

\[ \frac{A - c_1}{2} \]

\[ A - c_2 \]
A question: what happens when consumers are willing to pay more (A increases)?
In summary, this simple Cournot’s duopoly game has a unique Nash equilibrium.

Two economically important properties of the Nash equilibrium are (to economic regulatory agencies):

[1] The relation between the firms’ equilibrium profits and the profit they could make if they act collusively.

[1] **Collusive outcomes:** in the Cournot’s duopoly game, there is a pair of outputs at which both firms’ profits exceed their levels in a Nash equilibrium.

[2] **Competition:** The price at the Nash equilibrium if the two firms have the same unit cost $c_1 = c_2 = c$ is given by

\[
P^* = A - q_1^* - q_2^*
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{3}(A + 2c)
\]

which is above the unit cost $c$. But as the number of firm increases, the equilibrium price deceases, approaching $c$ (zero profits!).
Food for thought
LUPI

Many players simultaneously chose an integer between 1 and 99,999. Whoever chooses the lowest unique positive integer (LUPI) wins.

Question What does an equilibrium model of behavior predict in this game?

The field version of LUPI, called Limbo, was introduced by the government-owned Swedish gambling monopoly Svenska Spel. Despite its complexity, there is a surprising degree of convergence toward equilibrium.
Morra

A two-player game in which each player simultaneously hold either one or two fingers and each guesses the total number of fingers held up.

If exactly one player guesses correctly, then the other player pays her the amount of her guess.

Question Model the situation as a strategic game and describe the equilibrium model of behavior predict in this game.

The game was played in ancient Rome, where it was known as “micatio.”
Maximal game
(sealed-bid second-price auction)

Two bidders, each of whom privately observes a signal $X_i$ that is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) from a uniform distribution on $[0, 10]$.

Let $X^{\text{max}} = \max\{X_1, X_2\}$ and assume the ex-post common value to the bidders is $X^{\text{max}}$.

Bidders bid in a sealed-bid second-price auction where the highest bidder wins, earns the common value $X^{\text{max}}$ and pays the second highest bid.