University
of California, Berkeley Department
of Economics |

Welcome to the ECO 220C! This page is going to be updated frequently so please check back for updates.

- Instructor: Denis Nekipelov (e-mail: nekipelov@econ).

- Monday:

6:00pm - 8.00pm, Lecture, Room 639 in Evans hall

- Tuesday:

9:00am - 10:30am, Office hours, Room 667 in Evans hall

- 2009 Syllabus, pdf file.

**Lecture 1**
Course overview. Requirements and expectations . **Lecture 2**
Economic motivation for demand models for differentiated product markets. **Lecture 3**
Computational aspects of structural modeling: introduction**Lecture 4**
Structural analysis of static games: introductory examples**Lecture 5**
Static games of incomplete information**Lecture 6**
Analysis of auctions**Lecture 7**
Inference in auctions with assymetry**Lecture 8**
Analysis of dynamic discrete decision processes**Lecture 9**
Estimation methods for discrete dynamic games

Main Topics of the class: a brief overview.

Models of differentiated product markets.

Static models of interactions.

Dynamic models of interactions

Slides for Lecture 1

Basic utility-based model of consumers' behavior.

Rationale for modeling ``shortcuts''.

Discussion of the approach to estimation of the model.

Choice of specification and instruments.

Policy analysis: counterfactual modeling of firm behavior and introduction of new products.

Welfare and revenue analysis.

Technical challenges: an outline of work for future classes

Slides for Lecture 2

Computer arithmetic and computational errors

Notion of algorithmic complexity

Computer representation of functions

Approximation in multi-dimensional spaces

Stochastic numerical integration

Introductory information about pseudo-random numbers

Independence sampling, the Gibbs sampler, the Hastings-Metropolis algorithm

Assessing numerical accuracy in Markov Chain Monte-Carlo

Quadrature methods of numerical integration

Interpolation and approximation of integrals

Polynomial approximation and related accelerated integration methods

Numerical differentiation

Slides for Lecture 3

Parametric assumptions and structural inference

Static games of complete information: strategies and equilibria

Indeterminacy of realized equilibria and inference problems

Inference with multiple equilibria with no additional information

Inference with explicit equilibrium refinement mechanism

Estimation of games with multiple equilibria: technical challenges

Some algorithms for computing equilibria in static games

Slides for Lecture 4

Parametric assumptions and structural inference

Observable actions, best responses and equilibria

Multiple equilibria in games of incomplete information solving non-polynomial systems of equations

Estimation of games with multiple equilibria: technical challenges

Two-stage estimation of static games

One-stqge conditional moment-based estimation

Slides for Lecture 5

Common auction formats and structure of information

Observable actions, best responses and equilibria

Revenue equivalence results and welfare analysis

Structural estimation of primitive characteristics

Two-stage estimation in auction games

Slides for Lecture 6

Identification in auctions in the presense of unobserved characteristics

Observable actions, best responses and equilibria

Dynamic behavior in auctions

Auctions on the Internet: theory and evidence

Slides for Lecture 7

Notes for non-parametric estimation in auctions

Computational problem

Structure of the decision problem and econometric specification

Econometric estimation procedures and their properties

Slides for Lecture 8

Dynamic decision problem as a conditional moment equation

Semiparametric and non-parametric estimation of conditional moment functionals

Notion of semiparametric efficiency and structure of efficient estimation for discrete dynamic games

Slides for Lecture 8

**Assignment 1**(due Monday, March 2nd)

**Assignment 2**(due Monday, April 6th)

Last modified: Mon 26 January 2009 13:35 EDT