
Econ 113: April 21, 2015


- Subprime Lending Crisis, 2000s, continued – Housing Boom & Bust
- HELOCs and consumer spending (Mian & Sufi)
- Demographic Changes
- Women in the Labor Force
- The Pill
- Marriage Decisions


Last Class is Thursday April 30 Final is Thursday May 14, 8:00 am, 1 LeConte





There are real effects of financial changes


- Equity in house = Current price of comparable homes outstanding mortgage balance
- Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOC)
- Bank gives homeowner "line of credit"
- Can use money for whatever you want, whenever you want
- $-\,$ Repay eventually but often interest only for first 10 years
- Mian and Sufi article
 - County, zip-code, or MSA level data to study effect of HELOCs
 - To protect borrower identity, each observation = 5 borrowers












Mian & Sufi,	Table 3
--------------	---------

Table 1. Effect of House Prices on Household Borrowing for 1997 Homeowners

	Change	e in total debt, 2	002-2006 (thou:	sands \$)
ΔHome Value, 2002-06	0.245*** (0.050)	0.271*** (0.056)	0.253*** (0.056)	0.246*** (0.065)
Median home value, 2002	0.020 (0.039)	-0.014 (0.044)	-0.010 (0.037)	-0.076 (0.079)
Controls for credit score, HH income, debt/income, age		~		
Male (0/1)		~	~	~
Individual dummy variables			~	~
Census & Income variables				~
Observations (n)	13,328	13,199	13,199	12,497

Invites: UTIN OT ODSERVATION = groups of 5-9 reasonably homogeneous homeowners. Standard errors clustered at MSA level. ***Significant at 1% level. **Significant at 5% level. *Significant at 1% level. Source: Mian & Sufi, "House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing, and the US Household Leverage Crisis," AER 101 (2132-50). Table 3.



And they used that \$ to buy stuff

- Not a direct conclusion, but by process of elimination
- Table 6 tells us . . .
 - Panel A: House Price (HP) growth not determining likelihood of moving to a new zip code
 - Panel B: House Price (HP) growth not associated with buying mortgage-financed investment properties
 - Panel C: House Price (HP) growth not associated with paying off credit card balances
- What else is possible?
 - Home improvements (recorded in Residential Investment) & Consumption spending!


Mian & Sufi, Table 6


	Coefficient on ∆Home Price (HP), 2002-06						
	Probability	of Moving	Change in # d	of mortgages	Credit card balance	Credit card balance / income	
Actual HP growth	0.046 (0.036)		-0.011 (0.021)				
Instrumented HP growth♪		0.010 (0.076)		-0.109** (0.047)	0.084 (0.143)	0.017 (0.022)	
Observations (n)	68	13,196	12,772	12,772	3,233	3,233	


Other evidence supports conclusion


- Mian & Sufi, FRB-SF Newsletter, January 2011 (attached to handout)
- County-level data
- Measure 2002-2006 increase in debt:income ratio
 - "high-household debt" = counties with top 10% of increases
 - Lots of increase in HELOC debt
 - Probably lots of HELOC-financed additional spending
 "low-household debt" = counties with bottom 10% of increases
- How has recovery progressed in those two sets of counties?


High-debt REALLY cut back on car purchases











Demographic Changes								
	Table 1. Population Distribution							
	1950	1970	1990	2010				
% < 5	10.8	8.4	7.5	6.5				
5 - 15	17.5	21.9	15.4	14.7				
16 - 24	13.3	15.8	13.5	12.7				
25 - 44	30.0	23.6	32.5	26.6				
45 - 64	20.3	20.5	18.5	26.4				
65 +	8.1	9.8	12.5	13.1				
Total #	152 m	205 m	249 m	309 m				
Productivity Growth Slowdown	Resurgence	Demography	Women in the LF	The Pill				


More changes									
	Table 2. Vital Rates per 1,000 population								
		marriage rate	divorce rate	birth rate	death rate per 1,000	expec- tation of life at birth			
	1900			32.3	17.2	47.3			
	1920	12.0	1.6	27.7	13.0	54.1			
	1930	9.2	1.6	21.3					
	1940	12.1	2.0	19.4	10.8	62.9			
	1947	13.9	3.4	26.6					
	1950	11.1	2.6	24.1					
	1960	8.5	2.2	23.7	9.5	69.7			
	1970	10.6	3.5	18.4	9.5	70.8			
	1980	10.6	5.2	15.9	8.8	73.7			
	1990	9.8	4.7	16.7	8.6	75.4			
	2000	8.3	4.1	14.4	8.5	76.8			
	2010	7.3	3.6	13.0	8.0	78.7			
Productivity Growth Slow	down	Resurgence	9	Demography	Wom	en in the LE	The Pill		


Far fewer	"Phil &	Claire	Dunphy"
-----------	---------	--------	---------

 Few households today are the 	Table 3. Share of Households that are Married Couples w/Kids under 18				
"traditional family" of Mom, Dad, and	1960 1970	44.2 40.3			
Kid(s)	1970	30.9			
	1990	26.3			
	2000	24.1			
	2010	20.9			
Productivity Growth Slowdown Resurgence	Demography	Women in the LF The Pill			


More married women working


	all wo	men	white v	vomen	nonwhite women		
	married	single	married	single	married	single	
1900	5.6	43.5	3.2	41.5	26.0	60.5	
1920	9.0	46.4	6.5	45.0	32.5	58.8	
1930	11.7	50.5	9.8	48.7	33.2	52.5	
1940	13.8	45.5	12.5	45.9	27.3	41.9	
1950	21.6	50.6	20.7	51.8	31.8	40.0	
1960	31.9	58.6	29.8	48.5	40.5	39.7	
1970	40.5	56.8	38.5	52.1	50.0	43.6	
1980	49.8	64.4	49.3	64.2	59.0	49.4	
1990	58.4	66.9	55.8	68.6	64.4	50.4	
2000	61.1	68.9	60.5	70.3			
2010	61.0	63.3	60.7	64.4	63.6		






Occupational	Tabl Distributio		nen, 1890	-1999
	1890/ 1900	1930	1970	1999
Professional	9.6 %	16.5%	18.9%	35.9%
Clerical	4.0	20.9	34.5	23.4
Service	35.5	27.5	20.5	17.4
Sales	4.3	6.8	7.4	13.0
Manufacturing	27.7	19.8	17.9	9.2
Agricultural	19.0	8.4	0.8	1.1





One Little Pill, three weeks out of four

- The Pill
 - Puts women in charge of fertility control
 - Separates fertility control decision from time of sexual activity
 - Initially not available to single women under age 21
 - Laws changed state-by-state
- Question: Did access to the Pill affect women's fertility? The timing of children? Their labor market supply?



		fect of the F dard errors i		
	First birth	before age		# children
	age 22	age 19	age 36	ever born
ELA to Pill	-0.093 (0.043)	-0.011 (0.037)	-0.001 (0.031)	-0.062 (0.086)
ELA to abortion	-0.074 (0.057)	-0.086 (0.045)	-0.006 (0.006)	0.242 (0.120)
ELA to both	0.057	0.002 (0.065)	0.005	-0.186 (0.114)


&	of the Pill on Labor Intensity of Market standard errors in p	Work
	In labor force?	Annual Hours
ELA, now aged 21-25	0.005 (0.006)	7.81 (10.4)
ELA, now aged 26-30	0.042 (0.006)	107 (13.4)
ELA, now aged 31-35	0.019 (0.006)	71.2 (13.4)
ELA, now aged 36-40	0.002 (0.006)	29.1 (14.1)
ELA, now aged 41-44	-0.003 (0.008)	29.4 (15.6)

 Cost / benefit analysis Assume: goal is maximize net benefit Specialization and Trade Home production vs. Market production Changing comparative advantage Higher women's labor force participation Less marriage Later marriage 		Shall	I marr	y?	
– Less marriage	 Assume: goal is Specialization an Home productio 	, maximize d Trade n vs. Mark	ket producti		
	– Less marriage	abor for	ce particip	oation	

Less spe	ecialization
Percent o	Table 4. f married couples oth partners working
1970	39
1980	50
1990	54
2000	56
2010	54

Less Marriage & Later Marriage

% of 30-	Table 5. 34 year olds neve	e 5. Table 8. ds never married Median Age at First Marriage			
				Women	Men
	Women	Men	1900	21.9	25.9
1970	6.2	9.4	1930	21.3	24.3
1980	9.5	15.9	1940	21.5	24.3
1990	16.4	27.0	1947	20.5	23.7
			1950	20.4	22.8
2000	21.9	30.0	1960	20.3	22.8
2010	27.1	36.5	1970	20.6	22.5
			1980	21.8	23.6
			1990	24.0	25.9
			2000	25.1	26.8
			2010	26.3	28.1
Demography	Women in the LF	The Pill	Marriana Decisions	Immigration Laws	



		able 9. ouple Households	5
	Str	Straight	
	# (000's)	% of all households	# (000's)
1970	523	0.8	
1980	1,589	2.0	
1990	2,856	3.1	
2000	4,881	4.6	594
2010	5,748	5.0	654

1950	Bachelor 24	Master	Doctorate
1950	24		
		29	14
1970	43	39	13
1990	53	53	37
2000	57	58	44
2010	57	60	52
	1990 2000	1990 53 2000 57	1990 53 53 2000 57 58

statement: "Activities	e freshman who agree with of married women are best ome & family."
1970	48 %
1990	25 %
1997	25 %

Group Discussion Questions

- What were the explanations for fertility decline that we looked at earlier in the course?
- Are those explanations relevant to explaining the last 30-40 years of fertility behavior in the U.S.? Why/why not?
- What if we think of fertility decisions more broadly, as a cost/benefit calculus? How well does the cost/benefit approach explain the <u>19th century</u> fertility decline?