Taxation and the International Mobility of Inventors†

By Ufuk Akcigit, Salomé Baslandze, and Stefanie Stantcheva*

We study the effect of top tax rates on “superstar” inventors’ international mobility since 1977, using panel data on inventors from the US and European Patent Offices. We exploit the differential impact of changes in top tax rates on inventors of different qualities. Superstar inventors’ location choices are significantly affected by top tax rates. In our preferred specification, the elasticity to the net-of-tax rate of the number of domestic superstar inventors is around 0.03, while that of foreign superstar inventors is around 1. These elasticities are larger for inventors in multinational companies. An inventor is less sensitive to taxes in a country if his company performs a higher share of its research there. (JEL F22, F23, H24, H31, J61, O31, O34)

In 1876, Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone, and created the Bell Telephone Company one year later. By 1886, more than 150,000 people in the United States owned telephones. In 1916, James L. Kraft patented a pasteurization technique for cheese and established his company, Kraft Foods Inc., that would grow into a conglomerate responsible for creating some of the United States’ most popular food products and employing more than 100,000 people. In 1968, Ralph Baer created a TV game unit that allowed players to control on-screen action with paddle controls. Today, the video gaming industry is worth $66 billion. In the early 1970s, Michael Ter-Pogossian developed the positron emission tomography (PET) scanner, used today in countless medical examinations. In the mid-1970s, Samar Basu, through a series of patents, invented the technology that allowed the lithium ion batteries used in innumerable consumer products to be recharged multiple times. In 1981, Charles Simonyi started developing some of Microsoft Office’s most profitable products. In addition to being very prolific inventors, these innovators had something else in common: they were all immigrants.

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According to World Intellectual Property Organization data, inventors are highly mobile geographically with a migration rate around 8 percent. But what determines their patterns of migration? In particular, how does tax policy affect migration? The fear of a “brain drain” and the exodus of economically valuable agents in response to higher taxation has led to a vivid public debate regarding the taxation of high income people. For instance, in response to a New York Times article entitled “The Myth of the Rich Who Flee From Taxes,” following Gerard Depardieu’s Russian exodus for tax purposes, Forbes issued an article entitled “Sorry New York Times, Tax Flight of the Rich Is Not a Myth.” In this paper, we study the effects of top income taxes on the international migration of inventors, who are key drivers of technological progress.

While an important issue, international migration responses to taxation have remained underexplored due to the lack of a large-scale international panel dataset. One important exception is the study of the migration responses of football players, a set of economic agents very different from inventors, by Kleven, Landais, and Saez (2013). In our analysis, we use a unique international panel data on all inventors from the US and European patent offices in an unusual way, namely to track the international location of inventors since the 1970s. The benchmark data is panel data from the disambiguated inventor data by Li et al. (2014), based on inventors who patent with the United States Patent Office (USPTO). The focus is on the eight OECD countries that represent the bulk of USPTO patents for the period 1977–2000: Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States. The new disambiguated European inventor data is from Coffano and Tarasconi (2014). The US and European patent offices together account for a very large fraction of worldwide patents, so that our sample contains most of the universe of inventors who patent. We combine this inventor data with international effective marginal top tax rate data from Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014).

Particularly interesting are “superstar” inventors, namely those with the most abundant and most valuable innovations. The distribution of inventor quality, as captured by the citations that an inventor’s patents receive—an often-used measure of the economic value of patents—is highly skewed, as can be seen in Figure 1. While the median and mean inventors have, respectively, 11 and 42 lifetime citations, the average top 1 percent superstar inventor has 1,019 citations.

There are three major challenges that arise when studying the migration responses to taxation. These challenges come in addition to the aforementioned usual obstacle of lack of international panel data—a hurdle we are able to resolve in this paper thanks to the use of the patent data. First, conceptually, migration decisions should depend on the counterfactual income that an agent expects to receive—an often-used measure of the economic value of patents—is highly skewed, as can be seen in Figure 1. While the median and mean inventors have, respectively, 11 and 42 lifetime citations, the average top 1 percent superstar inventor has 1,019 citations.

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1 For a recent study using this data, see Miguélez and Fink (2013). High skilled workers are in general more mobile than low skilled workers, with inventors being among most high-skilled immigrants.
4 See Section IC for references to the literature studying patent citations.
earned. Finally, average tax rates may be endogenous to other factors in a country and in a given year.

Our strategy to study mobility proceeds in three steps in order to address these three challenges, making use of some unique features of the patent data. First, we construct detailed proxies for inventors’ counterfactual earnings in each potential destination country, which include, among others, measures of inventors’ qualities. Indeed, the patent data provides us with a rare opportunity to directly measure inventor productivity and quality. Our benchmark measure of quality is citations-adjusted patents, but we also consider the number of patents, average citations per patent, the maximum citations per patent, as well as measures of the breadth of patents and breadth of impact of an inventor.\(^5\) We focus on inventors who are employees of companies and, hence, not the owners of their patents.

The quality measures based on citations, are important determinants of inventors’ incomes, directly and indirectly. Directly, more citations mean a higher economic value of the patent (Trajtenberg 1990) and companies would typically reward inventors through bonuses or “fair-share” agreements. Indirectly, employers should try to promote and retain their star employees, as characterized by high patent qualities (see also the papers reviewed in Section ID which document the link between patent citations and income).

In addition to inventor quality, we also proxy for counterfactual earnings through a variety of variables, such as inventors’ technological field, their technological

\(^5\) See Section IC for a detailed description of how we construct quality measures for inventors and for alternative definitions of “superstars.”
fit with each potential destination country, their tenure, and ability-technological field-country specific trends. We also exploit information about what type of institution the inventor works for, notably whether he is employed by a multinational, and the share of the innovative activity of his company performed in each potential destination country.

Based on our benchmark quality measure (and for each of the other measures), we construct a corresponding quality distribution, conditional on region of origin and year, and determine the rank of each inventor in this distribution. We define superstar inventors as those in the top 1 percent of the quality distribution, and similarly construct the top 1–5 percent, the top 5–10 percent, and subsequent quality brackets.

Second, regarding the counterfactual average tax rate, we focus on the elasticity of migration to the top marginal income tax rate. The resulting elasticity is a reduced form parameter and our estimates are not necessarily interpretable as the “elasticities of migration to net-of-tax income,” for several reasons. First, top marginal tax rates are not equal to effective top average tax rates because of the nonlinearity of the tax system. This should be a minimal concern in the case of very high earners who are well above the top tax bracket. Second, there are other potentially relevant taxes for inventors, such as capital or corporate taxes. To minimize the latter concern, we restrict our benchmark sample to those inventors who are employees of companies and who are not the assignees of the patents—this ensures that personal ordinary income tax should be the main tax affecting decisions. Furthermore, firms’ decisions and institutional factors (such as the visa system) influence the response to taxes. Incidentally, the estimated elasticity to the top tax rate may also be interesting per se as it captures the effects of a “success” tax.

Third, turning to the identification, the simplest strategy is to exploit variation in top marginal tax rates across time and countries, controlling for country fixed effects and country specific linear trends to filter out longer-term country-specific evolutions in innovation, incomes, and migration. We do this analysis merely as a first pass as there may be other factors correlated with top marginal tax rates which vary at the same time in a given country. Instead, our preferred identification filters out all country-year level variation and exploits the differential impact of changes in the top marginal tax rate on top superstar inventors and slightly lower quality inventors within a given country and year. Top 1 percent inventors and those of slightly lower qualities are similar enough to be subject to the same country-year level policies and economic effects. However, only inventors who are actually in the top bracket are directly affected by the changes in top tax rates and the higher up in the top bracket they are, the more intensely they are treated by top tax rates. The evidence presented

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6 The three benchmark regions used to construct the per region and year quality distributions are based on comparable patenting intensities. They are (i) the United States, (ii) European countries and Canada, and (iii) Japan, but we also use per-country rankings for robustness checks (in online Appendix Table A16).

7 Note, however, that we are not trying to understand the effects of the taxation of direct patent income (such as royalties or corporate income). We are instead interested in the taxation of salary and bonus earnings, for which personal income taxes are the main consideration. Online Appendix Table A14 shows that the effect of capital gains taxes on migration is insignificant once income taxes are controlled for.

8 We also check that our results hold for the full sample which includes nonemployees in online Appendix Table A16.

9 The multinomial specification automatically filters out variables which are constant across countries alternatives such as year fixed effects.
(based among others on IRS tax data matched to the patent data) suggests that top 1 percent superstar inventors are very high up in the top tax bracket. The likelihood of being in the top bracket and the fraction of an inventor’s income in the top bracket decline as we move down the quality ranking of inventors. Hence, the lower quality, top 5–10 percent, top 10–25 percent, and below top 25 percent groups serve as control groups for the top 1 percent group.

We perform the analysis at three, successively more detailed levels. We start by documenting some stylized macroeconomic facts about the relation between mobility and top tax rates. Since the 1970s there is a negative correlation between the top tax rate and the share of top quality foreign inventors who locate in a country, as well as the share of top quality domestic inventors who remain in their home country.

Delving deeper into three specific case studies, we exploit the quasi-experimental variation provided by migration or tax reforms. First, we consider the special case of Russian inventors: a group whose migration opportunities were severely restricted before the collapse of the Soviet Union. We show that, in accordance with our main identification strategy, top quality Russian inventors, relative to lower quality Russian inventors, tended to migrate to lower top tax countries after the Soviet Union collapsed. We then exploit two large tax reforms, namely the US Tax reform Act of 1986 and Denmark’s “Researchers’ Tax” reform of 1992.

Finally, we estimate a full-fledged multinomial location choice model to obtain the micro elasticities to top tax rates for foreign and domestic inventors. We use the two identification strategies previously described exploiting, first, country-by-year variation in top tax rates and, second, the differential effective impact of top tax rates on inventors of different qualities.

We find that the superstar top 1 percent inventors are significantly affected by top tax rates when choosing where to locate. As explained in the text, we provide the effects relative to several possible control groups for the top 1 percent inventors. At the lower end, using the top 5–10 percent as a control group yields an elasticity of the number of domestic superstar top 1 percent inventors to the net-of-tax rate of 0.02, which, as explained below, may be a lower bound. Using the top 10–25 percent or the below top 25 percent as control groups yields elasticities of, respectively, 0.02 and 0.03. On the other hand, the elasticity of the number of foreign top 1 percent superstar inventors to the net-of-tax rate is much larger, with corresponding values of 0.63, 0.85, and 1.04. To put these numbers into perspective, the elasticity of the number of domestic football players in Kleven, Landais, and Saez (2013) to the net-of-tax rate ranges from 0.07 to 0.16 depending on the specification, and the

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10 As explained in Section IA, “below top 25 percent” refers here to a relatively high quality group of inventors who at some point have been or will be in the top 25 percent, but are not currently in the top 25 percent.

11 This is similar in spirit to papers using the differential impact of tax changes across income tax brackets (Eissa 1995) or across households with different nonlabor income and family size (Eissa and Hoynes 2006) rather than quality brackets like we do. It is most closely related to the differential propensities of being “treated,” as in Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2009) or Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012) who multiply Food Stamp program introduction by propensity to participate (proxied by group-level food stamp participation): in our case, we interact the top tax rate with the inventor’s quality ranking (which proxies the propensity of being in the top bracket). When choosing the control group for top 1 percent inventors, there is a trade-off between maximizing comparability (i.e., choosing a group very close in quality, e.g., the top 5–10 percent) and minimizing the control group’s propensity of being treated (i.e., choosing a group further down the quality distribution, e.g., the below top 25 percent). We therefore report the estimated coefficients for all inventor quality groups and the implied elasticities relative to three different choices of control group.
elasticity of the number of foreign players ranges from 0.6 to 1.3. We also find some evidence consistent with sorting by ability and general equilibrium wage effects.

The type and structure of companies seems important for the migration decision: Inventors who have worked for multinationals in the previous period are more likely to take advantage of tax differentials. On the contrary, they are much less sensitive to the tax rate in a given country if their company has a significant share of its innovative activity in that country.

We then perform extensive robustness checks on these benchmark results. First, we consider five different measures of inventor quality, both static and dynamic, and alternative proxies for earnings. Second, we contrast short-term and long-term mobility in response to taxation. Third, we address potential selection based on patenting behavior by estimating a Heckman selection model that exploits a 1994 reform effectively expanding patent protection in the United States. Finally, we reproduce the analysis on the disambiguated inventor data from the European Patent Office and find very similar elasticities of the number of domestic and foreign top 1 percent superstar inventors to the net-of-tax rate of, respectively, 0.02 and 1.24.

Related Literature.—That high skilled migration and its drivers are important considerations has been highlighted in the literature (see Kerr 2013 and the extensive references therein). High-skilled immigrants account for roughly 25 percent of US workers in innovation and entrepreneurship and contribute disproportionately to patents or start-ups. Immigrants account for a majority of the net increase in the US STEM workforce since 1995. There seems to be a positive selection among immigrants, as documented by Grogger and Hanson (2011) for foreign PhD students who stay in the United States and by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) for Mexican immigrant workers.

In turn, not just the receiving, but also the sending country is affected. It could either be suffering from a “brain drain,” by losing highly skilled people or gaining from a “brain gain,” if people invest in human capital more with the prospect of immigration or from remittances. Indeed, overseas diasporas have been studied as important determinants of knowledge flows (Foley and Kerr 2013). Inventor migration and the formation of geographical knowledge clusters and their spillovers have also received attention (Miguélez 2016; Breschi, Lissoni, and Tarasconi forthcoming; Miguélez and Moreno 2014, and the references therein).

Our paper adds to a recent literature that studies the international migration of people in response to taxation. Most closely related are the papers by Kleven, Landais, and Saez (2013) and Kleven et al. (2014). Kleven et al. (2014) find very high elasticities of the number of high income foreigners in Denmark using a preferential tax scheme on high-earning foreigners implemented by Denmark in 1992 that reduced top tax rates for three years.\footnote{By contrast, Young and Varner (2011) study the effects of a change in the millionaire tax rate in New Jersey on migration and find small elasticities. Young et al. (2016) consider the migration of millionaires in the United States using administrative data.} Kleven, Landais, and Saez (2013) study the migration of football players across European clubs. While we find somewhat lower elasticities for domestic inventors, Kleven, Landais, and Saez (2013) themselves conjectured that football players might be substantially more mobile than
other high-skilled workers, because they earn most of their lifetime income over a short period and their profession involves little country-specific capital. In addition, their sample exclusively considers migration across European countries, while we also include the United States, Canada, and Japan. Expanding the study to other continents might, one would expect, reduce the tax elasticities of migration. Other related papers consider migration within countries. Bakija and Slemrod (2004) use Federal Estate Tax returns to show that the effect of higher state taxes on the migration of wealthy individuals across states in the United States is very small. Moretti and Wilson (2014) consider aggregate state level effects of adopting subsidies for biotech employers (such as increase in R&D tax incentives) on the inflows of star scientists. Very complementary to our paper is recent work by Moretti and Wilson (2015) which considers the effects of state taxes on the migration of star scientists across US states and also finds highly significant effects of taxes on migration.

Estimating the elasticity of migration to the tax rate is also important for the theoretical literature of optimal taxation with migration, as it enters the optimal tax formulas (Wilson 1980, 1982; Mirrlees 1982). Our paper can shed some light on how big the proposed modifications to standard optimal tax formulas have to be empirically in order to account for migration.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the setting and data, as well as a simple model of inventor migration. Section II shows some stylized macro facts on the relation between top tax rates and superstar inventors’ migration. Section III presents quasi-experimental evidence based on three country case studies. Section IV describes the multinomial location model estimation and the main results. Section V contains several robustness checks and extensions. Section VI repeats the analysis on inventors who patent with the European Patent Office. Section VII concludes.

I. Setting, Data, and Strategy

This section provides some background information on inventors, patents, and our various datasets. We explain how we use the unique features of patent data for the study of the effects of taxation on inventor mobility with the help of a simple location choice model.

A. Inventors and Patents: Background

Inventors are the authors of innovations. They can be employees of companies, work for research institutions, or be self-employed “garage inventors.” Patents protect the intellectual property of the innovation. They are legally granted to an assignee. The assignee is either an individual (possibly, but not necessarily, one of

14 See also the more recent papers by Simula and Trannoy (2010) and especially Lehmann, Simula, and Trannoy (2014) who consider optimal nonlinear income taxation in the presence of migration.
15 The same applies for the macro structural literature that includes migration channels and needs to calibrate the migration elasticities (see Cosar, Guner, and Tybout 2016). The migration channel could also further bolster recent findings that the room for higher tax revenue through more progressive taxes is limited in Guner, Lopez-Daneri, and Ventura (2015).
the inventors on a given patent, a national, local, or state government, an institute, a hospital or medical institute, or a university.

Inventors seem to be more mobile than the general population, which is consistent with a positively documented relation between skill and mobility. As summarized in Miguélez and Fink (2013), the global migration rate in 2000 for the population above 25 years old was 1.8 percent, ranging from 1.1 percent for the unskilled to 5.4 percent for those with tertiary education. In our benchmark sample, 2.3 percent of inventors move at least once over their lifetime in the sample (an average of 12 years) and 4.6 percent of the superstar inventors move over the same duration.

B. A Simple Model of Inventor Migration

To motivate our empirical analysis, consider the following very simple model of inventor migration. There are \( C \) countries, labeled as \( c \in \{1, \ldots, C\} \). The wage of inventor \( i \) in country \( c' \) at time \( t \) is denoted by \( w_{c't}^i \). Let \( \tilde{w}_{c't}^i \) denote the corresponding marginal product. Index \( i \) allows the marginal product to depend on several inventor characteristics, such as his technological class, his age, as well as characteristics of the firm or employer he works for. If the international labor market is perfectly competitive, each inventor is paid his marginal product, so that

\[
\tilde{w}_{c't}^i = w_{c't}^i, \quad \forall c', t, i.
\]

Suppose that in country \( c \), an inventor with home country \( h_i \) has to pay a tax rate \( \tau_{ch_i}^t \) on his total income at time \( t \). The tax rate is allowed to depend on the country of origin because foreigners can sometimes face different tax regimes in different countries. For instance, US citizens are taxed on their worldwide income.

In addition to the income earned, there is also a net utility benefit denoted \( \mu_{ct}^i \) from locating in country \( c \) at time \( t \) for inventor \( i \). This benefit is person-specific and can include, among others, a home bias, technological strengths, and characteristics of the country, language differences, or distance to the home country. It can also capture country-specific characteristics of the company the inventor works for, such as the share of innovative activities the company performs in country \( c \) at any given time.

Total utility from choosing country \( c \) at time \( t \) for inventor \( i \) is given by

\[
U_{ct}^i = u\left(w_{ct}^i(1 - \tau_{ch_i}^t) + \mu_{ct}^i\right).
\]

If to a first order there are no adjustment costs of moving, the decision of where to locate every period is history-independent. Hence, country \( c \) will be chosen in period \( t \) if and only if

\[
u\left(w_{ct}^i(1 - \tau_{ch_i}^t) + \mu_{ct}^i\right) \in \arg\max_c \left\{ u\left(w_{c't}^i(1 - \tau_{ch_i}^t) + \mu_{c't}^i\right) \right\}.
\]

This dispenses us from having to make potentially unrealistic assumptions about the expectations of future tax rates, on which there is little empirical evidence and which could be country-specific. Note that for any two countries, none of which is the home country of the inventor, the utility from living in one of these countries does not depend on the other country—this is the sense in which there are no adjustment costs. However, the utility from living in any country does depend on the home country, for instance, through a home bias, geographical distance to, or language differences with the home country (which are the factors we control for in the estimation). In that sense, the home country plays a special role because it enters as a time-invariant individual characteristic through the index \( i \).
The model highlights that, conceptually, it is the average tax that should matter for the supply of inventors in a country. The probability that inventor $i$ locates in country $c$ will normally depend on the full vector of tax rates in all countries, $(\tau_{1h''}, \ldots, \tau_{ch''}, \ldots, \tau_{Ch''})$. However, for the empirical analysis, we make the assumption that the tax rate of any other country only has a negligible impact on the supply of inventors in country $c$. This is a good approximation if there are many possible origin and destination countries and each is relatively small. Hence, to a first order, the probability that inventors from country $k$ locate in country $c$ will depend only on $\tau_{ckt}$ and the relationship should be negative.

Note that the personal location preferences captured by $\mu$ could be so strong that they completely dominate any considerations of tax differences. As a result, strong location preferences unrelated to net income will reduce the observed sensitivity to tax rates. In the empirical analysis, we will explore such factors related to the type of job and company the inventor works in, in addition to the standard factors such as home bias, language differences, and geographical distances.

If the labor market for inventors is not perfectly flexible, and employers instead have a rigid demand for inventors, the wage need not be equal to the marginal product and may be a function of the tax system. This type of general equilibrium effects can be one of the potential reasons for endogeneity of top tax rates. We return to this issue in Sections IVA and IVB.

C. The Inventor Data

Our main data source is the disambiguated inventor data (DID) by Lai et al. (2014), which identifies unique inventors in the USPTO data. The USPTO data contains 4.2 million granted patents and 3.1 million inventors for the period 1975–2010, which represents 18 percent of worldwide direct patent filings and 26 percent of all patents.\textsuperscript{16}

We limit the sample to the eight major countries which account for 89 percent of all patents granted by the USPTO.\textsuperscript{17} The United States accounts for 55 percent of the USPTO patents, Canada for 2.3 percent, Great Britain for 3 percent, Germany for 7.6 percent, Italy for 1.2 percent, Japan for 19.6 percent, France for 2.9 percent, and Switzerland for 1.3 percent. These representation differences reflect the different propensities that countries have for filing a patent with the USPTO: 58 percent of US patent filings, 48 percent of Canadian filings, 19 percent of British filings, 16 percent of German filings, 20 percent of Italian filings, 13 percent of Japanese filings, 17 percent of French filings, and 12 percent of Swiss filings are filed with the USPTO.\textsuperscript{18}

But filing propensities and representation in the patent data are not necessarily correlated with migration propensities. Indeed, while it is true that the largest migration corridors are the Great Britain-US and Canada-US corridors, other migration

\textsuperscript{16} Patents can be filed with several offices and a direct patent filing is one of these recorded filings, while a patent is a given, unique invention.

\textsuperscript{17} Online Appendix Table A16 shows that our results persist if we do not limit the sample to those countries.

corridors such as the Japan-US and Switzerland-US ones are very small, although these countries have a high propensity of filing patents in the United States.

The DID contains inventors’ disambiguated names and residential address, which allows us to track the location of the inventor over time. Each of the inventor’s patents has a patent number, application year, grant year, and assignee name. In addition, to get information on each patent’s characteristics, such as citations or technological class, we merge the inventor data to the NBER patent data. Because of the truncation issue for patents’ citations (more recent patents mechanically have less time to accumulate citations), we limit the sample to the years 1977–2000.

Table 1—Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patents of superstar (top 1 percent) inventors</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patents of superstar (top 5 percent) inventors</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patents of non-superstar (below top 5 percent) inventors</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average patents per year while in sample</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max citations on any patent of superstar (top 1 percent) inventors</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max citations on any patent of superstar (top 5 percent) inventors</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max citations on any patent of non-superstar (below top 5 percent) inventors</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of patents (per country per year)</td>
<td>12,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of inventors (per country per year)</td>
<td>17,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of co-inventors (per patent)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of immigrants (per country per year)</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of immigrants per year to the United States</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of immigrants per year to Canada</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of immigrants per year to China</td>
<td>50.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of immigrants per year to Denmark</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of immigrants per year to France</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of immigrants per year to Great Britain</td>
<td>87.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of immigrants per year to Italy</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of immigrants per year to Japan</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of superstar (top 1 percent) inventors who move over life in sample</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of superstar (top 5 percent) inventors who move over life in sample</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of non-superstar (below 5 percent) inventors who move over life in sample</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average duration of stay in years conditional on move (benchmark sample)</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of inventors who are employees</td>
<td>83.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of employees who work for multinationals</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average years between first and last patent (benchmark sample)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Summary statistics are based on inventor and patents dataset described in Section IC for the period 1977–2000. The data includes inventors in eight countries: Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States. The sample is an unbalanced panel of 3,322,458 inventor-year observations with 1,540,214 unique inventors. The benchmark estimation sample contains all inventors who have ever been in the top 25 percent.

Table 1 provides some summary statistics for the inventor data.

Only very recently has an effort of disambiguation similar to that done for the DID been undertaken for the European patent data (Breschi, Lissoni, and Tarasconi forthcoming; Coffano and Tarasconi 2014). Despite the fact that there has been less work on this data and that the disambiguation is still less-well established, it offers some good advantages. The biggest of these is that the United States is less represented and European countries are more represented. We analyze inventor mobility using this data as well in Section VI.

For the macro stylized facts in Section II and the case studies in Section III, we also use a third alternative data source on inventors’ locations. This dataset is described in detail by Miguélez and Fink (2013) and extracted from patent applications that are
filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), a treaty administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) that offers some advantages for seeking international patent protection. The PCT data contains 54 percent of all international patent applications, but accounts for only 8 percent of worldwide patent filings. However, there has been no inventor name disambiguation and it is not yet possible to track inventors by name over time in a panel. As a result, we cannot construct dynamic quality measures for inventors as will be described below. The migration counts could be somewhat biased as, for instance, every inventor could be counted several times as a migrant. However, the great advantage of this dataset is that it contains nationality information. In addition, many smaller countries which are essentially nonexistent in the DID are better represented in the PCT data, which allows us to provide results for a larger set of countries than our benchmark eight countries. Thus, this data serves as a robustness check on the results using our benchmark data, while also providing an independent and different angle for the analysis.

**Constructing Quality Measures for Inventors.**—Citations received have traditionally been used as measures of the economic and technological significance of a patent (see Pakes 1986; Schankerman and Pakes 1986; Trajtenberg 1990; Harhoff et al. 1999; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001; Bessen 2008; Kogan et al. 2012; Moser, Ohmstedt, and Rhode 2015; Abrams, Akcigit, and Popadak 2013). We construct four different dynamic measures of the inventor’s quality, which place different importance on the quantity versus value of an inventor’s patents. Let $p_{ij}$ be the number of truncation-adjusted forward citations received by patent $j$ of inventor $i$. Note that this does not depend on time $t$, as it counts all the forward citations that patent will ever receive, not the citations received until time $t$. The truncation adjustment, which takes into account the fact that more recent patents have less time to accumulate citations, is described in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001). Let $P_t^i$ be the set of patents of inventor $i$ by the end of period $t$. Our benchmark measure is the citations-weighted dynamic patent stock of the inventor. Formally, we denote this measure by $q^1_t$ and it is equal to

\[ q^1_t = \sum_{j \in P_t^i} p_{ij}. \]

Measure $q^1$ takes into account both the quantity and the quality of an inventor’s patents, focusing on citations accumulated as a measure of one’s influence. Our second measure, denoted by $q^2_t$ is the patent count of the inventor, namely,

\[ q^2_t = |P_t^i|, \]

where $|P_t^i|$ is the cardinality of the set $P_t^i$. This measure ignores the quality of patents and purely focuses on their quantity and is hence not our preferred measure.\(^{19}\)

The third measure, $q^3_t$, is the mean number of citations per patent:

\[ q^3_t = \frac{\sum_{j \in P_t^i} p_{ij}}{|P_t^i|}, \]

\(^{19}\)Many patents have no real economic value and are never cited by any subsequent patent (see, for instance, Abrams, Akcigit, and Popadak 2013).
which measures the average quality of an inventor’s inventions to date. The fourth measure, $q^{4}_t$, is the max number of citations ever received on a patent by inventor $i$:

\[
q^{4}_t = \max_{j \in P^i_t} p_{ij},
\]

which captures the best an inventor has ever achieved and whether he ever had a “home-run” invention. The additional results for our non-benchmark measures $q^2$, $q^3$, and $q^4$ are in Section V.

Based on these quality measures, we can define a ranking for inventors and, in particular, identify “superstar” inventors. We could in principle use a worldwide ranking of inventors. However, the patenting intensity is quite different for different countries and thus the quality measures are not necessarily directly comparable at a global level. This is why we group our eight countries into three regions based on comparable patenting intensity: (i) the United States, (ii) Japan, and (iii) European countries and Canada. The United States and Japan stand out as the biggest patenting countries with 55 percent and 26 percent of all granted patents in the sample period (1977–2000). We assign each inventor to a region based on whether his “home” country is in that region. Since we do not observe actual nationality in this data, we call home country the country in which the inventor is first observed in our sample. We define superstars at time $t$ as those in the top 1 percent of the regional quality distribution at time $t$. The top 5 percent, top 10 percent, and top 25 percent are calculated in a similar way. These are dynamic measures in the sense that they can change over an inventor’s life, depending on where he falls in the regional distribution of quality in any given year. Henceforth, we use the notation “top 1–5 percent” to denote inventors who are in the top 5 percent excluding the top 1 percent, and, similarly the top 5–10 percent and top 10–25 percent to respectively denote inventors in the top 10 percent excluding the top 5 percent, and in the top 25 percent, excluding the top 10 percent. Whenever we write “below top 25 percent” we refer to the inventors who have been or will be in the top 25 percent during their lifetime, but are not currently in the top 25 percent.

D. Making Use of the Inventor and Top Tax Rate Data

There are three main challenges when studying migration: proxying for the counterfactual earnings in each potential destination, measuring the counterfactual tax rate, and finding exogenous variation in the tax rate. Accordingly, we take a three step approach.

**Step 1** (Proxying for Counterfactual Earnings): Our model highlighted that migration decisions should conceptually depend on the income an inventor...
expects to earn in each potential destination, which is a counterfactual, unobservable variable.\(^{22}\)

Fortunately, the patent data gives us a rich set of measures that can proxy for an inventor's counterfactual earnings. Among them are the previously described quality measures, \(q_1 - q_4\), in formulas (1)–(4). Patent quality to date is a composite, dynamic statistic that takes into account an inventor's past achievements. In that sense, it is a measure of inventor ability or earnings potential, and a reflection of the inventor's "resume."

Patent quality and citations should increase inventors' incomes in both a direct and an indirect way. First, there are direct rewards and bonuses for specific innovations, driven potentially by legal or contractual arrangements, such as "fair share" agreements in many countries.\(^{23}\) These rewards depend on the value of the patent to the company, and patent citations are a clear marker for the economic value of patents (Trajtenberg 1990; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001).

Second, and most relevant for our purposes, there can be indirect compensation for an inventor's ability. An employer could pay a higher salary or promote star innovators, with a stellar track record of patent quality, in order to both attract and retain crucial talent with the best patenting and innovation ability (Chesbrough 2006).\(^{24}\)

For a lot of companies, patent licensing is also a major source of revenues, justifying the need to hire the best innovators. For instance, IBM collects more than $1 billion in licensing revenues (Ryder and Madhavan 2014). The importance of "stars," who play a crucial role in the formation or transformation of many industries, has been emphasized by Zucker and Darby (2014). Note that we are not just trying to measure the income flow from any given patent but rather to proxy for an inventor's full earnings using quality measures based on his patents.

**Link between Income and Citations.**—Whether it arises from the direct or indirect channel, there appears to be a strong link between the value and quality of patents and the inventor's income. The distribution of rewards for patents seems to be highly skewed toward high quality inventors.

The best evidence for this comes from the administrative IRS tax records (for the full population) linked to the patent data by Bell et al. (2015). They find a relation between income and citations that is approximately of the form

\[
\text{income} = 200,000 + 1,400 \times \text{citations}.
\]

*Figure 2* shows the relation between income and inventor quality as measured by our benchmark measure \(q_1\), citations-weighted patents. To construct it, we use our benchmark citation-weighted quality distribution for the United States and define our top 1 percent of inventors, top 1–5 percent, top 5–10 percent, top 10–25 percent, top 25–50 percent, top 50–75 percent, and top 75–90 percent.

\(^{22}\) Grogger and Hanson (2015) show that high ability immigrants are more likely to stay where there is a high premium for high skill workers. Hence, proxying well for the counterfactual wage is crucial.

\(^{23}\) From our own calculations and reading of the legal rules, 14 percent of patents in our data come from legislations where by law the employer owns the patent, 30 percent come from legislations where the employee owns the patents, and the rest come from legislations where ownership is determined by contractual agreements.

\(^{24}\) Chesbrough (2006, p. 49) states that “R&D managers often use the number of patents generated \(\ldots\) as a metric to judge the productivity of \(\ldots\) a person or organization.”
and below top 25 percent of this quality distribution as explained above. We then use the aforementioned relation found in Bell et al. (2015) between citations and income and apply it to our inventors. We see that the average superstar inventor in the top 1 percent of the quality distribution earns $2,285,405. The average top 1–5 percent earns $883,970, the average top 5–10 percent inventor earns $549,460, the average top 10–25 percent inventor earns $370,975, and the average below top 25 percent inventor (but who has at some point been or will be in the top 25 percent) earns $230,774.

There are three key take-aways from this figure. First, patent quality as measured by citations is very strongly related to income, confirming our strategy of using quality as a main marker for income. Second, if we want to think about the effects that top tax rates may have on these inventors, we see that top inventors are in general very high up in the income distribution. The top 1 percent in particular is very deep into the top tax bracket. Third, up to the top 10–25 percent, inventors are still in the top bracket, but less and less of their income falls in the top bracket. In that sense, inventor quality is a very good measure of an inventor’s propensity of being treated by the top marginal tax rate and of the intensity of the treatment by the top marginal tax rate. It is high quality, high earnings inventors which are directly and strongly exposed to top tax rates. We come back to this important point below when we discuss our identification strategy.
In Swedish administrative data, the most cited inventors earn 60 percent more than the less cited ones (see online Appendix Figure A2). In 2003, the average top 1 percent superstar inventor earned SEK 1,172,000, the average top 1–5 percent earned SEK 973,450, the average top 5–10 percent earned SEK 771,850, and the average top 10–25 percent, and below top 25 percent earned, respectively, SEK 500,250 and SEK 410,000. Note that the top tax bracket threshold in the corresponding year was SEK 374,000. Hence, the same conclusions apply as for the US data: patent quality is very strongly linked to inventor income, top inventors are very high up in the top bracket, and patent quality is a very good marker for the propensity to be treated by the top marginal tax rate and for the intensity of the treatment (i.e., how deep into the top tax bracket inventors are).

Additional evidence on the link between citations and income abounds. Toivanen and Väänänen (2012) find that Finnish inventors receive a temporary reward equal to 3 percent of earnings for any patent grant. This hides important heterogeneities based on patent quality: moderately cited patents (with 20 to 30 citations) generate a premium of around 20 percent in annual earnings, while highly cited patents receive an earnings premium of 30 percent three years after the grant. Harhoff and Hoisl (2007) use data for Germany, where the employer has the right to claim the invention and, if he does, needs to reasonably compensate the employee in proportion to the value of the invention. They also find that the share of the salary received as a compensation for an invention is highly skewed with a few top inventions doubling the inventor’s salary. Top 5 percent inventors receive a 20–50 percent increase in their salary per invention. Similarly, as compensation for all inventions, the top inventors’ salaries can be multiplied by a factor of five. Giuri et al. (2007) find in the PatVal European inventors survey that 42 percent of inventors receive a monetary award for their patents, and that for 4 percent of the respondents, these monetary rewards are permanent.

For countries for which we do not have administrative data available, we have to rely on a two-step approach: First, we established a very significant positive link between citations and income based on the literature as well as on administrative data for countries where it is available. We then focus on the income distribution of inventors from survey data in Canada, the European Union, and Japan—keeping this link in mind—to show where inventors are relative to the top tax bracket. Figure 3 plots the income distribution of inventors relative to the top bracket. It highlights that the top 1 percent of inventors in terms of income are clearly comfortably in the top income tax brackets, and the top 1–5 percent or the top 5–10 percent are still quite likely to be in the top tax bracket. Below the top 10–25 percent the propensity to be treated by the top marginal tax rate seems sharply lower.

Hence, an inventor’s quality as measured by his patent citations is very strongly related to his income. As described in detail in Section IVA, we will allow the quality of the inventor to be rewarded differently in different countries and we will introduce ability and country specific trends in compensation. Additional characteristics used to control for the counterfactual wage are described there as well (such as quality measures, technological field, goodness of fit with the destination, tenure, experience, ability-technological-field-country-specific trends, etc.).

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25 These numbers were kindly provided to us by Olof Ejermo.
Figure 3. Income Distributions of Inventors

Notes: Survey data from Torrisi et al. (2016) reporting inventor incomes at the time of invention for patents with priority date in 2003–2005. The number of respondents for each country are: Switzerland: 457, Germany: 3,403, France: 1,307, Italy: 966, Great Britain: 551, and Japan: 2,927. The black vertical line represents the top income tax bracket threshold for individuals in 2003. The bins are constrained by the data we have available: these are the income brackets that the survey asked about. We are hence unable to see the exact cutoffs for all the percentiles we are interested in.
Step 2 (Using the Effective Top Marginal Tax Rate): We use the effective top marginal tax rate as our tax measure.\textsuperscript{26} The estimate obtained is not necessarily interpretable as “the migration elasticity to net-of-tax income” for several reasons. First, the average tax rate is not equal to the marginal tax rate because the tax system is not linear. Nevertheless, the top marginal tax rate is likely a good approximation to the average tax rate for top earners.\textsuperscript{27} In addition, conditional on being in the top tax bracket, the top tax rate is exogenous to earnings, unlike the average tax rate. The estimate is also interesting per se since the top marginal tax rate can also be viewed as a “success tax.”

Second, the estimated response will combine firm and worker responses (more on this in Section IVD) and will be a function of institutional features (e.g., visa regulations, as illustrated starkly for the case of Russian inventors in Section IIIA), both of which prevent an easy mapping from the reduced form estimates to behavioral primitives.

Finally, there are other taxes which may influence migration decision, such as corporate taxes or capital gains taxes. However, we limit the sample to inventors who are employees and who hence receive the bulk of their income as ordinary personal income. These inventors innovate within companies and, typically, their employers are the owners of the patents obtained. To a first order, this allows us to abstract from other forms of taxation such as capital taxation, corporate taxation, or royalties’ taxation, and instead focus on personal income taxation. We do control for capital gains and corporate taxes in online Appendix Table A14 and check our results on the full sample, including nonemployees in online Appendix Table A16.

There are certainly some complications with foreign tax rules and regimes across different countries, which we are not able to account for given our data. For instance, an inventor living temporarily in the United Kingdom but domiciled abroad can choose to some extent how to be taxed on his income earned abroad (on an “arising basis” or on a “remittance basis”). Depending on the inventor’s (unobservable) legal arrangements and future plans, this might lead to somewhat different effective marginal tax rates. In the analysis, we assume that, to a first order, the inventor pays the taxes of the country he physically resides in. The exception is for US inventors who are taxed on their worldwide income.\textsuperscript{28}

The effective top marginal tax rate is computed including all relevant taxes on labor income: the individual local, state, and national tax rates, the uncapped payroll taxes, and value-added taxes. These series come from Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014). For US citizens, who are taxed on worldwide income, a special top tax rate is computed for each possible location choice, taking into account the foreign tax

\textsuperscript{26} One way to interpret the obtained elasticity is as a reduced form estimate, where the top marginal tax rate can act like an instrument for the top average tax rate. The implicit “first-stage” is indeed significant: from our own computations, we see that changes in the top marginal tax rate are very strongly correlated with changes in the average tax rate on the top 1 percent of the income distribution.

\textsuperscript{27} Reassuringly, Kleven, Landais, and Saez (2013) show that the elasticities obtained for football players using the marginal top tax rate versus actual average tax rates are very similar. This hinges on the fact that those football players considered are well above the top tax bracket in terms of earnings. In our data we find a very strong correlation between the average tax rate on top earners (evaluated using the tax codes for different countries) and the top marginal tax rate.

\textsuperscript{28} Incidentally, in Section VC, we consider long-term mobility, which potentially allows a clearer equivalence between geographical location and tax residency, since it is harder to shift income abroad when residing long-term in a different location.
We drop people in the years in which they are observed in different countries within the same year, as it is not clear what tax rate their yearly income was subject to in those years.

**Step 3** (Identification Using Different Quality Inventors): As online Appendix Figure A1 shows, there have been many, both small and large, top tax rate changes in our sample. The simplest identification strategy exploits these variations across countries and time (i.e., country-by-year variation) in top marginal tax rates. In this case, it is still important to control for country fixed effects, as well as for country specific linear trends to filter out longer-term country-specific evolutions in innovation, incomes, and migration. We view this strategy only as a first pass, as there may be other factors correlated with top marginal tax rates which vary at the same time in a given country, such as the business friendliness of the environment or research stimulating policies. If there are general equilibrium effects of top taxes at the country-year level, these will also be loaded on the estimated coefficient of top taxes.

Our main and preferred identification instead filters out all variation at the country-year level and exploits the differential impact of changes in the top marginal tax rate on the top superstar inventors and slightly lower quality inventors. The idea is that the top 1 percent inventors and those of slightly lower qualities should be subject to the same country-year level policies and economic effects because they are all very high quality inventors. However, only inventors who are actually in the top bracket are directly affected by the changes in top tax rates.

In addition, the higher up an inventor is in the top bracket, the more the top marginal tax rate approximates well his average tax rate and the more intensely he is “treated” by top tax rate changes. The evidence presented above (among others in Figures 2 and A2) suggests that top 1 percent superstar inventors are very high in the top tax bracket. Up to the top 10–25 percent, inventors are still pretty much in the top bracket, but much less of their total income is in the top bracket. The propensity to be treated by the top marginal tax rate and the intensity of the treatment by the top marginal tax rate decline as we move down the quality distribution. Hence, we compare the top 1 percent inventors to lower quality inventors, exploiting their differential propensities of being treated by the top marginal tax rates and the different intensities of their exposure to the top marginal tax rate.

What would be the best choice of control group here? Based on the previous evidence regarding inventors’ income distributions, the top 1–5 percent or the top 5–10 percent can clearly not be considered control groups, since they are quite high in the top bracket as well. The top 10–25 percent may give us a lower bound estimate since they also appear to be partially treated although of course less of their income is in the top bracket. The below top 25 percent, but who will at some point be in the top 25 percent seem to be right below the top bracket. This is our preferred control group. However, we find it useful to show the estimated coefficients for

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29 Given the foreign tax credit rules for US citizens, we set the tax rate for US citizen abroad equal to the US tax if and only if the foreign tax rate is smaller than the US tax rate: this was frequently the case before 1985 for the eight countries under consideration, but not the case anymore after 1985.

30 Less than 0.2 percent of the observations are dropped for this reason.
all inventor groups and to compute the elasticities for different choices of control group. We hence include in the regression the full set of interactions of the retention rate with indicator variables for being in the top 1 percent, the top 1–5 percent, the top 5–10 percent, the top 10–25 percent, and the below top 25 percent. To reiterate, this identification allows us to include country-year fixed effects in the estimation in order to filter out other contemporaneous changes in the country.

Our strategy is similar in spirit to that in other studies which exploit the differential impact of tax changes across income tax brackets, using lower income brackets as control groups for top brackets (Eissa 1995), or across households with different nonlabor income and family size (Eissa and Hoynes 2006). We are most closely inspired by a strategy that captures the differential propensities of being “treated,” as in Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2009) or Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012) who multiply Food Stamp program introduction by propensity to participate (proxied by group-level food stamp participation); in our case, we interact the top tax rate with the inventor’s quality ranking (which proxies the propensity of being in the top bracket).

What could be potential confounders in our identification? We may worry that changes in top tax rates are correlated with changes in the average tax rate of the slightly lower quality groups. Historically, this does not seem to have been the case in our setting. There have overall been 90 top tax rate changes in our sample. For only 7 of these have the top marginal tax rate and the tax rate in the bracket below both increased, and for only 14 have they both decreased. Note here that we would mostly be worried about situations in which the top marginal tax rate and the rate in the bracket below would move in the opposite direction, which is the only case that would lead us to overestimate the effect of the top MTR with this identification strategy. Fortunately, this has never occurred in our sample.

In addition, if there are country-specific economic changes affecting differentially the top 1 percent inventors relative to lower quality inventors, and which are happening at the same time as top marginal tax rate changes, their effects could be difficult to disentangle from the effects of top marginal tax rates. For instance, if increases in top 1 percent income shares are driven by economic forces other than top taxes and are correlated with (or even cause) increases in top tax rates, we may be underestimating the effects of top tax rates (and vice versa). One intuitive way to think about this is in terms of the exclusion restriction. The top marginal tax rate is used as an instrument for relative tax changes across inventor qualities. If there are changes in earnings potential across different qualities which are correlated with top marginal tax rates, the exclusion restriction may not be satisfied with only the inclusion of country × year fixed effects.

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31 Several papers do however argue that it is top tax rates which cause the increases in top 1 percent income shares (see, among others, Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2012 and Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva 2014) and not the opposite. In this sense, top tax rates cause increased economic opportunities for top earners and, hence, more top inventor migration as well.
II. Stylized Macro Facts

We start by providing some stylized macroeconomic facts about the correlations between top retention rates and migration at the country-year level. This evidence is suggestive that, even at an aggregate level, there is a significant correlation between inventor migration and top taxes, which is concentrated on top quality inventors.

A. Macro Correlations in the Inventor Data

Figure 4 considers the relation between migration and top tax rates where each dot represents one country in a given year. In all panels, the outcome variable is

\[
\text{Elasticity} = \frac{\text{fraction of top quality inventors}}{\text{log top retention rate}}
\]

\[
\text{Elasticity} = \frac{\text{fraction of low quality inventors}}{\text{log top retention rate}}
\]

\[
\text{Elasticity} = \frac{\text{fraction of top quality foreign inventors}}{\text{log top retention rate}}
\]

\[
\text{Elasticity} = \frac{\text{fraction of low quality foreign inventors}}{\text{log top retention rate}}
\]

**Notes:** Each outcome variable at the country-year level is regressed (in logs) on the country’s patent stock, GDP per capita, country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the log retention rate, weighted by the number of inventors in that country and year. The elasticities are reported in each panel with standard errors clustered at the country level. Each dot represents the adjusted log outcome variable, namely the log outcome from which we subtract all covariates (except the log retention rate) times their estimated coefficients. Regression lines are depicted in each panel. In panel A, the outcome is the fraction of top 25 percent inventors working in their home country (number of top 25 percent inventors working in their home country divided by the total number of top 25 percent inventors from that country). Panel B considers the fraction of low quality bottom 50 percent inventors who work in their home country. Panel C considers the fraction of top 25 percent foreign inventors (the number of top 25 percent foreign inventors over the number of all inventors residing in the country). Panel D considers the fraction of low quality bottom 50 percent foreign inventors. Top retention rates are significantly correlated with the shares of top quality domestic and foreign inventors, but not with the shares of lower quality inventors.
adjusted for a country’s GDP, patent stock, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects, thus filtering out time invariant cross-country variation.32

Panel A focuses on the fraction of domestic inventors who remain in their home country. Figure 4 panel A shows that the decision to remain in the home country is significantly affected by top tax rates, with an elasticity of 0.08. On the other hand, there is no significant relation between top tax rates and the fraction of low quality inventors in Figure 4 panel B as should be expected given that these inventors are not in the top tax bracket. Panel B turns to the number of foreign inventors as a fraction of all inventors in a country. Figure 4 panel C again shows that top quality foreigners exhibit a significant elasticity of 0.47, while the elasticity of low quality foreigners in Figure 4 panel D is not significant. Table 2 columns 1 and 2 summarize these elasticities.

### B. Cross-Check Using the PCT Data

As an additional piece of macro evidence, we use the alternative data source from patents filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), described in Section IC. Figure 5 panel A plots the average share of domestic inventors in each country against the average top retention rate over the period 1980–2010. There is a significantly positive relationship, with an elasticity that is extremely close to the one

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32 In these partial residual plots, for any outcome $Y$ we regress $\log(Y)$ on country GDP, patent stock, country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the top log retention rate, clustered at the country level. We then construct the adjusted outcome as $\log(Y)$ from which we subtract all covariates (except the log retention rate) times their estimated coefficients.
obtained in the DID. Figure 5 panel B confirms that foreign inventors exhibit a much higher elasticity than domestic inventors.

III. Country Case Studies

We now turn to specific country case studies which exploit large historic breaks due to migration or tax reforms.

A. Russian Inventors’ Migration and the Soviet Union Collapse

Our first case study concerns Russian inventors, a group of inventors whose migration was essentially impossible before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

We use two sources of data, starting with the PCT data which has actual nationality information. As a first pass, Figure 6 plots the average number of Russian immigrants in different countries as a function of the average top retention rate before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Before 1991 (in panel A), the relationship is flat at zero, since Russian nationals were not able to react to tax differentials because of stark migration restrictions. By contrast, after 1991 (in panel B), a significantly negative relationship between Russian inventors and top tax rates appears.

Next we move beyond correlations and exploit our main identification strategy, which consists in comparing the effects of the top tax rate on top quality relative to lower quality inventors. For this, we turn to ethnicity data by Kerr (2008), to circumvent the problem of the lack of nationality information. This data also allows to recreate the exact same quality measures we have been using from the DID. Kerr (2008) uses an ethnic names database to assign inventors’ ethnicities, so we know which inventors have Russian ethnicity. Hence, there are of course inventors of Russian ethnicity abroad even before 1991 (unlike for the pure nationality measure from the PCT).
We can now exploit the differential impact of the top tax rate on higher versus lower quality inventors. Low quality Russian inventors can here serve as a control group that shares similar affinities with each potential destination country as higher quality inventors, and would hence filter out reasons unrelated to taxes (but potentially correlated with them) for which Russian inventors may want to move to specific countries. Low quality Russian inventors, however, should not be directly affected by top tax rates.

In panels A and B of Figure 7, we plot the ratio of foreign top 1 percent inventors over bottom 50 percent inventors as a function of the top tax rate, pre- and post-1991. Each dot represents a country-year observation. We can see the clear differential effect of the top tax rate on top quality Russian inventors relative to low quality Russian inventors. Pre-1991 there is a slightly positive (insignificant) relation between the relative number of foreigners in the top 1 percent versus the bottom 50 percent and top tax rates, but this relation becomes negative and significant post-Soviet Union collapse.

Table 3 shows the elasticity estimates for inventors of different quality. It confirms that while top 1 percent superstar inventors’ migration was unsurprisingly not related to top tax rates before the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is a very significant elasticity to top tax rates post 1991. The same effect, but much weaker, is visible for top 1–50 percent inventors. The elasticity of the top 1 percent superstar Russian inventors matches quite closely the elasticity of foreigners in the micro estimation in Section IV.

\[^{33}\text{Note that because Kerr (2008) assigns ethnicity (not nationality), it is expected to see some ethnic Russian inventors abroad in the Soviet Union era. What matters here is how the elasticity changed in the post collapse.}\]
B. United States Tax Reform Act 1986

Next, to dig deeper into the identification of the effects of top tax rates, we exploit the quasi-experimental variation provided by two large tax reforms: the US Tax Reform Act of 1986 and Denmark’s 1992 preferential tax scheme for foreigners.

To study the effects of these reforms on inventor migration, we use the synthetic control method by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010). It consists of building
a synthetic control country that is a weighted average of other countries in the sample. The weights are chosen to minimize the pre-reform distance between the country under consideration (i.e., United States or Denmark) and the synthetic country along dimensions of interest. The synthetic country plausibly represents what would have happened in the treatment country absent the reform. Online Appendix D provides the details.

To estimate the elasticities to top tax rates, we regress at the country-year level the log of each outcome variable on the log retention rate, a dummy for the post-reform period, and a dummy for country (there are two “countries” here, namely the treated country and the synthetic control country), where the log retention rate is instrumented by the interaction of the country dummy and the post-reform period dummy.

The US Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced top marginal tax rates from 50 percent to 28 percent. The corresponding change in average tax rates was very concentrated at the top of the income distribution. According to our own calculations, average tax rates decreased by a large 7.6 percent for the top 1 percent, decreased by only 2 percent for the top 5 percent of inventors, and actually increased by 0.7 percent for the top 10 percent of the income distribution.

Figure 8 plots the number of foreign inventors in the United States and in its synthetic counterpart, normalized by a base year (1986). We again use our preferred identification (and the differential impact of top tax rates on inventors of different

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34 There is still a debate about the extent to which the decrease in marginal tax rates was offset by base broadening, which was one of the goals of the reform. Gravelle and Hungerford (2012) argue that the tax base of the individual income tax was not widely broadened. Bakija and Steuerle (1991) find an overall modest increase in the tax base of 3.8 percent.

35 Some normalization is necessary because the United States is the largest country in the data and it would not make sense to try and match levels. It would also not make sense to look at the fraction of foreigners, since the reform was not preferentially targeting foreigners (unlike Denmark’s reform discussed in the next subsection).
qualities), and show the effects of this reform separately for top quality (top 1 percent) and slightly lower quality (here, top 10–25 percent) inventors.

Indeed, the differential effect of the top tax rate change on the foreign superstar top 1 percent inventors is visible in two ways. First, purely exploiting the logic of the synthetic control method, we can show that the number of foreign top 1 percent superstar inventors increased drastically relative to a scenario with no reform (as proxied by the synthetic control). The circle line (on the y-axis) is the top tax differential between the United States and the synthetic country, defined as $\tau_{US} - \tau_{synthetic}$. While top tax rates were about the same in the United States and in the control country, they diverge sharply post reform. The pre-reform trends are extremely close in the United States and the synthetic country. However, the series for top 1 percent foreign superstar inventors diverge exactly at the time of the US tax reform between the United States and the synthetic control country. When we repeat the analysis for the lower quality group of inventors (the top 10–25 percent), we do not see such an effect: there is no break in the trend post reform and, if anything, the US series for the top 10–25 percent foreign inventors fall a bit relative to the synthetic control. Hence, the lower quality top 10–25 percent foreign inventors, fare similarly in the United States (which decreased its top tax rates), and in the other countries (which did not decrease top tax rates).

The second way to see the differential effect of the reform on foreign superstar top 1 percent inventors is to directly consider the structural break in their series relative to that of foreign top 10–25 percent inventors. Naturally, all the series for foreigners are growing due to the general growth in patents, inventors, and innovation over time, but we can directly compare what happened to the growth rates of the top 1 percent foreign inventors and of the top 10–25 percent foreign inventors after the 1986 reform. Comparing the two solid black lines in panels A and B, we see that while the top 10–25 percent group was growing faster before the reform, it is the top 1 percent that started growing much more rapidly post reform. More specifically, pre-reform, the top 10–25 percent series was growing on average at 13 percent per year, while the top 1 percent was growing at only 6.8 percent per year during the same period. On the other hand, after the reform, the top 10–25 percent was still growing at about the same rate (11.4 percent per year), while the top 1 percent drastically accelerated to 16.4 percent per year. As a result, the composition of foreign inventors in the United States dramatically changed after the 1986 reform, and the ratio of the top 1 percent foreigners to the top 10–25 percent foreigners drastically increased.

C. Denmark’s 1992 Reform

Next, we consider the Danish 1992 reform, studied in Kleven, Landais, and Saez (2013) and Kleven et al. (2014). The Danish tax reform created a preferential tax

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36 The approach puts significant weight on Canada and on Switzerland for the top quality series and on Canada, Great Britain, and Japan for the lower quality series (see online Appendix D and online Appendix Table A12).

37 Unfortunately, other such reforms, such as the Spanish law of 2004 studied by Kleven, Landais, and Saez (2013) took place too late given our sample years (and the problem of truncation of patent citations) and cannot be studied well in our setting.
scheme for foreign researchers and high-income foreigners. Instead of the usual top tax rate (of 60 percent), foreigners were taxed for three fiscal years at a flat rate of 30 percent for their 1991–1995 income and then at another reduced rate of 25 percent after 1995. Since our inventors would typically qualify as “researchers,” we can study whether they were affected by this tax scheme.

We revert to using the PCT data, since Denmark is essentially not represented in the USPTO data. Recall that in the PCT data, we do not have inventor quality measures since it is not panel data. Looking at the effect on all inventors is likely to give us a lower bound of the effects of the reform on the high-quality, high-income inventors. In addition, we cannot track who is eligible under the three-year rule. Overall, this should give us a diluted, or lower-bound effect.\(^{38}\)

In Figure 9, we plot the fraction of foreign inventors in Denmark and in the synthetic country (again normalized by a base year (1985)), as well as the top tax rate differential on foreigners. We here use as an outcome variable the fraction of foreigners (foreign inventors over all inventors in Denmark), since this allows us to see the differential effect on foreigners (affected by the reform) relative to domestic inventors (not affected by this reform). The weights on countries forming the synthetic country are set to minimize the distance to Denmark in the pre-reform years (see the text and online Appendix D for details). The circle line shows the top tax rate differential between Denmark and the synthetic control country (on the right axis), i.e., \( \tau_{DK}/\tau_{synthetic} - 1 \). We report the difference-in-difference elasticity estimate described in the text.

\(^{38}\)The fact that we are obtaining a lower bound effect is confirmed through the comparison to Kleven et al. (2014), who are able to focus on top quality, high earning agents only, and find an elasticity of foreigners between 1.5 and 2.
weight on Switzerland and some small weights on Canada and Portugal (see online Appendix D), which are the countries in the PCT sample that best match Denmark’s pre-reform share of foreign inventors. The effects of the Danish reform on the inflow of foreigners is clear relative to the synthetic control. The implied elasticity is 0.7, which is a bit lower than our preferred elasticity of foreigners in the micro analysis based on the DID in Section IV, but almost identical to the elasticity of foreigners based on the EPO data in Section VI.

IV. Location Choice Model Estimation

In this section, we present the specification of and the results from the multinomial location model estimation that exploits our two identification strategies.

A. Specification and Estimation

Utility Specification and Controls.—To model the location choice of inventors, we adopt a multinomial discrete-choice model. Recall from Section IB that inventor $i$ in country $c$ at time $t$ obtains utility,

$$U_{cti} = u\left((1 - \tau_{cht_i})w_{cti}\right) + \mu_{cti}.$$  

(5)

For the empirical specification, we assume log utility of consumption (which allows us to rewrite utility as additively separable in pretax earnings and the tax rate). Our benchmark sample for the multinomial analysis contains inventors who, over their lifetime in the sample, have ever been or will ever be classified in the top 25 percent inventors (according to the ranking defined previously). Recall that we restrict the sample to the eight countries which account for around 90 percent of all patents in the USPTO. Hence, in each year, inventors face a choice between the United States, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, France, Japan, Italy, and Switzerland.

An important part of the analysis is to model as detailed and flexibly as possible (i) the idiosyncratic preference component $\mu_{cti}$ and (ii) the counterfactual wage $w_{cti}$. We consider them in turn.

Controlling for the Idiosyncratic Preference Component.—The innovator’s idiosyncratic preference for any given country at time $t$ is assumed to depend on:

(i) Individual-level characteristics $x_{it}$: These include the inventor’s age, his dynamic quality measure, his technological field, and whether he works in a multinational. In addition, we include indicator variables for whether

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39 This is to reduce the computational burden of the multinomial logit with many fixed effects on a very large sample. Each inventor-year observation will be duplicated eight times for each of the eight potential country choices, thus drastically scaling up the data size.

40 Note that the sample cut is based on a static measure of inventor quality, namely those who have ever been in the top 25 percent in their lifetime, while the ranking within that sample is dynamic and can change for a given inventor from year to year. Table 9 considers how the results change if we also rank inventors by the static measures.
the inventor is in the top 1 percent, top 1–5 percent, top 5–10 percent, top 10–25 percent, or below top 25 percent of inventors as ranked by quality and explained in Section IC. The benchmark measure use to create this ranking is the citations-weighted patents to date, but we consider as a robustness check the other measures $q^2 - q^4$ from formulas (2)–(4) in Table 9. The effect of these individual characteristics is allowed to vary by country (i.e., they are all interacted with country fixed effects). We assign one of six technological fields to the inventor based on the field in which he has the most patents. These six fields that come from Hall et al. (2001) include chemical, computer and communications, drugs and medical, electrical and electronics, mechanical, and others. Using finer classifications did not change our results.

(ii) Country-level covariates, denoted by $x_{ci}$: These depend on the identification used. In the case in which we identify off country-by-year variations in the tax rate (identification 1), these covariates include the country’s patent stock and GDP per capita, as well as country fixed effects, and country-specific time trends. For the identification using inventors of different qualities as treatment and control groups (identification 2), we replace the country’s patent stock, GDP per capita, and the country-specific trends by country × year fixed effects.

(iii) Controls for inventor-country pairs, denoted by $x_{cti}$ that capture the goodness of fit of a “match” between country $c$ and inventor $i$ at time $t$. First, we introduce a home dummy $h_{ci}$ equal to 1 if country $c$ is the home country of inventor $i$ in order to capture a potential home bias. Second, these include the patent stock of country $c$ at time $t$ in the inventor’s technological field, which proxies for the quality of professional fit between the inventor and the potential destination country. Third, we include the distance between the inventor’s home country and the destination country, and a dummy for whether the home and destination country have a common language. These could all affect the ease of moving.

In Section IVD that focuses on the role of companies in the migration decision, we also consider other country-inventor specific covariates such as the share of the innovative activity of the inventor’s company in each destination country.

Controlling for the Tax Rate.—As explained in Section IC, we use the top marginal tax rate as our tax measure. We include the log of the top retention rate interacted with indicator variables for the inventor’s quality rank at time $t$, denoted by $r_{it}$, where $r_{it}$ can be the top 1 percent, top 1–5 percent, top 5–10 percent, top 10–25 percent, or below the top 25 percent. In the case of identification 1, which uses country-by-year variation in the top marginal tax rate, this simply allows for differential effects of the top tax rate on different quality inventors. In the case of

41 Including year fixed effects does not change anything since the multinomial logit already filters out all variables which do not vary by country.
identification 2, this captures the propensities of different quality groups of being “treated” by the top tax rate.

We hence obtain the econometric specification for a discrete choice model at the individual inventor and year level. For each potential country choice $c$,

$$U_{cti} = \alpha_{\text{r}_i} \log(1 - \text{top MTR}^i) + \alpha \log(w_{cti}) + \beta_c x_{ct} + \zeta x_{cti} + \eta x_{cti} + v_{cti},$$

where $x_{ct}$ includes GDP per capita, patent stock, country fixed effects, and country-specific time trends in the case of identification 1 and country fixed effects and country $\times$ year fixed effects in the case of identification 2. “top MTR,$^i$" is the effective top marginal tax rate at time $t$ in country $c$ which depends on inventor $i$: if inventor $i$ is a US citizen, then we apply the foreign tax credit rule for US citizens. Otherwise, it is just the marginal top tax rate of country $c$ at time $t$ without any modification. $\alpha_{\text{r}_i}$ is a coefficient on the top marginal tax rate that depends on the inventor’s quality rank $r_i$ (equivalent to interacting the top retention rate with rank dummies).

For our preferred identification 2, we provide the results for three choices of control groups, the top 5–10 percent, the top 10–25 percent, and the below top 25 percent. Bear in mind that in this estimation sample, the “below top 25 percent” refers to a still relatively high quality group of inventors, which have been or will at some point be in the top 25 percent, but are not currently there. If we consider group $g$ as the control group, where $g \in \{\text{top 5–10 percent, top 10–25 percent, below top 25 percent}\}$, then the corresponding effect on the top 1 percent will be computed as $\Delta \alpha_g = \alpha_{\text{top 1 percent}} - \alpha_g$.

**Controlling for the Counterfactual Wage.—**As explained earlier, a crucial challenge is to control for the counterfactual wage $w_{cti}$ that inventor $i$ would receive in any country $c$ at time $t$. Part of the wage variation is well absorbed by the aforementioned controls (i)–(iii), which capture aggregate effects at the country-year level and the technological class level. In addition, we consider three more benchmark specifications that progressively add the following, more detailed proxies for $\log(w_{cti})$. Overall, we estimate the following four specifications:

(i) Including only controls (i)–(iii).

(ii) Adding the quality of the inventor at time $t - 1$, interacted with country fixed effects. This controls for aggregate country-specific effects that vary by ability. Our benchmark measure is, as explained in Section C, citation-weighted patents to date (measure $q1$)\(^{42}\).

(iii) Adding country and ability specific trends, i.e., controlling for year trend times country fixed effect times the ability measure, in order to capture differential evolutions over time in the wage premium in different countries.

\(^{42}\)Note again that the ability measure for an individual is dynamic and changes over life.
(iv) Adding country, ability, and technological field specific trends by controlling for year trend times country fixed effects times ability times technological field dummies.

*Estimation.*—Denote by \( P_{ct}^i \equiv \text{Prob}(U_{ct}^i > U_{c't}^i, \forall c') \) the probability of inventor \( i \) to locate in country \( c \) at time \( t \). If the error term \( v_{ct}^i \) has a type I extreme value distribution, this model can be estimated as a multinomial logit.

*Computing Elasticities.*—To go from the coefficients on the retention rate to elasticities, we follow the computations in Kleven, Landais, and Saez (2013) that we present only very briefly here. In the multinomial model, the elasticity of the probability of inventor \( i \) of locating in country \( c \) at time \( t \) to the net of tax rate \( (1 - \tau_{ct}) \), denoted by \( \varepsilon_{ct}^i \), is

\[
\varepsilon_{ct}^i \equiv \frac{d \log P_{ct}^i}{d \log (1 - \tau_{ct})} = \Delta \alpha_g (1 - P_{ct}^i),
\]

where \( \Delta \alpha_g \) is the effect, defined above, relative to control group \( g \in \{ \text{top 5–10 percent, top 10–25 percent, below top 25 percent} \} \). The authors then define the elasticity of domestic players in country \( c \), \( \varepsilon_d^c \), and the elasticity of foreign players in country \( c \), \( \varepsilon_f^c \). Letting \( I_c \) and \( I_c^f \) be the set of all, respectively, domestic and nondomestic inventors from country \( c \):

\[
\varepsilon_d^c \equiv \frac{d \log \left( \sum_{i \in I_c} P_{ct}^i \right)}{d \log (1 - \tau_{ct})} = \frac{\Delta \alpha_g \sum_{i \in I_c} P_{ct}^i (1 - P_{ct}^i)}{\sum_{i \in I_c} P_{ct}^i}.
\]

Similarly,

\[
\varepsilon_f^c \equiv \frac{d \log \left( \sum_{i \in I_c^f} P_{ct}^i \right)}{d \log (1 - \tau_{ct})} = \frac{\Delta \alpha_g \sum_{i \in I_c^f} P_{ct}^i (1 - P_{ct}^i)}{\sum_{i \in I_c^f} P_{ct}^i}.
\]

Average domestic and foreign elasticities, \( \varepsilon_d \) and \( \varepsilon_f \), then are defined as the weighted average elasticities across all countries:

\[
\varepsilon_d \equiv \sum_c \left( \frac{\sum_{i \in I_c} P_{ct}^i}{\sum_c \sum_{i \in I_c} P_{ct}^i} \right) \varepsilon_d^c.
\]

Similarly,

\[
\varepsilon_f \equiv \sum_c \left( \frac{\sum_{i \in I_c^f} P_{ct}^i}{\sum_c \sum_{i \in I_c^f} P_{ct}^i} \right) \varepsilon_f^c.
\]
Table 4—Exploiting Country-by-Year Variation and General Equilibrium Effects

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
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</thead>
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<td>log retention rate × top 1</td>
<td>0.890</td>
<td>0.891</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.365)</td>
<td>(0.377)</td>
<td>(0.384)</td>
<td>(0.383)</td>
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<tr>
<td>log retention rate × top 1–5</td>
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<td>0.456</td>
<td>0.527</td>
<td>0.507</td>
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<td>(0.182)</td>
<td>(0.197)</td>
<td>(0.199)</td>
<td>(0.203)</td>
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<td>log retention rate × top 5–10</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>0.202</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log retention rate × top 10–25</td>
<td>−0.131</td>
<td>−0.107</td>
<td>−0.0296</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log retention rate × below top 25</td>
<td>−0.415</td>
<td>−0.358</td>
<td>−0.275</td>
<td>−0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quality × country fixed effects
Quality × country fixed effects × year
Quality × country fixed effects × year × field fixed effects
Domestic elasticity
Foreign elasticity
Observations

Notes: Multinomial logit regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the country × inventor quality ranking level in parentheses. Regressions are based on the disambiguated inventor data (DID) described in Section IC for the period 1977–2000. The data includes inventors located in eight countries: Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States. All columns contain the following controls also listed in the text. In terms of country-level controls, we include country fixed effects and country-specific time trends, country patent stock, country GDP per capita. In terms of country-inventor pair controls, we include a home country dummy, the patent stock of the country in the inventor’s technological field, the distance between the inventor’s home country and the country, and a dummy for whether the country shares a common language with the inventor’s home country. The following inventor-level variables are all included and interacted with country fixed effects: inventor age, technological field of the inventor, a dummy for whether the individual works in a multinational firm. All columns also contain indicator variables for whether the inventor is in the top 1 percent, top 1–5 percent, top 5–10 percent, top 10–25 percent, or below the top 25 percent of inventors as ranked by benchmark quality and explained in Section IC. Column 2 contains in addition the inventor’s lagged citations-weighted patent stock to date (lagged measure q1) interacted with country fixed effects. Column 3 contains quality and country-specific time trends. Column 4 contains quality, country, and technological field specific time trends. The first row reports the coefficient on the log retention rate interacted with an indicator variable for being in the top 1 percent of inventors, while the second row reports the standard error. The subsequent row pairs report, respectively, the coefficients from the retention rate interacted with being in, respectively, the top 1–5 percent, top 5–10 percent, top 10–25 percent, or below the top 25 percent of inventors, as well as their standard errors. Domestic elasticity is the elasticity of domestic top 1 percent superstar inventors with respect to the top net-of-tax rate (one minus the top tax rate), while foreign elasticity is the elasticity of foreign top 1 percent superstar inventors with respect to the top net-of-tax rate. They are computed according to formulas (9) and (10) with \( \Delta \alpha_q = \alpha_{\text{top 1 percent}} \).

B. Results Using Country-by-Year Variation

The first identification exploits country-by-year variation in the top marginal tax rate. In this case, the regressions include country fixed effects and country-specific year trends, in addition to the main controls listed above, but no country-year fixed effects. To allow for heterogeneous effects of the top tax rate for different qualities of inventors, the top marginal retention rate is interacted with dummies for the quality ranking.

Column 1 of Table 4 contains the controls (i)–(iii) described in Section IVA. Below the regression estimates, the table reports the values and the standard errors of the elasticities to the net of tax rate of, respectively, the number of top 1 percent
superstar domestic and foreign inventors, as computed according to formulas (9) and (10).\textsuperscript{43}

The subsequent columns add the remaining controls for the counterfactual wage listed as (2)–(4) in Section A: Column 2 introduces the ability of the inventor interacted with country fixed effects. Column 3 adds country and ability specific trends and column 4 adds country, ability, and tech field specific trends. The effects of the top tax rate are very stable across the different specifications, which provides some reassurance about the controls for the counterfactual wage.

The top 1 percent of inventors and the top 1–5 percent of inventors are significantly sensitive to the top tax rate. The elasticity of domestic superstar top 1 percent inventors is (in the most detailed specification) 0.023 and that of foreign top 1 percent superstar inventors is 0.8. Note that these match very well the estimates using the below top 25 percent as a control group in Section C and Table 5.

It appears that the migration of top 10–25 percent and below the top 25 percent inventors appear to be negatively driven by top tax rate decreases, which can be due to the presence of sorting and general equilibrium effects. Indeed, the lack of country × year fixed effects here means that sorting and general equilibrium effects could be loaded on the estimated coefficients on the log retention rate. The migration of some inventors can have general equilibrium effects and spillovers on other inventors, depending on the structure of the labor market. For instance, if demand for inventors by companies in different countries is rigid, a lower top tax rate could lead to sorting by higher quality inventors, to the detriment of lower quality inventors.\textsuperscript{44} A high influx of top 1 percent and top 5 percent inventors may displace lower quality inventors.\textsuperscript{45} As expected, the magnitude and significance of these displacement effects is weakened as we add more detailed controls for the counterfactual wage. Indeed, while displacement takes place within a country and year, it may not take place so strongly within a country, year, quality, and technological field group.

C. Results Exploiting the Differential Effects on Inventors of Different Qualities

Table 5 contains the estimation results for our main identification that compares the effect of the top tax rate on the top 1 percent inventors relative to lower quality inventors. The coefficient on the retention rate for the top 1 percent inventors is significantly positive and large. The top 1–5 percent inventors still exhibit a very significantly positive effect of top tax rates, as can be expected since inventors in this group have a very high propensity of being treated. The top 5–10 percent inventors also show a positive effect, albeit insignificant, since their propensity to be treated is lower. The coefficients decline monotonically as we move down the quality distribution due to the declining propensities of being treated by the top tax rate.

\textsuperscript{43} The gap between the domestic and the foreign elasticity comes from the multinomial specification, combined with the fact that most inventors remain in their home country (see how the average probability of remaining in the home country scales the elasticities in formulas (9) and (10)). It does, however, fit very well with the correlations in Section II which showed a much higher elasticity for foreigners.

\textsuperscript{44} Kleven, Landais, and Saez (2013) also explore sorting effects in a rigid demand model for football players.

\textsuperscript{45} Another possible interpretation of the negative coefficient on lower quality inventors, is that there are direct aggregate effects of the top tax rate through tax revenue, which benefits lower quality inventors. However, controlling for total tax revenue per capita in country $c$ and time $t$ leaves the effects of the top tax rate on different quality inventors unchanged.
The lower panel in the table reports the elasticities of domestic top 1 percent superstar inventors and foreign top 1 percent superstar inventors for different choices of the control group $g$, computed according to formulas (9) and (10) for $g \in \{\text{top 5–10 percent, top 10–25 percent, below top 25 percent}\}$. Depending on the control group chosen, the estimated elasticities of domestic and foreign inventors will be different. As already discussed above, a control group such as the top 5–10 percent may give a lower bound estimate, since inventors in this group may still be partially treated. A control group such as the below top 25 percent, while still a relatively high quality group, has a lower propensity of being treated and will hence yield a larger estimated effect of the top tax rate on superstar top 1 percent inventors. For the control group consisting of, respectively, the top 5–10 percent, the top 10–25 percent, and the below top 25 percent, the estimated domestic elasticities are, respectively,
The corresponding elasticities on foreign inventors are, respectively, 0.63, 0.85, and 1.04. For comparison, Kleven, Landais, and Saez (2013) find that, depending on the specification, the domestic elasticity of football players is between 0.07 and 0.16, while the foreign elasticity is between 0.6 and 1.3. The authors suggested that their elasticities might be upper bounds, as football players are highly mobile individuals. In addition, they only consider the European football market, while we also include mobility between different continents.

To roughly illustrate these elasticities, suppose that the average country decreases its top tax rate by 10 percentage points from 60 percent (the average value of the top tax rate in the sample in year 2000) to 50 percent. Extrapolating from these elasticities and choosing the below top 25 percent group as a control group, the average country would be able to retain 1 percent more domestic top 1 percent superstar inventors and would be able to attract 26 percent more foreign superstar top 1 percent inventors.\(^\text{46}\)

We can also compute the elasticities of domestic and foreign top 1 percent superstar inventors country by country, as in formulas (7) and (8). To avoid carrying too many numbers, let us pick the estimates obtained using the below top 25 percent of inventors as a control group. In Table 6, columns 1 and 2 show, respectively, the elasticity of domestic and foreign top 1 percent superstar inventors to the top net-of-tax rate. The United States and Japan stand out with their relatively low elasticities of both foreign and domestic top 1 percent superstar inventors, while superstar inventors from Great Britain and Canada are particularly elastic. France, Italy, and Switzerland have moderately elastic domestic top 1 percent superstar inventors. Columns 3 and 4 compute the percent change in, respectively, domestic and foreign top 1 percent superstar inventors for a 10 percentage point top tax rate reduction from the actual level in each country. The differences in the percent changes are due to the different elasticities in the first two columns, but most importantly, to the very different bases on which they are computed (i.e., there are very different absolute

\(^\text{46}\) Of course, the percent difference here is due to the very different bases: there are many more domestic inventors in a country than foreign inventors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Domestic elasticity</th>
<th>Foreign elasticity</th>
<th>Percentage change in domestic inventors</th>
<th>Percentage change in foreign inventors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>27.2</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>33.9</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>43.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Elasticities per country are calculated for the year 2000. The control group chosen is the below top 25 percent of inventors from Table 5. To compute the percent change in domestic inventors and the change in foreign inventors for each country, we consider a 10 percentage points decrease in taxes from their actual level in that country in year 2000. Similar changes can of course be computed for any other percentage point change in taxes.
numbers of domestic and foreign top 1 percent superstar inventors in the various countries). At the low end of the spectrum, the United States would retain 0.1 percent more domestic superstar inventors, Japan 0.2 percent, and Germany 1.4 percent. At the high end of the spectrum, Great Britain and Canada would retain, respectively, 8 percent and 6.1 percent more domestic superstar inventors. At the same time, the United States would attract 18.4 percent more foreign superstar inventors, while France would attract 43.6 percent more superstar foreign inventors.47

**Economic Gains from Lower Taxes.**—A back of the envelope calculation can reveal the yearly economic gain from lower taxes through the channel of inventor migration. Suppose that top retention rates in country $c$ change by $d(1 - \tau_{ct})$. We compute the economic value gained from attracting more domestic and foreign top 1 percent superstar inventors as

$$dV_{ct} = \frac{d(1 - \tau_{ct})}{(1 - \tau_{ct})} \times (\varepsilon_d^c \times N_{ct}^d + \varepsilon_f^c \times N_{ct}^f) \times N_p \times V_p,$$

where $\varepsilon_d^c$ and $\varepsilon_f^c$ are as defined in equations (7) and (8), $N_{ct}^d$ and $N_{ct}^f$ are the number of, respectively, domestic and foreign top 1 percent superstar inventors who live in country $c$, $N_p$ is the average number of patents per year of top 1 percent superstar inventors (2.7 in our sample), and $V_p$ is the average value per patent.

To assign an average value per patent, we use estimates from the literature. Pakes (1985) finds that the average value of a patent is $810,000 (in 1972 dollars), which represents $2.7 million in 2000 dollars.48 Naturally, this is likely to be a lower bound on the value of the patents from superstar top 1 percent inventors. Superstar inventors are by definition those who create the most valuable breakthrough patents. Indeed, while the median patent in our sample receives 8 citations, the most valuable top 1 percent patents receive on average 171 citations, which is 21 times higher. Hence, we can perform a second calculation, supposing that the value per patent of superstar top 1 percent inventors is close to the value of the top 1 percent most valuable patents (which could be approximated by 21 times the average value of $2.7 million, i.e., $57 million).49 The potential gains in economic value from top tax decreases are shown in Table 7 for a 5 percentage point and a 10 percentage point top tax decrease. Naturally, these are only the gains through the migration channel of top 1 percent inventors and there are of course many other economic gains or losses from reducing the top tax rate through other channels in the rest of the economy.50 These effects could also be a lower bound of the economic value lost if there are positive spillovers from having superstar inventors locally (as documented in the papers cited in the introduction and in Section IC). As we show in Section VA,

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47 Note that the heterogeneous elasticities of migration to tax rates across countries could be another reason for why some countries can tax more than others (Kleven 2014).
48 We use the GDP deflator provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis to adjust the nominal numbers.
49 Assuming that the value of patents scales approximately linearly in citations.
50 Because this is clearly just a very small fraction of all the effects that lower top tax rates could have, these numbers are not meant to be compared to the lost tax revenue. They are just meant to illustrate the “dollar value” of the elasticities estimated.
superstar inventors also have more patent breadth and breadth of impact, above and beyond pure citations, which may imply that their patents are even more valuable.

The economic gains per country from decreasing top tax rates depend on the domestic and foreign elasticities (in Table 6), but also on the size of the inventor base. The United States has the largest economic gain, despite the small elasticities, while Italy has the smallest economic gains, which is a combination of a relatively low elasticity of domestic inventors and a relatively small inventor base. To a first-order we could imagine that these yearly gains would scale up for a tax decrease that lasts several years.

### D. The Role of Companies

What is the role of employers in determining inventors’ mobility? One might expect that role to be important. Indeed, large companies often recruit internationally. In the United States, Qualcomm Inc. and Microsoft have ratio of foreign inventors to total inventors in the company of, respectively, 51 percent and 57 percent. In Switzerland, Alstom Technology Ltd. and Syngenta Participation AG both have immigration rates of 67 percent (WIPO 2013). There are two related questions when talking about the role of the employer. The first is whether employer characteristics, in particular whether it is a multinational company and how concentrated it is in some countries, matters. The second is whether the employer contributes to the decision of where to locate and, as a result, the estimated elasticity is a mix of employee and firm responses.

Regarding the latter question, the top personal income tax rate affects the surplus available from a firm-employee match. Depending on the bargaining setup between firms and employees, the firm should internalize to varying degrees the level of the personal income tax rate. In the limit, if the firm had to pay full compensating
differentials for higher top tax rates to star workers, it should perfectly internalize personal income tax rates. At the same time, the company might bring to the table other considerations for relocating the worker, which are orthogonal to the personal income tax rate. In this latter case, the observed sensitivity to the top personal income tax rates should be lowered relative to a case where workers and firms decide unitarily. To sum up, any observed response to personal income taxes may be driven by the employee or by the firm, depending on the bargaining and wage setting process.

Regarding the role of the type of employer, in theory, the effects on international mobility of working for a multinational company are ambiguous. On the one hand, it might make an international move easier for the worker either directly within the company, or by giving him access to a wider international network built over the course of his career in a multinational. Of course, workers more likely to take advantage of tax differentials in the future could also simply self-select into a multinational with the expectation to move in response to tax rates. On the other hand, multinationals may be more able to relocate their workers internationally for strategic corporate reasons, rather than because of personal income tax rates, which would tend to dampen the estimated elasticity to top personal tax rates. The role of companies for inventor mobility is studied in Table 8.

Column 1 of Table 8 reports the results from the benchmark specification, adding the interaction of the top retention rate with a dummy equal to 1 if the inventor did not work for a multinational company in the previous period during which he was observed in the sample. Inventors who are not in multinationals are significantly less sensitive to the top tax rate. It seems, then, that working for a multinational company facilitates taking advantage of tax differentials.

Next, we compute the share of innovative activity of the inventor’s company that takes place in each potential destination country, defined as the fraction of yearly patents of the company assigned to inventors from that country. Column 2 shows that if the company of the inventor has a higher share of its innovative activities in some destination country, the inventor is less sensitive to the retention rate in that destination country. The elasticity for those inventors whose company has no share of activity in the foreign country is very large, but declines very rapidly in the share of activity abroad.

This does not give us much indication as to who (the employee or the firm) ultimately makes the decision where to locate the worker. Indeed, a higher activity share abroad might mean that the idiosyncratic preference $\mu$ of the inventor is large for that destination country, due to career concerns, and this difference is sufficiently large to outweigh tax differentials. But it may instead be the company that wants to relocate inventors to high activity places for strategic corporate reasons unrelated to the personal income tax. Both scenarios would generate the reduced elasticity to tax rates observed in column 2.

While companies may or may not be relocating workers due to personal tax considerations, we can at least provide some evidence that they do not relocate inventors in our sample based on corporate taxation. Online Appendix Table A14 reports the results from regressions identical to those in Table 4, to which we add the corporate tax as an explanatory variable. The corporate tax rate has no explanatory power for inventors’ location decisions.
Overall, even though we cannot ultimately detect who makes the decision to move, we showed that employer characteristics matter for the elasticity of migration to top tax rates.

V. Robustness to Alternative Specifications and Extensions

This section provides an extensive series of robustness checks on our benchmark results and several extensions.
A. Alternative Inventor Quality Measures

Our measure of inventor quality and the corresponding ranking of inventors is central to our analysis. Therefore, we explore here how the results change if we consider different quality measures.

*Static versus Dynamic Measures, Wage Formation, and Employer Expectations.*—Recall that our benchmark quality measure is dynamic citations-weighted patents. This means that an inventor could be classified as a superstar today (if he is ranked in the top of the regional quality distribution in that year), but may not have been a superstar yesterday, and may also no longer be a superstar tomorrow. That is, dynamic superstar rankings can change over time, and it is assumed that only the current quality ranking matters for income. This corresponds to a situation in which the employer has no foresight at all about the inventor’s future potential, or there are no job search and matching frictions that would prevent firms from firing a worker and hiring a better one in a future period in which information about the inventor’s quality is revealed. Symmetrically, it also implies that, conditional on the current value of the quality measure and rank, past rankings do not matter.

Of course, the wage setting process is a complicated one and might depend both on past performance and future expectations, which provide the employer with additional information about the inventor’s productivity not necessarily reflected in his current patents to date. To take a concrete example from academia, a university might hire a promising young PhD graduate without any publication or patent record, based on his revealed skills during conversations and seminars. This new hire may have a high marginal product as measured by his impact on graduate students and colleagues that is not yet reflected in his publication record. Alternatively, a senior professor with several very high impact publications, but who is no longer producing at a level that would classify him in the current top 1 percent of researchers is probably still highly paid based on his past record.

If these situations apply in practice, a more appropriate component of the income of an inventor would be based on a lifetime, static quality. In particular, we can redefine an inventor as being in the top 1 percent of inventors if, over the course of his life in the sample, he has ever been or will ever be in the top 1 percent. The results for this alternative quality measure are in column 1 of Table 9. The elasticity measures are very close to the benchmark (column 4 in Table 5). In reality, wages are probably set to some extent based on current marginal product and to some extent based on potential future information and on realized past information, especially if there are search and matching frictions that make the employer want to lock in promising employees. It is hence reassuring that even a fully static measure still maintains our main result.

We also consider the case in which an inventor is defined as a superstar if he has ever been in the top 1 percent *in the past* (even if he currently no longer is in the top 1 percent). This corresponds to the case in which an inventor is always rewarded for past success, even independent of his current performance, but is not rewarded in anticipation of future success, or there is no advance, lead information about the inventor. The results are almost perfectly identical to the static measure in column 1 of Table 9 and hence not reported to save on space.
Patent Quality versus Quantity Measures.—As described in Section IC, there are several possible quality measures based on patents and citations that put different emphasis on the quality versus the quantity of patents. The correlations of these various measures, although significantly positive at the 5 percent level, are not always large. For instance, the correlation between measure \( q_1 \) (citations-weighted patents) and \( q_2 \) (number of patents) is 0.67, the correlation between \( q_1 \) and \( q_3 \) (average citations per patent) is 0.35, and the correlation between \( q_2 \) and \( q_3 \) is only 0.02 (see the full correlation matrix in online Appendix Table A1).
We may be worried that our benchmark quality measure (citations-weighted patent, \(q_1\)) is correlated with the likelihood of observing an inventor in the sample, and, consequently, with the likelihood of observing a move. Therefore, we provide three more tests by using patent counts \(q_2\), average citations per patent \(q_3\), and max citations per patent \(q_4\) as alternative measures to show that it is really the quality of an inventor that matters, rather than the pure quantity of patents. Column 2 of Table 9 reassures us that the results are not artificially driven by observing people with more patents more frequently. Using simple patent counts, the coefficient on the top retention rate becomes much smaller and insignificant for top 1 percent inventors, while positive and significant for the below top 25 percent inventors. On the other hand, using purely quality driven measures such as average citations per patent (in column 3) or max citations per patent (in column 4), maintains or even strengthens our benchmark results. Hence, the relation is not mechanically driven by frequency of observation.

**Patent Breadth and Breadth of Impact Measures.**—One may think that another way to assess an inventor’s impact could be through the breadth of his innovations, and the extent of his new and original ideas. We hence construct two additional quality measures. The first measure, which we call “breadth of impact” considers the number of technology classes that end up building on an inventor’s patents. Formally, we take the set of patents of an inventor until time \(t - 1\) and count the number of technological classes which contain patents that ever cite those patents. The second measure, called patent breadth, is the dynamic claims-adjusted patent stock, i.e., the number of claims on all patents received by the inventor by time \(t - 1\) (constructed exactly as our benchmark measure \(q_1\), but using claims instead of citations). It is common in the literature to use patent claims to proxy for patent breadth (Lerner 1994; Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004). In online Appendix Table A10, we show that, as expected, superstar inventors according to our benchmark definition, also have significantly more patent breadth and breadth of impact. The results using the patent breadth and breadth of impact as quality measures are, respectively, in columns 1 and 2 of Table 10. These measures appear to be much weaker than our measures based on patent citations. This is unsurprising given the extensive evidence shown in Section IC about the strong link between citations and inventor income, in contrast to the lack of evidence on the link between the patent breadth and breadth of impact measures with economic value of the patent and inventor income.

**B. Accounting for Potential Selection**

One problem about using the patent data to track inventors’ locations is that we only observe inventors in years in which they patent, but not in the years between consecutive patents. We perform two analyses to address this problem. First, we make sure that the results do not change much when we impute the inventors’ locations for missing years. Second, we estimate a selection model.

**Imputing Location for Missing Years.**—To impute observations for years in which inventors do not patent, we use the following imputation algorithm: if the inventor is seen in country \(A\) in year \(X\) and in country \(B\) in year \(Y > X\), we assume that he has been in country \(A\) until year \(X + (Y - X)/2\) and in country \(B\) thereafter and until
year $Y$. We do not impute years before the first or after the last patent. Column 5 of Table 9 shows that the elasticities are slightly smaller, but still very similar when we use the imputed data.

**Binary Selection Model.**—To check for selection based on the number of patents, we also use a formal selection model. To simplify the computational burden, we only study the mobility between the United States and Canada. The US-Canada corridor is very large and among inventors who migrate within this corridor, very few also migrate to another country. Among 863,406 US-born inventors, 640 are observed only in Canada later, while 35 are observed both in Canada and some other country. Among 44,321 Canada-born inventors, 946 are observed only in the United States later and 18 are observed both in the United States and some third country.
First, we estimate a simple probit model for the inventors born and observed only in Canada or the United States, where the dependent variable takes the value 1 if an inventor locates in the United States. The dependent variables are analogous to the ones described in Section A, with some small modifications. Again, we include the same set of controls (i)–(iii), and we consider progressively more detailed specifications for the counterfactual wages, by adding quality measures, quality-country specific trends, and quality-country-field specific trends. The retention rate is the US top retention rate, interacted with inventor rankings (top 1 percent, top 1–5 percent, ...).

Next, we perform a formal Heckman selection model with exactly the same controls and compare its results with those from the simple probit model without selection. We exploit a reform enacted in 1995 and introduced by the “Patent Term and Publication Reform Act of 1994” to synchronize patent terms with requirements of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. The main changes were that the patent term of 17 years (counted from the patent grant year) was changed to 20 years from the patent’s earliest application year. Given that on average the patent grant period is less than three years, this is typically an effective increase in the patent term. Indeed, the average lag between the application and the grant was 2 years, which effectively implies that the reform has increased the average duration of patent protection upon patent grant by 1 year to 18 years (= 20 years − 2 years). Online Appendix Table A9 provides the average gap between the application and grant years on average, as well as for inventors of different qualities and industries. This reform increased the likelihood of patenting, and, hence, of observing inventors in the data (see Table 11 below), but should not have affected location choices. Hence, we use a dummy for post-1994 in the first stage of our selection model.

Table 11 shows the results from the simple probit model and the corresponding selection model. It confirms that the effects of top tax rates remain very similar after controlling for selection.

To sum up, the results using imputed data showed that imputing missing years leaves the results highly significant (Table 9, column 5). The results from Section VA using patent count as a quality measure showed that the relation between patenting and moving was not mechanical. Combined with the formal selection model results, this tends to show that selection based on patenting is likely not the driver of our results.

Sample Selection.—One might be worried that the choice of patenting in the USPTO is not innocuous for foreign inventors. First, it could be that inventors who plan to migrate to the United States tend to patent more heavily with the USPTO. This would tend to make the observed sample more mobile on average than a fictitious sample in which inventors are randomly assigned to patent offices. On the other hand, however, conditional on appearing in the sample, those who had planned to migrate to the United States (and, accordingly, had decided to patent with the USPTO) may not be driven at all by tax considerations, which would tend to reduce the elasticity to taxes. To address this issue we first repeat the analysis on inventors who patent with the EPO. Many more inventors in the EPO data are Europeans. These results are presented in Section VI and confirm our previous results. Second, we drop all movers to the United States from both the USPTO and the EPO samples.
These results are reported in online Appendix Tables A15 and A17. These tables show that the effect of the top retention rate is still very significant on the superstar top 1 percent inventors.\(^{51}\)

### C. Long-Term Mobility

The mobility of inventors has different economic implications if it is short-term versus long-term. In this section, we consider the effects of taxation exclusively on long-term mobility. We define a long-term move as a move that is never followed by a move back to the origin country during the time the inventor is in the sample. Recall that the average time in the benchmark sample for an inventor is 12 years. On the one hand, long-term mobility may be much less sensitive to contemporaneous tax rates, since people should normally re-optimize only once future tax changes happen. On the other hand, long-term mobility could be even more strongly correlated with tax changes if tax changes are highly persistent and people are aware of this fact, or if people overestimate the persistence of tax changes and are then faced with moving costs that prevent them from moving back during the average period of 12 years that we observe them. The results in column 1 of Table 12 show that domestic inventors’ long-term mobility is slightly less sensitive to tax rates.

\(^{51}\)Note that for the USPTO sample, overall the estimated coefficients are larger, but the elasticities for domestic superstar inventors are a bit smaller and the elasticities of foreign superstar inventors are a bit larger. This is due to the lower overall number of moves once we drop moves to the United States (see our discussion of how the elasticities are derived from the multinomial logit as in (9) and (10) and related to the probability of staying in one’s home country).
For foreign inventors, it is slightly more sensitive to tax rates. When it comes to long-term moves, it does not seem to matter significantly whether the inventor works for a multinational (column 2). It still seems to matter how concentrated the research activity of the employer is (column 3), although the effects are weakened. This may indicate that for long-term mobility, career concerns continue to matter.

### VI. European Patent Office Inventors

All our micro results until now used the DID, derived from the USPTO data. This data is naturally heavily dominated by US inventors. Therefore, it is very
valuable to test whether the sensitivity of superstar inventors to top tax rates also holds in the European Patent Office (hereafter, EPO) data. The disambiguation of the EPO data has only recently been done and is the subject of ongoing research efforts (see Coffano and Tarasconi 2014; Breschi, Lissoni, and Tarasconi forthcoming).

In this data, the representation of the same eight countries we used for our benchmark analysis is as follows: Canada accounts for 1.3 percent, Switzerland for 3.3 percent, Germany for 23.7 percent, France for 7.7 percent, Great Britain for 6.2 percent, Italy for 3.8 percent, Japan for 16.4 percent, and the United States for 27.5 percent. Hence, the biggest difference is the reduced share of the United States in the data. The construction of all variables and the sample is the same as for the benchmark analysis. For consistency, we also consider the exact same eight countries. Online Appendix Table A11 provides some summary statistics for the European patent office data. The sample period here is 1977–2007.

Table 13 provides the counterpart of the benchmark results in Table 5 and the extended results in Table 9 for the EPO data.

Column 1 contains the results using our benchmark quality ranking according to measure $q_1$, citations-weighted patents. We see the same pattern as in the DID with the superstar top 1 percent inventors very significantly sensitive to top tax rates. The elasticities of both domestic and foreign superstar top 1 percent inventors are somewhat smaller than in the DID. Indeed, in the EPO, even the top 5–10 percent inventors are significantly sensitive to top tax rates, probably because top tax brackets are in general lower in European countries (which are naturally more heavily represented in the EPO than in the DID). Using the top 10–25 percent and the below top 25 percent as control groups yields, respectively, elasticities of domestic top 1 percent superstar inventors of 0.016 and 0.02 and elasticities of foreign top 1 percent superstar inventors of 0.94 and 1.24.

The next four columns consider the alternative quality measures already shown for the DID in Table 9. Column 2 shows the static or lifetime quality measure (“has ever been or will ever be in the top 1 percent,” etc.) as described in Section A. Column 3 shows the average citations per patent (measure $q_3$), while column 4 shows the max citations per patent (measure $q_4$). As was the case in the benchmark DID as well, ranking inventors according to their max citations per patent (measure $q_4$) yields the strongest elasticities for domestic top 1 percent superstar inventors of, respectively 0.013 and 0.03 depending on the control group. Column 5 reports the results for the pure patent count, for which, as explained in Section A, it is a very good sign that the effects of the top retention rate on superstar inventors is not as strong as for the lower quality inventors (according to this measure). This indicates that our results are not mechanically driven by seeing more frequently inventors who patent more.

In online Appendix Table A17, we provide the aforementioned results with the EPO data, dropping all inventors who ever move to the United States. The effect of the top tax rate on superstar top 1 percent inventors remains strongly significant.

Overall, the results using the EPO data are highly consistent with those using the benchmark DID, which gives further confidence in our estimated effects of the top tax rate on superstar top 1 percent inventors.
VII. Conclusion

In this paper, we consider the effects of taxation on the international mobility of inventors, who are economically highly valuable agents and key drivers of economic growth. We put particular emphasis on superstar inventors, those with the most and most valuable inventions. We use disambiguated inventor data, based on USPTO and EPO data, to track the international location of inventors over time, and combine it with effective top marginal tax rate data. We exploit variations in the top tax rate across time and countries, as well as its differential impact on inventors at different points in the quality distribution.

Table 13—Inventor Mobility in the European Patent Office Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>Alternative quality measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log retention rate × top 1</td>
<td>2.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.647)</td>
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<td>log retention rate × top 1–5</td>
<td>1.952</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.564)</td>
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<tr>
<td>log retention rate × top 5–10</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.517)</td>
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<tr>
<td>log retention rate × top 10–25</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.457)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log retention rate × below top 25</td>
<td>0.839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.446)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quality × country fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Quality × country fixed effects × year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
× field fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Control: Top 5–10
Domestic elasticity | 0.008 | 0.010 | 0.003 | 0.013 | −0.003 |
|          | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.006) |
Foreign elasticity | 0.495 | 0.729 | 0.720 | 0.822 | −0.331 |
|          | (0.406) | (0.504) | (0.505) | (0.330) | (0.467) |

Control: Top 10–25
Domestic elasticity | 0.016 | 0.012 | 0.005 | 0.022 | −0.006 |
|          | (0.007) | (0.006) | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.006) |
Foreign elasticity | 0.943 | 0.969 | 1.180 | 1.430 | −0.562 |
|          | (0.443) | (0.488) | (0.470) | (0.315) | (0.452) |

Control: Below top 25
Domestic elasticity | 0.020 | 0.014 | 0.011 | 0.030 | −0.014 |
|          | (0.009) | (0.007) | (0.002) | (0.007) | (0.009) |
Foreign elasticity | 1.240 | 1.045 | 2.176 | 1.929 | −1.024 |
|          | (0.533) | (0.566) | (0.444) | (0.428) | (0.696) |

Observations | 8,449,929 | 8,449,929 | 8,449,929 | 8,449,929 | 8,449,929 |

Notes: Multinomial logit regressions on data from the EPO. Robust standard errors clustered at the country × inventor quality ranking level in parentheses. See the explanatory footnote to Table 5. All columns contain the same covariates as column 4 in Table 5. Column 1 corresponds exactly to column 4 from Table 5, but using the EPO data. Column 2 uses the static or lifetime measure of inventor ranking (“has ever been or will ever be in the top 1 percent,” etc.). For this column only, we define the last two groups as top 10–20 percent and top 20–25 percent (to maintain the same number of groups). The next three columns use three alternative quality measures to rank inventors into the top 1 percent, top 1–5 percent, etc. Column 3 uses the inventor’s average citations per patent to date (measure \( q_3 \) as defined in (3)). Column 4 uses the max citations per patent of an inventor to date (measure \( q_4 \) as defined in (4)). Column 5 uses the patent count to date (measure \( q_2 \) as defined by formula (2)). All these quality measures were described in detail in Sections C and A.
We first provide stylized macroeconomic facts that highlight the responses of superstar inventors to top taxes. We then present quasi-experimental evidence from three country case studies that exploit large changes in migration policies or tax policy. We proceed to estimating a detailed multinomial location model. Our preferred identification is based on a difference-in-difference design where top quality inventors are the treatment group and lower quality inventors are a control group. We are thus able to control for country \times year fixed effects, hence filtering out country-specific economic changes, potentially contemporaneous to top tax rate changes. The usual difference-in-difference caveat also applies if there are other changes (e.g., political changes) that differentially affect the top inventors and lower quality inventors and are contemporaneous to top tax rate changes. We therefore (and among other checks) provide estimates of the effects of top tax rates on superstar inventors relative to several control groups.

We find that the baseline elasticity of the number of superstar domestic inventors to the top net-of-tax rate is small (around 0.03 in our preferred specification). This translates on average into an increase of 1 percent in domestic superstar top 1 percent inventors at home for a 10 percentage points decrease in top tax rates from a level of 60 percent. The elasticity of the number of superstar top 1 percent foreign inventors to the net-of-tax rate is much higher, around 1, which translates into a 26 percent increase in foreign superstar top 1 percent inventors for the same 10 percentage points decrease in top tax rates. Inventors who have worked for multinationals in the previous period are more likely to take advantage of tax differentials, possibly because working for a multinational makes a move abroad easier and grants the inventor international exposure. On the other hand, inventors whose company has a research activity that is highly concentrated in a given country are less sensitive to tax differentials in that country, presumably because career concerns (being located where the company’s main research activity is) outweigh tax considerations. We also find some suggestive evidence for sorting effects by ability and negative spillovers from high quality to low quality inventors.

We then perform extensive robustness checks on the measures of earnings and quality used, the length of the migration spells studied, and potential selection based on patenting behavior. In these extensions and robustness checks, our results persist. We also reproduce the analysis on a new disambiguated inventor dataset based on European Patent Office patents and find baseline elasticities to the net-of-tax rate of 0.02 for domestic top 1 percent superstar inventors and of 1.24 for foreign top 1 percent superstar inventors.

These results suggest that, if the economic contribution of these key agents is very important, their migratory responses to tax policy might represent a cost to tax progressivity. Our estimates could fruitfully be used to calibrate the models of optimal taxation in the presence of migration cited in the introduction. An additional relevant consideration is that inventors may have strong spillover effects on their geographically close peers, making it even more important to attract and retain them domestically.

Because inventors are key determinants of economic growth, this paper speaks to the relation between taxation and growth. An interesting direction for future research would be to include the migration margin of inventors, together with their externalities, into a structural economic growth model with taxation.
REFERENCES


