The Effects of Taxes on Earnings: Evidence from a Cohort Based Payroll Tax Reform in Greece

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1. INTRODUCTION

Payroll taxes (financing Social Security programs) raise about the same revenue (25% of total revenue) as individual income taxes in OECD countries

Payroll taxes have **two** characteristics:

- 1. Flat rates with cap
- 2. Taxes nominally shared by employers and employees

Payroll taxes create large tax wedges but are much less studied than individual income taxes

1. AIM OF THE PAPER

We use a unique 1992 reform of the Greek payroll taxes:

Individuals entering the labor market after 1992 face a permanently much higher earnings cap

Using longitudinal administrative data on 2004-2007 earnings, we can cast light on:

- 1. Incidence of the payroll tax on employers vs. employees
- 2. Effects of payroll tax on earnings and labor market outcomes

2.1 PAYROLL TAX SYSTEM IN GREECE

1. Payroll taxes are large in Greece: fund pension, health, unemployment, and family benefits

2. Several systems: (a) self-employed, (b) govt workers, (c) IKA: private sector employees, 2m workers, 45% of all workers. This study on IKA workers only

3. IKA tax rates: 28% for employers, 16% for employees \Rightarrow combined rate of 35%

4. Flat rates up to a **monthly** earnings cap of €2,315 in '07 and indexed [around 90th percentile]

5. Pension benefits based on last 5 years of earnings \Rightarrow **Pure tax** for younger workers

2.1 THE 1992 PAYROLL TAX REFORM

1. 1992 reform increases taxes and reduces benefits but reform is **cohort** based: individuals with no covered earnings before 1993 (new entrants) face **a higher cap** and lower retirement benefits

(a) New entrants cap set at 2.3 times the old cap [\in 5,280 per month in '07, around 99th percentile]

(b) Tax remains a pure tax when far from retirement

2. Impact of New vs. Old tax differential develops over time [as new entrants reach old cap]

2.2 IKA ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

Longitudinal Data include **all** Greek workers who entered IKA (Social Security System) from 1988 to 1997 [1988-1992 entrants are in old regime, 1993-1997 entrants are in new regime]

1) Core variables: date of birth, gender, nationality, date of IKA entry (by day), regime

2) Job level variables: (March '04, March '05,...,March '07) Occupation, Days of work, Monthly Earnings by type: regular, overtime, bonus, etc., Payroll Taxes and Rates, Employer (ID, industry, location, size)

2.3 STANDARD CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

w is (monthly) earnings (posted wage/salary), $z = w(1 + \tau_R)$ is gross earnings [τ_R is employer rate], $c = w \cdot (1 - \tau_E)$ is net earnings [τ_E is employee rate]

Caps: \bar{w} , $\bar{z} = \bar{w} \cdot (1 + \tau_R)$, $\bar{c} = \bar{w} \cdot (1 - \tau_E)$

$$c = z \cdot (1 - \tau_E) / (1 + \tau_R) = (1 - \tau) z \left[\tau = (\tau_E + \tau_R) / (1 + \tau_R) \right]$$

Old entrants face rate τ up to \bar{z}_O (90th percentile) while New entrants face rate τ up to $\bar{z}_N = 2.3 \cdot \bar{z}_O$ (99th percentile)

In standard competitive model: (a) gross earnings z = marginal product, (b) w concept (posted wage/salary) is irrelevant, (c) only τ and \overline{z} matter for labor supply

2.3 STANDARD COMPETITIVE MODEL PREDICTIONS

Old entrants shortly before 1993 and new entrants shortly after 1993 are almost identical [reform was voted late in 1992, no time to game system]


Absent labor supply effects, they have same marginal product and hence get same gross earnings $z \Rightarrow$ New entrants above \bar{z}_O bear full burden of tax increase


Labor Supply Effects for new entrants:

(a) Below \bar{z}_O (P90): unaffected

(b) Between $ar{z}_O$ and $ar{z}_N$: work less (subst.), $z\downarrow$

(c) Above $ar{z}_N$ (P99): work more (income effect), $z\uparrow$






3.1 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY: RDD PLOTS


Compare outcomes for pre and post entrants. RDD plots by month of entry with quadratic fits on each side.


1) First Stage: (a) fraction new regime, (b) fraction above cap


2) Checks: (a) Number of workers (no gaming), (b) age, (c) gender

3) Second Stage: distribution of current earnings z, w, c (expect no effect below \overline{z}_O , and effects above \overline{z}_O)









3.2 RDD: REGRESSION SPECIFICATIONS

Reform takes place at t = 0 (1/1/1993):

 $Y_i = \alpha_0 + \beta_0 \cdot \mathbf{1}(t_i \ge 0) + \alpha_1 \cdot t_i + \beta_1 \cdot t_i \cdot \mathbf{1}(t_i \ge 0) + \varepsilon_i$

where t_i is date of entry (by day), Y_i is the outcome, β_0 is the coefficient of interest.

Robustness: (a) Restrict the sample of 1991-1994 entrants, (b) add control variables (month of entry dummies), (c) add higher polynomials in t_i

3. RDD: 1st Stage Results and Identification Checks (March 2007)						
A. First Stage						
Percent in new Regime	89.25	89.39	89.12	87.38	88.96	
	(0.09)	(0.20)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.20)	
Percent with earnings above cap	-5.87	-5.35	-5.89	-5.37	-5.24	
	(0.14)	(0.23)	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.29)	
B. Identification Checks						
Number of monthly entrants	-690	-535	-529	22	-579	
	(347)	(530)	(291)	(430)	(595)	
Age (in years)	0.075	0.233	-0.024	-0.022	0.080	
	(0.035)	(0.060)	(0.035)	(0.053)	(0.072)	
Gender (% male)	-3.14	0.09	-3.24	-0.03	0.33	
	(0.31)	(0.49)	(0.31)	(0.46)	(0.63)	
RDD Specification						
Linear entry date trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Only 1991-1994 entrants		Yes				
Monthly dummies			Yes	Yes	Yes	
Quadratic date trends				Yes	Yes	
Cubic entry date trends					Yes	
Number of Observations:	434,132	166,895	434,132	434,132	434,132	


3.1 SECOND STAGE OUTCOMES


1. $Prob(z > z^*)$ with $z^* \in (\bar{z}_O, \bar{z}_N)$ [placebo test: use $z^* < \bar{z}_O$]


2. $E(z|z \ge \overline{z}_O)$ or $E(\min(z, \overline{z}_N)|z \ge \overline{z}_O)$ [placebo test: use $E(\min(z, \overline{z}_O)|z \ge z^*)$ with $z^* < \overline{z}_O$]


Repeat substituting z with w and c


Because of strong seasonality effects \Rightarrow Series by year of entry are much smoother and easier to read

































4A. RDD: 2nd Stage Results, Earnings E(min(z,z _N) z > z _O)							
Average Monthly Earnings above old cap (capped at new cap)							
Gross Earnings z (in Euros)	111 (14)	144 (23)	104 (14)	108 (21)	139 (29)		
Earnings w (in Euros)	-29 (11)	2 (19)	-35 (12)	-25 (17)	0 (24)		
Net Earnings c (in Euros)	-99 (10)	-74 (17)	-105 (11)	-97 (15)	-73 (21)		
RDD Specification							
Linear entry date trends Only 1991-1994 entrants	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Monthly dummies Quadratic date trends Cubic entry date trends			Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes		
# of Observations:	127,396	48,329	127,396	127,396	127,396		

4B. RDD PLACEBO Earnings E(min(z,z ₀) $z > 1500^{*}(1+\tau_{R})$)							
Average Monthly Earnings above 1500 (capped at old cap)							
Gross Earnings z (in Euros)	1.5 (2.6)	-5.2 (4.2)	0.8 (2.6)	-9.8 (3.9)	-4.1 (5.4)		
Earnings w (in Euros)	2.1 (2.0)	-6.2 (3.3)	1.9 (2.1)	-8.3 (3.1)	-6.6 (4.3)		
Net Earnings c (in Euros)	2.6 (1.9)	-7.8 (3.0)	2.7 (1.9)	-8.4 (2.8)	-9.0 (3.9)		
RDD Specification							
Linear entry date trends Only 1991-1994 entrants	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Monthly dummies Quadratic date trends Cubic entry date trends			Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes		
# of Observations:	357,348	136,985	357,348	357,348	357,348		


1988-1997 entrants			1991-1994 entrants only			
Gross		Net Earn.	Gross	Earnings	Net Earn.	
Earn. z	Earnings w	С	Earn. z	W	С	
0.494	0.135	-0.134	0.301	-0.079	-0.353	
(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.089)	(0.092)	(0.094)	
0.148	-0.043	-0.208	0.178	0.019	-0.139	
(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.051)	(0.053)	
0.546	0.482	0.500	0.175	0.031	0.068	
(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.149)	(0.147)	(0.145)	
0.220	-0.004	-0.173	0.186	0.002	-0.153	
(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.069)	
0.035	-0.081	-0.173	0.079	-0.031	-0.111	
(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.035)	
0.167	0.148	0.141	0.072	-0.009	0.006	
(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.117)	
1,781,559	1,781,559	1,781,559	685,415	685,415	685,415	
	Gross Earn. z 0.494 (0.056) 0.148 (0.028) 0.546 (0.093) 0.220 (0.041) 0.035 (0.018) 0.167 (0.076)	Gross Earn. z Earnings w 0.494 0.135 (0.056) (0.058) 0.148 -0.043 (0.028) (0.031) 0.546 0.482 (0.093) (0.092) 0.220 -0.004 (0.041) (0.042) 0.035 -0.081 (0.018) (0.021) 0.167 0.148 (0.076) (0.075)	Gross Earn. zNet Earn. Earnings wNet Earn. c 0.494 0.135 -0.134 (0.056) (0.058) (0.059) 0.148 -0.043 -0.208 (0.028) (0.031) (0.033) 0.546 0.482 0.500 (0.093) (0.092) (0.090) 0.220 -0.004 -0.173 (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) 0.035 -0.081 -0.173 (0.022) 0.167 0.148 0.141 (0.076) 0.167 0.148 0.141 (0.075) (0.074)	$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	

5. RDD: Effects on Earnings: Prob(z>z*)



	1988-1997 entrants			1991-1	994 entrar	nts only
	Gross	Earnings	Net Earn.	Gross	Earnings	Net Earn.
	Earn. z	W	С	Earn. z	W	С
Male Workers	130	-11	-81	177	37	-33
	(21)	(17)	(15)	(34)	(28)	(25)
Female Workers	48	-77	-140	88	-36	-103
	(27)	(23)	(21)	(44)	(38)	(34)
Difference:	81	66	59	89	73	70
Male-Female	(36)	(31)	(27)	(59)	(50)	(44)
Small Firms	117	-20	-90	122	-2	-66
(<400 workers)	(20)	(16)	(14)	(32)	(27)	(23)
Large Firms	114	-34	-108	169	6	-83
(>400 workers)	(19)	(23)	(14)	(31)	(26)	(23)
Difference:	-4	-14	-18	48	7	-17
Small-Large	(28)	(23)	(20)	(45)	(37)	(33)

5. RDD E(min(z, z_N)| $z > z_O$), Heterogeneity by Groups



3.4. INFORMAL SURVEY OF 5 EMPLOYERS

Knowledge and Responses to Tax Regime Diff:

(a) 5/5 know about differential tax regime
(b) 2/5 know/ask prospective recruits about their regime
(c) 0/5 say new regime affects negatively offered salaries
or pay raises [consistent with empirical results]

Reasons for offering same salaries w:

(a) Union pressure 0/5
(b) Risk of legal anti-discrimination action 0/5
(c) Fairness/morale concerns 1/5
(d) 3/5 Younger workers are more productive (hence, remain a good deal for employers)

4. IMPLICATIONS AND INTERPRETATION

Gross earnings z not equal to marginal product individual by individual

In Greece, young subsidize the old possibly because of social norms regarding pay seniority

Firms cannot arbitrage because it would require firing the old (legal and workplace morale constraints)

If norms are based on posted salaries w, then differential incidence of employer vs. employee payroll taxes