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SWISS INCOME TAX HOLIDAYS

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ABSTRACT

This paper estimates intertemporal labor supply responses to two-year long income tax holidays staggered across cantons in Switzerland. Swiss cantons shifted from an income tax system based on the previous two years' income to a standard annual pay as you earn system, leaving 2 years of income untaxed. We find significant but quantitatively small responses of earnings with an inter-temporal elasticity of .05 overall. Some groups, such as high wage income earners and especially the self-employed display larger responses with elasticities around .1 and .2 respectively. We find no effects along the extensive margin at all and almost no effects on hours of work suggesting that responses are driven primarily by tax avoidance rather than real labor supply.

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1 Introduction

The intertemporal labor supply elasticity of substitution—traditionally called the Frisch elasticity—measures how much more people are willing to work when their wage increases temporarily. This elasticity plays a key role in amplifying the effects of technological shocks on labor supply and economic activity in calibrated macro real business cycle models. The intuition is the following. Suppose there is a temporary negative technological shock which reduces productivity (relative to trend). This shock reduces wages temporarily. If the Frisch elasticity is large, relatively modest technological shocks can translate into large labor supply responses and hence explain why downturns are accompanied by large falls in employment. Indeed, most calibrated macro real business cycle models require a very large Frisch elasticity in excess of one to generate realistic quantitative predictions (see e.g., King and Rebelo, 1999).

However, identifying the Frisch elasticity is empirically challenging as it requires exogenous time variation in net wage rates unrelated to labor supply or human capital accumulation decisions. As a result, recent studies have often used specific occupations—such as taxi drivers—where exogenous variation in wages is more plausible (see Reichling and Whalen, 2012; Chetty et al., 2013, for surveys and discussions). Using tax variation has long been a traditional source of exogenous variation to estimate *static* labor supply elasticities (see e.g., Keane, 2011, for a survey). However, tax variation typically does not provide temporary variation needed to estimate the Frisch elasticity.¹ In this paper, we break new ground on this important issue by exploiting an unusual tax policy reform in Switzerland that generated large, salient, and well-advertised one- or two-year long income tax holidays staggered across the 26 Swiss cantons, which are the member states of the Swiss Confederation. The tax holiday, which exempts earnings from income taxation temporarily for everybody in the local economy (the cantonal level), is close to being the ideal experiment to estimate the Frisch elasticity. This has three additional advantages relative to previous work. First, our estimates are representative of the total population and do not focus on very specific—and potentially more elastic—occupations (such as taxi drivers). Second, we can identify the Frisch on an annual frequency, which is the relevant time frame for business cycle analyses (occupation-specific studies use much higher—often daily—frequencies). Third, while various frictions, such as jobs with fixed hours or high fixed costs of starting to work, may dampen the response relative to the standard frictionless model of labor supply, such frictions are also present when the economy responds to a temporary technology shock. Therefore, the “frictional Frisch”

¹Important exceptions are Bianchi et al. (2001); Sigurdsson (2018); Stefansson (2018) who use a one year income tax holiday in Iceland. We discuss the link between these studies and ours in detail below.

elasticity we estimate is also the relevant reduced form parameter to evaluate the role of intertemporal labor supply in macro business cycle modeling.²

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Switzerland switched from an income tax system where current taxes were based on the previous two years' income to a standard annual pay as you earn system. For example, in the old system, income taxes due in years 1997 and 1998 were both based on the average income over the two preceding years 1995 and 1996. This system of owing taxes based on prior year incomes was common in income tax systems before pay as you earn tax systems were put in place.³ In the new system, taxes on income earned in year t are collected during year t with a tax return filed in year $t + 1$ and an adjustment made through a tax refund or an extra tax payment if taxes already collected are not exactly equal to taxes owed.⁴ This is the system used in all advanced economies today.

Swiss cantons transitioned in three waves in 1999, 2001, and 2003. Two cantons transitioned early in 1999, most cantons transitioned in 2001, and three cantons transitioned late in 2003. The transition happened for federal, cantonal, and municipal income taxes simultaneously in each canton. To illustrate the mechanism, take the example of the canton of Thurgau as depicted on Figure 1 top panel, which transitioned in 1999. In 1997 and 1998, income taxes (at the federal, cantonal, and municipal levels) were paid based on the average of 1995 and 1996 incomes. In 1999, income taxes (at the federal, cantonal, and municipal levels) were based solely on 1999 incomes. In 2000, income taxes were based solely on 2000 incomes, etc. To avoid double payment of taxes in 1999 and 2000, no tax was ever assessed on 1997 and 1998 incomes (which would have been paid in 1999 and 2000 under the old system). Therefore, this transition created a two-year long income tax holiday for incomes earned in years 1997 and 1998. Hence, cantons transitioning in 1999 had a tax holiday for years 1997-1998; cantons transitioning in 2001 had a tax holiday for years 1999-2000; and cantons transitioning in 2003 had a tax holiday for years 2001-2002. An extra source of variation comes from the fact that some cantons used an annual system of assessment (instead of biennial) for the cantonal and municipal taxes. For these cantons, the transition generates only a *one*-year long tax holiday for local taxes.⁵

²Naturally, estimating separately the pure frictionless Frisch elasticity from the dampening effects of frictions could also be useful for other applications (see e.g., Chetty et al., 2013).

³The US transitioned in 1943, the UK transitioned in 1944. France, the last holdout, just transitioned in 2019. The Swiss system was further particular in that it used an average of two years to compute base income (instead of using a standard annual income base).

⁴In both the old and the new system, Switzerland does not use withholding at source and individuals are typically required to pay estimated taxes in quarterly installments (as is done in the US for income not subject to tax withholding such as self-employment income).

⁵Take the example of Zurich which transitioned in 1999. In 1998, local taxes were based on 1997

The tax holiday increased the net-of-tax rate (defined as one minus the marginal tax rate) by about 25–30% on average. Hence for example, with a Frisch elasticity of one, which is toward the low end of estimates used in macro-calibrations, we should expect a 25–30% increase in earnings. The tax holiday timing was discussed at length in the press well before the transition took place, making it salient to the public, particularly for the last 2 waves of transitioning cantons. Various press articles discussed how working and earning more during the tax holiday (relative to later years) was fiscally advantageous.

To carry out our study, we use population-wide social security longitudinal earnings records from 1990 to 2010 matched to decennial Census data. These data allow us to obtain precise estimates exploiting fine geographical variation. Our strategy relies on a simple difference-in-differences method where we compare earnings outcomes over time and across localities that transitioned at different times. Because we have large data, we obtain smooth and precise time series for a number of earnings outcomes even when restricting the data to specific earnings quantiles or demographic groups. We find that series for different cantons move in a very similar way over time pre- and post-reform giving us confidence that the parallel trend identification assumption holds. The graphical time series evidence shows clearly that spikes in earnings arise during the tax holidays for some sub-groups, and can then be confidently interpreted as the causal effect of the tax holiday. We supplement the time series analysis by a longitudinal regression based micro-level approach to tease out tax holiday effects on earnings systematically. Our analysis is limited to labor income because we do not have data on capital income (as the cantonal tax administrations did not systematically collect data on incomes earned during the tax holidays). Our main analysis focuses on prime age individuals aged 20 to 60.⁶ Recessions are typically characterized by large job losses among prime age workers (Farber, 2015).

We obtain five main results. First, we do not find any evidence of a response along the employment margin (extensive margin). This implies that the Frisch elasticity is very small along the extensive margin. Second, there is a small aggregate response of wage earnings with an implied Frisch elasticity of .03 for aggregate wage earnings. The responses are larger higher up in the wage earnings distribution, with Frisch elasticities of .1 for the highest-earners. We do not find responses along the hours of work margin. Third, there is a larger response of self-employment earnings that is present at different earnings levels (and not just the top). Overall, the Frisch elasticity for self-employment

incomes. In 1999, local taxes were based on 1999 incomes, so that the tax holiday for local taxes was just for 1998. Local income taxes (defined as cantonal plus municipal) make up over 80% of income taxes in Switzerland in aggregate.

⁶For the elderly, tax incentives interact with retirement decisions and the incentives created by the retirement system.

earnings is around .2–.3. Fourth, effects are actually larger for men than for women, in contrast to the standard findings in the labor supply literature. The exception is married couples with children, where the elasticities are similar. Fifth, most of these responses are concentrated in the last wave of transitioning cantons with tax holidays in 2001–2002. Responses for earlier transitions such as 1997–1998 or 1999–2000 appear to be more muted. This latter effect might be due to learning as it might take time for the public to understand tax holidays and how to respond to them. Overall, our evidence suggests that responses are driven primarily by tax avoidance rather than real labor supply. As a result, our paper shows that the Frisch real labor supply channel due to labor market-wide temporary changes in net-wage-rates is quantitatively very modest and particularly so along the extensive employment margin. This casts doubt on quantitative calibrations of macro models that use very large Frisch elasticities to account for the large employment fluctuations over the business cycle.

Closest to our study, Bianchi et al. (2001), Sigurdsson (2018), and Stefansson (2018) exploit the one-year tax holiday in Iceland produced by a transition from an income tax based on prior year income to a pay as you earn income tax in 1987. Using a small survey dataset, Bianchi et al. (2001) report large effects with an implied Frisch elasticity of .42 along the extensive margin. But it is difficult to disentangle the tax effects from the business cycle effect in this study as the tax holiday corresponded to the peak year of the business cycle in Iceland (see their Figures 1 and 2, p. 1565). Sigurdsson (2018) builds a population wide earnings dataset to study the same reform. Using labor supply participation patterns by age, he finds a much smaller extensive-margin Frisch elasticity .1. Exploiting variation in tax burdens across income groups, he finds an intensive marginal Frisch elasticity of .4. Stefansson (2018), using a similar identification strategy, finds a smaller Frisch elasticity of .07 but points out that his estimate is sensitive to the assumption of a constant elasticity across income groups. The key advantage of our analysis is that tax holidays in Switzerland happen at different times in different cantons while it happened at the same time in all regions of Iceland.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the reform and the variation we exploit. Section 3 describes the data we use. Section 4 describes our empirical results. Section 5 concludes. The appendix includes more details on the data we use as well as a number of robustness checks that we only mention briefly in the main text.

2 The Tax Holiday Reform

2.1 The Swiss Income Tax System

Individual income taxes in Switzerland are quantitatively large and represent about 1/3 of total tax revenue or about 9% of the Swiss GDP. Income taxes in Switzerland are residence-based and levied at the federal, cantonal, and municipality level. The federal income tax is set by federal law, is uniform across cantons, and represents about 1/6 of total income tax revenue. Local taxes which include cantonal and municipal taxes are very large and represent about 5/6 of income tax revenue.⁷ Cantonal taxes are set by cantonal law and municipalities simply apply a multiplier to the cantonal tax to determine municipal taxes. The cantons set their income tax schedule freely and municipalities choose their multiplier freely.⁸ The federal tax is more progressive with very low tax rates on low and middle-income taxpayers while local taxes often impose significant tax burdens through most of the income distribution. The top marginal tax rate combining all income taxes is typically in the 30-40% range (although it can go as low as the low 20s and go as high as the mid-40s in some municipalities).⁹

Married couples file together and are taxed based on total family income so that secondary earners face significant tax burdens, particularly if the income of the primary earner is high. The income tax base includes both labor and capital income although this study will solely focus on labor income (including wage earnings and self-employment earnings) due to data availability constraints (incomes made in tax holiday years did not have to be reported to the tax administration). The cantonal tax administrations are responsible for the collection of the taxes at all three levels and taxpayers only file one tax return for all three taxes.

⁷These statistics are taken from OECD (2016) and refer to year 1996 which is the year just before the reforms we study take place. Statistics for 2015 (the latest year available) are fairly similar. Because the federal tax is more progressive, the relative share of federal income tax in total income taxes grows with income and can be as high as 50% for high income earners in some cantons.

⁸The Swiss federation comes perhaps closest to the ideal Tiebout model of local public finance with many studies analyzing tax competition and tax induced mobility across municipalities and cantons. Liebig et al. (2007); Schmidheiny (2006); Brülhart et al. (2016); Martinez (2016) study mobility across Swiss Cantons in response to local income or wealth taxes. Kirchgassner and Pommerehne (1996); Eugster and Parchet (2018); Parchet (2018); Brülhart and Parchet (2014) study tax competition in the setting of tax rates by municipalities and cantons.

⁹Appendix Figure A1 depicts the average income tax rate (summing across federal and local income taxes) by municipality for a single taxpayer with an annual income of 100,000 Swiss Francs (CHF). This is about the 90th percentile of the labor earnings distribution among workers as of 1999. 1 CHF is approximately equal to one US dollar.

Old tax system. Prior to the tax reform we are exploiting in this paper, Switzerland applied a biennial retrospective income tax system. For example, taxes paid in years 1997 and 1998 were based on average income in 1995 and 1996. In 1997, a tax return would be filed reporting incomes in 1995 and 1996. From this tax return, tax liability would be determined for both year 1997 and year 1998 (and was identical in 1997 and 1998) so that taxpayers only had to file a tax return every second year. Tax payments were typically made in quarterly installments each year. The drawback of this system is that if the economic situation of the taxpayer changes (due to marriage, divorce, job loss, etc.), the tax due might not correspond well with current income. A few cantons, including the large canton of Zurich, were actually using an annual period of assessment (instead of biennial) for the cantonal and municipal taxes. In these cantons, incomes earned in year t were taxed in year $t + 1$ and returns had to be filed every year. The federal tax was still biennial in these cantons.¹⁰

New tax system. In the new system, Switzerland uses a standard pay as you earn annual income tax system whereby incomes earned in year t are taxed in year t through estimated payments. Individuals pay estimated taxes typically in quarterly installments (with some variation across cantons). In contrast to other countries, Switzerland has not adopted tax withholding at source under the new system. The fact that Switzerland does not have tax withholding on earnings makes income taxes quite salient as individuals pay installments directly to the government. After the end of year t , an income tax return is filed in year $t + 1$ which lists all income sources and computes the exact tax. Any difference between the exact tax owed and the taxes already paid during year t generates a tax refund or an extra tax payment.

2.2 Description of the Tax Holiday Transition

Discussions about switching to a modern pay as you earn annual income tax system had taken place since the 1980s in the Swiss government. In December 1990, two federal laws were passed encouraging (but not forcing) cantons to make the transition from the old system to the new system by 2001 and allowing the federal income tax to change alongside with cantonal taxes.¹¹ However, the cantons were free to adopt the new system whenever they wanted. Two cantons, Zurich and Thurgau decided to switch early in

¹⁰One canton, Basel-Stadt, had always had a standard pay as you earn income tax system for its local taxes and hence did not need to transition except for the federal tax.

¹¹The two laws were the cantonal tax harmonization law (StHG) which was scheduled to become effective on January 1st, 1993 and the new federal tax law (DBG) scheduled to become effective on January 1st, 1995.

1999 while most cantons waited until 2001. Three cantons were not yet ready by 2001 and hence postponed the transition to 2003.¹² Importantly, when a canton decided to transition in a given year, the transition applied to all taxes at the federal, cantonal, and municipal levels.¹³

How does the transition generate tax holidays? Suppose a canton wants to transition in 1999. This specific example is illustrated on Figure 1, top panel. In 1997 and 1998, income taxes under the old system are based on the average income for years 1995 and 1996. In 1999, income taxes have to be based on 1999 incomes. This means that incomes earned in 1997 and 1998 are never taxed, hereby creating a two-year long tax holiday. Taxpayers do pay taxes every year during the transition but no tax is ever paid on the incomes earned in the two years before the transition.

As mentioned above, a few cantons (including Zurich) used an annual assessment period (instead of biennial) for their cantonal and municipal taxes. For such cantons, there is a *single* tax holiday year for local taxes and two tax holiday years for the federal tax. Let us illustrate this with the case of Zurich that transitioned in 1999. In 1997, local taxes in Zurich are based on 1996 incomes while federal taxes are based on the average of 1995 and 1996 incomes. In 1998, local taxes are due based on 1997 incomes while federal taxes are again based on the average of 1995 and 1996 incomes. In 1999, both local and federal taxes are based on 1999 incomes. Hence, 1997 and 1998 are tax holiday years for federal taxes but only 1998 is a tax holiday for local taxes. Hence, the tax holiday for local taxes in Zurich is reduced to a single year. Four of the 20 cantons transitioning in 2001 are also in this situation and have a tax holiday for local taxes for only year 2000 (and 1999-2000 for federal taxes).

Figure 1, bottom panel, depicts a map of the cantons in Switzerland and summarizes the timing of the transition across cantons. For the federal income tax, the tax holiday was either 1997/1998 (cantons in blue with horizontal stripes), 1999/2000 (cantons in green with diagonal stripes), or 2001/2002 (cantons in brown with vertical stripes). Generally, the tax holiday for the local (cantonal and municipal) income tax was the same as for the federal tax. However, for cantons which were using *annual* assessment periods (instead of biennial), the tax holiday for local taxes is only one year. These cantons are depicted in darker blue and darker green with higher frequency stripes. One canton (Nidwalden in very dark green) had no local tax holiday at all due to a different form of transition. One canton (Basel-Stadt in black) had always had a pay as you earn local tax system

¹²Due to the biennial structure of the old system, the change could only take place in an odd year such as 1999, 2001, 2003. No canton was ready to consider switching in 1995 or 1997.

¹³Hence, the federal tax was not uniform across cantons during the transition as cantons transitioned during different years. This departure from uniformity was allowed by the new federal tax law (DBG) enacted to encourage the transition.

and transitioned to the annual pay as you earn system for the federal tax in 1995.¹⁴ We will use this color-coding in all our subsequent analysis.

2.3 Tax constraints on Responses to Tax Holidays

Extraordinary incomes. All transitioning cantons specified that extraordinary incomes earned during the holiday would remain taxable. Extraordinary income included one-time lump-sum payments, irregular capital incomes, lottery winnings, and extraordinary business incomes due to accounting changes. Importantly, for labor earnings, income increases due to promotions, job changes, or more hours worked were not considered extraordinary income. Bonuses and shared profits were not considered extraordinary profits if they were specified in the contract and had also been paid in prior or later years. In sum, any real labor supply response (and corresponding compensation) was not extraordinary income and hence was fully exempt during the tax holiday. Tax avoidance through income shifting remained possible as it was difficult for the tax administration to assess whether income earned during the tax holiday was “extraordinary” especially in the case of the self-employed.

Cantons differed in the reporting requirements for incomes earned in tax holiday years. Some cantons only collected information on extraordinary incomes (and did not require reporting of ordinary income that was tax exempt). As a result, income tax data cannot be used to study the reform. This is why we cannot study capital income.

Self-employment reporting. Self-employment earnings were reported to the social security administration through the income tax system. Therefore, in the old system, self-employment earnings are reported on a biennial basis as well (in most cantons) but with an additional delay of 1 year. The social security administration transitioned to the new pay-as-you-earn system uniformly across all cantons in 2001 for self-employment earnings. Starting in 2001, self-employment earnings are reported on an annual pay-as-you-earn basis in *all* cantons. Self-employment earnings for 1999 and 2000 were never registered in the social security system and hence benefitted as well from a social security contribution holiday but we cannot observe and hence analyze them. This timing corresponded to the tax holiday in 20 cantons (cantons in green in Figure 1, bottom panel). Cantons with earlier or later tax holidays had to collect self-employment earnings information during their tax holidays specifically (in the same way they collected information on

¹⁴For this transition, the federal tax in 1995 was based on the maximum tax liability under the old and the new system. Therefore, this transition did not generate a clean tax holiday for the federal tax. As such, our analysis will not try to estimate the effects of this early transition in Basel-Stadt.

extraordinary incomes). For these cantons, we therefore observe self-employment earnings during their income tax holiday and we study them specifically (see appendix A.1 for complete details).

In contrast, wage earnings were always reported in real time to the social security administration independently of the income tax system. Because of such different reporting, we separate the analysis of wage earnings from the analysis of self-employment earnings.

Betwixt assessments. Under the old system, large changes in economic circumstances such as permanent entry or exit (typically defined as lasting 2 or more years), a permanently large change in income, or migration to another canton, would trigger temporary pay-as-you-earn taxation (called betwixt assessments) until the end of the tax period. This temporary pay-as-you-earn taxation would be based on the new (annualized) income. The rationale for betwixt assessments was to accommodate large changes in economic circumstances, and especially alleviate the hardship of having to pay retrospective taxes after a large fall in income.¹⁵ Betwixt assessments disappear under the new system but could still happen during the tax holidays. We discuss in detail in appendix A.1 how this betwixt assessment system works and we summarize here how this system interacts with the tax holidays.

Extensive margin. Permanent entry in the labor force in the old system and during the tax holiday generates a betwixt assessment. Entry earnings during the tax holiday are taxed only once during the tax holiday while in the old system, such entry earnings would have been taxed a second time during the following tax period (as regular taxes were retrospective). Hence, entry earnings during the tax holiday also benefit from a tax cut: one time taxation instead of double taxation. But this double tax alleviation is likely not as salient. Therefore, the tax holiday might have a muted effect on accelerating entry of young workers. However and most important, a *temporary* entry (lasting less than 2 years) would not trigger a betwixt assessment. Hence, as long as an extensive margin response to the tax holiday was temporary, which is the expected response to a temporary tax change, then the tax holiday applied.¹⁶

A permanent exit from the labor force, such as retirement, triggers a betwixt assessment during the tax holiday so there is no change in the tax treatment of pre-retirement

¹⁵The vast majority of betwixt assessments were for decreases in income rather than increases in income. Over the tax periods 1979/80–1997/98, incomes under betwixt, pay as you earn assessments were on average 16% lower than those under regular assessment, i.e., those based on past income.

¹⁶If a taxpayer expects the entry to be temporary, no betwixt assessment is made. If however the entry is then extended, the tax administration would charge betwixt assessment taxes retrospectively. This is why, in the old system, that tax administration encouraged new workers to declare their new situation and start paying taxes immediately (to avoid having to pay back later).

earnings but complex effects on the treatment of pension income. As we do not have pension income data, we focus on prime workers aged 20–60 to exclude retirement from our analysis (the legal retirement ages were 62 for women and 65 for men at that time). *Migration.* Migration to another canton also triggered a betwixt assessment under the old system and during the tax holiday. Upon moving, retrospective tax liability in the canton of origin stopped and was replaced by pay as you earn on an annualized basis in the new canton of residence. As a result, taxpayers could not benefit from moving to tax holiday cantons and moving away from a tax holiday canton would terminate the tax holiday, hereby reducing incentives to move during a tax holiday. Our data show no statistically significant evidence of reduced migration into tax holiday cantons, but the point estimates among top earners are negative (appendix Table A3, col. (4)).

Intensive margin. Large changes in earnings could also trigger betwixt assessments in the old system and during the tax holidays. However, such changes had to be both permanent (2 year or more) and significant (change in occupation or quantitatively a very large change in earnings or hours).¹⁷ Any temporary change in earnings (lasting less than 2 years) to take advantage of the tax holiday would not trigger a betwixt assessment. Most permanent changes in earnings (such as a promotion or job change within the same industry; taking a secondary job) would not trigger a betwixt assessment as long as they were not very large.

2.4 Salience of the Reform

Behavioral responses to the tax holiday can happen only if the public is well informed about the reform and understands that it generates a tax holiday. Hence, it is important to provide evidence on how salient the tax holiday was.

The federal laws passed in the early 1990s had established that all cantons would eventually transition. Each canton could freely decide when to transition and the exact form that the transition would take. The decision was taken by cantonal legislatures. In 14 cantons, such as Zurich, the new tax laws were put to a popular referendum—either by default, by wish of the cantonal legislature, or because a party or group of individuals forced a referendum by collecting a pre-determined number of signatures. In the cases where a referendum was held, by default the resident population in a canton received voting documentation by mail. We have gathered this documentation for each canton. The voting documentation included information on the transition in an easy to understand language and in many cases the incidence of the tax holiday was further explained

¹⁷For hours, the change typically had to be of more than 20 hours per week (e.g., going from full-time to less than half-time).

by a graphical illustration (see appendix Figure A2 bottom panel for an example). It also listed what was classified as extraordinary incomes (expenses), which were subject to taxation (deductions) even during the holiday. In about half of all cases, the votes took place during the first tax holiday year (see appendix Figure A3). In all cases, the vote was always strongly in favor. Turnout ranged between 26 and 60% (see appendix Table A1 for complete details on the vote timing and turnout by cantons). However, the actual referendum or legislative vote was the last step in a longer process. In the cantons where there was no vote, the final decision on the transition hence tended to take place before the beginning of the holiday. The first drafts for the reform, including the date, were usually discussed 3–4 years before the transition. Typically, the transition was in the public debate for many months before the decision was officially taken through the referenda or legislature votes. In most cases, the official final decision came about 1.5 years before the beginning of the transition year. Hence, for two-year long tax holidays, the public was always informed in advance for the *second* year of the tax holiday. The public was typically officially informed in the middle of the first tax holiday year although the public debate often started before the first tax holiday year. In sum, we expect more information and hence larger behavioral responses for the second year of the tax holiday.

Let us describe in more detail the transition process in each of the three waves of cantons depicted on Figure 1, bottom panel.

Early transitions. Two cantons, Zurich and Thurgau transitioned early in 1999. Zurich held a popular referendum on transitioning in 1999 on June 8, 1997. As Zurich has a single 1998 tax holiday year for cantonal taxes, the public was officially informed about the 1998 tax holiday more than 6 months before the start of 1998, leaving time to anticipate and prepare for the reform. Thurgau decided its transition in 1999 on June 30, 1997. This means that Thurgau residents knew for sure by the middle of 1997 that 1997 and 1998 would be tax holiday years. Hence, we should expect a larger behavioral response for 1998 than for 1997 in Thurgau.

2001 transitions. Most cantons were expected to transition in 2001. These decisions were typically made during calendar year 1999, with votes held into calendar year 2000. This implies that in many cases the information was made official during the first tax holiday year of 1999 and before the start of 2000, the second tax holiday year. Most of the referenda held in 2000 were mandatory referenda, and the large share of yes votes show that the new tax laws were uncontested. Taxpayers could therefore expect the new system to be put in place. Hence, we should expect a larger response in the second tax holiday year. As Zurich and Thurgau had already transitioned with tax holidays, we

expect that the public was even better informed for this large group of cantons.

2003 transitions. The three cantons VD, VS, and TI which transitioned late in 2003 decided to transition at this date typically in 2000 or 2001. The reason these cantons transitioned late was mostly that their information technology systems were not yet ready. Legally, these cantons claimed that they needed to make some changes in their cantonal laws to incorporate the new requirements and that due to some of the changes the transition period was extended until January 1 2003. As most cantons had already transitioned, the nature of the transition and the tax holidays it creates is likely to have been even more salient for these cantons.

Press coverage. Another way to assess salience is to examine press coverage of the transition and in particular how often tax holidays were mentioned. There were many press articles discussing the tax reform and the tax holiday it creates (see appendix Figure A2, top panel for an example with a salient graphical illustration).

Figure 2 depicts the number of press articles mentioning the word “Bemessungslücke” (blank year) and the French term “brèche fiscale”, or other expressions used to refer to the reform in German and French by year and most major newspapers.¹⁸ The figure displays four series: (1) the series in blue circles is for two Zurich based newspapers, (2) the series in light green triangles for three Bern and Lucerne based newspapers, (3) the dashed series in dark green triangles for two Geneva and a Solothurn based newspapers, (4) and the series in brown squares for three Vaud and Valais based newspapers. The tax holiday for Zurich is depicted in blue, the tax holiday for Bern and Lucerne is depicted in light green, the tax holiday for Geneva and Solothurn is depicted in dark green, and the tax holiday for Valais and Vaud is depicted in light brown (in the series, the symbols for the tax holiday years are also blanked out). The figure shows that press interest in the tax holiday peaked during the years when the actual tax holidays happened (i.e., in advance of the transition year which is the year immediately after the tax holidays). Interestingly, the figure shows that these peaks corresponded to the regions where the blank year was in place. This suggests that at least for the second blank year and especially for the second wave of the reform (1999/2000), salience can be assumed to have been large.

¹⁸We constructed these graphs by scraping the newspaper archive “Swissdox”, which contains a full text archive of most newspapers in Switzerland. The sample is restricted to large daily newspapers whose archive covers the relevant time period (i.e. starts in 1998 or earlier). The following German- and French-speaking newspapers fulfill these sample restrictions and are based in the regions shown in the graph: 24 Heures (since 1997), Berner Zeitung (since 1998), Der Bund (since 1994), Le Matin (since 1997), Le Temps (since 1998), Neue Luzerner Zeitung (since 1998), Neue Zürcher Zeitung (since 1993), Solothurner Zeitung (since 1996), Tages-Anzeiger (since 1995), and Tribune de Genève (since 1997).

It is important to recognize that the fact that the transitions were formally passed by the cantonal legislatures and discussed in the press does not automatically insure that all taxpayers were perfectly informed. Many people do not follow local legislative activity nor read the press systematically. Indeed, recent empirical work has shown that taxpayers often have imperfect information about tax systems even when tax systems have been fairly stable (see e.g., Fujii and Hawley (1988)). However, the tax holiday was a simple concept to understand: earnings during the tax holiday are free of all income taxes. This does not require understanding the intricacies of the income tax code nor the marginal tax rate schedule. Nevertheless, it remains possible that taxpayers, while informed of the tax holiday, do not infer that increasing labor supply is advantageous, or may view such a behavior as gaming the system.

2.5 Expected Behavioral Responses

The tax holiday generates intertemporal substitution price effects as income earned during the tax holiday escapes the income tax. On the extensive margin, the cut in the average tax rate is around 11 points on average (see Figure 3, top panel). On the intensive margin, the cut in the marginal tax is even larger, around 20-25 points on average (see Figure 3, bottom panel). The cut in tax rates is lower for lower income individuals due to the progressivity of the tax system. On an annual basis, there is no direct income effect as income taxes are due every year. Indeed, the reason for the tax holiday is precisely to avoid double taxation during the transition. Aggregate annual income tax collections do not display any discontinuity during the tax holiday and transition years (see appendix Figure A4). Therefore, the tax reform comes very close to a pure intertemporal substitution effect.

Real labor supply responses. The tax holidays should induce individuals to work more during the tax holiday both at the extensive and intensive margins.

On the extensive margin, the tax holiday makes working more attractive and could induce some individuals to work. This effect should be strongest for secondary earners as they are traditionally seen as more elastic and the average tax rate on secondary earners is significant due to joint taxation of married couples. In principle, responses along the extensive margin should be temporary (as the tax holiday incentive is temporary). For temporary responses, the tax holiday applies fully (see our discussion above).

On the intensive margin, individuals might decide to work more and earn more as the marginal income tax rate on extra earnings is zero during the tax holiday. Individuals could work overtime, take an extra job or add work through self-employment, or cut down

on unpaid vacation. They could also shift to a higher paying job. As long as changes along the intensive margin are temporary, they will benefit from the tax holiday. Even permanent changes may benefit as long as they are not too large (see our discussion above). There are of course adjustment costs in labor supply decisions as it requires cooperation with the employer. We will see indeed that responses are larger in industries where overtime work is more prevalent (and hence more likely to be available to willing workers). Self-employed individuals are likely to have more flexibility in adjusting their labor supply and hence we should expect a larger response among the self-employed.

Using the conventional labor supply and labor demand competitive model, if the labor supply response is strong and labor demand is not perfectly elastic, then the wage rate could fall. In that case, this attenuates the labor supply response. Demand responses should lead to a fall in the wage rates. Our main analysis focuses on earnings (wage rates times hours of work) as social security data record only earnings and not wages and hours of work separately. However, it is possible to use the wage structure surveys (described in detail below) to examine wage rates specifically. As we shall see, there is no evidence of a negative effect on wages, implying no visible demand driven wage effects. This is perhaps not surprising in light of the quite modest supply responses we obtain in aggregate.

It is important to note that labor supply responses could be small due to large adjustment costs in the labor market. Adjustment costs can take the form of fixed hours, the need to negotiate extra work with the employer, or the need to search and find an alternative or secondary job. More generally, if labor supply affects future wages, through career or experience effects, this will reduce intertemporal substitution. This is why we often refer to our estimates as “frictional Frisch” elasticities.

Tax avoidance responses. Individuals might also be able to shift income into the tax holiday years (at the expense of surrounding years) through tax avoidance. This could happen for example if workers have flexibility regarding the payment of their labor income. In principle, such shifting is easiest for the self-employed. Therefore, we will analyze self-employment earnings specifically and separately from wage earnings. Individuals might also negotiate with their employer a higher pay during the tax holiday (and correspondingly lower pay either before or after). For example, bonuses might be retimed into the tax holiday year. We will assess whether labor earnings are depressed either just before or just after the tax holiday to detect such time shifting effects, and analyze bonuses specifically using the wage survey.¹⁹

¹⁹It is also possible that real positive labor supply responses could depress labor supply in adjacent years, for example through reduced vacation time during the tax holiday and longer vacations afterwards.

3 Data

We use two main data sources for our empirical analysis. We defer to the online appendix the complete description of the data and provide a short summary in this section.²⁰

Matched SSER-Census Data. Our main dataset merges the register-based 1990, 2000, and 2010 population censuses of Switzerland with longitudinal social security annual earnings records (SSER) covering the period 1981–2010. The main match is done in 2010 using social security numbers. The 1990 and 2000 censuses do not contain social security numbers and were matched with the 2010 census using probabilistic methods based on sex, date of birth, marital status, nationality, religion, place of residence and other variables.²¹ About 8% of our 2010 matched data cannot be matched to the earlier censuses, for instance because multiple possible matches (see appendix Section A.2 and Figure A5 for details).

Both datasets cover the full population. In the SSER data, employed or self-employed individuals generate one record per job per year that details the starting and ending month of an employment relationship along with the total earnings over that time period. Labor earnings are uncapped, and include variable pay components such as bonuses and stock options. We need to match these records to census data because the social security data do not contain geographical information which is key for our empirical design. Panel A in Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the matched data pooling all years from 1990 to 2010.

Because virtually everybody generates a record at some point in his or her life, our matched data set contains 98% of the resident population aged 20–60 in 2010. As we move back in time, the sample coverage of persons aged 20–60 gets slightly smaller because certain individuals that lived in Switzerland in these earlier years died or emigrated and hence are not present in the 2010 census. Figure A6 in appendix shows that we could match SSER and the census 2010 for 93% of all individuals aged 20–60 living in Switzerland in 2000, the time around which the reforms we analyze took place.²² For 86% of individuals, we additionally have information from the census 2000. The census

²⁰In the appendix, we also offer some analysis based on the Swiss labor force survey (SLFS), the equivalent of the US Current Population Survey.

²¹This relies on the “Swiss National Cohort” project presented in detail in Spoerri et al. (2010). See appendix A.2 and Figures A9, A10, A11 for details.

²²In appendix Figure A7, we compare the employment rate of 20 to 64 year-old Swiss men and women in our data with the employment rate of these groups according to the labor force survey described below. The employment rates are slightly higher in our data than they are in the labor force survey. This is likely due to the fact that people with very low but positive earnings in a given year have social security income in that year but may not be recorded as participating in the labor force in the labor force survey, which only refer to the fraction of individuals employed in the second quarter of a specific year.

contains relevant personal characteristics such as educational background, learned and current occupation, individuals' marital status, the presence of children, and a household identifier that allows calculating household income. With the exception of household income and marital status that we impute for individuals we cannot match (see Appendix A.2), analyses using these characteristics are thus based on a slightly smaller sample.

Our matched dataset has an important drawback that should be noted: the earnings records in 1998 are incomplete due to recording failures in some of the local social security offices. The share of wage earners for which records are missing is about 5–6%. The problem of missing records is not equally distributed across cantons. In the longitudinal micro-level analyses below, we thus have to discard data from 1998. We impute the missing data in the graphical macro-level analyses.

Employer Survey (LSE). The Swiss wage structure surveys (*Lohnstrukturerhebung* LSE) have been conducted every two years by the Swiss federal Statistical Office (FSO) since 1994. They are a large stratified random sample of private and public firms with at least three full-time-equivalent workers from the manufacturing and service sectors in Switzerland.²³ They cover between one sixth (1996) and one half (2010) of total employment in Switzerland. The mandatory surveys contain extensive information on the individual characteristics of workers and provide reliable (employer-reported) information on hours worked per worker. They contain detailed salary information broken down into individuals pay components, including bonus payments per worker. The main drawbacks of these data are that (1) they cannot be used to study the extensive labor supply margin; (2) they only provide the geographical location of the work location (and not the residence location) which creates measurement error for individuals who do not live in the same canton they work; (3) they are bi-annual and hence do not cover every single year (although the even years are always the second year of the tax holiday and hence the ones where the information is best and the expected response largest). We address the second problem by excluding zip codes where more than 25% workers stem from one of the other groups of cantons relevant in the analysis. Approximately 10% of all observations in the surveys are dropped due to this restriction. The commuting patterns by zip code are computed from the census in 2000. We use the wage structure surveys to examine how the tax holiday affected wage rates and variable pay components. Panel B in Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the employer survey data pooling all years.

²³The data exclude public sector employees at the federal and local levels, as well as the agricultural sector. Additionally, we exclude the public sector (i.e. public administration, education, and health, NACE rev. 1.1. two-digit industries 75, 80, and 85) from the analysis since it is not fully covered in the early waves.

4 Empirical Results

In this section, we present our empirical results. We divide cantons into various groups as depicted in our earlier Figure 1, bottom panel: (1a) 1 canton (Thurgau) which transitioned early in 1999 with tax holiday in 1997-98, (1b) 1 canton (Zurich) which transitioned early in 1999 with tax holiday in 1998 only for local taxes (and 1997-98 for the federal tax), (2a) 16 cantons which transitioned in 2001 with a tax holiday in 1999-2000 for both the federal and local income taxes, (2b) 4 cantons which transitioned in 2001 with a tax holiday in for 2000 only for local income taxes (and 1999-2000 for the federal tax), (3) 3 cantons which transitioned late in 2003 with tax holiday in 2001-02. We always use the same colors and shaped symbols to depict each group: (1a) light blue circles, (1b), dark blue circles, (2a) light green triangles, (2b) dark green triangles, (3) brown squares. We sometimes group together groups (1a) and (1b) into a single group (1) and groups (2a) and (2b) into a single group (2).

First, we examine the levels of tax rates to establish the magnitude of the first stage generated by the tax holidays. Second, we analyze aggregate effects on employment and earnings. Third, we zoom in on specific sub-groups by age and income groups. Fourth, we present an event study micro-econometric framework to quantitatively estimate the elasticities. Most of our empirical analysis is based on the matched social security and census data that are the most comprehensive. However, we also examine additional outcomes such as hours of work, wage rates, and bonuses using the wage structure surveys.

4.1 First Stage Effect and Parallel Trend Identification

First stage effect on tax rates. First, we examine the levels of average and marginal tax rates so that we can establish the size of the first stage in terms of tax rate reductions. Figure 3 displays the average income tax rate (top panel) and marginal income tax rate (bottom panel) averaged across workers in our sample by year and groups of cantons from 1990 to 2010. Tax rates include federal, cantonal, and municipal income taxes. The average tax rate is the total income tax divided by gross income.²⁴ We treat married individuals and singles separately. We use tax rates for singles without children in case a person is single. For married individuals, we compute household income using the social security data by exploiting the household identifier in the census data. We impute household income for married individuals that could not be matched to the census.²⁵ We

²⁴See appendix section A.2.4 for more information on the tax data used in the analysis.

²⁵We impute spousal income based on an out-of-sample prediction. To this end, we regress spousal income on a set of predictors of spousal income using the sample of individuals with non-missing household identifier in 2000. The predictors are a full set of interactions between age, gender and a categorical

then compute tax rates based on household income using tax rates for married individuals with two children for married persons. If the couple has no children below age 20 according to census data, we use tax rates for married individuals without children.²⁶ Averages across municipalities and cantons are employment weighted. The cantons are divided in five groups based on when the tax holiday took place as described above following Figure 1, bottom panel. In the series, the dots corresponding to tax holidays are bigger and are blanked out (as tax holidays are called “blank years” in French and German). This graphical representation will be used in all subsequent reduced form graphs. For each of the groups, we represent the corresponding tax holiday periods using the vertical shading and the same color code.

Tax rates are naturally zero during tax holidays. Cantons with a single year tax holiday (groups 1b and 2b) also have a *federal* tax holiday the preceding year explaining the lower tax rate. Yet, the effect is small as federal income tax revenue is less than 20% of total income tax revenue. Substantively, two points are worth noting. First, tax rates and especially marginal tax rates are fairly high on average. Average tax rates are around 10–13% while marginal tax rates are around 20–25%. Obviously, the change in average and especially marginal tax rates are even substantially larger for groups with above-average incomes (such as men or married women). Second, the graph shows that, over the period 1990–2010, the variation in tax rates (either average or marginal) due to the tax holidays dwarves other variations due to tax reforms. Hence, there is no doubt that the tax holiday reform creates very large temporary variation in tax rates and hence provides a promising natural experiment to identify behavioral responses.

Parallel trends across groups of cantons. Our key identification assumption is that, absent the tax holidays, the various canton groups would have evolved similarly in terms of employment and earnings. Below, we present evidence of parallel trends in the labor supply outcomes that we study in this paper. Here, we provide evidence that cantons also follow similar business cycles. Figure 4 displays the official Swiss unemployment rates by year and groups of cantons from 1990 to 2010. The yearly unemployment rate is defined as the average of monthly unemployment rates. The official unemployment rate is the ratio of individuals registered at the Swiss public employment service (registered unemployment) to workers plus registered unemployed. The Swiss wide unemployment rate is also depicted in thick red line.²⁷ Two points are worth noting on Figure 4.

variable of an individual’s own labor income, as well as nationality, canton effects and year effects.

²⁶These imputations might have a small impact on the precision of our estimates.

²⁷As is well known, the unemployment rate in Switzerland is low (it ranges from 1% to 5%) because in recessions immigrant workers who become unemployed leave the country. As being counted as unemployed requires official registration, it is possible also that some resident unemployed are not registered,

First, the unemployment rates differ across canton groups in level but not in trend. Levels are higher in the late transitioning canton group (3) in brown squares and lower in the cantons groups (1a) and (2a) in light blue circles and light green triangles. However, all canton groups follow exactly the same business cycle so that the parallel trend assumption holds almost perfectly.²⁸ The first tax holiday of 1997-1998 (in blue circles) happens at the very end of the mid-1990s recession when the economy starts to recover. The second tax holiday of 1999-2000 (in green triangles) happens during an economic boom when unemployment rate is falling fast. The last tax holiday of 2001-2002 (in brown squares) happens when the unemployment rate starts to tick up again. Second, the figure shows that nothing visible happens to the unemployment rate during the tax holidays in the treated cantons. This is consistent with our subsequent findings of no response along the extensive margin that we discuss just below.

4.2 Aggregate Difference-in-Difference Analysis

We start by plotting basic employment and earnings statistics by year and by groups of cantons focusing on the sample of working age individuals aged 20-60 in the relevant year. Hence, these statistics are repeated cross-sectional statistics. In all these graphs, the tax holiday years are denoted by the vertical shaded bars and we use the same color coding as in Figure 3 on tax rates.²⁹ Unlike wage earnings, self-employment earnings are not observed for all years during the transitions (see above). Therefore, we start with wage earnings only and defer the analysis of self-employment to the end of this section.

Wage employment rates. Figure 5, top panel, displays the wage employment rates from 1990 to 2010 in the five groups of cantons. The sample in each year is defined as all individuals aged 20-60 in the year (and who are still alive and Swiss residents in 2010, when we match to the 2010 census). The wage employment rate is computed as the fraction of individuals in the sample with positive wage earnings during the year. Two findings are worth noting on Figure 5.

First, all groups of cantons follow fairly parallel trends over the full period. The par-

especially for short unemployment spells.

²⁸The only exception is perhaps group (2b) dark green triangles for which the unemployment rate increases more than the other groups in the early 2000s.

²⁹As mentioned above, about 5% of wage records are missing in 1998 (due to some local offices failing to transmit their data correctly to the central office). To correct for this, we re-estimate series by year and group in a refined sample that excludes the local offices affected by the 1998 missing data. We then impute 1998 values in the full data assuming that the 1998 value relative to the average of 1997 and 1999 is the same in the refined sample and in the full sample. See appendix A.2 and Figure A8 for details. We have checked using other years that this method delivers accurate results.

allelism is not exactly perfect, especially in the very long run. For example, employment rate grows about 3 points less in group (2b, dashed dark green triangles) than in other groups. However, the trends are close to parallel in the medium run around the tax holidays. This implies that for each group of cantons, the other groups constitute decent control groups.³⁰ In the micro-level regression framework, we control for these longer term differences in earnings trends by controlling for linear time trends per canton.

Second, there is no evidence of any relative increase in employment rates during the tax holidays represented by the blanked out symbols in the shaded areas.³¹ This implies that the temporary tax holidays did not affect labor supply along the *extensive margin*. To put these findings in perspective, because the cut in the average tax rate is around 12% (Figure 3), a Frisch elasticity of one along the extensive margin (a low end value of the estimates commonly used in macro calibrations) should generate an increase in employment rate of 11%, i.e. around 8 points. This would create an enormous spike in the empirical series of Figure 5. Therefore, our very simple aggregate time series evidence can clearly rule out such large Frisch elasticities empirically.

Quantitatively, Table 2, column (1), shows estimates derived from a basic OLS regression based on the aggregate time series by group depicted on Figure 5. We regress the time series for the 5 groups of cantons on year dummies, group dummies, and an indicator called “blank year” that is equal to 1 during tax holiday years: for 2 years in cantons that have two-year long tax holidays for cantonal and municipal taxes, and for 1 year for cantons whose cantonal tax holiday only lasted one year. This analysis is very transparent and provides very conservative standard errors. The first row is the first stage effect on the net-of-tax rate. The second row is the reduced form on the wage employment rate, expressed as a percent effect relative to the average employment rate during the tax holiday. The third row estimates the Frisch elasticity by taking the ratio of row 2 to row 1 and computing the standard error using the delta method. There is no significant effect on wage employment rates (-.07% effect) and the resulting elasticity is extremely small and precisely estimated: -.005 (.021).³²

We have done two robustness checks. First, we have redefined employment as annual

³⁰Appendix Figure A12 depicts employment rates separately for males and females and show that differential trends are driven entirely by women with almost perfect parallelism for men.

³¹The only exception is group (1a, light blue circles), the sole canton of Thurgau, that displays a very slight spike in 1998 but this spike is not particularly significant as spikes of similar magnitude appear in 2000 and 2002 as well for this canton. Appendix Figure A12 shows that such spikes are driven by women with no spikes at all for men.

³²Appendix Figures A12 and A14 display the employment rates separately for men, women, and married women by year and groups of cantons from 1990 to 2010. None show visible effects during the tax holidays. Appendix Table A2 displays the corresponding OLS estimates. They are insignificant and very close to zero, even among married women with children, the group expected to be the most elastic.

earnings above some modest positive threshold of 10,000 CHF instead of any positive earnings (1 CHF is approximately equal to one US dollar). It is conceivable that some individuals who intend to temporarily enter (or not to leave) the labor force during the tax holidays might not be able to target exactly the calendar year. Therefore, using a higher threshold for employment can help capture these effects as well. The absence of any response carries over unchanged when using the higher 10,000 CHF threshold (see appendix Figure A13 comparing the top and bottom panel). Second, we have repeated the analysis using the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS), the equivalent of the US Current Population Survey (see appendix section A.2.3 for a description of the data source). The first panel of appendix Figure A15 displays the employment rate using the SLFS. The figure is noisier due to smaller sample size but it does not display any tax holiday effects on the employment rate consistent with our results using Social Security data.

We show in appendix Table A3 that the tax holiday did not generate any significant responses along various other dimension of extensive labor supply: number of jobs and number of months employed. The effect on months employed is marginally significant but very small in magnitude (.02 months or .15% extra months).

Wage earnings. Figure 5, bottom panel displays the average wage earnings from 1990 to 2010 in the five groups of cantons. The sample is the same as in the top panel and includes zeros. We thus capture both extensive and intensive margin responses. Earnings are expressed in 1000s of 2010 CHF (adjusted for inflation). Two points are worth noting.

First, overall, the trends are close to parallel in all three groups, with a much higher level in the Zurich (canton group (1b) in dashed dark blue circles). Note that there is a very slight catching up trend in wage earnings for late transitioning cantons (group 3, brown squares). This implies that the identification strategy of comparing cantons around the tax holidays is a defensible one.

Second, there are visible spikes in earnings in 1998 for early transitioning cantons (blue series in circles) and especially in for late transitioning cantons with tax holidays in 2001-02 (brown series in squares). These spikes are consistent with a behavioral response to the tax change. However, the magnitude of the spikes is fairly modest, maybe 1 or 2 points of average earnings at most, which would translate into Frisch elasticities of around .05. Furthermore, the series in green triangles with tax holiday years in 1999 and 2000 (that include 19 out of the 24 cantons we analyze) do not display visible spikes. Conversely, the canton of Zurich (group (1b) in dashed dark blue circle) does display a false spike in 2001, that is likely driven by high profits and compensation in the finance industry that year. Quantitatively, Table 2, column (2), shows that the corresponding

elasticity estimate combining all 5 series are modest .026 (.017) and not even significant, clearly ruling out any elasticity estimate above .1 along the *intensive margin*.³³

Responsive groups: high wage earners and the self-employed. We consider next two groups likely to display larger responses: high wage earners and the self-employed.

High wage earners. The top panel of Figure 6 zooms in on high wage income earners. The sample is further restricted to individuals with annual labor earnings above 100,000 CHF on average in 1994-1996, a couple years before the reform started. The figure shows a clear and significantly larger response of wage earnings for this group than in the full population (Figure 5). The spikes in the early and late transitioning cantons are larger and even middle transitioning groups (2a) and (2b) in green triangles display a visible spike in 2000. The spike is largest for the late transitioning cantons of around 5% excess earnings during the 2001-02 tax holidays. Table 2, column (3), shows that the corresponding elasticity estimate combining all 5 series is highly significant 0.43 (.016).³⁴

Self-employment earnings. The bottom panel of Figure 6 displays average self-employment earnings by year and groups of cantons from 1990 to 2010 among the self-employed (defined as individuals with positive self-employment earnings in a given year). As discussed earlier, self-employment earnings are measured on a biennial basis before 2001 and self-employment earnings in 1999 and 2000 are subject to a social security tax holiday and hence unobserved in the data. As a result, we do not observe self-employment earnings during the tax holidays for the middle-transitioning cantons in green triangles. There are clear spikes in self-employment earnings during the tax holiday both in the early transitioning cantons (1997-1998) and in the late transitioning cantons (2001-2002). Trends are fairly (albeit not perfectly) parallel so that the tax holiday spikes stand-out. In particular, self-employment earnings in the late transitioning cantons (group 3) which experience the largest tax holiday spikes do not fully revert back after the tax holiday relative to groups (1) and (2a). However, group 3 and group 2b remain fully parallel throughout the full period (except for the tax holiday spikes).

Table 2, column (4), shows that the elasticity estimate combining all series is sizable and significant .29 (.12). Therefore, the evidence shows that self-employment earnings respond much more than wage earnings, likely because they have more flexibility to adjust their labor supply or through tax avoidance, in line with the previous literature.

³³Appendix Table A2 presents results by demographic subgroups. The elasticity of male wage earnings is marginally significant .037 (.019) but the female wage earnings elasticity is not .018 (.020). There is no evidence that elasticities are larger for married women with children.

³⁴Complete results by income groups based on the time series are presented in Appendix Table A4.

4.3 Individual-level Longitudinal Analysis

While our simple repeated cross-section analysis shows transparent evidence of no-response along the extensive margin and some response along the intensive margin, particularly for high wage earners and the self-employed, it is useful to develop a simple individual-level micro-econometric framework to estimate the size of the corresponding behavioral elasticities. We estimate two complementary regression models. To quantify the Frisch elasticity implied by the tax holidays effects, we use a regression of labor supply outcomes on the individual net-of-tax rate, instrumenting the net-of tax rate with an indicator of the tax holiday in the respective canton. We study the validity of this instrumental variable (IV) approach and the timing of the response by estimating the reduced-form effect of the tax holiday on labor supply using an event study.

There are four key advantages of these micro-level analyses. First, they allow us to focus on a panel of individuals (instead of comparing repeated cross sections as we did so far) and include controls such as individual fixed effects, linear time trends per canton, and life-cycle effects. Second, they allow us to analyze the precise time pattern of the reduced-form response to tax holidays: inter-temporal labor or income shifting might produce a deficit in earnings in years surrounding the tax holidays. Such effects in adjacent years are difficult to see in the repeated cross-section graphs as the tax holidays in an adjacent year for one group is the tax holiday year for another. Third, they deliver more precise and direct quantitative estimates of the frictional Frisch elasticity parameters than the crude estimates coming out of the time series graphs. Fourth, they tie the labor supply response of individuals directly to the individual-level change in tax burden.

IV design. The IV approach is based on the following regression model:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \delta \log(1 - \tau_{it}) + X_{it}\beta + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where Y_{it} is an outcome for individual i in year t , α_i and α_t represent person and year fixed effects, respectively. Controls X_{it} include gender dummies, age controls (age and age squared by gender) and linear time trends by canton of residence. τ_{it} represents the tax rate of individual i in year t , computed as explained in section 4.1. The tax rate represents the *average* tax rate if we study extensive margin labor supply responses and the *marginal* tax rate if we study intensive margin responses. δ represents the semi-elasticity of the outcome with respect to the net-of tax rate and can be used to recover the Frisch elasticity.³⁵ To provide a causal effect of the net-of tax rate on labor supply, we

³⁵The Frisch elasticity η^F is approximately defined as $\eta_{approx}^F = \hat{\delta}/\bar{Y}_{it}$, where \bar{Y}_{it} is the sample mean of the outcome. However, log changes poorly approximate the percent change in the net-of tax rate here

instrument $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ with a dummy equal to one if the canton of residence of individual i has a cantonal tax holiday.

Event study. To provide a transparent illustration of the timing of the reduced-form effect in the IV model, we estimate individual-level event study regressions that show the reduced-form effect of the tax holiday on the outcome in the years around the cantonal tax holiday. We consider the following specification:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \sum_{k=-4}^4 \delta_k \cdot TH_{ct}^k + X_{it}\beta + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

where Y_{it} , α_i , α_t , and X_{it} are defined as in equation (1). The important covariates are TH_{ct}^k for $k = -4, \dots, 4$, which represent a sequence of event study dummies that are k years away from the first year of the federal tax holiday in canton c . The coefficients of interest are the dummies δ_k for $k = -4, \dots, 4$ that capture the deviation in the outcome k years away from the first tax holiday year for the specific individual. Since we exclude the dummy for 2 years before the tax holiday, $k = -2$ serves as the reference period. $k = 0$ is the first year of the tax holiday and $k = 1$ is the second year of the tax holiday. For cantons with a single local tax holiday year (groups 1b and 2b), the local tax holiday year is set at $k = 1$ (there is no local tax holidays in $k = 0$ for this group but there is a federal tax holiday). Setting the reference period equal to $k = -2$ allows us to test for possible income shifting from the year before into the first year of the tax holiday. To absorb the effects outside of the estimation window of the event study, we additionally control for two dummies for $k \leq -5$ and $k \geq 5$.

Identification and sample The key identification assumption of this micro-level estimation framework is that treated and untreated cantons would have followed parallel outcome trends (in terms of employment and earnings) if the tax holiday had not taken place once we control for individual fixed effects, life-cycle effects, and linear time trends by canton of residence. Importantly, the plausibility of this identifying assumption can be tested with the event study design by checking whether the dummy coefficients well before the reform $k = -4, -3$ and well after the reform $k = 3, 4$ are equal to zero. The event study also reveals whether earnings in the years adjacent to the tax holiday are depressed ($k = -1, 1$), e.g. due to retiming of income. We do not generally find evidence

because of the large changes in the net-of tax rate caused by the tax holidays. We thus scale η_{approx}^F with $\hat{\gamma}^{FS}/(e^{\hat{\gamma}^{FS}} - 1)$ to estimate η^F , where $\hat{\gamma}^{FS}$ represents an estimate of the first stage effect of the tax holiday indicator on the log of the net-of tax rate according to equation (1).

that this is the case, which means that the results are very similar in our IV design if we control for tax holiday effects in the years adjacent to the tax holidays.

We estimate both models based on a sample that covers the years 1995–2006 (approximately 4 years around the tax holiday years) and excludes 1998 (as a fraction of the data are missing in a non-random way). As a result, we also exclude the two early transitioning cantons which had tax holidays in 1998.³⁶ We focus on workers aged 22–55 in 1996 that we follow longitudinally. We drop workers older than 62 in later years to avoid interactions with retirement behavior. Individuals are assigned to cantons based on where they lived in 1996 over the total sample period to avoid picking up the effects of strategic relocation decisions of individuals as a response to the tax holiday. However, as shown in the last column of appendix Table A3, the evidence that individuals deferred moving across cantons because of the tax holiday is limited.

First stage. To illustrate the timing of the first stage, we first estimate the event study model (equation (2)) using net-of tax rates as outcome variables. In these regression, Y_{it} is the log of one minus the average income tax rate ($\log(1 - ATR_{it})$) for extensive responses and the log of one minus the marginal income tax rate ($\log(1 - MTR_{it})$) for intensive responses. The top panel of Figure 7 depicts estimates of the effects of the tax holiday on these outcomes for each year from 4 years to before the tax holidays (years -4,-3,-2,-1 with year -2 set at zero by normalization), into the tax holiday (years=0,1) and after the tax holiday (years 2,3,4). The vertical bars represent 95% cluster-robust confidence intervals clustered at the level of the 106 commuting zones in Switzerland.

Two points are worth noting. First, there are clear large first stage effects during the tax holidays as we expect. The first stage effect for the net-of-marginal tax rate is about 22% while the first stage effect for the net-of-average tax rate is about 11%, consistent with our earlier aggregate time series in Figure 3. Second, the coefficients are very close to zero outside of the tax holidays. This confirms that the tax holidays created a very large first stage effect on net-of-tax rates.

Effects on wage earnings. The bottom panel of Figure 7 depicts reduced-form event study estimates of the effects of the tax holiday on the extensive and intensive margin of labor supply. The dependent variable Y_{it} in the model “extensive margin” is an indicator equal to 1 if a person has positive wage earnings in a given year. The dependent variable Y_{it} in the model “intensive margin” is annual wage earnings of employees (excluding

³⁶We have experimented trying to incorporate 1998 in the event study regressions. In the end, short of dummifying out 1998 entirely, which is equivalent to excluding 1998 as we do, we were not able to obtain stable pre-trends due to the highly specific and non-random way the data are missing.

individuals with no wage earnings in a given year) expressed in 2010 CHF. This effect is scaled post-estimation by mean wage earnings in the estimation sample so as to express the effects in percent. The graph depicts 95% cluster-robust confidence intervals.

The results confirm our earlier impressions from the time series. There is no effect along the extensive margin and there is a small effect along the intensive margin, of about 1% and significant. Combining this reduced form effect with the first stage effect of a bit more than 0.2 log points leads to a Frisch elasticity of about .04 along the intensive margin, a quantitatively small estimate consistent with our earlier time series analysis but more precisely estimated.

Heterogeneity. An intriguing question is why are the Frisch elasticity estimates so small. To cast light on this, it is valuable to explore heterogeneity.

Figure 8 uses the reduced-form event study to illustrate heterogeneity in the intensive margin response across various dimensions: gender, education, and level of earnings. The top panel depicts estimates for males and females separately. Effects appear to be somewhat larger for males than for females consistent with our time series analysis. The panel at the bottom left breaks down the sample by education (workers with a tertiary degree vs. workers without a tertiary degree). The effect are about twice as large for the tertiary educated workers. The panel at the bottom right breaks down the sample by wage earnings levels measured as average total labor income in the 1994–1996 period: we consider two groups: high earners with over 100K CHF on average and low earners with less than 100K CHF. The effect appears much larger for the high earners. For this group, estimates suggests that earnings are lower just after the tax holiday, consistent with retiming of income into the tax holiday with depressed earnings afterwards although the estimates are fairly imprecise.

Table 3 presents the estimates and corresponding Frisch elasticities based on the IV regression (equation (1)). The displays the effect of the tax holiday on wage employment and wage earnings for male and female separately in 4 columns. Panel A displays detailed results for the full sample. The first row depicts the semi-elasticity of outcomes: the effect of the log-net-of-tax rate on the level of the outcome of interest. The second row depicts the first stage effect of the tax holiday dummy on the log net-of-tax rate. The third row reports the corresponding (frictional) Frisch elasticity. The extensive elasticity is very close to zero (-.01 for men and -.02 for women) and precisely estimated consistent with Figure 7. The intensive elasticity is small but significant and larger for men (.04) than for women (.01) consistent with the event study in Figure 8.

Panels B and C consider the sub-groups of married with children and married without

children respectively. The extensive elasticities are always very close to zero. Interestingly on the intensive margin, the elasticity for married women with children is higher (.05) than without children (.01) while the elasticities for married men are similar with and without children, and also similar to the overall sample of men in Panel A. In all cases, the estimated intensive elasticities are quantitatively very small (never above .05). Panels D and E split the sample by education: those with a tertiary degree vs. not. Again, the extensive elasticities are always very close to zero. On the intensive margin, the elasticities are larger for those with tertiary degree both for men and women but still always quite small (below .05) consistent with Figure 8.

Table 4 uses the IV model to present the estimates and corresponding elasticities dividing the sample by five labor income groups (by panel) based on average income in 1994-1996. As in Table 3, it presents the estimates of the tax holiday effect and corresponding elasticities on wage employment and wage earnings for male and female separately in 4 columns. All the elasticities along the extensive margin are estimated to be very close to zero implying that there is no response for any income group. For the intensive margin, the table shows that elasticities are growing with earnings. They are zero at the bottom for group 1-25K CHF. For males, they grow to .03 in the next two groups (25-50K and 50-100K), .04 for the group 100-200K, and .07 (.013) for the top group 200K. For females, the elasticity estimates are very small (.02 or less) for all groups except the top that has an elasticity of .09 (.042). Therefore, the table confirms our previous findings that responses are larger at the top of the wage earnings distribution. Conceivably, higher earners have more flexibility to retime their compensation perhaps through bonuses as we show below. Even at the top though, the elasticities remain quantitatively small in the range .05-.1.

Figure 9 explores the heterogeneity in the size of the Frisch elasticity estimates by occupation, and how the elasticity is related to average earnings in the occupation (top panel) and share of workers with overtime in the occupation (bottom panel). We divide individuals using a two-digit classification of occupations used by the Swiss administration. Within each occupation, we estimate the Frisch elasticity using equation (1). We focus on the overall (intensive and intensive margin) Frisch elasticity by including non-workers with labor earnings of zero. The occupation for each person is defined as of 2000 when the social security data are matched to the census in 2000. Non-employed are assigned to occupations based on learned occupation. Each dot on the panels represents an occupation. The size of the dot is scaled to the number of workers in the corresponding occupation. Three results are worth noting.

First, we find that Frisch elasticities differ significantly across industries from slightly

negative values (around $-.03$) to small positive values (around $.07$). Most occupations have small and positive elasticities (in the range $0-.02$). Some high skill occupations such as engineers, entrepreneurs, legal professions, or professors have among the highest elasticities (around $.06-.07$). In all cases though, elasticities are modest in size and always below $.1$. Second and as we saw earlier, the top panel shows that there is a clear positive relationship between average earnings in the occupation and the size of the estimated Frisch elasticity. Quantitatively, the plotted regression line shows that each extra 1000 CHF is associated with an increase the Frisch elasticity by $.001$. Third, the bottom panel shows that occupations where a larger share of workers do overtime also have higher estimated Frisch elasticities. Quantitatively, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of workers with overtime is associated with a $.0139$ increase in the Frisch elasticity. This suggests that workers in occupations where overtime work is more common have more flexibility to adjust upward their labor supply during the tax holiday. This also suggests that part of the response we obtain may reflect real labor supply responses.³⁷

Effects on self-employment earnings. Figure 10 depicts the reduced-form effects on self-employment earnings using the event study model (equation (2)). We focus on workers aged 20-55 in 1996 who are self-employed at least once during the estimation period. The dependent variable is annual self-employment income per person (including 0 if there is no self-employment earnings in a given year). The effect is scaled post-estimation by mean self-employment earnings in the estimation sample.

The top panel depicts two series: the full sample of self-employed and self-employed with average labor income over 100K CHF in the 1994–1996 period. The effects on self-employment earnings are much larger than for wage earnings: there is excess self-employment of almost 10% during the tax holiday years, and larger in the second year of the tax holiday. For high self-employment earners, the effects are even larger about 15%. The lower panel compares men and women. It shows striking heterogeneity by gender: effects for men are more than twice as high as for women (around 10% for males vs. about 5% for females). The conventional wisdom is that female labor supply is more elastic than male labor supply. Therefore, a possible explanation for our findings is that they reflect tax avoidance rather than genuine labor supply responses. Note that for self-employment effects depicted in the picture remain slightly elevated after the tax holidays (and even significantly so 3 years after the tax holiday). This suggests that the

³⁷Following Sigurdsson (2018), we have also explored whether responses are larger in industries with a higher variation in effective weekly working times perhaps because workers have more flexibility of adjust their hours of work in such industries. However, we did not find any significant relationship.

identification assumption may not hold quite perfectly.³⁸ Quantitatively, however, the figure shows clearly excess self-employment earnings during the tax holiday.

Table 5 summarizes the effect of the tax holiday on earnings of self-employed. It shows estimated semi-elasticities and corresponding Frisch elasticities derived from IV regressions. For the main sample of self-employed in Panel A, the estimated elasticity is .21. The elasticity is much larger for men (.22) than for women (.09). The elasticity for high earners is the same as in the full sample (.21 in both cases). Therefore, the larger response for high earners from Figure 10 corresponds to a larger first stage for high earners: high earners get a bigger marginal tax rate break due to the progressivity of the income tax schedule. Panel B shows that married self-employed have slightly higher elasticities than overall. Panel C and D show that elasticities are larger for the self-employed with tertiary education than for those with no tertiary education. Strikingly, women with no tertiary education display a zero elasticity while tertiary educated women have an elasticity of .18. Overall, the elasticity for the self-employed (.2) is much larger than for wage earnings (less than .05). The elasticities for the self-employed are also spread throughout income groups (while elasticities for wage earners increase sharply with earnings). Consistent with wage earners, we also find higher elasticities for men than women for self-employment earnings.

Do the self-employment responses that we uncover come from tax avoidance or real labor supply responses? In principle, tax avoidance would take the form of income shifting across years (shifting income into tax holiday years and shifting expenses out of tax holiday years). This would result in depressed reported income in the years adjacent to the tax holidays. In contrast, labor supply responses are less likely to produce such an effect. In the standard model with separability in preferences across periods, there would be no such effect. It could arise with time complementarities in labor supply however, for example if people postpone vacations to take advantage of the tax holiday. The evidence from Figure 10 does not reveal any visible dip right after the tax holiday, which is more consistent real labor supply responses than tax avoidance responses. Yet, in absence of a decisive test, weight should be given to the previous literature where evidence of strong responses typically points toward tax avoidance responses rather than labor supply responses (see e.g., Saez et al. (2012)).

Robustness. Appendix Table A5 shows that the baseline elasticity estimates for wage earnings (along the extensive and intensive margin) and for self-employment earnings based on the IV estimation are robust along a number of dimensions: (1) excluding the

³⁸Alternatively, it could signal that the temporary tax holiday had persistent effects on labor supply, similar as documented by Sigurdsson (2018) for the tax holiday in Iceland.

control variables included in the baseline, (2) adding control variables absorbing effects of the tax holiday in the the year before and after the tax holiday, thus accounting for possible effects of the tax holidays on income shifting, (3) controlling further for the cantonal unemployment rate, (4) discarding observations with imputed place of residence, (5) identifying the effect only from the response in the second cantonal blank year (controlling for the effect in the first), (6) identifying the effect only from the response in late-coming cantons with tax holidays in 2001 and 2002, (7) using fully uncapped earnings (instead of capping annual earnings at 2.5 million CHF). In all cases, the estimates are similar to the baseline estimates discussed above. A noteworthy exception is that the Frisch elasticity for the self-employed becomes somewhat larger (.36) if we identify the effect only from the second tax holiday year. In general, however, the table shows that the IV estimates for the main outcomes are robust to various alternative specifications.

4.4 Additional Results

Decomposing earnings: hours of work and wage rates. In the basic model of labor supply and demand that we described above, the tax holiday creates a positive labor supply response in the form of increased hours of work. This positive labor supply effect might in turn reduce the wage rate if labor demand is not perfectly elastic. This will dampen the effect on total earnings. Therefore, it is important to examine separately the effects on hours of work and wage rates. Hours of work and wage rates are not measured in the social security data but are measured in the labor force survey and the wage structure survey. Here, we present evidence from the wage structure surveys.³⁹ Because the wage structure surveys are repeated cross sections with no panel dimension, we cannot replicate the longitudinal analyses used in the last section. Instead, we present simple times series patterns following the strategy of section 4.2.

Figure 11 depicts hours of work (top panel) and hourly wage rates (bottom panel) by year and group of cantons using the wage structure surveys 1994–2010 carried out bi-annually.⁴⁰ Hours of work and hourly wages are based on the month of October in each year. Hours worked refer to contractual (i.e. normal) hours worked for workers with monthly salaries and to actual hours worked for workers paid by the hour. Wage rates incorporate regular pay but exclude overtime and variable pay components (e.g. bonuses). In both panels, the sample in each year is limited to workers aged 20–60,

³⁹The labor force survey is much smaller and hence produces noisier series. These series are presented in appendix Figure A15 and show results that are consistent with the larger wage structure survey, in particular no detectable effect on hours of work.

⁴⁰We show in appendix Figure A16 that total monthly earnings in the wage structure survey display some evidence of response to the tax holiday consistent with our findings from the social security data.

excluding public sector employees and foreign workers that do not pay regular taxes in Switzerland. We group cantons as usual. Geographical information in the wage structure survey is based on place of work while tax treatment is based on residence. To reduce the number of cases where a person works in one group of cantons but resides in another one, we exclude zip codes in which more than 25% of workers live and work in different groups of cantons according to the census in 2000 (see section 3).

Both panels display fairly stable parallel trends before and after the reform. The top panel does not show any visible response of hours of work to the tax holiday. Hours of work do not seem to spike at all during the tax holidays in treated cantons relative to other groups of cantons. The bottom panel shows some evidence of an impact of the tax holiday on wage rates. There is no visible spike in wage rates for the two groups of cantons transitioning early (series in blue circles and green triangles) but there is a spike in hourly wage rates at the time of the tax holiday for the cantons transitioning late in 2001–2002 (series in brown squares). This positive effect is the reverse of a labor demand effect driving wages down during the tax holiday. It suggests instead that workers are able to manipulate their wage rate as well to drive up their earnings and take advantage of the tax holiday.⁴¹ Quantitatively, regression analysis presented in appendix Table A6 based on the depicted series shows that the tax holiday increases hours of work by .1% (not significant) and hourly wage rates by .5% (not significant either).⁴²

Overall, the decomposition of earnings into wages and hours of work shows that labor demand cannot explain the small earnings effects. In contrast to the labor demand channel story, we have found that wage rates respond if anything positively to the tax holiday. Therefore, the change in net-of-tax wage rates due to the tax holiday is not dampened through a labor demand reduction in wage rates. The lack of effects on hours of work we have found confirms that the Frisch labor supply elasticity is very small.

Effects on bonuses. Finally, we look at bonuses, which is an earnings component that is more flexible than regular wages and salaries and hence might be used to shift earnings toward the tax holiday years. Bonus data are available in the wage structure survey. Figure 12 displays the fraction of employees with bonuses above 5,000 CHF (among all employees including those with no bonus) by year and groups of cantons from 1996 to 2010 using the wage structure survey (LSE) carried out bi-annually. The sample in a given

⁴¹To test this hypothesis, we show in appendix Figure A17 that the hourly wage response is much stronger and clear in all three groups of cantons when the sample is restricted to workers more likely to be well informed about the tax holiday (workers in occupations “examining, advising, attesting”).

⁴²Quantitative effects on hours of work are marginally significant for workers in occupations “examining, advising, attesting” although modest in size (.7%). Effects on wage rates are larger and very significant for this group (4.3%) (appendix Table A6).

year t includes all employees in the dataset weighted to represent population averages. The top panel is for all employees while the bottom panel is restricted to male workers in private sector firms. The top panel shows mild evidence of a bonus spike during the tax holidays in each of the three groups, most visible in the cantons that transitioned late in 2001-02. Quantitatively, regression analysis based on the depicted series shows that the likelihood of receiving a bonus increases by almost 10% during the tax holiday and this effect is marginally significant (appendix Table A6, Panel A, col. (4)).

Therefore, this evidence suggests that workers are able to shift bonuses to take advantage of the tax holiday. The absence of hours of work effects along with some positive effects on wage rates and bonuses suggests that the response we have obtained might be partly due to tax avoidance rather than actual labor supply behavior.

5 Conclusion

Our paper has estimated the intertemporal labor supply (Frisch) elasticity of substitution exploiting temporary income tax holidays in Switzerland. Importantly, our estimate captures the macro-level Frisch elasticity taking as given all existing frictions on labor supply adjustments. This is the relevant parameter to assess the employment effects of real business cycles but it could differ from a micro-level and frictionless Frisch elasticity.

Overall, we can draw the following conclusions. First, there is no evidence at all of responses along the extensive margin, even for sub-groups likely to be more elastic such as women. Second, there is a small aggregate response of wage earnings which is largest at the top of the wage earnings distribution. The overall Frisch elasticity for wage earners is below .05 overall and is about .07 for high wage earners. Third, there is a larger response of self-employment earnings that is present at all earnings level (and not just the top) with a Frisch elasticity around .2–.3. Fourth, effects are concentrated among men with essentially no effects for women except married women with children, in contrast to the standard findings in the labor supply literature. Fifth, most of these responses are visible for the last wave of transitioning cantons with tax holidays in 2001-2002. Responses for earlier transitions such as 1997-1998 or 1999-2000 appear to be much more muted. This latter effect might be due to learning as it might take time for the public to understand tax holidays and how to respond to them.

Our results are consistent with a large body of work in public economics showing that real labor supply to taxation are generally modest but that whenever taxpayers have easily accessible tax avoidance opportunities, they tend to exploit them (see e.g., Saez et al. (2012) for a survey of this literature). In the specific case of tax avoidance through inter-

temporal substitution, the literature has uncovered a number of cases of strong timing responses before anticipated increases in tax rates, such as the realization of capital gains (Auerbach and Poterba, 1988; Saez, 2017) or stock-option exercises (Goolsbee, 2000). Closest to our application, Best and Kleven (2017) study a tax holiday for a 1% tax on real estate transaction in Britain and find a very large 20% increase in transactions in part due to retiming. Importantly, large responses happen when frictions are very small, i.e., taxpayers can freely decide to time the transaction. For wage earners in Switzerland, frictions in labor supply adjustments are likely large enough to prevent any sizable response, except perhaps among high wage earners who may have more ability to retime their earnings (through bonuses for example). The self-employed can more easily retime their earnings through the tax avoidance channel. It is also possible that a response to a tax *increase* (instead of decrease) would have generated larger elasticities: labor supply might be easier to adjust downward than upward (employees can always decide to quit unilaterally for example); perhaps the loss resulting from a tax increase looms larger than the gains from a tax decrease through behavioral loss aversion effects.

Intriguingly, some studies have found larger real labor supply responses to tax cuts in specific related contexts. The Iceland tax holiday generated larger effects than the Swiss tax holiday (Bianchi et al., 2001; Sigurdsson, 2018). Tazhitdinova (2017) finds a large response to taking (small) second jobs after they became tax-free in Germany in 2003. The Swiss labor market is quite flexible according the *Global Competitive Index* created by the World Economic Forum. Therefore, an intriguing possible explanation is that both the Iceland and German tax breaks were presented by the government and hence perceived by the public as an encouragement and opportunity to work more, hereby reducing the informational and social frictions to labor supply adjustment.⁴³ In contrast, the Swiss tax holiday was presented as a modernization of the tax system and gaming the reform was discouraged (e.g., with taxation of extraordinary incomes for example).

⁴³In the US context, Kleven (2019) shows that the very salient welfare reform of the 1990s had a very large impact on labor supply of single mothers while the less salient but economically large Earned Income Tax Credit expansions did not.

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| Year X | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 |
|--|---------------------------------|------|---------------------------------|------|---------------------------------|------|---|---|
| Tax base for assessment period X | Incomes realized in 1991 + 1992 | | Incomes realized in 1993 + 1994 | | Incomes realized in 1995 + 1996 | | Income realized in 1999 | Income realized in 2000 |
| Payment of tax liability owed for year X | During 1993 and 1994 | | During 1995 and 1996 | | During 1997 and 1998 | | Provisional installments 1999, final assessment in 2000 | Provisional installments 2000, final assessment in 2001 |




Figure 1: Transition from Old to New System Across Swiss Cantons

Notes: The top panel of the figure depicts an example of a transition from the old system of biennial retrospective taxation to the new system of annual pay as you earn taxation in 1999 (as in the canton of Thurgau TG). Under the old system, in 1997 and 1998, taxes are based on the average income across years 1995 and 1996. In 1999, taxes are due on current 1999 incomes. Hence, because of the transition, incomes earned in 1997 and 1998 are never taxed, creating a two-year tax holiday. The bottom panel depicts the timing of the transition across the 26 Swiss cantons. For the federal income tax, the tax holiday was either 1997/98 (2 cantons in blue horizontal stripes, Thurgau TG and Zurich ZH), 1999/00 (20 cantons in green diagonal stripes), or 2001/02 (3 cantons in brown vertical stripes). Generally, the tax holiday for the local (cantonal and municipal) income tax was the same as for the federal tax. However, for cantons that were using annual assessment periods (instead of biennial), the tax holiday for local taxes is only one year. These cantons are depicted with more stripes and darker colors: darker blue (1 canton Zurich ZH) and darker green (4 cantons). One canton (Nidwalden NW in very dark green with very many stripes) had no local tax holiday at all because it chose a different transition tax. One canton (Basel-Stadt BS in solid black) transitioned earlier and hence had no tax holiday. Nidwalden and Basel-Stadt are excluded from our subsequent analysis leaving 24 cantons divided in 5 groups (light blue 1 canton, dark blue 1 canton, light green 15 cantons, dark green 4 cantons, brown 3 cantons).




Figure 2: Press Articles Referring to the Tax Holiday

Notes: The figure shows the number of press articles mentioning the word “Bemessungslücke” (blank year) and the French term “brèche fiscale”, or other expressions used to refer to the reform in German and French (Gegenwartsbesteuerung, Gegenwartsbemessung, postnumerando, praenumerando, brèche de calcul, trou de taxation, taxation bianuelle, taxation annuelle) by year and most major newspapers. The figure displays four series: (1) the series in blue circles is for two Zurich based newspapers, (2) the series in light green triangles for three Bern and Lucerne based newspapers, (3) the dashed series in dark green triangles for two Geneva and a Solothurn based newspapers, (4) the series in brown squares for three Vaud and Valais based newspapers. In the series, the dots corresponding to tax holidays are bigger and are blanked out (as tax holidays are called blank years in French and German). The tax holiday periods are also depicted in shaded colors. The figure shows that local press interest in the tax holiday typically peaked during the years when the actual tax holidays happened locally.




Figure 3: First Stage Effect of Tax Holidays on Average and Marginal Tax Rates

Notes: This figure displays the average income tax rate (top panel) and average marginal income tax rate (bottom panel) for employed persons in our sample by year and groups of cantons from 1990 to 2010. Tax rates include federal, cantonal, and municipal income taxes. Years denote the year in which the corresponding income is earned (not when the tax is paid). We use tax rates based on household income for married individuals with two children in case a person is married, and tax rates for singles in case a person is single. The average tax rate is the total income tax divided by gross income. Averages across municipalities and cantons are employment weighted. The cantons are divided in five groups based on when the tax holiday took place. (1a) light blue circles: tax holiday in 1997-98 (1 canton), (1b) dashed dark blue circles: tax holiday in 1998 (1 canton), (2a) light green triangles: tax holiday in 1999-2000 (15 cantons), (2b) dashed dark green triangles: tax holiday in 2000 (4 cantons), (3) brown squares: tax holiday in 2001-02 (3 cantons). In the series, the dots corresponding to tax holidays are bigger and are blanked out (as tax holidays are called blank years in French and German). For each of the groups, we represent the corresponding tax holiday periods using the vertical shading and the same color code. Tax rates are naturally zero during tax holidays. Cantons with a single year tax holiday (groups 1b and 2b) also have a *federal* tax holiday the preceding year explaining the lower tax rate but it is a small effect as federal income tax revenue is only 1/6 of total income tax revenue.




Figure 4: Parallel Trends in Unemployment Rates across Cantons

Notes: This figure displays the official unemployment rate by year and groups of cantons from 1990 to 2010. The cantons are divided in five groups based on when the tax holiday took place. (1a) light blue circles series: tax holiday in 1997-98 (1 canton), (1b) dark blue dashed circles: tax holiday in 1998 (1 canton), (2a) light green triangles: tax holiday in 1999-2000 (16 cantons), (2b) dark green triangles: tax holiday in 2000 (4 cantons), (3) brown squares: tax holiday in 2001-02 (3 cantons). The Swiss wide unemployment rate is also depicted in thick red line. The yearly unemployment rate is the average of monthly official unemployment rates. The official unemployment rate counts individuals registered at the Swiss public employment service (registered unemployment). The figure shows that the various canton groups follow the same business cycle supporting the parallel trend assumption needed for identification.




Figure 5: Effects of Tax Holiday on Wage Employment and Earnings

Notes: This figure displays the employment rate of wage earners (top panel) and average wage earnings (bottom panel) by year and groups of cantons from 1990 to 2010. The sample in a given year t is all individuals aged 20-60 in year t who are still alive and Swiss residents by 2010 (i.e., present in the 2010 Census). The wage employment rate is computed as the fraction of individuals in the sample with positive wage earnings during the year. Average wage earnings in the bottom panel include non-workers and are expressed in 1000s of 2010 CHF (adjusted for inflation). The cantons are divided in five groups based on when the *cantonal* tax holiday took place. (1a) light blue circles: 1 canton with tax holiday for cantonal taxes in 1997-98 (1 canton), (1b) dashed dark blue circles: 1 canton with tax holiday for cantonal taxes in 1998 (1 canton), (2a) light green triangles: 15 cantons with cantonal tax holiday in 1999-2000, (2b) dashed dark green triangles: 4 cantons with cantonal tax holiday in 2000, (3) brown squares: 3 cantons with cantonal tax holiday in 2001-02. For each of the groups, we represent the corresponding tax holiday periods using the vertical shading and the same color code. In the series, the dots corresponding to tax holidays are bigger and are blanked out (as tax holidays are called blank years in French and German). The top panel shows no evidence of employment effects due to the tax holiday. The bottom panel shows some evidence of modest spikes in earnings during the tax holidays.




Figure 6: Effects of Tax Holiday on High Wage Earners and Self Employment Earnings

Notes: This figure displays average wage earnings for high earners (top panel) and average earnings for the self-employed (bottom panel) by year and groups of cantons from 1990 to 2010. The top panel is for all wage earners with average annual labor earnings above 100,000 CHF in 1994-1996. The bottom panel is for all self-employed (individuals with positive self-employment earnings in a given year). Earnings are expressed in 1000s of 2010 CHF (adjusted for inflation). Self-employment earnings are observed biennially before 1999 and annually after 2000. Self-employment earnings in 1999 and 2000 are subject to a social security tax holiday and hence unobserved in the data. The cantons are divided into groups based on when the *cantonal* tax holiday took place. For each of the groups, we represent the corresponding tax holiday periods using the vertical shading and the same color code. In the series, the dots corresponding to tax holidays are bigger and blanked out (as tax holidays are called blank years in French and German). Both panels show evidence of positive responses of earnings to the tax holidays.




Figure 7: Event Study Estimates of the Effect of the Tax Holiday for Wage Earners

Notes: This figure shows estimates of the effects of the tax holiday (TH) on the log net-of-tax rate (the first stage, top panel) and employment and wage earnings per employee (the reduced form effect, lower panel). The figure is based on the event study model (equation 2). The estimation sample covers the years 1995–2006 (± 4 years around the tax holiday years), excludes 1998, and comprises two groups of cantons which transitioned in 2001 and 3 cantons which transitioned in 2003. We focus on workers aged 22–55 in 1996 and drop workers older than 62 in later years. The dependent variables in the top panel are $\log(1 - \tau)$, where τ represents the average and the marginal tax rate, respectively. The latter estimation is restricted to individuals with positive wage earnings in a given year. In the lower panel, the dependent variable in the model “extensive margin” is an indicator equal to 1 if a person has positive wage income in a given year. The dependent variable in the model “intensive margin” is real wage earnings (excluding non-workers). The effect is scaled post-estimation by mean outcome in the estimation sample so that effects can be interpreted as percent change. Individuals are assigned to cantons based on where they lived in 1996. Controls include age and age squared by gender and linear time trends by canton of residence. The vertical bars represent cluster-robust 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 8: Heterogeneity of Wage Response to Tax Holidays at the Intensive Margin

Notes: This figure shows estimates of the effects of the tax holiday (TH) on wage earnings per employee for different subpopulations following the same longitudinal event study regression strategy as in Figure 7, bottom panel. Effects are expressed as a fraction of mean wage earnings. Tax holiday years are shaded. The top panel compares males and females. The panel at the bottom left compares workers depending on their highest educational attainment in 2000. The panel at the bottom right compares individuals depending on their average total labor income in the 1994–1996 period. Individuals are assigned to cantons based on where they lived in 1996. The vertical bars represent cluster-robust 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 9: Frisch Elasticities for Wage Earners by Occupation Characteristics

Notes: In each panel, individuals are split across two-digit occupations using the Swiss classification of occupations. Occupation is defined as of 2000 when the social security data are matched to the census in 2000. Non-employed are assigned to occupations based on learnt occupation. The Frisch elasticity are derived from occupation-specific individual-level IV regressions of annual wage earnings per person (excluding non-workers) on person and year fixed effects and $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$, where τ is the marginal tax rate (equation 1). $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ is instrumented with an indicator variable which is 1 in the year in which municipal and cantonal taxes are zero due to the tax holiday. We control for age and age squared by gender and canton-specific linear time trends. In each case, the estimation sample covers the years 1995–2006, excludes 1998, and comprises two groups of cantons which transitioned in 2001 and 3 cantons which transitioned in 2003. We focus on workers with data from the census 2000 that are aged 22–55 in 1996 and drop workers older than 62 in later years. The size of the dot reflects the sample size of each estimation. The elasticities are plotted against occupation-specific averages of outcomes of wage earners with data from the census 2000 that live in a canton without a tax holiday in 2000. In the top panel, the x-axis is the average annual wage earnings in an occupation in 2000. In the bottom panel, the x-axis is the share of workers working overtime, defined as the share of workers usually working at least 45 weekly hours in the census 2000.




Figure 10: Event Study Estimates of the Overall Effect of the Tax Holiday on the Self-Employed: All and High Earners (top) and By Gender (bottom)

Notes: This figure shows estimates of the effects of the tax holiday (TH) on self-employment earnings per person for different subpopulations following the same longitudinal event study regression strategy as in Figure 7, bottom panel. The estimation sample covers the years 1990–2010 (including 1998) and comprises one canton that transitioned in 1999, two groups of cantons which transitioned in 2001, and 3 cantons which transitioned in 2003. We focus on workers aged 20–55 in 1996 that are self-employed at least once in the estimation period. We exclude workers older than 62 in later years. The dependent variable is annual self-employment income per person (including 0 if there is no self-employment earnings in a given year). The effect is scaled post-estimation by mean self-employment earnings in the estimation sample. The top panel compares the effect for the total sample against individuals with an average labor income that exceeds 100K in the 1994–1996 period. The lower panel compares men and women. Individuals are assigned to cantons based on where they lived in 1996. The vertical bars represent cluster-robust 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 11: Effects on Hours (top) and Wage Rates (bottom) from Employer Survey

Notes: This figure uses the wage structure surveys (LSE) carried out bi-annually to depict hours of work (top panel) and hourly wage rates (bottom panel) by year and group of cantons. Hours of work and hourly wages are based on the month of October in each year. Hours worked refer to contractual (i.e. normal) hours worked for workers with monthly salaries and to actual hours worked for workers paid by the hour. Wage rates incorporate regular pay but exclude overtime and variable pay components (e.g. bonuses). In both panels, the sample in each year is limited to workers aged 20–60 excluding public sector employees (workers from NACE rev. 1.2 two-digit industries 75, 80, and 85) and foreign workers who do not pay regular taxes in Switzerland (workers with resident permits with a duration of less than 10 years). We consider three groups of cantons: (a) cantons which transitioned in 1999 with a tax holiday for 1998 or 1997–1998 (in blue circles) (b) cantons which transitioned in 2001 with a tax holiday for 2000 or 1999–2000 (in green triangles), (c) 3 cantons which transitioned in 2003 with tax holiday in 2001–02 (in brown squares). In the series, the dots corresponding to tax holidays are bigger and are blanked out. Geographical information in the wage structure survey is based on place of work while tax treatment is based on residence. To reduce the number of cases where a person works in one group of cantons but resides in another one, we exclude zip codes in which more than 25% of workers live and work in different groups of cantons according to the census in 2000.




Figure 12: Tax Holiday Effects on Bonuses

Notes: This figure displays the fraction of employees with bonuses above 5,000 in 2010 CHF by year and groups of cantons from 1994 to 2010 using the wage structure surveys (LSE) carried out bi-annually. The sample in a given year t in the top panel includes all employees aged 20–60, excluding public sector employees (workers from NACE rev. 1.2 two-digit industries 75, 80, and 85) and foreign workers that do not pay regular taxes in Switzerland (workers with resident permits with a duration of less than 10 years). We consider three groups of cantons: (a) cantons which transitioned in 1999 with a tax holiday for 1998 or 1997-1998 (in blue circles) (b) cantons which transitioned in 2001 with a tax holiday for 2000 or 1999-2000 (in green triangles), (c) 3 cantons which transitioned in 2003 with tax holiday in 2001–02 (in brown squares). Geographical information in the data is based on place of work while tax treatment is based on residence. To reduce the number of cases where a person works in one group of cantons but resides in another one, we exclude zip codes in which more than 25% workers stem from one of the other groups of cantons according to the census in 2000. In the series, the dots corresponding to tax holidays are bigger and are blanked out (as tax holidays are called blank years in French and German).

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---------|---------|-------|---------|----------|
| | Mean | sd | p1 | p99 | N |
| Panel A: Matched SSER-Census | | | | | |
| Share employed (in %) | 85.3 | 35.4 | 0.0 | 100 | 70494051 |
| Share self-employed (in %) | 8.5 | 27.8 | 0.0 | 100 | 70494051 |
| Annual wage earnings (in CHF) | 46835.4 | 54287.9 | 0.0 | 208600 | 70494051 |
| Annual self-employment earnings (in CHF) | 4747.6 | 30828.8 | 0.0 | 110500 | 70494051 |
| Average tax rate (in %) | 11.3 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 27 | 58508409 |
| Marginal tax rate (in %) | 21.1 | 9.0 | 0.0 | 40 | 58508409 |
| <i>Individual characteristics in 2000</i> | | | | | |
| Age | 39.85 | 11.087 | 20 | 60 | 3380599 |
| Female | 0.50 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 | 3380599 |
| Married | 0.60 | 0.490 | 0 | 1 | 3380599 |
| Children aged 0–5 | 0.23 | 0.553 | 0 | 2 | 3117109 |
| Children aged 6–15 | 0.43 | 0.801 | 0 | 3 | 3117109 |
| Swiss national | 0.87 | 0.332 | 0 | 1 | 3380599 |
| Tertiary education | 0.23 | 0.421 | 0 | 1 | 3039550 |
| Secondary education | 0.60 | 0.491 | 0 | 1 | 3039550 |
| Panel B: Employer Survey (LSE) | | | | | |
| Earnings in October (in CHF) | 6426.3 | 3670.3 | 372.2 | 21135.3 | 5901025 |
| Hourly wage in October (in CHF) | 37.8 | 16.3 | 17.1 | 102.7 | 5901023 |
| Hours worked in October | 159.1 | 43.0 | 13.3 | 199.3 | 5901025 |
| Share of workers with bonus > 5k (in %) | 11.3 | 31.7 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 5901025 |

Notes: The table presents mean, standard deviation (sd), and the 1st (p1) and 99th (p99) percentile of the main variables used in the empirical analysis. We focus on individuals aged 20–60 in every year, excluding foreign workers who do not pay regular taxes in Switzerland. All cantons in Switzerland are included. Panel A is based on the SSES-Census data. The sample in the upper half covers all person-year observations between 1990 and 2010 from individuals who are still alive and Swiss residents by 2010. The lower half of panel A shows descriptives of individual characteristics in 2000. Panel B is based on the Employer Survey (Wage Structure Survey, *LSE*) and thus focuses on employed persons only. The sample covers all worker-year observations from all surveys between 1994 and 2010 (the survey is carried out every 2 years). Public sector employees are excluded. “Share employed” (“share self-employed”) is the fraction of individuals in the sample with positive earnings (self-employment earnings) during the year. The average and the marginal tax rate are computed for employed persons only. Tax rates include federal, cantonal, and municipal income taxes. We use tax rates based on household income for married individuals with two children in case a person is married, and tax rates for singles in case a person is single. “Monthly earnings” refer to the month of October in each year and include regular salaries and overtime and other variable pay components (e.g. bonuses). Hourly wages refer to month of October and incorporate regular pay but exclude overtime and variable pay components (e.g. bonuses). Hours of work are based on the month of October and refer to contractual (i.e. normal) hours worked for workers with monthly wages and to actual hours worked for workers paid by the hour. See section A.2 in the online appendix for more information on these data and variables.

Table 2: Regression Analysis of Tax Holiday Effects on Labor Supply: Macro Estimates

| VARIABLES | (1) Wage employees/ population (in %) All | (2) Wage earnings per person All | (3) Wage earnings per person High earners | (4) Self-employment earnings Self-employed |
|----------------------------|--|---|--|---|
| $\% \Delta[1 - \tau]$ | 12.9 | 27.0 | 46.1 | 26.4 |
| $\% \Delta y$ | -0.07 (0.27) | 0.71 (0.47) | 1.99 (0.75) | 7.70 (3.28) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.005 (0.021) | 0.026 (0.017) | 0.043 (0.016) | 0.291 (0.124) |
| Observations | 105 | 105 | 105 | 80 |
| Canton group FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Period FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Notes: The table presents estimates of the labor supply effects of the tax holiday based on regressions of the aggregate time series of the 5 groups of cantons (shown in Figures 5 and 6) on year dummies, canton group dummies, and an indicator which is 1 in the year in which municipal and cantonal taxes are zero. OLS standard errors are reported. The estimation sample covers the years 1990–2010 in columns 1–3 and 1987–2010 in column (4). The outcome in column (1) is the share of wage earners in the population of adults aged 20–60 (in %). The outcome in columns (2) and (3) is the average annual wage per person, including non-workers. The outcome in column (4) is average self-employment earnings (self-employment earnings of all individuals with positive self-employment earnings in a given year). Columns (1) and (2) are estimated using the full sample of adults aged 20–60. Column (3) focuses on wage earners with average annual labor earnings above 100,000 CHF in 1994–1996. Column (4) is based on all individuals that have positive self-employment earnings in at least one period. $\% \Delta y$ indicates the implied percent change in the outcome by dividing the estimated effect—the coefficient of the indicator of the tax holiday—by the average level of the outcome variable in the year of the tax holiday. The Frisch elasticity η^F is estimated by dividing $\% \Delta y$ by the estimated percent change in net-of-tax wage rates ($\% \Delta[1 - \tau]$) created by the tax holiday for the respective group. $\% \Delta[1 - \tau]$ is based on changes in average tax rates in column (1) and on changes in marginal tax rates in the remaining columns. For each individual, $\% \Delta[1 - \tau]$ is computed based on hypothetical marginal or average tax rates on the actual income earned during the tax-free years in the tax system in place prior to the tax holidays.

Table 3: Effects of Tax Holiday on Participation and Earnings of Employees

| VARIABLES | (1) Employee 0/1 Men | (2) Average wage earnings Men | (3) Employee 0/1 Women | (4) Average wage earnings Women |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|--|
| Panel A: Entire sample | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | -0.005 (0.004) | 3,409 (373) | -0.013 (0.005) | 392 (221) |
| Effect of TH on $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | 0.115 (0.002) | 0.248 (0.004) | 0.107 (0.002) | 0.239 (0.004) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.01 (0.005) | 0.04 (0.004) | -0.02 (0.007) | 0.01 (0.004) |
| Observations | 11,841,019 | 9,955,956 | 12,148,453 | 8,693,128 |
| Individual FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Period FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Panel B: Married w/ children | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | 0.003 (0.004) | 3,848 (604) | 0.002 (0.010) | 1,710 (282) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | 0.00 (0.005) | 0.04 (0.006) | 0.00 (0.015) | 0.05 (0.008) |
| Panel C: Married no children | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | -0.009 (0.004) | 3,550 (496) | -0.010 (0.003) | 401 (158) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.01 (0.004) | 0.03 (0.004) | -0.01 (0.005) | 0.01 (0.003) |
| Panel D: Tertiary edu. | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | -0.008 (0.005) | 5,754 (645) | -0.017 (0.006) | 958 (425) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.01 (0.006) | 0.04 (0.005) | -0.02 (0.007) | 0.02 (0.006) |
| Panel E: Non-tertiary edu. | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | -0.006 (0.004) | 2,058 (218) | -0.012 (0.005) | 258 (163) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.01 (0.004) | 0.03 (0.003) | -0.02 (0.007) | 0.01 (0.004) |

Notes: The table summarizes the effect of the tax holiday on the labor supply of employees. It shows estimated semi-elasticities and corresponding Frisch elasticities derived from individual-level IV regressions of labor supply outcomes on person and year fixed effects and $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$, where τ is the average tax rate in column (1) and the marginal tax rate in the other columns (equation 1). $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ is instrumented with an indicator variable which is 1 in the year in which municipal and cantonal taxes are zero due to the tax holiday. The effect of the tax holidays (TH) on $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ (the first stage) is reported for the total sample in panel A. The estimation sample covers the years 1990–2010 (excluding 1998) and comprises two groups of cantons which transitioned in 2001, and 3 cantons which transitioned in 2003. We focus on workers aged 20–55 in 1996 and drop workers older than 62 in later years. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is an indicator whether a person has positive wage income in a given year. The dependent variable in columns (2) and (4) is average wages of persons with with positive wage income in a given year. Columns (1) and (2) focus on men, columns (3) and (4) on women. Panel A reports effects for all men and women, respectively Panels B and C report effects for married individuals with or without at least one child aged 15 or less. Panels C and D report effects depending on individuals highest educational attainment in 2000 (as reported in the census 2000). Controls are age and age squared by gender and canton-specific linear time trends. Individuals are assigned to cantons based on where they lived in 1996. Standard errors are clustered on the level of commuting zones. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 4: Labor Supply Effects by Pre-Holiday Labor Income Groups

| VARIABLES | (1) Employee 0/1 Men | (2) Average wage earnings Men | (3) Employee 0/1 Women | (4) Average wage earnings Women |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|--|
| Panel A: 1–25k CHF | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | -0.000 (0.018) | 395 (668) | -0.014 (0.009) | -153 (352) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | 0.00 (0.024) | 0.01 (0.014) | -0.02 (0.010) | -0.01 (0.013) |
| Panel B: 25–50k CHF | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | 0.007 (0.006) | 1,659 (265) | -0.010 (0.004) | 650 (172) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | 0.01 (0.008) | 0.03 (0.004) | -0.01 (0.004) | 0.01 (0.004) |
| Panel C: 50–100k CHF | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | -0.004 (0.002) | 2,140 (240) | -0.010 (0.006) | 394 (290) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | 0.00 (0.003) | 0.03 (0.003) | -0.01 (0.006) | 0.01 (0.003) |
| Panel D: 100–200k CHF | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | -0.000 (0.006) | 7,019 (701) | -0.010 (0.014) | 2,074 (1,426) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | 0.00 (0.006) | 0.04 (0.004) | -0.01 (0.014) | 0.02 (0.009) |
| Panel E: More than 200k CHF | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | 0.003 (0.006) | 27,375 (5,236) | -0.046 (0.042) | 30,207 (14,008) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | 0.00 (0.007) | 0.07 (0.013) | -0.06 (0.060) | 0.09 (0.042) |

Notes: The table summarizes the effect of the tax holiday on the labor supply of employees. It shows estimated semi-elasticities and corresponding Frisch elasticities derived from individual-level IV regressions of labor supply outcomes on person and year fixed effects and $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$, where τ is the average tax rate in column (1) and the marginal tax rate in the other columns (equation 1). $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ is instrumented with an indicator variable which is 1 in the year in which municipal and cantonal taxes are zero due to the tax holiday. The effect of the tax holidays (TH) on $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ (the first stage) is reported for the total sample in panel A. The estimation sample covers the years 1995–2006 (excluding 1998) and comprises two groups of cantons which transitioned in 2001 and 3 cantons which transitioned in 2003. We focus on workers aged 22–55 in 1996 and drop workers older than 62 in later years. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is an indicator whether a person has positive wage income in a given year. The dependent variable in columns (2) and (4) is average wages of persons with positive wage income in a given year. Columns (1) and (2) focus on men, columns (3) and (4) on women. Individuals are assigned to Panels A–E based on their average annual labor income in the 1994–1996 period. Controls are age and age squared by gender and linear time trends by canton. Individuals are assigned to cantons based on where they lived in 1996. Standard errors are clustered on the level of commuting zones.

Table 5: Effects of Tax Holiday on Earnings of Self-Employed

| VARIABLES | (1) Earnings per self-employed All | (2) Earnings per self-employed Men | (3) Earnings per self-employed Women | (4) Earnings per self-employed High earners |
|--|---|---|---|--|
| Panel A: Entire sample | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | 7,119 (1,556) | 10,068 (2,164) | 1,474 (690) | 28,067 (3,616) |
| Effect of TH on $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | 0.224 (0.004) | 0.227 (0.004) | 0.219 (0.005) | 0.356 (0.003) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | 0.21 (0.046) | 0.22 (0.049) | 0.09 (0.043) | 0.21 (0.027) |
| Observations | 8,805,211 | 5,794,070 | 3,011,141 | 953,149 |
| Individual FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Period FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Panel B: Married | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | 10,044 (1,821) | 14,524 (2,630) | 1,354 (652) | 31,343 (4,077) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | 0.25 (0.046) | 0.28 (0.051) | 0.09 (0.043) | 0.22 (0.029) |
| Panel C: Tertiary education | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | 14,988 (1,956) | 18,693 (2,709) | 5,673 (1,269) | 30,709 (4,332) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | 0.24 (0.032) | 0.25 (0.037) | 0.18 (0.040) | 0.20 (0.027) |
| Panel D: Non-tertiary education | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | 3,743 (1,613) | 6,023 (2,259) | -13 (898) | 22,346 (6,200) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | 0.16 (0.069) | 0.19 (0.072) | 0.00 (0.079) | 0.25 (0.071) |

Notes: The table summarizes the effect of the tax holiday on earnings of self-employed. It shows estimated semi-elasticities and corresponding Frisch elasticities derived from individual-level IV regressions of labor supply outcomes on person and year fixed effects and $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$, where τ is the marginal tax rate. $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ is instrumented with an indicator variable which is 1 in the year in which municipal and cantonal taxes are zero due to the tax holiday (equation 1). The effect of the tax holidays (TH) on $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ (the first stage) is reported for the total sample in panel A. The estimation sample covers the years 1990–2010 (including 1998) and comprises one canton that transitioned in 1999, two groups of cantons which transitioned in 2001, and 3 cantons which transitioned in 2003. We focus on workers aged 22–55 in 1996 that are self-employed at least once in the estimation period. We exclude workers older than 62 in later years. The dependent variable is annual self-employment income per person with positive self-employment income in a given year. Column (1) uses the total sample, (2) focuses on men, (3) on women and (4) on high-income self-employed, defined as individuals with an average total labor income of at least 100k in the 1994–1996 period. Panel A reports effects for all men, women, and high-income individuals, respectively. Panel B reports effects for individuals married in 1996. Panels C and D report effects depending on individuals highest educational attainment in 2000 (as reported in the census 2000). Controls are age and age squared by gender and linear time trends by canton. Individuals are assigned to cantons based on where they lived in 1996. Standard errors are clustered on the level of commuting zones.

Online Appendix

A.1 Betwixt Assessments

In this section, we describe betwixt assessments carried out to deal with large changes in economic situation under the old system and how they interact with the transition. Betwixt assessments were done only when changes were permanent, which is defined as a change in work status lasting at least 2 years. Starting to work for a short period (less than 2 years) or stopping work temporarily (less than 2 years) would not trigger a betwixt assessment. As such, temporary extensive margin responses carried out during the tax holiday are not affected by betwixt assessments.

Incentives created by betwixt assessments. Under the old system and during the tax holidays, when a person had a permanent change in employment situation, or moved permanently to a different canton during a tax period, the system adopted a temporary pay as you earn taxation (betwixt assessment) until the end of the period. Let us examine in detail how this affects incentives for permanent entry, permanent exit, or migration.

Permanent entry. Suppose the tax period is 1995/1996 and a person had not worked in 1993/1994 and started working on July 1st, 1996 for 2000 CHF/month. In this case, there is no taxation in 1995 and the first half of 1996 (as the reference period 1993/1994 has zero earnings). In the second half of 1996, there is a betwixt assessment where the person is taxed based on her current new earnings, annualized to $2000 \times 12 = 24,000$ CHF. This assessment lasts for 6 months only (so that half of an annual tax on 24,000 CHF is due). In 1997/1998, the person is taxed based on her annualized income of 24,000 CHF from 1996 (i.e., the reference earnings for the 1995/1996 are taken to be the annualized earnings when the person was working). Earnings from 1997/1998 will then be taxed in 1999/2000, etc. Therefore, in the old system, new entry earnings were doubled taxed, first as pay as you earn and then during the regular next period of taxation.

Entering during the tax holiday triggers a betwixt assessment exactly as in the old system but, in contrast to the old system, there would be no double taxation during the next period. Hence, the tax holiday also reduces the tax burden on the entry margin but it is less salient as only the second and future layer of taxation is removed. Empirical analysis (not reported) shows that the tax holiday has no significant impact on entry decisions.

Permanent exit. Symmetric incentives are created along the exit dimension.⁴⁴ Let us consider the most common case of retirement. Suppose a person earns 2000 CHF/month up to July 1, 1996 and then retires with a pension of 1000 CHF/month. In 1995 and the first half of 1996, the tax is based on average earnings of 1993 and 1994. In the second half of 1996, the person is taxed pay as you earn based on annualized pension income of $12 \times 1000 = 12,000$ CHF. In 1997/1998 the tax will also be based on 12,000 CHF of annual pension income from the second half of 1996. Hence, initial pension income is also double taxed. This implies that the earnings while working made in 1995 and the first half of 1996 are never taxed in the old system (and the earnings for 1993/1994 are only taxed for 1.5 years out of 2, hence bear only 75% of the normal tax burden). Effectively, the old system created a tax holiday for earnings made

⁴⁴Under the old system, death extinguishes tax liability so that income made during one's last tax period is never taxed (and income earned during the tax period preceding death is only partly taxed while the person is still alive in her last tax period). We do not study this aspect as most people stop working well before death and death while still working is typically an unexpected event.

in the tax period when leaving the labor force (and a partial tax holiday for the period before leaving the labor force). Therefore, the best strategy is to have high earnings (e.g. earn overtime or get bonuses) just before retirement.⁴⁵ Empirical analysis (not reported) of earnings prior to retirement suggests that retirees had indeed high earnings in their last tax period in the old system (using the new system as a control group).

Exiting during the tax holiday triggers a betwixt assessment exactly as in the old system. Therefore, pre-retirement earnings are taxed exactly the same in the old system and during the tax holiday transition. The only difference is about the treatment of pension income. In the old system, pension income in the first period of retirement is taxed twice while it is taxed only once during the tax holiday. We do not have access to pension income data to analyze responses of pension benefits.⁴⁶

Migration to another canton. Migration to another canton also triggered a betwixt assessment under the old system. I.e., tax liability in the canton of origin stopped and was replaced by pay as you earn on an annualized basis in the new canton of residence. This means that earnings in the canton of origin was partially tax exempt while initial earnings in the new canton of residence would be doubled taxed. Moving during the tax holiday also triggered a betwixt assessment. As a result, riding the tax holiday waves by moving from canton to canton to follow the blank years was not a winning strategy. After the first move, the taxpayer would be assessed on her current income and hence would not benefit from the tax holiday anymore. Therefore, the tax holiday actually reduces incentives to move during a tax holiday (our data do not show any evidence of migration to tax holiday cantons as expected from the tax incentives we have described).

Intensive responses. A large and permanent change in earnings (conditional on working) could also trigger a betwixt assessment if specific restrictive conditions were met (see below). In such cases, the new earnings were taxed twice under the old system (pay-as-you earn during the betwixt assessment and retrospectively in the next tax period) and only one during the tax holiday. However, this reduction in the tax burden might not have been very salient to taxpayers.

How did betwixt assessments work in practice? Next, we provide details on how such betwixt assessments worked and were administered and how this impacts our analysis.

Origins. The betwixt assessment was added to the tax code in the 1950s, about 10 years after the introduction of the federal income tax law in 1940. The goal was to adjust taxes downward faster when income fell (as the tax adjustment had a two year lag in the system). Therefore, the betwixt system is geared toward *decreases* in income rather than *increases* and is generally initiated at the request of taxpayers as the tax administration does not receive real time information on income changes (recall there is no withholding at source nor third party reporting for earnings in Switzerland). The view was that betwixt adjustments should remain the exception. The list of causes, which allowed for a betwixt assessment, was defined and the provision was to be applied restrictively.

⁴⁵The timing of exit along the extensive margin is actually neutral. Exiting early in the period implies that the previous tax period earnings are almost fully exempt. Exiting late in the period implies that the current tax period earnings are exempt. Empirically, we find no effect on the timing of retirement during the tax period in the old system. The old system also encouraged people to have initially low retirement benefits.

⁴⁶There is relatively little scope for individuals to control the level of their defined benefits pensions. However, there is more flexibility in how individuals choose to receive their defined contributions benefits from their individual pension fund accounts: they can choose the pre-defined annuity, which is taxed as income, or cash-out the capital, which is taxed with a separate one-time tax at payout. Bütler and Ramsden (2017) study the role of taxation in individual annuitization decisions.

Triggers causing a betwixt assessment. A mere reduction or increase in income alone was not a sufficient condition for a betwixt assessment. The betwixt assessment was applied when the underlying structure of the income changed. Acceptable reasons listed in Art. 45 DBG were: a) divorce or permanent separation, b) permanent and substantial changes of the underlying basis of livelihood as a result of taking or giving up work or change of occupation, and c) inheritance. The federal and cantonal courts specified Art. 45 b) further in many verdicts. The occupational change needed to be substantial and of “far-reaching structural” nature (e.g., BGE 115 Ib 11, 1989; *Entscheid Steuerrekurskommission des Kantons Basel-Landschaft Nr. 99/1996*). Examples include change of occupation into a completely different field, where the knowledge and skills from the former job are no longer of substantial value, or if the income is determined by substantially different criteria (e.g., going from a fixed salary to a piece rate or a revenue participation) and evolves differently (BGE 115 Ib 11, 1989). This included the change of the main activity (see below) between employment and self-employment. In this case, the magnitude of the income change was of no importance, since the change was structural in nature (BGE 115 Ib 11, 1989; BGE 101 Ib 398 ff., 1975). In any case, the change needed to be permanent in addition to meeting one of the conditions laid out above. The fact that cumulative requirements had to be met for a betwixt assessment means that during the tax holidays especially intensive margin responses would typically not trigger a betwixt assessment.

Provisions with respect to the magnitude of the change in income. Since the objective of betwixt assessments was to reduce hardship, legal practice evolved further mainly around cases of income reductions. To keep the number of betwixt assessments low, over time courts added minimal criteria, by which the income had to change in order to qualify for a betwixt assessment. For the federal tax and the majority of cantons, income needed to fall by at least 20% (33% in Wallis, 25% in Bern and Basel-Landschaft). Most cantons required in addition that the change exceeded some nominal threshold (3000 to 20,000 CHF; *Facts, Nr.6/1998 “So sparen Sie bei Ihren Steuern”, p. 56 ff.*). This implies that increases in income of up to 20% (and much more, as is laid out below) were possible during the tax holidays without triggering a betwixt assessment. Furthermore, as Känzig, the leading scholar in the field noted in his reference handbook (Känzig, 1982, p. 799), such income limits were not to be taken for sufficient conditions in cases of increases in income. The wish of the legislator had been to ease hardship by the means of betwixt assessments. In the case of an increase in income, which is what we study, there was no hardship to be eased.

What did permanent mean? Betwixt assessments were only done if the income change was permanent. Juridical practice could vary, such that depending on the canton a change was deemed permanent if it lasted more than typically 24 months. In the canton of Aargau even a case where someone took up or gave up the main employment for up to five years was not seen as permanent change (Beer, 1979, p.58). In a case related to unemployment, the canton of Basel-Landschaft adhered to 24 months for a change to be permanent, a ruling which was confirmed by the federal court in 1996 (in: *Gerichts- und Verwaltungspraxis des Kantons Zug 1997/98*, p. 15). If it was unclear whether a change in employment would be permanent or not, tax authorities reverted to what was usual in that case. Irregular or non-permanent jobs like assistant teacher, temporary help or replacements for someone were seen as non-permanent activities in nature (Känzig, 1982, p. 778). It was therefore possible to take up several, small short-term jobs during the tax holiday to exploit the tax-free years. If ex-ante it could not always be determined with certainty whether a new employment would be of permanent nature, there was no urge for the tax authorities to answer this question right away. It was always possible to do a betwixt assessment if ex-post a change turned out to be permanent and substantial.

No betwixt assessments for professional mobility. Professional changes within the same field such as

promotions, up- and downward professional mobility, expansion of professional activities, taking or giving up some professional activities (e.g., running a second restaurant, sitting on the board of a company, becoming a partner of a private company), or a simple change of job from one employer to another were not deemed as changing the structure of the income generating process (BGE 115 Ib 11, 1989; (Känzig, 1982, p. 790)). Related changes in income averaged out over time and they were taken into account under the regular, past-based tax system—albeit with a delay of several years. Examples include an employee who founded his own incorporated company where he was the sole employee. The canton of Basel-Landschaft did not deem this change as qualifying for a *betwixt* assessment, as the taxpayer was technically still an employee and he had not changed profession or the field of work (BStPra 4/1998, 198-205).

No betwixt assessments for changes in secondary employment. Taking or giving up a secondary employment or secondary professional activity (“Nebenerwerb”, “Nebenserwerbstätigkeit”, “activité lucrative accessoire”, “activité annexe”) did not qualify for a *betwixt* assessment, even if this change was permanent (BGE 110 Ib 313, 1984). Examples include an employee in hospitality who sporadically also earned money in real-estate trade. The latter was deemed a secondary activity and when he gave up this activity, the tax authorities did not grant him a *betwixt* assessment, because his main activity in hospitality had not changed (Entscheid der Steuerrekurskommission des Kantons Basel-Landschaft Nr. 6/1996). Similarly, taking or giving up a seat in a company board did not qualify for a *betwixt* assessment, even though the change in income from such activities could be substantial and was permanent. The distinction between main and secondary occupation was not primarily drawn according to the relative income these activities generated, but according to the time dedicated to them (Beer, 1979, p. 57 ff. with specific examples for Bern and Aargau). Therefore, the main activity of a full-time employee who ran her own business on the side, was her employment, even if the business generated higher income. This distinction between main and secondary activity allowed taxpayers, who already had a job, to start up their own business or take up a second job on the side and fully exploit the tax holiday.

Betwixt assessments only for substantial changes in the level of the main employment. In some instances, cantons did apply *betwixt* taxation in response to changes in employment with the same job, usually only the main job. This was the case if changes in the level of employment were substantial, such as going from part-time to full-time employment. Relevant again was not the change in income, but the percentage change in employment. For instance, the canton Basel-Landschaft saw a change from 80% employment (approx. 34 hours/week) to 50% (21 hours/week) as not substantial enough for a *betwixt* assessment. The relative change in employment had to be at least 40% (and not 37.5% as in this case; Entscheid der Steuerrekurskommission des Kantons Basel-Landschaft Nr. 99/1996). In the canton of Bern, *betwixt* taxation was done if the absolute change in employment percent was at least 50 percentage points. Doubling employment from 40% to 80% was therefore possible without triggering a *betwixt* assessment (Berner Zeitung, 18.11.1999, “Rat in der BZ”, p. 32.). Especially for those already in the labor market it was therefore possible to have substantial increases in income through increases in labor supply during the tax holiday, without being taxed.

The case of secondary earners. For secondary earners, changes in labor supply at the intensive margin were not usually cause for a *betwixt* assessment. In line with the considerations above, what mattered were the hours supplied and not the change in income. The case was more complicated for secondary earners who had been permanently out of the labor force and took up a job. Occasional, irregular jobs were not a cause for a *betwixt* assessment (Berner Zeitung; 30.09.1999, p. 29, “Rat in der BZ”). Examples would include working three months as substitute teacher, helping out in a nearby restaurant one summer etc. Also, incidental help in the spouse’s business was not a cause for a *betwixt* assessment

(Känzig, 1982, p. 779). Taking up a sideline but regular and permanent job—even with a limited amount of hours—was cause for a betwixt assessment in most cantons (e.g., Bern, Schaffhausen, Basel-Landschaft) but not in all (e.g., Aargau; Beer, 1979; BGE 102 Ia 352). Taking up a main job was cause for a betwixt assessment (Känzig, 1982, p. 779). Therefore, extensive margin responses of second earners were only possible to some limited degree if the new job was permanent (lasting typically 2 or more years).

How and when was a betwixt assessment done? A betwixt assessment was done (i) automatically, when the tax authorities knew that the conditions for a betwixt assessment were met (e.g., when registering as self-employed or as a new wage earner, when retiring and applying for the public pension, or when moving between cantons with a prae-numerando system). In some cantons taxpayers were requested to inform the tax authorities about changes in employment during the tax period. Tax authorities also systematically ran information campaigns for labor market entrants in vocational schools about the importance of informing the tax administration when taking up the first job, in order to avoid large tax bills due two or three years later. (ii) the taxpayer requested a betwixt assessment (e.g., when becoming unemployed, respectively after being unemployed for an extended period of time of at least 12 months and claiming a substantial, permanent change in her income). (iii) ex-post, after filing the tax return. In the latter case, the tax liability was corrected ex-post. This was for example the case when a formerly non-working spouse permanently entered the labor force. Note that tax administrations have no access to the social security earnings data. They could therefore not check income or the number of employers in the social security data, in case someone took up a second job, for example.

What income was subject to a betwixt assessment? It was always only the new income stream causing a betwixt assessment, which was taxed pay as you earn. In case of the spouse entering the labor force, only his or her income was affected; the spouse's and any other incomes were still facing standard retrospective taxation. Following the same logic, if a single taxpayer had several income sources (e.g., labor and capital incomes), only the income stream which met the conditions for betwixt taxation was taxed pay as you earn.

How did tax administrations know whether to do a betwixt assessment during the reform? The reform caused blank years, and for these no regular tax return was collected. However, all cantons required to fill out a special, shortened tax return (sometimes together with a brief questionnaire) in the first year under the new system, i.e., right after the tax holiday had ended. The purpose was to detect extraordinary incomes earned during the tax holidays, such as lottery gains or extraordinary compensation like bonuses or gratification payments not foreseen in the contract and not usually paid out in prior and/ or future years (on the treatment of bonuses, also see court ruling StGE BL Nr. 69/2002, September 13 2002).

How were extraordinary incomes during the tax holiday and betwixt assessments different? Extraordinary incomes were subject to a separate tax during the tax holiday. This was done mainly to avoid tax avoidance through income shifting. In contrast to a betwixt assessment, however, only the part exceeding ordinary income was taxed. For example, a self-employed who had some extraordinary income from self-employment, e.g. a windfall gain, only paid the annual tax on the extraordinary part, but not on her whole income from self-employment. This means that if taxpayers tried to increase their income in response to the tax holiday, it was always only the part deemed as extraordinary which was taxed ex-post, ordinary income remained taxed. Betwixt taxation on the other hand affected the whole income stream, e.g., all income from self-employment when changing from employee to self-employed.

Measurement of self-employment income. Employees pay social security contributions pay-as-you-earn with direct withholding at source. Therefore, the reporting of wage earnings to social security has always been done fully independently of the income tax system and hence is not affected by

the tax holiday reforms we are studying. In contrast, for self-employment income, contributions to social security were and are based on self-employment income as reported in the federal income tax return. Tax authorities must communicate the self-employment income information to the cantonal social security agencies. Due to the biennial nature of the old income tax system, self-employment incomes in the social security records appear as constants over two years for most self-employment income (exceptions were cases of betwixt assessments, see below). What follows applies only to self-employment income.

Old system. Like the income tax system, the social security system was of retrospective character for self-employment income in the old system. As a result, assessment period and contribution period were not identical. In addition, in order to leave enough time for reporting from the tax authority to the social security administration, social security contributions were assessed with a one year lag compared to the federal income tax liability. Therefore, self-employment income earned in 1995/1996 would be reported for tax purposes in 1997/1998, and in the social security system for years 1998/1999.

This resulted in a lag of three years between actually earning income from self-employment and the year for which social security contributions were due. The social security register data records self-employment income not in the year it was actually earned, but in the year the corresponding contributions were due. This means that the entries we observe in year 1998/1999 reflect average self-employment income earned in 1995/1996.

As the assessment of social security contributions for self-employment income was based on tax returns, whenever tax authorities applied a betwixt assessment, i.e., a temporary pay-as-you-earn assessment, this carried over to the assessment of social security contributions. The social security office, did not apply their own betwixt assessment of social security compensations, but simply used the income information from the betwixt income tax assessment as the base. For the social security office, it was of no importance whether reported income came from a betwixt or regular tax assessment.

New system. Following the changes in the income tax system, the social security system changed to a pay-as-you-earn system also for self-employment earnings. In contrast to the income tax system, the change in the social security system, which is organized at the national level, took place at the same time in all cantons in 2001. Starting in 2001 contributions for self-employment income are due for the year the income was earned. Since self-employment income can often not be determined on a monthly basis, the self-employed make quarterly installments of their social security contributions and get a final assessment in the upcoming year(s), as soon as the definitive assessment of the federal income tax is available. Importantly, since 2001 self-employment income in the social security registers always refers to the year it was earned, not the years it was assessed.

Social security contribution holiday in 1999 and 2000 for self-employment income. The change in 2001 in turn created a social security contribution holiday for self-employment income in 1999 and 2000: incomes earned in 1999 and 2000 were never the base for any social security calculations on self-employment income. This social security holiday would otherwise have taken place in the year prior to retirement: upon entering retirement, contributions end, hence self-employment earnings during the two years prior to retirement were never the base for any social security contributions.

The social security holiday for self-employed overlapped with the tax holiday of 20 cantons. Therefore, for these 20 cantons, we do not have their actual self-employment income during the tax holidays (unless, they got a betwixt assessment, which, however, we cannot identify from the data). In the three cantons that changed late, with tax holidays in 2001 and 2002, tax authorities had to separately collect information on self-employment income during the tax holiday to report these incomes to the social security contribution (AHI-Praxis 3/2000, p.107 ff.; Art. 218 Abs. 6 DBG and Art. 69 Abs. 6 StHG). For these cantons, we do therefore have the actual self-employment income earned during the tax holidays. In

the three cantons that adopted the annual pay-as-you-earn tax system prior to 2001, tax administrations also had to collect information on earnings from self-employment during the tax holiday *ex post* and report it to the social security offices (AHI-Praxis 3/2000, p. 108). Using this information, the social security offices emulated the biennial retrospective system to ensure equal treatment of social security contributions across cantons. This is why we still observe the strong biennial pattern in self-employment incomes in all cantons until 2000. Because social security earnings records for self-employment income had a lag of two to three years, we can analyze the response of these incomes to the tax holiday in the canton of Zurich and Thurgau, despite the missing records for 1998. For self-employment incomes, what is missing, are the actual incomes of 1995.

A.2 Data Description

We are using several data sources for our empirical analysis.

A.2.1 Matched SSER-Census Data

We use a novel, matched data set in our main empirical analyses. The dataset combines the Swiss population censuses with social security data that tracks the entire labor market history of the population of Switzerland. More specifically, our data set is based on a merge between the register-based population census of Switzerland as of December 2010 (via a social security number) and 100% of the social security earnings records (SSER) from the Old-Age and Survivors' Insurance (OASI, AHV in German), covering the period 1981–2012. We further match data from the population censuses in 1990 and 2000. These older population censuses did not contain a social security number. They can thus not be merged directly to the SSER. However, the censuses were matched with the register-based census in 2010 using probabilistic methods based on sex, date of birth, marital status, nationality, religion, place of residence and other variables in the course of the “Swiss National Cohort” project.⁴⁷

Figure A5 illustrates our dataset. The underlying sample is everyone that ever generated an entry in the SSER between 1981 and 2010 and that still lives in Switzerland in 2010. Because almost everybody generates a record at some point in his or her life because contributing to the old age insurance is mandatory from age 18 onward, our data set contains 98% of the permanent population age 18 or older in 2010 (6.29 million of 6.42 million permanent residents in 2010). The merged dataset also contains information from the census 2000 for 5.18 million individuals (83% of the sample) and from the census 1990 for 4.34 million individuals (69.1%). As is illustrated by the figure, our dataset does not contain information on individuals that lived in Switzerland in 1990 or 2000 and that emigrated or died before 2010. We also do not have the census 2000 information in our linked dataset for 7.9% of individuals that participated in the census 2000 and in principle still live in Switzerland in 2010. The reason is that for certain individuals participating in the census 2000, there was no unique probabilistic match between the census 2000 and the census 2010 (see Spoerri et al., 2010, for a discussion of the reasons).

Figure A6 shows the share of individuals aged 20–60 present in our SSER-census data relative to the actual population aged 20–60 in a given year. The latter data are taken from the official population statistics of the Federal Statistical Office. Our data covers 98% of all individuals aged 20–60 in 2010. As we move back in time, the sample coverage of persons aged 20–60 gets slightly smaller because certain individuals that lived in Switzerland in these earlier years died or emigrated and hence are not in the 2010 census. The figure shows that our matched data set contains 92% of all individuals aged 20–60

⁴⁷Spoerri et al. (2010) contains an extensive discussion of this data linkage.

living in Switzerland in 2000. For 92% of these individuals, we have data from the census 2000.

In the SSER data, employed and self-employed individuals generate one record per job per year that details the starting and ending month of an employment relationship along with the total earnings over that time period. For example, a person with two different employers and also some self-employment income would generate three records.⁴⁸ Finally, the register also contains contributions of non-employed individuals (e.g. students) because contributions to the old-age scheme are mandatory from age 20 onward until reaching the statutory retirement age. The statutory retirement age was 65 for men throughout our sample period. For women, it was increased from 62 to 63 in 2001 and to 64 in 2005 as part of the 10th OASI reform implemented in 1997. Besides the retirement age, the reform increased compulsory coverage of non-employed married and widowed women below retirement age, who had been exempt from annual contributions towards the OASI before.

In Figure A7, we compare the employment rate of 20 to 64 year-old Swiss men and women in our data with the employment rate of these groups according to the SLFS (Swiss labor force survey). We observe that the employment rates are slightly higher in our data than they are in the SLFS. The likely reason is that the employment rate in the SLFS refers to the second quarter of each year, while we define a person as employed in a given year if she or he has positive earnings in at least one month of the year.

While the data hence covers the near universe of the population of Switzerland, the matched data set has some disadvantages, too. First, the earnings records in 1998 are incomplete. The share of wage earners for which records are missing is about 5%. It is not entirely clear why these records are missing (see the discussion below). The missing records prevent us from analyzing aggregate outcomes in 1998, as the problem of missing records does not affect all cantons to the same extent. Second, the register-based census 2010 does not contain information on some variables of interest normally available in census data such as schooling/education, occupation, or number of children. Such information are only available for individuals for which we could match the censuses in 1990 or 2000. For the relatively small number of individuals that we were unable to match to the census data in 2000, we only observe the characteristics of individuals as of 2010. This is a concern for characteristics that can change over time, especially an individual's place of residence, marital status and immigrant status or citizenship. The census provides information on how these characteristics changed in the past, allowing us to reconstruct the information for years prior to 2010. Nevertheless, we have to impute some of the data points making a set of assumptions. We discuss how we exploited the various variables in the census datasets in order to construct the three variables below.

Missing records in 1998. The earnings records in the year 1998 are incomplete. About 4.5–5.5% of all records are missing. Figure A8 illustrates this. The reasons for the missing observations are not entirely clear. According to statisticians of the compensation office, the missing records most likely arise because one of the IT pools, which are responsible for delivering the earnings records of several equalization funds (*Ausgleichskassen*) to the federal equalization fund collecting the data, had IT problems at the time. As one IT pool handles several equalization funds, several equalization funds have missing records in 1998. The problem is that some cantons are more heavily affected by the missing data problem than others. For example, descriptive analyses suggest that the cantonal equalization funds of the cantons of St. Gallen and Fribourg were strongly affected. The problem with the missing records remained unnoticed at the time because statistics that are based on the earnings records were only published in odd years. Inquiries revealed that it would be impossible to try to recover the missing

⁴⁸Moreover, the data contain individual records for unemployment benefits and disability pensions as well as income compensation allowances in the event of military service or maternity.

records as of today. The reason is that many affected workers are retired by now. The equalizations funds discard the data for retired workers. In the event study micro-approach, we thus discard observations from 1998 to ensure that our analysis is not affected by this data problem. For aggregate time series, we re-estimate each series by year and group in a refined sample that excludes all compensation offices affected by the 1998 missing data. We then impute 1998 values in the full data assuming that the 1998 value relative to the average of 1997 and 1999 is the same in the refined sample as in the full sample.

Missing records in certain compensation offices in certain years. In a few cases, there are also compensation offices in which the records for a year other than 1998 are missing. These are usually smaller compensation offices with a small number of affiliated workers. We identified these cases by looking at detailed time series of employment rates by canton and subgroups of the population. They always lead to a large drop in the aggregate employment rate of a specific subgroup in just one year within employment rate series that are usually very smooth. In total, we identified 14 cases of missing data. Each of these cases is somewhat different. For instance, the missing data may only affect self-employment spells or only affect individuals from certain cantons within the same compensation office. In order to keep as many individuals in the sample as possible, we thus treated each of these cases separately. In general, we identified the subgroup of individuals that is likely to be affected by the problem, and then discard all spells from these individuals altogether. Due to this data cleaning, we drop 3% of all individuals from the analysis sample.

Dropping these individuals does not affect any of the aggregate results presented in the paper. In a few cases, it slightly increases the precision of the estimates.

Place of residence. The different censuses provide various pieces of information on an individual's place of residence in a given year:

- Register-based census in 2010
 - Municipality of residence in 2010
 - Year a person moved to the municipality in 2010
 - Municipality of residence in 2009, 2008 and 2005 (incomplete)
 - Municipality of residence before the one in 2010
- Census 2000
 - Municipality of residence in 2000
 - Municipality of residence in 1995
- Census 1990
 - Municipality of residence in 1990
 - Municipality of residence in 1985

We exploit all of these variables in order to assign individuals to the places they live in a given year. In case the information is inconsistent, we always prefer the information from a newer census wave. The list of variables makes clear that we know individual's place of residence for a large share of the population in certain benchmark years (i.e. 2010, 2009, 2008, 2005, 2000, and so on). The upper panel of Figure A9 illustrates this. In 2000, for instance, the place of residence is known for 93% of individuals

in our sample. The first assumption when imputing locations is to assume that individuals stayed in the municipality of residence throughout the entire period if the municipality of residence does not change between in two consecutive benchmark years (e.g., 2000 and 2005). As shown in the upper panel of Figure A9, this assumption reduces the share of missing information on place of residence substantially. The next step is to assign (random) moving years if our data shows that a person moved between two consecutive benchmark years from one place to another. The final step in the imputation is to assign individuals to the last known place of residence for all years where the data is missing.⁴⁹

We evaluated the accuracy of our imputation, exploiting that the SSER data contains identifiers of cantonal unemployment agencies if an individual receives unemployment benefits. Since the unemployed are assigned to cantonal agencies based on their canton of residence, we can compare the imputed canton of residence of registered unemployed with the canton of their unemployment agency. The lower panel of Figure A9 provides a summary of the results of this accuracy test. It shows the share of correctly assigned cantons of residence for individuals for which we actually know the canton of residence due to the information in the censuses and for all individuals, including the imputed places of residence. The figure shows that the share of correctly assigned cantons of residences is 92–94% around the year 2000.

Immigrant status. Information on the residency status of immigrants is important in our analysis because immigrants only pay taxes in Switzerland if they either have a residency permit C or obtained the Swiss citizenship. The different census datasets contain several variables that allow us reconstructing whether a person pays taxes in Switzerland in a given year.

- Register-based census in 2010
 - Nationality in 2010
 - Year of immigration to Switzerland (in case a person is foreign born)
 - Residency permit in 2010
- Census 2000
 - Nationality in 2000
 - Year of naturalization
 - Residency permit in 2000
- Census 1990
 - Nationality in 1990
 - Residency permit in 1990

All individuals that are Swiss nationals and that are born in Switzerland are considered as Swiss nationals in all years. Similarly, for a large share of foreign born in the sample, we can reconstruct with certainty whether they were Swiss or not in a given year due to the information on the year of naturalization from the census 2000.⁵⁰ The main question to answer is then whether a foreigner had a

⁴⁹Two comments on this assumption are in order. First, the problem of missing information on the place of residence is smaller for older individuals, as individuals usually become more settled, the older they get. Second, the assumption is not as strong for the imputation of canton (rather than the municipality) of residence, because only 26% of the observed moves in our data occur across cantons.

⁵⁰We also consider someone as Swiss throughout our sample period if the year of naturalization is missing but a person is Swiss according to the censuses in 1990 and/or 2000.

residency permit C in a given year. We first consider a foreigner to have a C permit throughout the sample period if he or she has a C permit in 1990 and/or in 2000. For the remaining individuals, we impute the missing information on the immigrant status in the years before 2010 using the year of arrival in Switzerland (reported in the 2010 census). In particular, we assume that an immigrant has a permit C or gained the Swiss passport if he or she lived in Switzerland for at least 10 years. Figure A10 provides the motivation for this approach using data from the 2010 census. Ten years after immigration 86% of all foreign born have a C permit or a Swiss passport. Moreover, we know the residence status in 2010. We can thus reassign individuals that are thought to be either Swiss citizen or C permit holders in 2010 which in fact are not.

Marital status. Marital status is an important variable as it affects both the potential labor supply response and the tax rate faced by individuals due to joint filing. The census datasets provide the following information on marital status:

- Register-based census in 2010
 - Marital status in 2010
 - Year when the marital status changed
 - Year of separation (if applicable)
- Census 2000
 - Marital status in 2000
 - Year when the marital status changed
- Census 1990
 - Marital status in 1990

Figure A11 illustrates how we imputed the marital status based on the variables listed above. The figure focuses on the population aged 20–60 in a given year. Line (1) shows the number of individuals for which the marital status is known with certainty. The figure shows that the share of individuals with known civil status is 91% in 2000 and 100% in 2010. The share is smaller for years that are further away from the *next* census year. Line (2) builds on the census information but imputes missing data *between* these benchmark years. The main assumptions are the following. First, we assume no change in the marital status for the years in-between the census years if the status is unchanged between two census years. Second, if a person is single, widowed, or divorced in 1990 (2000) and married in 2000 (2010), we assume that the marital status did not change until the year of marriage as observed in the census 2000 (2010). Vice versa, if a person is married in 1990 (2000) and widowed, separated, or divorced in 2000 (2010), we assume that they were married until last date of change in the marital status in 2000 (2010). Third, for individuals with no information from the census 1990, we assume that everyone that married between 1990 and 2000 was single before, and that every divorce or widowhood between 1990 and 2000 was preceded by a marriage which started at the average marriage age (men: 30, women: 29).

For the remaining observations—those with no data from the censuses 1990/2000—, it is only possible to reconstruct the history of the marital status up to the last change as observed in the census 2010. Prior to that event, we impute the status assuming that the change in civil status recorded in the data is

the only one that ever took place.⁵¹ In our scenario, everyone was single before getting married and every divorce or widowhood was preceded by a marriage which started at the average marriage age (men: 30, women: 29). Before that age, individuals who are divorced in 2010 are assumed to have been single. For dissolved same-sex partnerships we assume that they started no earlier than the average marriage age but always later than 2006, and that before that, the person was always single. These assumptions allow assigning a marital status to almost everyone in the sample throughout the entire period 1990–2010 (i.e. close 100% of the sample aged 20 to 60, see Figure A11). We drop the very few individuals for which the marital status is unknown from our analysis sample.

A.2.2 Wage Structure Surveys (LSE)

The Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO) has conducted the Swiss wage structure surveys (*Lohnstrukturerhebung* LSE) every two years since 1994. They are a stratified random sample of private and public firms with at least three full-time-equivalent workers from the manufacturing and service sectors in Switzerland. Excluded are (i) public sector employees in municipalities (until 2006), (ii) agricultural workers, and (iii) apprentices and interns. The surveys cover between 16.6% (1996) and 50% (2010) of total employment in Switzerland. Participation is mandatory. The surveys contain extensive information on the individual characteristics of workers and provide reliable (employer-reported) information on hours worked per worker. Moreover, they provide detailed information on the wage components of each worker, providing, among others, detailed information on bonus payments per worker.

We focus on Swiss nationals and foreign nationals with residency permit C aged 20–60. We drop a small number of observations with missing information on gender, nationality, and civil status. Moreover, we exclude public sector employees (workers from NACE rev. 1.2 two-digit industries 75, 80, and 85) since the public sector is not covered comprehensively in the surveys before 2006. One issue with these data for our analyses is that they only provide the geographical location of the work location and not the residence location. This creates measurement error for individuals who do not live in the same canton they work. We address this problem by excluding zip codes where more than 25% workers stem from one of the other groups of cantons relevant in the analysis. Approximately 10% of all observations in the surveys are dropped due to this restriction. The commuting patterns by zip code are computed from the census in 2000.

We consider the following outcomes:

- Hours of work per worker per month: Hours of work are employer-reported and refer to the month of October in each year. Hours worked refer to contractual (i.e. normal) hours worked for workers with monthly wages (4 1/3 times weekly working time) and to actual hours worked for workers paid by the hour.
- Hourly wages: Hourly wages refer to the month of October in each year. They are computed by dividing the sum of regular gross wage earnings in October plus 1/12 of a possible 13th monthly wage payment by hours of work per worker. Wage rates thus incorporate regular pay but exclude overtime and variable pay components (e.g. bonuses). We winsorize the lowest and highest 0.25% of wages to reduce the influence of outliers.
- Earnings: Earnings refer to gross labor earnings in 2010 CHF in October of each year, including social security contributions. Earnings include regular monthly wages and overtime and other variable pay components (e.g. bonuses). We winsorize the lowest and highest 0.25% of earnings

⁵¹Note that we need the information on separated but not (yet) divorced individuals because they are taxed as singles.

to reduce the influence of outliers.

- **Bonuses:** Includes bonus payments, premiums, profit shares paid out to employees and other non-regular wage payments to the worker for the entire year of the survey.

A.2.3 Labor Force Survey (SLFS)

The Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) is the equivalent of the US Current Population Survey. In the period of interest, this survey was conducted in the second quarter of each year. It includes about 17,000 individuals (approximately 0.5% of households) before 2002 and about 50,000 (1.5%) from 2002 onward. We focus on Swiss nationals and foreign nationals with residency permit C aged 20–60. These data have two main advantages relative to our main census-social security data. First, they provide earnings and employment information for both spouses for married individuals, which we use to estimate spousal earnings in order to estimate tax rates for married individuals. Second, they provide information on hours of work. The main drawback relative to our main data is a very small sample size (the full population data is about 100 times larger). As a result, most of the series produced with the labor force survey are very noisy compared to the population-wide data. Another drawback is that most variables are self-reported introducing significant measurement error as well.

We consider the following outcomes:

- **Employment rate:** fraction of people employed in the second quarter of each year as a share of the permanent population (refers to employment in the week before the survey)
- **Earnings:** total annual labor earnings, self-reported
- **Hours of work per week:** Hours effectively worked in week before the survey (refers to all jobs held), self-reported
- **Hourly earnings:** annual labor earnings divided by 51 times self-reported normal weekly working hours

A.2.4 Income Tax Rates Data

None of the above micro data sets includes individual's tax rates. We therefore merge the statutory tax rate for a given income in a given municipality to these data. Income tax rate data have been collected and made available by Parchet (2018) for this project. The data set is based on average effective tax rates on gross income published by the Federal Tax Administration for the 800 (approximately) largest municipalities. These tax rates are defined as shares of the consolidated cantonal, municipal and church tax liability in gross annual income for different categories of taxpayers (unmarried, married without children, married with two children, retired) and gross income classes (from CHF 10,000 to CHF 1,000,000). Parchet (2018) has collected the municipal tax multipliers for all municipalities between 1983 and 2014 and, using the fact that intra-cantonal differences in consolidated tax rates are almost entirely due to municipal tax multipliers, has estimated the total average tax rate for all municipalities and taxpayers.

Missing Cantons. Unfortunately, tax rates cannot be estimated with this method for the cantons of Appenzell Innerrhoden and Neuchâtel before 2001. In the former, multipliers are not available; in the latter, municipalities could set their own tax schedule. For these cases, predicting consolidated tax rates is not possible, nor is the estimation of the cantonal tax rate. Tax rates for these cantons are therefore missing.

Marginal Tax Rates. We linearly interpolate the tax rates in steps of 1,000 CHF between the income brackets provided in the original data. For incomes above 1 million CHF we assume a constant marginal

tax rate. Our estimates of the marginal tax rate are based on the local changes in the tax rate in steps of 1,000 CHF.

Municipality Mergers. The consolidated tax rates and tax multipliers are published in real time for each municipality, as it exists in a given year. The location information we obtain from the Census data refers to the registers of municipalities as of November 2010. Since there has been an ongoing trend in mergers of small municipalities over time, it is not possible to perform a 1:1 match on the tax rate data. We therefore update the municipality codes in the tax rate data to match the municipality registers as of November 2010. Individuals living in a merged municipality, we assign the average tax rate of the merged municipalities. Individuals living in a newly created municipality, we assign the average tax rate that was applied on this territory prior to the secession.

A.3 Further Robustness Checks and Results

Aggregate time series. Table A2 presents estimates of the labor supply effects of the tax holiday based on regressions of the aggregate time series for all 5 groups of cantons on year dummies, canton group dummies, and an indicator which is 1 in the year in which municipal and cantonal taxes are zero. OLS standard errors are reported. It expands upon the results presented in Table 2.

The estimation sample covers the years 1990–2010 (*including* 1998). The outcome in columns (1) and (3) is the share of wage earners in the population (in %). The outcome in columns (2) and (4) is the average annual wage per employee with positive wage earnings. Columns (1) and (2) focus on men, columns (3) and (4) on women. Panel A is estimated using the full sample of adults aged 20–60. Panels B and C report effects for married individuals aged 20–60 with and without children, respectively. $\Delta\%y$ indicates the implied percent change in the outcome by dividing the estimated effect—the coefficient of the indicator of the tax holiday—by the average level of the outcome variable in the year of the tax holiday. The Frisch elasticity η^F is estimated by dividing $\Delta\%y$ by the estimated percent change in net-of-tax wage rates ($\Delta\%[1 - \tau]$) due to the tax holiday for the respective group. $\Delta\%[1 - \tau]$ is based on changes in average tax rates in column (1) and on changes in marginal tax rates in the remaining columns. For each individual, $\Delta\%[1 - \tau]$ is computed based on hypothetical marginal or average tax rates on the actual income earned during the tax-free years in the tax system in place prior to the tax holidays.

Figure A14 zooms in on married women whose labor supply decisions are traditionally expected to be most elastic. This figure displays the employment rate (top panel) and average earnings including non-workers (bottom panel) for married women by year and groups of cantons from 1990 to 2010. The sample in a given year t is all female individuals aged 20–60 in year t and married in year t who are still alive and Swiss residents by 2010 (i.e., present in the 2010 Census). Married women are expected to be particularly responsive to taxes, yet, the figure does not show effects on employment or average earnings except perhaps in 1998 for the cantons transitioning early (blue series in circles). The bottom panel has excellent parallel trends for all series so that we can be quite confident that earnings of married women, which include both the intensive and extensive margins, did not respond.

Effects in the Labor Force Survey. Figure A15 displays various employment outcomes using the Labor Force Survey (SLFS): (a) employment rate, (b) earnings, (c) hours of work per week among employees, (d) average hourly earnings among employees. The sample in a given year t includes all individuals aged 20–60. For hours of work and hourly earnings, we restrict the sample to employees. We consider 3 groups of cantons. (1) 2 cantons which transitioned in 1999 with a tax holiday in 1998 or

1997-98 (in blue), (2) 20 cantons which transitioned in 2001 with a tax holiday in 1999-00 or 2000 (in green triangles), (3) 3 cantons which transitioned in 2003 with tax holiday in 2001-02 (in brown squares). In the series, the dots corresponding to tax holidays are bigger and are blanked out (as tax holidays are called blank years in French and German). The figure does not display any tax holiday effects on these outcomes. Given the noise in the series due to small sample size, this is consistent with our previous analysis using the much larger social security data and the wage structure survey.

Additional extensive margin effects. Table A3 presents estimates of the effect of the tax holiday on a set of further extensive margin outcomes constructed using our matched social security and census data. As before, the regressions are based on aggregate time series for the three main canton groups. The outcome in column (1) is the number of jobs per person employed. Distinct jobs are identified in the social security data based on an individual’s number of different register entries with positive labor earnings in a given year. The outcome in column (2) is the number of months in employment per person employed during the year. The outcome in column (3) is the number of self-employed as a fraction of the total population. Finally, the outcome in column (4) is the number of persons moving into the respective canton group in a given year as a fraction of the total population. The tax holidays was not actually creating incentives to move due to the betwixt assessment (see above) and hence looking at migration can be seen as a placebo test. Panel A reports effects among all individuals aged 20-60. Panel B and C report effects for males and females, respectively. Panel D reports effects for married women only. Panel E reports effects for individuals with more than 200K average annual labor income in the 1994–1996 period.

We do not find statistically significant evidence that the tax holiday affected one of these outcomes for any of these groups. Therefore, the lack of responses along the extensive margin is pervasive and holds along all the dimensions we have explored.

Effects by income groups based on aggregate time series. Table A4 presents estimates of the tax holiday (TH) on labor supply based on regressions of the aggregate time series for the 5 groups of cantons on year dummies, group dummies, and an indicator which is 1 in the year in which municipal and cantonal taxes are zero. The estimation sample covers the years 1990–2010 in columns 1–3 and 1987–2010 in column (4). Columns (1) and (2) are estimated using the full sample of adults aged 20–60. Column 3 focuses on wage earners with average annual labor earnings above 100,000 CHF in 1994-1996. Column 4 is based on all individuals that have positive self-employment earnings in at least one period. The outcome in column (1) is the employment rate (in %). The outcome in column (2) is annual labor earnings per person (including individuals with zero earnings). The outcome in column (3) is the average wage per employee. The outcome in column (4) is average self-employment earnings (self-employment earnings of all individuals with positive self-employment earnings in a given year). Individuals are assigned to Panels A–E based on their average annual labor income in the 1994–1996 period. Individuals with zero earnings in 1994–1996 are dropped. The Frisch elasticity η^F is estimated by dividing $\% \Delta y$ (i.e. the estimated effect relative to the average level of the outcome variable in the year of the tax holiday) by the estimated percent change in net-of-tax wage rates ($\% \Delta [1 - \tau]$) due to the tax holiday for the respective group. $\% \Delta [1 - \tau]$ is based on changes in average tax rates in column (1) and on changes in marginal tax rates in the remaining columns. For each individual, $\% \Delta [1 - \tau]$ is computed based on hypothetical marginal or average tax rates on the actual income earned during the tax-free years in the tax system in place prior to the tax holidays.

The results from the time series are very consistent with the event study estimates reported in Table 4.

For wage earnings, the elasticities along the extensive margin are always zero, while the elasticities along the intensive margin are sharply increasing with earnings: from 0 at the bottom to about .09 at the top. For self-employment earnings, the elasticities are within .18–0.26 throughout the distribution.

Event study robustness checks. Table A5 shows that the main event study estimates are robust along a number of dimensions. It presents semi-elasticities derived from individual-level IV regressions of labor supply outcomes on person and year fixed effects and $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$, where τ is the average tax rate in column (1) and the marginal tax rate in the other columns. $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ is instrumented with an indicator variable which is 1 in the year in which municipal and cantonal taxes are zero due to the tax holiday. The dependent variable in column (1) is an indicator whether a person has positive wage income in a given year. The dependent variable in columns (2) and (3) is average wages of males (column 2) and females (column 3) with positive wage income in a given year. The dependent variable in columns (4) is annual self-employment income per person (including 0) in a given year. The first panel presents our baseline results (see Tables 3 and 5 for the definition of the estimation samples). Panel B excludes the control variables included in the baseline. Panel C contains two control variables absorbing effects of the tax holiday in the the year before and after the tax holiday, thus accounting for possible effects of the tax holidays on income shifting. In Panel D, we control for the cantonal unemployment rate (based on register data). In Panel E, we discard observations with imputed place of residence. In Panel F, the effect is only identified from the response in the second cantonal blank year, controlling for the effect in the first. Similarly, Panel G identifies the effect only from the response in late-coming cantons with tax holidays in 2001 and 2002. Panel H uses wage and self-employment incomes that are not capped at 2.5 Mio. in 2010 CHF. In all Panels B-H, the estimates are very similar to the baseline estimates in Panel A.

Wage Structure Survey results. Table A6 presents estimates of the tax holiday on labor supply and wages based on regressions of aggregate time series for three groups of cantons (based on their transition timing) on year dummies, group dummies, linear time trends interacted with groups dummies, and an indicator which is 1 in the year in which municipal and cantonal taxes are zero. The estimation is based on the wage structure surveys (LSE) 1994–2010 carried out bi-annually so that the total number of observations in each regression is 27. OLS standard errors are reported. The dependent variable in column (1) is monthly earnings in 2010 CHF in October of each year. Earnings include regular salaries and overtime and other variable pay components (e.g. bonuses). The dependent variable in column (2) is hourly wages, computed from October salaries in each year, excluding overtime and variable pay components (e.g. bonuses). The dependent variable in column (3) is employer-reported hours worked per worker in October. Hours worked refer to contractual (i.e. normal) hours worked for workers with monthly salaries and to actual hours worked for workers with hourly wages. The dependent variable in column (4) is the fraction of employees with bonuses above 5,000 in 2010 CHF. Panel A reports results for all employees aged 20–60 with Swiss passport or residency permit C in the dataset, excluding public sector employees. Panel B is restricted to workers with individual wage contract. Panel C is restricted to workers falling under a collective (firm-, occupation-, or industry-wide) bargaining agreement. Panel D is restricted to workers in jobs with the main activities examining, advising, and attesting.

The results from the table show that there is a insignificant effect of .6% on total earnings for the total sample—an estimate that is roughly in line with our baseline estimate based on the social security data (.71% in Table 2, col. (2)). The effect on earnings is much stronger (4.8%) and high significant in the job category examining/advising/attesting. In this more responsive group, this effect on total

earnings is driven by an effect on hourly wage rates of 4.3% (highly significant) while the effect on hours of work is pretty small (.7%) and only marginally significant.

In the full sample, the effect on hours of work is very small (0.1%) and insignificant. The effect on hours of work is stronger (0.5%) and marginally significant for workers in individual contracts. The estimated effect on bonuses is fairly large (around 9.4%) but only marginally significant.

Average Tax on CHF 100,000 Gross Income




Figure A1: Average Tax Rates Across Swiss Cantons

Notes: This figure depicts the average income tax rate in 1999 across Swiss municipalities. The tax rate combines income taxes at the federal, cantonal, and municipal levels and is computed for a single tax filer with gross income of 100,000 CHF, approximately the 90th percentile of labor earnings across all Swiss workers. The average tax rate is defined as taxes owed divided by gross income. The graph shows substantial variation in tax burdens across areas with tax rates at low at 10% and tax rates as high as 25%.

Gewusst wie!

2003 wird im Wallis die Gegenwartsbemessung eingeführt.
Was hat dieser Steuersystemwechsel für Auswirkungen in der Bemessungslücke 2001 und 2002

Am 1. Januar 1993 trat das Gesetz zur Steuerharmonisierung in Kraft mit der Auflage an die Kantone, ihre Gesetzgebung innert 8 Jahren anzupassen. Nebst einer Vereinheitlichung, die die Steuerpflicht, der Gegenstand der Besteuerung, das Verfahrens- oder Strafrecht betrifft, wird im Wallis der Wechsel der zeitlichen Bemessungsgrundlage von Bedeutung sein.

Das bis anhin gültige Veranlagungssystem der Vergangenheitbemessung mit Primärerwerb wird im Wallis im Jahr 2003 gegen die Gegenwartsbemessung mit Postmeritum getauscht. Was dieser Wechsel bedeuten kann, zeigt Alois Kämpfen von der Kämpfen Treuhand AG anhand einiger ausgewählter Themen auf.

Von Alois Kämpfen, dipl. Wirtschaftsprüfer

Die Einführung der so genannten einjährigen Gegenwartsbemessung, die im Kanton Wallis – wie in den Kantonen TI und VD – auf den 1. Januar 2003 vorgenommen wird, bedeutet, dass Sie jedes Jahr (statt wie bisher alle zwei Jahre) eine Steuererklärung einreichen müssen.

Vorteile der neuen Methode

Was auf den ersten Blick nach zusätzlichem Papierkrieg aussieht, hat jedoch auch klare Vorteile:
= Der wirtschaftlichen Leistungsfähig-

Ablauf des Wechsels des Veranlagungssystems



Die ordentlichen Einkommen 2001 und 2002 fallen aufgrund des Wechsels in die Bemessungslücke. Ausserordentliche Erträge wie z. B. Lotteriegewinne werden jedoch zur Besteuerung herangezogen.



In den Jahren 2001 und 2002 wird das Durchschnittseinkommen von 1999 und 2000 (Fr. 62,500) aufgrund der diesjährigen Steuererklärung versteuert.

zusammenhängenden Aufwendungen bei der direkten Bundessteuer und den Kantons- und Gemeindesteuern in die Bemessungslücke.
Ausserordentliche Einkünfte während der Bemessungslücke, d. h. während den Jahren 2001 und 2002 unterliegen für das Steuerjahr in dem sie zugeflossen sind einer separaten Jahressteuer zu dem Satz, der sich für diese Einkünfte allein ergibt und die Aufwendungen, die mit diesen ausserordentlichen Einkünften unmittelbar zusammenhängen, können abgezogen werden. Sozialabzüge werden nicht gewährt. Weitere ausserordentliche Aufwendungen, die in die Bemessungslücke fallen, können im Durchschnitt 2001–2002 noch zusätzlich abgezogen werden. Die Veranlagung 2001–2002 wird nachträglich revidiert. Der Ersetzgeber zahlt die ausserordentlichen Einkünfte sowohl bei der direkten Bundessteuer als auch bei den Kantons- und Gemeindesteuern bespesselt, also nicht abschliessend auf Ausserordentliche Einkünfte von Unselbständigerwerbenden können u. a. Kapitalerträge für wiederkehrende Leistungen, Aperiodische Vermögenserträge oder Lotteriegewinne sein. Bei Selbständig-Erwerbenden können dies u. a. Kapitalerträge, Aufwertungen, Auflösung von Rückstellungen und nicht vorgenommene Abschreibungen sein.
Die ausserordentlichen Aufwendungen sind im Gegensatz zu den Einkünften abschliessend aufgeführt. Es sind dies: Unterabzügen für überwiegend privat genutzte Liegenschaften, soweit sie den Pauschalbetrag übersteigen, Beiträge an die 2. Säule (Einkauf von Beitragsjahren oder Leistungsverbesserungen im Rali-

Beim Wechsel auf die Gegenwartsbemessung im Jahr 2003 wird Anfang des Jahres eine provisorische Steuererklärung ausgefüllt. Die definitive Veranlagung erfolgt Anfang des nächsten Jahres aufgrund der effektiv erzielten Einkünfte des abgeschlossenen Jahres.

Teilrevision des Steuergesetzes

Erläuterungen

| 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 |
|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Bezug der Steuer 1998 | Bezug der Steuer 1999 | Bezug der Steuer 2000 | Bezug der Steuer 2001 (Akontozahlung) | Bezug der Steuer 2002 (Akontozahlung) |
| Veranlagung 1997/98 | Veranlagung 1999/2000 | Veranlagung 1999/2000 | | Veranlagung 2001 |
| Bemessung 1995/96 | Bemessung 1997/98 | Bemessung 1997/98 | | Bemessung 2001 |
| BEMESSUNGSLÜCKE | | | | |
| | | | Steuererklärung 2001A | Steuererklärung 2001B |

Figure A2: Press (top) and Voting (bottom) Explanations of the Tax Holidays
Notes: The top panel shows an illustration of a press article explaining the tax reform and the tax holiday it creates. The article was published on February 16, 2001 for the canton of Valais, which transitioned in 2003 and hence had a tax holiday for years 2001 and 2002. Hence, as early as the beginning of the first holiday year, the public was clearly informed that incomes earned in 2001 and 2002 would not be taxed. The bottom panel depicts the voting pamphlet explaining the incidence of blank years (“Bemessungslücke”) sent to voters before the tax reform referendum for the canton of Obwalden in October 1999. Such voting documents were typically produced in cantons organizing a referendum for the tax transition.




Figure A3: Dates of Cantonal Referenda

Notes: The figure depicts the dates of cantonal referenda held in each canton where the new law was put to a public vote. The colored time frames indicate periods of the federal and cantonal tax holidays applying to the cantons where a vote was held. Note that NW only had a federal holiday. The voting referendum was the very last part of the reform process.




Figure A4: Individual Income Tax Collections per Capita

Notes: This figure depicts total income tax revenue per capita collected by year and groups of cantons. Amounts are expressed in thousands of 2010 CHF. The cantons are divided in five groups based on when the tax holiday took place. (1a) light blue circles: tax holiday in 1997-98 (1 canton), (1b) dark blue dashed circles: tax holiday in 1998 (1 canton), (2a) light green triangles: tax holiday in 1999-2000 (15 cantons), (2b) dark green triangles: tax holiday in 2000 (4 cantons), (3) brown squares: tax holiday in 2001-02 (3 cantons). In the series, the dots corresponding to tax holidays are bigger and are blanked out (as tax holidays are called blank years in French and German). Tax rates are naturally zero during tax holidays. Before the transitions, income tax collected in a given year typically corresponded to incomes earned in prior years. After the transition, income tax collected in a given year typically corresponds to incomes earned in the current year. The figure shows that there was no visible discontinuity in income tax collections across the tax holidays (there was no double taxation nor gap in tax collection in the transition).




Figure A5: Illustration of matched SSER-Census data

Notes: This figure illustrates the matched SSER-census dataset. The data covers everyone that ever generated a social security record between 1981 and 2010 and that is still alive and living in Switzerland in 2010. Because contributing to the old age insurance is mandatory from age 18 onward, the 6.29 million observations in 2010 represent 98% of the actual population aged 18 and older in 2010 in Switzerland. 83% of these individuals (5.18 million individuals) could be matched to a consistent census 2000 record. 69.1% (83.2% of 83% or 4.34 million individuals) could be matched to a consistent census 1990 record.




Figure A6: Sample Coverage

Notes: This figure displays the total resident population of Switzerland aged 20–60 and the total population captured by our sample aged 20–60 (which are all individuals with a social security record in any year 1990–2010 and resident in Switzerland in 2010 so that they can be matched to the Census 2010). The numbers show the fraction of individuals in our sample vs. the full population. Coverage is closer to one in recent years (due to deaths and migration).




Figure A7: Accuracy of Employment Rate

Notes: This figure displays the employment rates of men and women aged 20–64 separately in our sample and in official statistics derived from the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS). In our data, we count individuals as employed if they have non-zero labor earnings in a given year. The official statistics count a person as employed if she works at least one hour in the second quarter of a specific year. These differences in the measurement of employment explain the level differences between the two statistics. We omit 1998 due to the missing social security records in this year.






Figure A8: Missing Records in 1998

Notes: This figure displays the number of records and individuals in our data by year. It illustrates the issue of missing records in 1998 due to missing social security data for that year.



(a) Share with known place of residence



(b) Accuracy of imputed canton of residence

Figure A9: Imputation of Municipality of Residence

Notes: The figure displays statistics of the imputation of municipality of residence. The dashed line in the top panel shows the number of individuals in the SSES data set for which the place of residence is known with certainty. The second line shows the number of individuals for which the place of residence is known if we assume that individuals lived at their last known place of residence for at least 8 years. Our baseline strategy is to assign all individuals to the last known municipality (third line).

The lower panel evaluates the accuracy of our imputation for the years 1995–2010 regarding the *canton* of residence. The figure exploits that registered unemployed are assigned to cantonal agencies based on their canton of residence. The figure compares the imputed canton of residence of registered unemployed with the canton of the unemployment agency. The figure shows the share of correctly assigned cantons of residence for individuals for which we actually know the canton of residence due to the information in the census (dashed line) and for all individuals, including the imputed places of residence (straight line). The figure shows that the share of correctly assigned cantons of residences among all individuals is around 90% in 2000.





Figure A10: Share of Immigrants with C Permit or a Swiss Passport, by Duration of Stay
 Notes: The figure displays the share of immigrants with C permit or a Swiss passport, by duration of stay.



Sample: 20-60 year-olds still living in Switzerland in 2010

Figure A11: Marital Status Imputation

Notes: The figure displays the number of individuals in our sample for which the marital status is known based on our stepwise imputation method. We focus on the population aged 20–60 in a given year. Line (1) shows the number of individuals for which the marital status is known. The figure shows that the share of individuals with respect to the total sample aged 20–60 with known civil status lies at 91% in 2000 and almost 100% in 2010. The share becomes smaller, the further away a year from the next census year. Line (2) builds on these census information but imputes missing data between these years. In particular, we always assume no change in the marital status for the years in-between if the status is unchanged between census years. The third line imputes the marital status for the remaining individuals—those with no data from the censuses 1990/2000—by basically assuming that the change in civil status recorded in the data is the only one that ever took place. This assumption allows us imputing the marital status for almost the entire rest of the sample.




Figure A12: Effects of Tax Holidays on Wage Employment Rates: Males (top) and Females (bottom)

Notes: This figure displays the employment rate of wage earners for males (top panel) and females (bottom panel) by year and groups of cantons from 1990 to 2010. The sample in a given year t is all individuals aged 20-60 in year t who are still alive and Swiss residents by 2010 (i.e., present in the 2010 Census). The wage employment rate is computed as the fraction of individuals in the sample with positive wage earnings during the year. The cantons are divided in five groups based on when the *cantonal* tax holiday took place. (1a) light blue circles: 1 canton with tax holiday for cantonal taxes in 1997-98 (1 canton), (1b) dashed dark blue circles: 1 canton with tax holiday for cantonal taxes in 1998 (1 canton), (2a) light green triangles: 15 cantons with cantonal tax holiday in 1999-2000, (2b) dashed dark green triangles: 4 cantons with cantonal tax holiday in 2000, (3) brown squares: 3 cantons with cantonal tax holiday in 2001-02. For each of the groups, we represent the corresponding tax holiday periods using the vertical shading and the same color code. In the series, the dots corresponding to tax holidays are bigger and are blanked out (as tax holidays are called blank years in French and German). Both panels show no evidence of employment effects due to the tax holiday.




Figure A13: Robustness of Wage Employment Effects: Benchmark (top) vs. 10,000 CHF Threshold (bottom)

Notes: This figure depicts a robustness check on the wage employment effects from Figure 5. The top panel shows the share of wage earners (pooling together both male and females aged 20-60) where employment is defined as having any positive wage earnings during the year as in Figure 5. The bottom panel repeats the same figure but defines employment as having annual wage earnings above 10,000 CHF (instead of zero) in 2010 CHF. Both panels show the same absence of employment effects of the tax holiday. Therefore, the lack of employment effects is robust to changing the minimum threshold of earnings used to define employment.




Figure A14: Effects on Married Women: Employment (top) and Wage Earnings (bottom)

Notes: This figure displays the share of wage earners (top panel) and average wage earnings excluding non-workers (bottom panel) for married women by year and groups of cantons from 1990 to 2010. The sample in a given year t is all female individuals aged 20-60 in year t and married in year t who are still alive and Swiss residents by 2010 (i.e., present in the 2010 Census). Wage earnings are expressed in 1000s of 2010 CHF (adjusted for inflation). The cantons are divided in five groups based on when the cantonal tax holiday took place. (1a) light blue circles: tax holiday in 1997-98 (1 canton), (1b) dark blue dashed circles: tax holiday in 1998 (1 canton), (2a) light green triangles: tax holiday in 1999-2000 (15 cantons), (2b) dark green triangles: tax holiday in 2000 (4 cantons), (3) brown squares: tax holiday in 2001-02 (3 cantons). For each of the groups, we represent the corresponding tax holiday periods using the vertical shading and the same color code. Married women are expected to be particularly responsive to taxes; yet, the figure does not show effects on employment or average wage earnings.




Figure A15: Evidence from the Labor Force Survey

Notes: This figure displays various employment outcomes using the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS): (a) employment rate, (b) earnings, (c) hours of work per week among employees, (d) average hourly earnings among employees. The sample in a given year t includes all Swiss and foreign workers with a resident permit C aged 20-60. For hours of work and hourly earnings, we restrict the sample to employees. We consider 3 groups of cantons. (1) 2 cantons which transitioned in 1999 with a tax holiday in 1998 or 1997-98 (in blue), (2) 20 cantons which transitioned in 2001 with a tax holiday in 1999-00 or 2000 (in green triangles), (3) 3 cantons which transitioned in 2003 with tax holiday in 2001-02 (in brown squares). Groups (1a) and (1b) and groups (2a) and (2b) have been bunched together and groups (1) and (2) given sample size in the survey data. In the series, the dots corresponding to tax holidays are bigger and are blanked out (as tax holidays are called blank years in French and German). The figure does not display any tax holiday effects on these outcomes. Given the noise in the series due to small sample size, this is consistent with our previous analysis using the much larger social security data and the wage structure survey.




Figure A16: Effects on Monthly Earnings in Employer Survey

Notes: This figure displays monthly earnings in 2010 CHF in October for all workers by year and groups of cantons from 1994 to 2010 using the wage structure surveys (LSE) carried out bi-annually. Earnings include regular salaries and overtime and other variable pay components (e.g. bonuses). The sample in a given year t contains all workers aged 20–60 with Swiss passport or residency permit C in the dataset (excluding public sector employees) weighted to represent population averages. We consider three groups of cantons: (a) cantons which transitioned in 1999 with a tax holiday for 1998 or 1997-1998 (in blue circles) (b) cantons which transitioned in 2001 with a tax holiday for 2000 or 1999-2000 (in green triangles), (c) 3 cantons which transitioned in 2003 with tax holiday in 2001–02 (in brown squares). Geographical information in the data is based on place of work while tax treatment is based on residence. To reduce the number of cases where a person works in one group of cantons but resides in another one, we exclude zip codes in which more than 25% workers stem from one of the other groups of cantons according to the census in 2000. In the series, the dots corresponding to tax holidays are bigger and are blanked out (as tax holidays are called blank years in French and German).




Figure A17: Effects on Hourly Wages: All Workers (top) and Workers in Job Category “Examining, Advising, and Attesting” (bottom)

Notes: This figure displays average hourly wages in 2010 CHF by year and groups of cantons from 1994 to 2010 using the wage structure surveys (LSE) carried out bi-annually. Hourly wages are computed from October salaries in each year and incorporate regular pay but exclude overtime and variable pay components (e.g. bonuses). The sample in a given year t in the top panel includes all workers aged 20–60 with Swiss passport or residency permit C in the dataset (excluding public sector employees) weighted to represent population averages. The sample in the bottom panel is restricted to workers in jobs with the main activities “examining, advising, attesting”. We consider three groups of cantons: (a) cantons which transitioned in 1999 with a tax holiday for 1998 or 1997–1998 (in blue circles) (b) cantons which transitioned in 2001 with a tax holiday for 2000 or 1999–2000 (in green triangles), (c) 3 cantons which transitioned in 2003 with tax holiday in 2001–02 (in brown squares). Geographical information in the data is based on place of work while tax treatment is based on residence. To reduce the number of cases where a person works in one group of cantons but resides in another one, we exclude zip codes in which more than 25% workers stem from one of the other groups of cantons according to the census in 2000. In the series, the dots corresponding to tax holidays are bigger and are blanked out (as tax holidays are called blank years in French and German).

Table A1: Date of Cantonal Referenda and Legislative Decisions on the Reform

| Holiday | Canton | Date | Share Yes | Turnout | Notes |
|----------------|--------|----------|-----------|---------|---------|
| <i>1997-98</i> | | | | | |
| | TG | 6/30/97 | | | no vote |
| <i>1998</i> | | | | | |
| | ZH | 6/8/97 | 58.85 | 38.4 | |
| <i>1999-00</i> | | | | | |
| | AG | 4/18/99 | 63.17 | 33.3 | |
| | AI | 4/25/99 | | | * |
| | BL | 6/13/99 | 65.19 | 47.57 | |
| | GR | 6/13/99 | 77.54 | 36.04 | |
| | OW | 10/24/99 | 61.91 | 26.93 | |
| | GL | 5/7/00 | | | * |
| | BE | 5/21/00 | 60.86 | 41.72 | |
| | AR | 5/21/00 | | | * |
| | UR | 5/21/00 | 67.11 | 45.42 | |
| | SH | 8/27/00 | 70.11 | 59.99 | |
| | SZ | 9/24/00 | 81.43 | 45.48 | |
| | ZG | 11/26/00 | 69.27 | 45.88 | |
| | NW** | 11/26/00 | 77.5 | 41.33 | |
| | SG | 4/9/98 | | | no vote |
| | LU | 11/22/99 | | | no vote |
| | FR | 6/6/00 | | | no vote |
| <i>2000</i> | | | | | |
| | SO | 6/30/99 | | | no vote |
| <i>2001-02</i> | | | | | |
| | VD | 7/4/00 | | | no vote |
| | TI | 7/6/01 | | | no vote |
| | VS | 9/13/01 | | | no vote |

Notes: Holidays refer to the cantonal (and municipal) income tax holidays. At the federal level all cantons had a two-year holiday. See text for details. In cantons where no popular vote was held, the date refers to the date when the cantonal parliament enacted the tax transition law. Popular votes or parliament votes were the very end of processes that had typically started many months earlier.

* In these cantons, votes are held at a cantonal assembly (*Landsgemeinde*), which is why statistics are not available.

** In NW there was no cantonal holiday.

Table A2: Macro Estimates of Tax Holiday Effects on Labor Supply of Female and Male Wage Earners

| | (1) Wage employees / population (in %) Men | (2) Wage earnings per employee Men | (3) Wage employees / population (in %) Women | (4) Wage earnings per employee Women |
|-------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| Panel A: Total sample | | | | |
| $\% \Delta[1 - \tau]$ | 13.2 | 27.6 | 12.5 | 26.3 |
| $\% \Delta y$ | -0.01 (0.19) | 1.01 (0.53) | -0.21 (0.45) | 0.48 (0.52) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.001 (0.014) | 0.037 (0.019) | -0.017 (0.036) | 0.018 (0.020) |
| Panel B: Married w/ children | | | | |
| $\% \Delta[1 - \tau]$ | 12.1 | 28.4 | 12.7 | 29.2 |
| $\% \Delta y$ | -0.06 (0.24) | 1.49 (0.90) | -0.89 (0.76) | 0.79 (0.93) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.005 (0.019) | 0.052 (0.032) | -0.071 (0.060) | 0.027 (0.032) |
| Panel C: Married no children | | | | |
| $\% \Delta[1 - \tau]$ | 15.7 | 32.8 | 15.9 | 32.9 |
| $\% \Delta y$ | -0.07 (0.22) | 1.05 (0.42) | 0.36 (0.65) | 0.53 (0.78) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.004 (0.014) | 0.032 (0.013) | 0.023 (0.041) | 0.016 (0.024) |
| Observations | 105 | 105 | 105 | 105 |
| Canton group FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Period FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Notes: The table presents estimates of the labor supply effects of the tax holiday based on regressions of the aggregate time series for all 5 groups of cantons on year dummies, canton group dummies, and an indicator which is 1 in the year in which municipal and cantonal taxes are zero. OLS standard errors are reported. The estimation sample covers the years 1990–2010 (*including* 1998). The outcome in columns (1) and (3) is the share of wage earners in the population (in %). The outcome in columns (2) and (4) is the average annual wage per employee with positive wage earnings. Columns (1) and (2) focus on men, columns (3) and (4) on women. Panel A is estimated using the full sample of adults aged 20–60. Panels B and C report effects for married individuals aged 20–60 with and without children, respectively. $\Delta\%y$ indicates the implied percent change in the outcome by dividing the estimated effect—the coefficient of the indicator of the tax holiday—by the average level of the outcome variable in the year of the tax holiday. The Frisch elasticity η^F is estimated by dividing $\% \Delta y$ by the estimated percent change in net-of-tax wage rates ($\% \Delta[1 - \tau]$) due to the tax holiday for the respective group. $\% \Delta[1 - \tau]$ is based on changes in average tax rates in column (1) and on changes in marginal tax rates in the remaining columns. For each individual, $\Delta\%[1 - \tau]$ is computed based on hypothetical marginal or average tax rates on the actual income earned during the tax-free years in the tax system in place prior to the tax holidays.

Table A3: Effect of Tax Holiday on Months Employed, Number of Jobs, Unemployment, and Between Canton-Group Migration

| VARIABLES | (1) Jobs per employee | (2) Months employed (employees) | (3) Unemployed / population (in %) | (4) Immigrant / population (in %) |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|---|
| Panel A: Total sample | | | | |
| Effect in blank year | -0.0031 (0.0052) | 0.0178 (0.0108) | -0.306 (0.239) | -0.020 (0.052) |
| $\Delta\%y$ | 0.14 | 0.15 | -6.25 | -4.80 |
| Panel B: Men | | | | |
| Effect in blank year | -0.0030 (0.0055) | 0.0173 (0.0112) | -0.307 (0.266) | -0.028 (0.048) |
| $\Delta\%y$ | 0.24 | 0.18 | -5.98 | -5.92 |
| Panel C: Women | | | | |
| Effect in blank year | -0.0031 (0.0054) | 0.0174 (0.0132) | -0.318 (0.223) | -0.010 (0.056) |
| $\Delta\%y$ | 0.02 | 0.10 | -6.49 | -3.88 |
| Panel D: Married women | | | | |
| Effect in blank year | -0.0033 (0.0066) | 0.0152 (0.0194) | -0.303 (0.180) | 0.012 (0.024) |
| $\Delta\%y$ | 0.13 | 0.08 | -8.97 | -1.60 |
| Panel E: Very high earners | | | | |
| Effect in blank year | -0.0029 (0.0154) | -0.0417 (0.0244) | 0.022 (0.109) | -0.107 (0.098) |
| $\Delta\%y$ | 0.23 | -0.11 | -18.53 | -36.65 |
| Observations | 105 | 105 | 105 | 105 |
| Canton group FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Period FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Notes: The table presents estimates of the tax holiday on labor supply based on regressions of the aggregate time series for the 5 main groups of cantons on year dummies, group dummies, and an indicator which is 1 in the year in which municipal and cantonal taxes are zero. The estimation sample covers the years 1990–2010 (*including* 1998). The dependent variable in column (1) is the number of jobs per employee. Distinct jobs are identified based on the number of distinct register entries with positive wage earnings in a given year. The dependent variable in column (2) is the number of months in employment per employee during the year. The dependent variable in column (3) is the number of individuals registered as unemployed at the Swiss public employment service as a fraction of the total population (in %). The dependent variable in column (4) is the number of persons moving into a canton of the respective canton group as a fraction of the total population (in %). Panel A reports effects for the total sample aged 20–60. Panel B and C report effects for males and females aged 20–60, respectively. Panel D reports effects for married women aged 20–60 only. Panel E reports effects for individuals with more than 200k average annual labor income in the 1994–1996 period. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A4: Macro Estimates of Labor Supply Effects by Pre-Holiday Labor Income Groups

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| | Employment rate (in %) | Earnings per person | Wage earnings per employee | Self-employment earnings per self employed |
| Panel A: 1–25k CHF | | | | |
| % Δy | -0.24 (0.37) | 0.72 (3.36) | 1.48 (2.98) | 5.11 (3.76) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.025 (0.038) | 0.034 (0.159) | 0.070 (0.141) | 0.237 (0.174) |
| Panel B: 25k–50k CHF | | | | |
| % Δy | -0.13 (0.24) | 0.34 (1.46) | 0.52 (1.41) | 6.14 (2.36) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.010 (0.020) | 0.013 (0.057) | 0.020 (0.054) | 0.238 (0.091) |
| Panel C: 50k–100k CHF | | | | |
| % Δy | -0.13 (0.18) | 0.41 (0.44) | 0.57 (0.60) | 7.98 (3.25) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.009 (0.012) | 0.013 (0.014) | 0.018 (0.019) | 0.262 (0.107) |
| Panel D: 100k–200k CHF | | | | |
| % Δy | -0.03 (0.36) | 1.65 (0.72) | 1.70 (0.85) | 10.88 (3.84) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.001 (0.016) | 0.037 (0.016) | 0.038 (0.019) | 0.248 (0.088) |
| Panel E: More than 200k CHF | | | | |
| % Δy | -0.05 (0.69) | 4.86 (1.69) | 5.03 (2.18) | 10.06 (2.82) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.002 (0.020) | 0.085 (0.030) | 0.088 (0.038) | 0.180 (0.051) |
| Observations | 105 | 105 | 105 | 80 |
| Canton group FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Period FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Notes: The table presents estimates of the tax holiday (TH) on labor supply based on regressions of the aggregate time series for the 5 groups of cantons on year dummies, group dummies, and an indicator which is 1 in the year in which municipal and cantonal taxes are zero. The estimation sample covers the years 1990–2010 in columns 1–3 and 1987–2010 in column (4) (*including* 1998). Columns (1) and (2) are estimated using the full sample of adults aged 20–60. Column 3 focuses on wage earners with average annual labor earnings above 100,000 CHF in 1994–1996. Column 4 is based on all individuals that have positive self-employment earnings in at least one period. The outcome in column (1) is the employment rate (in %). The outcome in column (2) is annual labor earnings per person (including individuals with zero earnings). The outcome in column (3) is the average wage per employee. The outcome in column (4) is average self-employment earnings (self-employment earnings of all individuals with positive self-employment earnings in a given year). Individuals are assigned to Panels A–E based on their average annual labor income in the 1994–1996 period. Individuals with zero earnings in 1994–1996 are dropped. The Frisch elasticity η^F is estimated by dividing % Δy (i.e. the estimated effect relative to the average level of the outcome variable in the year of the tax holiday) by the estimated percent change in net-of-tax wage rates (% $\Delta[1 - \tau]$) due to the tax holiday for the respective group. % $\Delta[1 - \tau]$ is based on changes in average tax rates in column (1) and on changes in marginal tax rates in the remaining columns. For each individual, % $\Delta[1 - \tau]$ is computed based on hypothetical marginal or average tax rates on the actual income earned during the tax-free years in the tax system in place prior to the tax holidays.

Table A5: Robustness Checks: Specification and Data Construction

| VARIABLES | (1) Employee 0/1 All | (2) Average wage earnings Men | (3) Average wage earnings Women | (4) Earnings per self-employed All |
|---|-------------------------------|--|--|---|
| Panel A: Baseline | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | -0.008 (0.004) | 3,409 (373) | 392 (221) | 7,709 (1,612) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.01 (0.005) | 0.04 (0.004) | 0.01 (0.004) | 0.22 (0.047) |
| Panel B: No controls | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | -0.019 (0.006) | 4,926 (821) | 1,328 (208) | 7,788 (2,240) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.02 (0.008) | 0.05 (0.008) | 0.03 (0.004) | 0.23 (0.066) |
| Panel C: Controlling for income shifting | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | -0.010 (0.006) | 3,601 (544) | 625 (215) | 7,459 (1,663) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.01 (0.007) | 0.04 (0.005) | 0.01 (0.004) | 0.22 (0.049) |
| Panel D: Controlling for unemployment | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | -0.009 (0.004) | 3,411 (374) | 403 (234) | 6,930 (1,638) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.01 (0.005) | 0.04 (0.004) | 0.01 (0.005) | 0.21 (0.048) |
| Panel E: No imputed | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | -0.010 (0.004) | 3,497 (376) | 353 (204) | 11,018 (2,050) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.01 (0.005) | 0.04 (0.004) | 0.01 (0.004) | 0.29 (0.055) |
| Panel F: Only second year | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | -0.007 (0.005) | 3,811 (564) | 374 (95) | 12,124 (2,095) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.01 (0.006) | 0.04 (0.006) | 0.01 (0.002) | 0.36 (0.062) |
| Panel G: Only 2001/02 | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | 0.004 (0.013) | 3,345 (1,890) | 557 (630) | 6,636 (1,559) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | 0.01 (0.016) | 0.04 (0.019) | 0.01 (0.013) | 0.19 (0.045) |
| Panel H: Uncapped earnings | | | | |
| $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ | -0.008 (0.004) | 3,543 (489) | 410 (195) | 7,291 (2,078) |
| Frisch elasticity η^F | -0.01 (0.005) | 0.04 (0.005) | 0.01 (0.004) | 0.21 (0.060) |

Notes: The table illustrates the robustness of our main results. It presents semi-elasticities derived from individual-level IV regressions of labor supply outcomes on person and year fixed effects and $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$, where τ is the average tax rate in column (1) and the marginal tax rate in the other columns. $\log(1 - \tau_{it})$ is instrumented with an indicator variable which is 1 in the year in which municipal and cantonal taxes are zero due to the tax holiday (equation 1). The dependent variable in column (1) is an indicator whether a person has positive wage income in a given year. The dependent variable in columns (2) and (3) is average wages of males (column 2) and females (column 3) with positive wage income in a given year. The dependent variable in column (4) is annual self-employment income per person (including 0) in a given year. The first panel presents our baseline results (see Tables 3 and 5 for the definition of the estimation samples). Panel B excludes the control variables included in the baseline. Panel C contains two control variables absorbing effects of the tax holiday in the year before and after the tax holiday, thus accounting for possible effects of the tax holidays on income shifting. In Panel D, we control for the cantonal unemployment rate (based on register data). In Panel E, we discard observations with imputed place of residence. In Panel F, the effect is only identified from the response in the second cantonal blank year, controlling for the effect in the first. Similarly, Panel G identifies the effect only from the response in late-coming cantons with tax holidays in 2001 and 2002. Panel H uses wage and self-employment incomes that are not capped at 2.5 Mio. in 2010 CHF. Standard errors are clustered on the level of commuting zones. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A6: Effect of Tax Holiday on Earnings, Wage Rates, Hours Worked, and Bonus Payments (Wage Structure Survey)

| VARIABLES | (1) Hours worked | (2) Hourly wage | (3) Earnings | (4) Bonus 5K+ |
|--|------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Panel A: All workers | | | | |
| Effect in blank year | 0.218 (0.324) | 0.164 (0.185) | 0.036 (0.040) | 0.007 (0.004) |
| % Δy | 0.1% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 9.4% |
| Panel B: Individual contract | | | | |
| Effect in blank year | 0.754 (0.430) | 0.327 (0.204) | 0.077 (0.047) | 0.007 (0.006) |
| % Δy | 0.5% | 0.9% | 1.3% | 7.2% |
| Panel C: Collective agreement | | | | |
| Effect in blank year | -0.535 (0.541) | 0.080 (0.282) | 0.018 (0.043) | 0.013** (0.005) |
| % Δy | -0.3% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 32.7% |
| Panel D: Examining/Advising/Attesting | | | | |
| Effect in blank year | 1.138 (0.659) | 2.035*** (0.441) | 0.419*** (0.110) | 0.021 (0.017) |
| % Δy | 0.7% | 4.3% | 4.8% | 8.1% |
| Observations | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 |
| Canton group FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Period FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Canton group trends | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Notes: The table presents estimates of the tax holiday on labor supply and wages based on regressions of aggregate time series for three groups of cantons (cantons which transitioned in 1999, in 2001 and in 2003) on year dummies, group dummies, linear time trends interacted with group dummies, and an indicator which is 1 in the year in which municipal and cantonal taxes are zero. The estimation is based on the wage structure surveys (LSE) 1994–2010 carried out bi-annually. The dependent variable in column (1) is earnings in 2010 CHF in October of each year. Earnings include regular salaries and overtime and other variable pay components (e.g. bonuses). The dependent variable in column (2) is hourly wages, computed from October salaries in each year excluding overtime and variable pay components (e.g. bonuses). The dependent variable in column (3) is employer-reported hours worked per worker in October. Hours worked refer to contractual (i.e. normal) hours worked for workers with monthly wages and to actual hours worked for workers paid by the hour. The dependent variable in column (4) is the fraction of employees with bonuses above 5,000 in 2010 CHF. Panel A reports results for all employees aged 20–60 with Swiss passport or residency permit C in the dataset, excluding public sector employees. Panel B is restricted to workers with individual wage contract. Panel C is restricted to workers falling under a collective (firm-, occupation-, or industry-wide) bargaining agreement. Panel D is restricted to workers in jobs with the main activities examining, advising, and attesting.