Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving Online Appendix

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Abstract

1 Appendix A - Mathematical Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1a. The function $U(g)$ is globally strictly concave in g. Hence, there will be a unique solution to the maximization problem (if the solution exists, which we prove below). If $a \leq \underline{\underline{a}}(S)$, then $U'(0) \leq 0$ and hence, since $U'(\cdot)$ is strictly decreasing on the interval $[0, \infty)$ because of concavity, $g^* = 0$ follows. If $\underline{\underline{a}}(S) < a < \underline{a}(S)$, then $U'(0) > 0$ and hence $g^* > 0$ using the first inequality; using the second inequality, $U'_-(g^s) < 0$ and hence $g^* < g^s$. If $\underline{a}(S) \leq a \leq \bar{a}$, then $U'_-(g^s) \geq 0$ and $U'_+(g^s) \leq 0$ which by strict concavity of U implies $g^* = g^s$. Finally, if $a > \bar{a} > 0$, then $U'_+(g^s) > 0$ which implies $g^* > g^s$; in addition, g^* is finite given the assumption $\lim_{g \to \infty} v'(g, G_{-i}) = 0$. Finally, to show that g^* is weakly increasing in a, notice that in cases (ii) and (iv) where the solution is interior, the implicit function theorem implies $dg^*/da = -v'(g^*, G_{-i}) / (u''(W - g^*) + av''_g(g^*, G_{-i})) > 0$.

Proof of Lemma 1b. Parts (i) and (ii), as well as the monotonicity of g^*_m in a, follow the proof of Lemma 1a, with the difference that the relevant threshold to determine giving is a_m. To show (iii), consider that, for any $g > 0$ and $a > a_m (> 0)$, the marginal utility of giving θg in person (if at home) is larger than the marginal utility of giving g via mail (if not at home) since $U'(\theta g, 0) = -u'(w - \theta g) + av'(\theta g) + S1_{\{\theta g \leq g^s\}} > -u'(w - g) + a\theta v'(\theta g) = U'(0, g)$. This holds in particular for $g = g^*_m$, and hence $U'(\theta g^*_m, 0) > U'(0, g^*_m) = 0$, and thus $g^* > \theta g^*_m > 0$ by strict concavity of U. For $\underline{\underline{a}}(S) < a \leq a_m$, $g^* > g^*_m = 0$. Finally, for $a \leq \underline{\underline{a}}(S)$, $g^* = g^*_m = 0$, which completes the proof of (iii). For the case $\theta = 0$, $U'(g_m) < 0$ for all g_m and hence $g^*_m = 0$.

Proof of Lemma 2. The optimal probability of being at home (when interior) satisfies:

$$c'(h) = [u(W - g^*(a)) - u(W - g^*_m(a)) + av(g^*(a), G_{-i}) - av(\theta g^*_m(a), G_{-i})] - s(g^*(a)) \tag{1}$$

Because $c'(h)$ is strictly increasing, this expression can be inverted to yield a unique solution, which we denote by $H^*(a, S)$. Taking into account corner solutions, the solution is $h^*(a, S) = \max[\min[H^*(a, S), 1], 0]$.

The strategy of proof is to first solve for the extreme cases $a \leq \underline{\underline{a}}$ and $a > \bar{a}$, and then characterize the solution for the intermediate range using continuity and monotonicity. For the case $a \leq \underline{\underline{a}}(S)$, $g^*(a) = 0$ by Lemma 1a and $g^*_m(a) = 0$ by Lemma 1b; hence, the term in brackets is zero. If $S = 0$, then $h^*(a, 0) = H^*(a, 0) = h_0$ for $a \leq \underline{\underline{a}}(0)$. If $S > 0$, then the second term equals $-Sg^s < 0$ and thus $h^*(a, S) < h_0$ for $a \leq \underline{\underline{a}}(S)$.

For the case $a > \bar{a}$, the right-hand-side expression in (1) is the difference between the utility of giving g^* in person, $u(W - g^*(a)) + av(g^*(a), G_{-i})$, and the utility of giving g^*_m via mail, $u(W - g^*_m(a)) - av(\theta g^*_m(a), G_{-i})$. For the first term, the inequality $u(W - g^*(a)) + av(g^*(a), G_{-i}) > u(W - g) + av(g, G_{-i})$ holds for any $g \neq g^*$, because for $a > \bar{a}$, the agent would strictly prefer g^* to any other g even in absence of the $s(g)$ term. This inequality holds in particular for $g = \theta g^*_m$, and hence $u(W - g^*(a)) + av(g^*(a), G_{-i}) > u(W - \theta g^*_m(a)) +$

$av(\theta g_m^*(a), G_{-i}) \geq u(W - g_m^*(a)) + av(\theta g_m^*(a), G_{-i})$, where the last inequality follows since $0 \leq \theta < 1$. This implies that $h^*(a, S) > h_0$ for $a > \bar{a}$.

Next, we show that the right-hand-side expression in (1), which is continuous in a, is also monotonically increasing in a for $a > \underline{\underline{a}}(S)$ by an application of the envelope theorem. For given S, differentiating the right-hand-side expression in (1) with respect to a, we obtain

$$\frac{dg^*}{da}\left[-u'(W - g^*) + av'(g^*) - \frac{ds(g^*)}{dg^*}\right] - \frac{dg_m^*}{da}\left[-u'(W - g_m^*) + a\theta v'(\theta g_m^*)\right] + \left[v(g^*(a), G_{-i}) - v(\theta g_m^*(a), G_{-i})\right] \quad (2)$$

The first term in (2) is zero because (a) at the interior solutions for g^* (cases (ii) and (iv) of Lemma 1a), the term $-u'(W - g^*) + av'(g^*) - \frac{ds(g^*)}{dg^*}$ is zero by the f.o.c. w.r.t. g^*, (b) in the region for which $g^* = g_s$ (case (iii) in Lemma 1a), $dg^*/da = 0$. The second term in (2) is also zero by virtue of $-u'(W - g_m^*) + a\theta v'(\theta g_m^*) = 0$ being the f.o.c. for g_m^*. Hence, expression (2) equals the third term, which is positive because $g^*(a) > \theta g_m^*(a)$ by Lemma 1b for $a > \underline{\underline{a}}(S)$.

Given that the right-hand-side expression in (1) is increasing in a, it follows that $H^*(a, S)$ is also monotonically increasing in a, and hence $h^*(a, S)$ is non-decreasing in a. For the case $S = 0$, given that $h^*(a, 0) = h_0$ for $a \leq \underline{\underline{a}}(0)$, it follows that $h^*(a, 0) > h_0$ for $a > \underline{\underline{a}}(0)$ (remember $h_0 < 1$). For the case $S > 0$, given that $h^*(a, S) < h_0$ for $a \leq \underline{\underline{a}}(S)$ and $h^*(a, S) > h_0$ for $a > \bar{a}$, the Intermediate Value Theorem implies that there exists a point $a_0(S) \in (\underline{\underline{a}}(S), \bar{a})$ such that the right-hand-side expression in (1) is exactly zero. At such point, $h^*(a_0(S), S) = h_0$ and, by monotonicity of the expression in (1) with respect to a, $h^*(a, S) < h_0$ for $a < a_0(S)$ and $h^*(a, S) > h_0$ for $a > a_0(S)$ follow. Uniqueness of $a_0(S)$ follows from the monotonicity of h^* in a.

Proof of Lemma 3. For $a > a_0(S)$, by definition of $a_0(S)$ (Lemma 2), the agent prefers to meet the solicitor rather than not, which is the reason why even at cost $c(h^*)$ she set $h^* > h_0$ (Lemma 2). Hence, the agent will never want to opt out. For $S > 0$ and $a < a_0(S)$, conversely, the agent prefers not to meet the solicitor rather, which is the reason why even at cost $c(h^*)$ she set $h^* < h_0$ (Lemma 2). Hence, she prefers to opt out, which yields the utility from not meeting the solicitor, without incurring cost $c(h)$. Finally, for the case $a = a_0(S)$ or the case $S = 0$ and $a < a_0(0) = \underline{\underline{a}}$, the agent is indifferent between meeting the solicitor and not. (Recall that for $S = 0$ and $a < a_0(0) = \underline{\underline{a}}(0)$, $g^* = 0$ and $g_m^* = 0$). Hence, the agent is indifferent between opting out and not, and we break the indifference by assuming no opting out.

Proof of Proposition 1. We start from comparing $P(H)_F$ and $P(H)_{OO}$. For $S = 0$, $a_{OO} = -\infty$ and hence $P(H)_F = P(H)_{OO}$. For $S > 0$, $P(H)_F \geq P(H)_{OO}$ follows from $h^*(a, S) \geq 0$. We turn to comparing $P(H)_{NF}$ and $P(H)_F$, which depends on $h_0 \gtrless \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} h^*(a, S) dF$. In the case of Altruism and No Social Pressure, $h^*(a; S) = h_0$ for $a \leq a_0(0) = \underline{\underline{a}}(0)$ and $h^*(a, S) > h_0$ for $a > a_0(0) = \underline{\underline{a}}(0)$ (Lemma 2 for $S = 0$). Given $1 - F(\underline{\underline{a}}(0)) > 0$, this

implies $P(H)_F > P(H)_{NF}$. In the case of Social Pressure and Limited Altruism, $h^*(a,S) < h_0$ for $a < a_0(S)$ (Lemma 2 for $S > 0$). Given $F(a_0(S)) = 1$, this implies $P(H)_{NF} > P(H)_F$.

Proof of Proposition 2. We start from comparing $P(G)_F$ and $P(G)_{OO}$. Because $h^*(a,S) \geq 0$ for all a and $a_0(S) \geq \underline{\underline{a}}(S)$, $P(G)_F \geq P(G)_{OO}$ follows, with $P(G)_F = P(G)_{OO}$ for $S = 0$ (given $a_0(0) = \underline{\underline{a}}(0)$). We turn to comparing $P(G)_{NF}$ and $P(G)_F$, which depends on $h_0[1 - F(\underline{\underline{a}}(S))] \gtrless \int_{\underline{\underline{a}}(S)}^{\infty} h^*(a,S)dF$. In the case of Altruism and No Social Pressure, $h^*(a,0) > h_0$ for $a > a_0(0) = \underline{\underline{a}}(0)$ (Lemma 2 for $S = 0$). Given $1 - F\left(\underline{\underline{a}}(0)\right) > 0$, this implies $P(G)_F > P(G)_{NF}$. In the case of Social Pressure and Limited Altruism, given $F(a_0(S)) = 1$, the inequality becomes $h_0[F(a_0(S)) - F(\underline{\underline{a}}(S))] \gtrless \int_{\underline{\underline{a}}(S)}^{a_0(S)} h^*(a,S)dF$ which, using $F(a_0(S)) - F(\underline{\underline{a}}(S)) > 0$ and $h^*(a,S) < h_0$ for $a < a_0(S)$ (Lemma 2 for $S > 0$), implies $P(H)_{NF} > P(H)_F$.

Proof of Proposition 3. The conditional probability of giving in the NF treatment is $P(G|H)_{NF} = 1 - F(\underline{\underline{a}}(S))$. The conditional probability of giving in the F treatment is

$$P(G|H)_F = \frac{(1-r)h_0\left(1 - F(\underline{\underline{a}}(S))\right) + r\int_{\underline{\underline{a}}(S)}^{\infty} h^*(a,S)dF}{(1-r)h_0 + r\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} h^*(a,S)dF}.$$

The inequality $P(G|H)_F \geq P(G|H)_{NF}$ reduces to $\int_{\underline{\underline{a}}(S)}^{\infty} h^*(a,S)dF / \int_{\underline{\underline{a}}(S)}^{\infty} dF \geq \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} h^*(a,S)dF$ after simple algebra. That is, if the probability of being at home conditional on seeing a flyer and having $a > \underline{\underline{a}}(S)$ is greater than the probability of being at home conditional on just seeing a flyer. The inequality $P(G|H)_F \geq P(G|H)_{NF}$ follows because $h^*(\cdot,S)$ is non-decreasing in a (Lemma 2). To prove $P(G|H)_{OO} \geq P(G|H)_{NF}$, consider two cases: (i) for $S = 0$, the agent never opts out and hence $P(G|H)_{OO} = P(G|H)_F \geq P(G|H)_{NF}$; (ii) for $S > 0$, the inequality $P(G|H)_{OO} \geq P(G|H)_{NF}$ can be rewritten as $(1-r)h_0\left(1 - F(\underline{\underline{a}}(S))\right) + r\int_{a_0(S)}^{\infty} h^*(a,S)dF \geq [(1-r)h_0 + r\int_{a_0(S)}^{\infty} h^*(a,S)dF](1 - F(\underline{\underline{a}}(S)))$, which simplifies to $rF(\underline{\underline{a}}(S))\int_{a_0(S)}^{\infty} h^*(a,S)dF \geq 0$, which always holds.

Proof of Proposition 4. (i) The probability of a large donation $P(G^{HI})$ satisfies $P(G^{HI})_{NF} = (1 - F(\bar{a}))h_0$ and $P(G^{HI})_F = (1-r)(1 - F(\bar{a}))h_0 + r\int_{\bar{a}}^{\infty} h^*(a,S)dF = P(G^{HI})_{OO}$. Because $h^*(a,S) > h_0$ for $a > \bar{a}$ (Lemma 2), $P(G^{HI})_F$ and $P(G^{HI})_{OO}$ are strictly greater than $P(G^{HI})_{NF}$ when $F(\bar{a}) < 1$ and equal (to zero) otherwise. (ii) The probability of a small donation $P(G^{LO})$ satisfies $P(G^{LO})_{NF} = (F(\bar{a}) - F(\underline{\underline{a}}(S)))h_0$, $P(G^{LO})_F = (1 - r)(F(\bar{a}) - F(\underline{\underline{a}}(S)))h_0 + r\int_{\underline{\underline{a}}(S)}^{\bar{a}} h^*(a,S)dF$, and $P(G^{LO})_{OO} = (1-r)(F(\bar{a}) - F(\underline{\underline{a}}(S)))h_0 + r\int_{a_0(S)}^{\bar{a}} h^*(a,S)dF$. For $S = 0$, $a_0(0) = \underline{\underline{a}}(0)$ and hence $P(G^{LO})_F = P(G^{LO})_{OO}$. For $S > 0$, $P(G^{LO})_F > P(G^{LO})_{OO}$ as long as $F(a_0(S)) - F(\underline{\underline{a}}(S)) > 0$.

Proof of Proposition 5. The unconditional probability of giving via mail $P(G_m)$ satisfies $P(G_m)_{NF} = 0$, $P(G_m)_F = r\int_{a_m}^{\infty}(1 - h^*(a,S))dF$, and $P(G_m)_{OO} = r\int_{a_0(S)}^{\infty}(1 - h^*(a,S))dF + r\left[F(a_0(S)) - F(a_m)\right] \cdot 1_{a_0 > a_m}$. All types that are notified by the flyer (probability r) and are not at home (probability $1 - h$) will give if the altruism level a is above a_m (Lemma

1b). In the NF condition, this never occurs since $r = 0$. In the F condition, instead, givers are notified and the probability of being at home is determined by $h^*(a, S)$; hence, trivially, $P(G_m)_F \geq P(G_m)_{NF}$. In the OO condition, the probability is the same except over the range $[a_m, a_0(S)]$, where the individual opts out (Lemma 2), and hence $1 - h^* = 1$. (Notice that this range may not exist).

2 Appendix B - Recruitment of Solicitor and Surveyors

Solicitors and surveyors were recruited from the student body at the University of Chicago, UIC, and Chicago State University via flyers posted around campus, announcements on a university electronic bulletin board, and email advertisements to student list hosts. All potential solicitors were told that they would be paid $9.50 per hour during training and employment. Interested solicitors were instructed to contact the research assistants to schedule an interview.

Initial fifteen-minute interviews were conducted in private offices in the Chicago Booth School of Business. Upon arrival to the interview, students completed an application form and a short questionnaire. In addition to questions about undergraduate major, GPA, and previous work experience, the job application included categorical-response questions—scaled from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree—providing information about personality traits of the applicant: assertiveness, sociability, self-efficacy, performance motivation, and self-confidence. Before the interview began, the interviewer explained the purpose of the fund-raising campaign or survey and the nature of the work. The interview consisted of a brief review of the applicant's work experience, followed by questions relating to his or her confidence in soliciting donations. All applicants were offered some form of employment.

Once hired, all solicitors and surveyors attended a 45-minute training session. Each training session was conducted by the same researcher and covered either soliciting or surveying. The soliciting training sessions provided background of the charities and reviewed the organization's mission statement. Solicitors received a copy of the informational brochure for each charity in the study. Once solicitors were familiarized with the charities, the trainer reviewed the data collection procedures. Solicitors were provided with a copy of the data record sheet which included lines to record the race, gender, and approximate age of potential donors, along with their contribution level. The trainer stressed the importance of recording contribution and non-contribution data immediately upon conclusion of each household visit. Next, the trainer reviewed the solicitation script. At the conclusion of the training session, the solicitors practiced their script with a partner and finally in front of the trainer and the other solicitors.

Training sessions for surveyors followed a similar procedure. Surveyors were provided with copies of the data record sheets. The trainer reviewed the data collection procedure and stressed the importance of recording all responses immediately upon conclusion of each household visit. The trainer then reviewed both the script and the survey that the surveyors would be conducting. The surveyors then practiced the script and survey with the trainer.

3 Appendix C - Charity and Survey Scripts

La Rabida Children's Hospital [ECU] Script

(If a minor answers the door, please ask to speak to a parent. Never enter a house.)

"Hi, my name is _____. I am a student volunteering for the University of Chicago visiting Chicago area households today on behalf of La Rabida Children's Hospital [*the East Carolina University Center for Natural Hazards Research.*].

(Hand brochure to the resident.)

La Rabida is one of Illinois' foremost children's hospitals, dedicated to caring for children with chronic illnesses, disabilities, or who have been abused or neglected. La Rabida's mission is to provide family-centered care that goes beyond a child's medical needs to help them experience as normal a childhood as possible - regardless of a family's ability to pay. La Rabida is a non-profit organization.

[*The ECU Center provides support and coordination for research on natural hazard risks, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and flooding. The ECU Center's mission is to reduce the loss of life and property damages due to severe weather events through research, outreach, and public education work.*]

To help La Rabida [*the ECU Center*] fulfill its mission, we are collecting contributions for La Rabida Children's hospital [*the ECU Center for Natural Hazards Research*] today.

Would you like to make a contribution today?

(If you receive a contribution, please write a receipt that includes their name and contribution amount.)

[AFTER they decide whether or not to give]:

If I may ask you one quick question - did you see our flyer on your door yesterday?

[Record answer in log]

If you have questions regarding La Rabida [*the ECU Center*] or want additional information, there is a phone number and web site address provided in this brochure. Thank you."

Survey Script (2008)

(If a minor answers the door, ask to speak to an adult. Never enter a house.)

Hi, my name is _____, and I am a student working for the University of Chicago. I am working for a professor who is doing research on people's pro-social behavior.

We are conducting confidential ____ minute surveys in _____ today. [*You would be paid $___ for your participation.*] Do you think you might be interested?

If not interested: Thank you for your time. If I may ask you one quick question, though – did you see our flyer on your door? [Show door-hanger and record answer in your log]

If interested: Great! Before we get started, I'd like to tell you a little bit about the survey and what we are doing to keep your answers confidential. First, we will not put your name on the survey. Second, when we put your answers in our computer, we will not enter your address

information. Third, the computerized data will not be shared with third parties outside of this research project without your consent. So there is a very low risk of a breach of the confidentiality of your answers. Also, I'd like to make sure that you know that you don't have to answer any questions you're uncomfortable with, and you can stop your participation in this survey at any time. Finally, if you have any questions about your rights in this research study you can contact the University's Institutional Review Board, and I can provide you their contact information later.

So, would you like to take the survey?

If yes: Great! Let's get started.

If no: Thank you for your time. If I may ask you one quick question, though – did you see our flyer on your door? [Show door-hanger and record answer in your log]

[If they ask for IRB contact information, give it to them: Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board, The University of Chicago, 5835 South Kimbark- Judd Hall, Chicago, IL 60637, Phone: +1 773 834-7835]

[After they are done: - Pay $___, if applicable; - Have them sign the payment sheet; - Thank them; - Record the outcome in your log.]

4 Appendix D - Additional Tables

See the text for references to the Online Appendix Tables 1-4.

Online Appendix Table 1. Results for Fund-Raising Treatments: Robustness

Specification:	OLS Regressions											
Dep. Var.:	Indicator for Answering the Door			Indicator for Giving			Indicator for Giving Small Amount (≤ $10)			Indicator for Giving Large Amount (> $10)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Flyer Treatment	-0.0387	-0.0388	-0.0383	-0.0011	-0.0009	-0.0015	-0.0033	-0.0032	-0.0027	0.0022	0.0023	0.0012
	(0.0137)***	(0.0137)***	(0.0140)***	(0.0062)	(0.0062)	(0.0063)	(0.0052)	(0.0051)	(0.0053)	(0.0035)	(0.0035)	(0.0035)
Flyer with opt out Treatment	-0.0967	-0.0966	-0.0984	-0.0195	-0.0197	-0.0204	-0.0193	-0.0194	-0.0191	-0.0002	-0.0003	-0.0013
	(0.0194)***	(0.0193)***	(0.0195)***	(0.0084)**	(0.0083)**	(0.0085)**	(0.0081)**	(0.0080)**	(0.0082)**	(0.0051)	(0.0051)	(0.0052)
Indicator ECU Charity	0.0088			-0.0249			-0.0127			-0.0123		
	(0.0143)			(0.0049)***			(0.0053)**			(0.0032)***		
Omitted Treatment		No-Flyer			No-Flyer			No-Flyer			No-Flyer	
Mean of Dep. Var. for Omitted Treatment		0.413			0.0717			0.0414			0.0215	
Fixed Effects for Area Rating, Solicitor, Date*Location, Hour	X	X		X	X		X	X		X	X	
Fixed Effects for Area Rating, Solicitor*Date*Location, Hour			X			X			X			X
N	N = 7668	N = 7668	N = 7668	N = 7668	N = 7668	N = 7668	N = 7668	N = 7668	N = 7668	N = 7668	N = 7668	N = 7668

Notes: Estimates for a linear probability model, with standard errors clustered by solicitor-date, in parentheses. For each dependent variable, the first regression reproduces the benchmark specification of Table 2, the second column includes the same specification, but does not control for the ECU indicator, and the thid column present results for a specification with fixed effects for solicitor*date*location. In this third column, the ECU dummy drops out because on a given date, a solicitor only raises money for one of the two charities. The omitted treatment is the Baseline No-Flyer fund-raising treatment.

Online Appendix Table 2. Results for Fund-Raising Treatments: By Time Period

Specification:	OLS Regressions											
Dep. Var.:	Indicator for Answering the Door			Indicator for Giving			Indicator for Giving Small Amount (≤ $10)			Indicator for Giving Large Amount (> $10)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Flyer Treatment	-0.0361	-0.0428	-0.022	-0.0045	-0.0013	0.0186	-0.0062	0.0004	0.0039	0.0018	-0.0017	0.0147
	(0.0291)	(0.0159)**	(0.0345)	(0.0116)	(0.0094)	(0.0103)*	(0.0101)	(0.0079)	(0.0077)	(0.0067)	(0.0049)	(0.0087)
Flyer with opt out Treatment	-0.1023		-0.0828	-0.0254		-0.0095	-0.0261		-0.0161	0.0007		0.0066
	(0.0280)***		(0.0353)**	(0.0134)*		(0.0136)	(0.0124)**		(0.0095)	(0.0071)		(0.0101)
Indicator ECU Charity	-0.004		0.0836	-0.0244		-0.0176	-0.0086		-0.0127	-0.0158		-0.0050
	(0.0170)		(0.0417)*	(0.0079)***		(0.0101)	(0.0065)		(0.0069)*	(0.0042)***		(0.0067)
Omitted Treatment		No-Flyer			No-Flyer			No-Flyer			No-Flyer	
Mean of Dep. Var. for Omitted Treatment	0.4267	0.3951	0.3731	0.0961	0.0578	0.0448	0.0586	0.0344	0.0299	0.0375	0.0234	0.0149
Time period	4/08-6/08	7/08-8/08	9/08-10/08	4/08-6/08	7/08-8/08	9/08-10/08	4/08-6/08	7/08-8/08	9/08-10/08	4/08-6/08	7/08-8/08	9/08-10/08
Fixed Effects for Area Rating, Solicitor, Date*Location, Hour	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
N	N = 3058	N = 3056	N = 1554	N = 3058	N = 3056	N = 1554	N = 3058	N = 3056	N = 1554	N = 3058	N = 3056	N = 1554

Notes: Estimates for a linear probability model, with standard errors clustered by solicitor-date, in parentheses. For each dependent variable, the three columns reproduce the benchmark specification of Table 2 in the specified time period. The omitted treatment is the La Rabida No-Flyer fund-raising treatment.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Online Appendix Table 3. Minimum Distance Estimates: Robustness (Censored Normal Distribution of Altruism)

	Censored Normal Distribution of Altruism for Charity					
	Benchmark Estimates	**More Detailed Giving Moments**	**Less Detailed Giving Moments**	**No Survey Moments**	**Only Survey Moments**	**Identity Weighting Matrix**
Common Parameters	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prob. Observing Flyer (r)	0.341	0.343	0.339	0.270	0.376	0.309
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.012)
Elasticity of Home Presence (eta)	0.040	0.048	0.033	0.062	0.036	0.047
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.018)
Survey Parameters						
Mean Utility (in $) of Doing 10-Minute Survey	-26.863	-26.163	-28.064	-	-28.181	-26.699
	(4.204)	(4.123)	(4.945)	-	(5.075)	(5.403)
Std. Dev. of Utility of Doing 10-Minute Survey	29.591	29.289	30.394	-	31.367	29.644
	(5.129)	(5.037)	(5.593)	-	(5.838)	(6.248)
Social Pressure Cost of Saying No to Survey	6.197	5.319	7.227	-	6.007	5.097
	(1.492)	(1.518)	(2.38)	-	(2.176)	(1.833)

Charity Parameters	La Rabida	ECU	La Rabida	ECU	La Rabida	ECU	La Rabida	ECU	La Rabida	ECU	La Rabida	ECU
Share with Zero Altruism	0.753	0.763	0.751	0.749	0.791	0.822	0.718	0.710	-	-	0.797	0.841
	(0.048)	(0.071)	(0.062)	(0.095)	(0.053)	(0.072)	(0.07)	(0.106)	-	-	(0.09)	(0.095)
Mean Altruism *a*, Conditional on a>0	12.786	9.659	12.738	9.410	12.245	9.324	14.054	10.590	-	-	10.946	9.881
	(1.444)	(1.485)	(1.541)	(1.574)	(1.266)	(1.369)	(1.946)	(2.032)	-	-	(3.339)	(3.385)
Std. Dev. of Altruism *a*, Conditional on a>0	10.545	7.994	10.498	7.751	10.226	7.870	11.458	8.611	-	-	9.159	8.396
	(1.038)	(1.103)	(1.072)	(1.107)	(0.919)	(1.077)	(1.338)	(1.418)	-	-	(2.539)	(2.628)
Curvature of Altruism Function	10.606		10.340		8.079		14.026		-		6.630	
	(4.466)		(5.168)		(4.442)		(6.267)		-		(9.231)	
Social Pressure Cost of Giving 0 in Person	3.751	1.438	2.911	0.694	5.089	2.460	3.330	1.289	-	-	3.950	2.445
	(0.581)	(0.784)	(0.685)	(0.669)	(2.328)	(2.263)	(0.668)	(0.711)	-	-	(1.481)	(1.651)
Welfare and Decomposition of Giving												
Average Welfare per Househ. of Fund-Raiser (in $)	-1.102	-0.442	-0.778	-0.149	-1.543	-0.818	-0.992	-0.409	-	-	-1.134	-0.737
	(0.145)	(0.301)	(0.174)	(0.257)	(0.76)	(0.869)	(0.17)	(0.274)	-	-	(0.379)	(0.591)
Share of Givers who Seek The Fund-raiser	0.518	0.528	0.556	0.633	0.520	0.502	0.504	0.507	-	-	0.551	0.567
	(0.041)	(0.095)	(0.042)	(0.143)	(0.042)	(0.102)	(0.04)	(0.096)	-	-	(0.13)	(0.134)

Notes: Estimates from minimum-distance estimator with moments listed in Appendix Table 1 and benchmark modelling assumptions, including a censored normal distribution for the altruism parameter a. Notice that the share with zero altruism is not a separate parameter, but it is the share implied by the censoring of a at a=0. Benchmark estimates in Column (1) use giving moments (0,10), 10, (10,20], (20,50], 50+. Estimates in Column (2) use giving moments (0,3], (3,7], (7,10], (10,20], (20,50], 50+. Estimates in Column (3) use giving moments (0,10], (10,20], (20,50], 50+. Estimates in Column (4) do not use any of the survey moments, while estimates in Column (5) only use the survey moments. Estimates in Column (6) use the identity weighting matrix as weighting matrix in the minimum distance estimator. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Online Appendix Table 4. Minimum Distance Estimates: Robustness (Exponential Distribution of Altruism)

	Exponential Distribution of Altruism for Charity											
	Benchmark Estimates with Exp.		More Detailed Giving Moments		Less Detailed Giving Moments		No Survey Moments		Only Survey Moments		Identity Weighting Matrix	
Common Parameters	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
Prob. Observing Flyer (r)	0.340		0.341		0.340		0.272		0.376		0.309	
	(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.012)	
Elasticity of Home Presence (eta)	0.034		0.039		0.034		0.042		0.036		0.044	
	(0.008)		(0.01)		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.015)	
Survey Parameters												
Mean Utility (in $) of Doing 10-Minute Survey	-27.771		-27.030		-27.903		-		-28.181		-26.961	
	(4.332)		(4.199)		(4.881)		-		(5.075)		(5.451)	
Std. Dev. of Utility of Doing 10-Minute Survey	30.166		29.709		30.224		-		31.367		29.802	
	(5.296)		(5.149)		(5.523)		-		(5.838)		(6.3)	
Social Pressure Cost of Saying No to Survey	6.990		6.292		7.086		-		6.007		5.403	
	(1.416)		(1.384)		(2.343)		-		(2.176)		(1.793)	
Charity Parameters	La Rabida	ECU	La Rabida	ECU	La Rabida	ECU	La Rabida	ECU	La Rabida	ECU	La Rabida	ECU
Share with Zero Altruism	0.807	0.846	0.817	0.852	0.815	0.866	0.803	0.843	-	-	0.807	0.853
	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.03)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.04)	(0.028)	(0.039)	-	-	(0.089)	(0.095)
Mean Altruism *a* , Conditional on a>0	9.838	7.103	10.052	7.079	9.697	7.309	10.084	7.197	-	-	10.109	9.062
	(0.541)	(0.929)	(0.507)	(0.79)	(0.546)	(1.01)	(0.585)	(0.974)	-	-	(2.274)	(2.298)
Std. Dev. of Altruism *a,* Conditional on a>0	9.838	7.103	10.052	7.079	9.697	7.309	10.084	7.197	-	-	10.109	9.062
	0.541	0.929	0.507	0.790	0.546	1.010	0.585	0.974	-	-	2.274	2.298
Curvature of Altruism Function	4.033		3.608		3.409		4.329		-		4.583	
	(2.116)		(2.328)		(2.461)		(2.383)		-		(7.539)	
Social Pressure Cost of Giving 0 in Person	4.996	2.358	4.226	1.513	5.202	3.280	4.933	2.339	-	-	4.410	2.767
	(0.453)	(1.032)	(0.574)	(1.02)	(2.345)	(2.45)	(0.488)	(1.052)	-	-	(1.429)	(1.654)
Welfare and Decomposition of Giving												
Average Welfare per Household of Fund-Raiser (in $)	-1.330	-0.708	-0.990	-0.357	-1.360	-1.047	-1.302	-0.707	-	-	-1.155	-0.773
	(0.128)	(0.411)	(0.189)	(0.402)	(0.735)	(0.941)	(0.126)	(0.417)	-	-	(0.416)	(0.609)
Share of Givers who Seek The Fund-raiser	0.543	0.528	0.582	0.609	0.558	0.514	0.543	0.523	-	-	0.548	0.568
	(0.056)	(0.097)	(0.064)	(0.121)	(0.062)	(0.104)	(0.059)	(0.099)	-	-	(0.152)	(0.16)

Notes: Estimates from minimum-distance estimator with moments listed in Appendix Table 1 and benchmark assumptions, except for the assumption that the altruism distribution is a mixture of a negative exponential distribution and a probability mass at no altruism (a=0). For the willingness to do a ten-minute survey for no pay we still assume a normal distribution, as in the benchmark results. Benchmark estimates in Column (1) use giving moments (0,10), 10, (10,20], (20,50], 50+. Estimates in Column (2) use giving moments (0,3], (3,7], (7,10], (10,20], (20,50], 50+. Estimates in Column (3) use giving moments (0,10], (10,20], (20,50], 50+. Estimates in Column (4) do not use any of the survey moments, while estimates in Column (5) only use the survey moments. Estimates in Column (6) use the identity weighting matrix as weighting matrix in the minimum distance estimator. Standard errors are in parentheses.