## Econ 219B Psychology and Economics: Applications Introduction to Empirical Problem Set

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May 6, 2009

## 1 Intro to Problem Set

- Problem set focused on financial markets
- Biases of investors and accountants
- Accounting Information on company performance
  - accounting books
  - quarterly earnings announcement
- Two main focuses:

- Optimal accounting rules
- Stock price response to profitability information in accounting books

- What is right valuation of company?
  - Crucial to guarantee right allocation of capital
  - Denote  $e_{t,k}$  earnings (profits) of company k in year t
  - Stock price = Discounted sum of future cash flows:

$$p_{t,k} = e_{t,k} + \frac{e_{t+1,k}}{1+r} + \frac{e_{t+2,k}}{(1+r)^2} + \dots$$

– Need forecasts of future profitability  $e_{t,k}$ 

- Two main components:
  - Short-run earnings performance

- Long-run performance
- Analysts provide forecasts on both

- Analysts. Process information on companies and make it available (for a fee)
  - Sell-side. Work for brokerage firm (investment bank)
  - Buy-side. Work for mutual funds

- Sell-side analysts:
  - \* more likely to have conflict of interest (Inv. Bank selling shares of target company)
  - \* data widely available (IBES, FirstCall)

- Analysts generate two main outputs:
  - 1. Earning forecasts  $\hat{e}_{t,k}$ 
    - Dollar earning per share of company
    - Quarterly or annual
    - Forecast h years into the future:  $h\simeq$  3,4 years
  - 2. Long-term "growth rate" of earnings  $g_e$

• Common forecasting model:

$$\hat{p}_{t,k} = e_{t,k} + \frac{\hat{e}_{t+1,k}}{1+r} + \frac{\hat{e}_{t+2,k}}{(1+r)^2} + \dots + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{(1+r)^{h+t}} \hat{e}_{t+h,k} * g_e$$

## **Company releases of information**

- Each quarter: Announcement of accounting performance
  - Scheduled announcement, conference call
  - Release of accounting indicators
  - Special focus on earnings per share  $e_{t,k}$
- Comparison of forecasted and realized earnings
- Measure of new information: earning surprise  $e_{t,k} \hat{e}_{t,k}$ .
- Renormalize by price of share:  $s_{t,k} = \left(e_{t,k} \hat{e}_{t,k}\right) / p_{t,k}$


 $\bullet$  Investors react to new information by updating stock price  $p_{t,k}$ 

- Problem set
- Focus on response of stock prices to earning surprise
- Economic significance:
  - Processing of new information
    - \* Clean measure of information
    - \* Clean measure of response
  - Timing of release of information by company


- Identify in the data three anomalies:
- Anomaly 1. Post-Earnings Announcement Drift. (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 1996; Bernard and Thomas, 1989).
  - Announcements of good news in earnings  $e_{t,k}$  are followed by higher returns over next 2-3 quarters
  - Arbitrage should eliminate this
  - Interpretation: Investors inattentive initially, news incorporated slowly over time
- Measure new information using earnings surprise  $s_{t,k}$

• Follow standard 'quantile' procedure: Divide into quantiles based on  $\boldsymbol{s}_{t,k}$ 


- Plot returns for each quantile
- Focus on light blue line for now (Figure from DellaVigna and Pollet, 2006)



- Anomaly 2. Less Immediate Response and more Drift when More distractions (DellaVigna-Pollet, forthc.; Hirshleifer-Lim-Teoh, 2007)
  - Announcements on Friday (DVP) or with more competing news (HLT):
    - \* Drift stronger and Immediate response lower
    - \* Inattention: More distracted investors



- Anomaly 3. (Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999)
  - CEOs shift the earnings so as to meet analyst expectations



- Similar result if earnings compared to earnings 4 quarters ago or compared to zero profits
- Interpretation:
  - Investors have 'bias': They penalize significantly companies that fail to meet thresholds
  - Managers cater to this bias by manipulating earnings