Origins and Responses to the Crisis

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Nearly two years after the outbreak of the credit crisis (which may be dated to March 2007 when major losses were announced by the U.S. subprime-based investors Accredited Home Lenders Holding and New Century Financial), key issues remain to be resolved. At the most basic level the questions are two. What caused the crisis? And in light of one’s answer to this first question, what should be done to minimize the risk of repetition if not of identical events then at least of something similar?

To say that these questions remain to be satisfactorily answered is not the same as saying that there has been a shortage of attempts. Standard operating procedure starts by rounding up the usual suspects: unethical mortgage brokers, greedy bankers, naïve homeowners, and ill-informed investors. Lists focusing less on individuals than mechanisms emphasize agency problems between brokers and banks, the originate-and-distribute model, excessive leverage and short-term funding, the perverse incentives created by executive compensation practices, conflicts of interest within the rating agencies, and permissive monetary policies. These long lists of causes lead to correspondingly long lists of reforms: regulate mortgage brokers, rating agencies, and executive compensation; force banks to keep a participation in any securities they originate; require banks to hold more capital; and revisit whether monetary policy should respond to credit booms and asset bubbles. This of course is only a very incomplete summary of a vast and rapidly-growing literature.

The limitations of this standard operating procedure will be apparent. However successful it is at pinpointing the immediate causes of the crisis, it fails to identify the deeper conditions that allowed those immediate causes to arise. While there is no question that investment banks and other financial institutions relied excessively on leverage and short-term funding, for example, the deeper question is how they came to do so and why such practices were so freely allowed. Similarly, while there is no disputing that relying on self-regulation in the form of banks’ internal models of value at risk and commercial credit ratings meant inadequate regulation, the deeper question is how this belief in the efficacy of self-regulation was allowed to develop. Failing to inquire into deeper forces may lead to regulatory reforms that address symptoms rather than fundamental causes, allowing those causes to again manifest themselves in the future in different but equally destructive ways.

A more parsimonious way of putting the point is: if the causes of the crisis are so obvious in retrospect, why did so many smart people fail to appreciate the gravity of the situation prior to the event?
At the most fundamental level the causes of the current crisis go back to the Great Depression of the 1930s. A factor contributing to financial problems in that period, in conventional analysis, was conflicts of interest between the commercial- and investment-banking arms of large financial conglomerates. It was the tendency for the investment-banking division run by individuals with high risk tolerance to gamble the funds of small retail depositors that led to the bank runs and failures that converted a garden variety recession into the Great Depression. Whether or not this diagnosis is accurate is disputed. For present purposes, however, this dispute is beside the point: the point is that the diagnosis led to the Glass-Steagall Act separating investment and commercial banking and to strict regulation of the financial services industry. Without access to retail deposits and with money market instruments tightly regulated, investment banks funded themselves using their partners’ capital and could therefore be placed outside the financial safety net.

Tight regulation and populist posturing were understandable reactions to the financial disaster that was the Great Depression. But as memories of that episode dimmed, the advantages liberalizing financial markets and encouraging financial innovation acquired more weight in policy discussions. In the U.S. the three signposts on this road were the deregulation of commissions for stock trading in the 1970s, the removal of Regulation Q placing ceilings on interest rates on retail deposits in the 1980s, and the elimination the Glass-Steagall restrictions on mixing commercial and investment banking in the 1990s. In the days of fixed commissions, investment banks could make a comfortable living booking stock trades. Deregulation meant competition, entry by low-cost brokers like Charles Schwab, and thinner margins. The elimination of Glass-Steagall then allowed commercial banks to encroach on the investment banks’ other traditional preserves. Forcing commercial banks to compete for deposits on price in turn left them no choice but to pursue these new lines of business.

In response, investment banks to survive were forced to branch into activities like originating and distributing collateralized bond obligations (investment-grade bonds backed by pools of junk bonds), the market in which collapsed in the second half of the 1980s; following that they developed asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities, which gained a clientele in the 1990s. To sustain their profitability, they were forced to use more leverage, funding themselves through the money market. Commercial banks, now paying interest on deposits, were anxious to put their overnight money to work; this rendered them responsive to the investment banks’ requests for short-term funding. Thereby arose the first set of causes of the crisis: the originate-and-distribute model of securitization and the extensive use of leverage.

It is important to note that these were unintended consequences of basically sensible and well-motivated policy decisions. It is hard to defend rules requiring price fixing in stock trading

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1 For some authors, including present company, this would seem to be the locus classicus of all things economic.
2 The Pecora Commission established by the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs alleged a number of specific conflicts of interest, such as the tendency for banks to underwrite questionable securities in order to pay off their own bad loans. The obvious irony is that the roots of the current crisis lie not merely in today’s incentive problems but, ultimately, in incentive problems that arose in the 1920s.
3 See White (1986) and Kroszner and Rajan (1994, 1997).
4 It was not only commercial banks of course, but also insurance companies like AIG that did the encroaching.
and imposing ceilings on deposit rates. The deregulation of commissions allowed small investors to trade stocks more cheaply, which made them better, off other things equal. Analogous arguments can be made about the removal of ceilings on interest on retail deposits; depositors should have been rendered better off, other things equal. But other things were not equal. Investment banks, which were propelled into riskier activities by these policy changes and tightly connected to other financial institutions by the interbank market, remained outside the regulatory net. Allowing commercial banks to branch into new activities outstripped the capacity of regulators to keep pace, especially when budgetary imperatives and ideology starved the regulatory agencies of resources. A fragmented regulatory regime suitable for a segmented financial-services industry became increasingly inadequate as the sharp lines between commercial banking, investment banking and other financial institutions were erased.

One can imagine that, with sufficient time, these problems would have been addressed. Well before the gravity of the current crisis had become apparent, U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson tabled a plan for reorganizing and consolidating the supervision and regulation of the country’s financial system. One can similarly imagine that, sooner or later, federal insurance would have been extended to money-market mutual funds, and investment banks would have been brought under the regulatory umbrella. But changes in regulatory practice take time. At the most basic level, the subprime crisis resulted from the tendency for financial normalization and innovation to run ahead of financial regulation.

Similarly, eliminating Glass-Steagall’s restrictions on mixing investment and commercial banking was a fundamentally sensible decision. Conglomeratization allows financial institutions to diversify their business. Combining with commercial banking allows investment banks to fund their operations using a relatively stable base of deposits instead of relying on fickle money markets. This model has proven its viability in Germany and other European countries over a period of centuries. These advantages are evident in the United States even now, with Bank of America’s purchase of Merrill Lynch and the decision of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to transform themselves into bank holding companies in order to access deposits on the wholesale market or to purchase regional banks.

Again, however, the problem was that other policies were not adapted to the new environment. Conglomeratization takes time. In the short run, investment banks were allowed to lever up their bets. They remained outside the purview of the regulators. As self-standing entities funding themselves short term, they were vulnerable to illiquidity and disruptions to their funding. A crisis sufficient to threaten the entire financial system ultimately precipitated the inevitable conglomeratization. Presumably there was a better way.

The other element in the crisis was the consumer spending boom and the resulting domestic and international imbalances. The Bush Administration cut taxes, causing government dissaving. The Federal Reserve cut interest rates in response to the 2001 recession. All the while the financial innovations described above made credit even cheaper and more widely available. This of course is just the story, in another guise, of the subprime, negative-amortization, NINJA mortgages pushed by subsidiaries of the like of Lehman Brothers. The result was increased U.S. consumer spending and the decline of measured household savings into negative territory.
What policy might have done about this continues to be disputed, even with benefit of hindsight. Some say that the Fed should have reversed out its low interest rates more rapidly in order to damp down the credit boom and consumer-spending binge and that the Congress should have raised taxes to rein in the United States’ twin deficits. But either response would have slowed and, in the worst case, interrupted recovery from the 2001 recession. The appropriate response to reckless lending and unsustainable credit expansion was more vigorous regulation of the financial institutions extending the lending and providing the credit. Financial problems are best addressed with financial instruments, macroeconomic problems with macroeconomic instruments. But in this instance more vigorous regulation ran up against the obstacles enumerated above.

The other side of the story was financial internationalization. Much as with the separation of investment from commercial banking, the Great Depression led to the imposition of tight restrictions on international capital flows (not so much by the United States, in this case, as by other countries). The gradual relaxation of those restrictions, which was another logical reaction of policy makers as memories of the Great Depression faded and which picked up speed in the 1990s, is a well-known tale. The point here is that by facilitating U.S. dependence on foreign finance and feeding the country’s credit boom, these changes helped to set the stage for what followed.

The other element helping to set the stage for the crisis was the rise of China and the decline of investment in Asia following the 1997-8 crisis. With China saving nearly 50 per cent of its GNP, all that money had to go somewhere. Much of it went into U.S. treasuries and the obligations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This propped up the dollar. It reduced the cost of borrowing for Americans, on some estimates, by as much as 100 basis points, encouraging them to live beyond their means. It created a more buoyant market for Freddie and Fannie and for financial institutions creating close substitutes for their agency securities, feeding the originate-and-distribute machine.

Again, these were not exactly policy mistakes. Lifting a billion Chinese out of poverty is arguably the single most important event of our lifetimes, and it is widely argued that the policy strategy in which China exported manufactures in return for high-quality financial assets was a singularly successful growth recipe. Similarly, the fact that the Fed responded quickly to the collapse of the high-tech bubble prevented the 2001 recession from becoming even worse. But there were unintended consequences. Those adverse consequences were aggravated by the failure of regulators to tighten capital and lending standards when capital inflows combined with loose Fed policies to ignite a credit boom. They were aggravated by the failure of China to move more quickly to encourage higher domestic spending commensurate with its higher incomes.

Now we are paying the price. As financial problems surface, a bloated financial sector is being forced to retrench. Some manifestations of these pressures, like the marriage of Bank of America with Merrill Lynch, are happier than others, like the failure of Lehman Brothers. But

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5 This of course, is simply the debate over the U.S. contribution to the problem of global imbalances and what if anything should have been done about it.
7 Assuming that the financial assets in question are indeed high quality – more on this below.
either way there will be downsizing and consolidation of the financial-services industry. Foreign
central banks are suffering capital losses on their U.S. treasury and agency securities. As the
People’s Bank and other foreign central banks absorb their losses on U.S. treasury and agency
securities, they will reasonably begin to question whether the U.S. is properly regarded as a
supplier of high-quality financial assets.\(^8\) The Bretton Woods II model where China trades high-
quality manufactures for high-quality U.S. financial assets will lose its luster.\(^9\) Capital flows
toward the United States will diminish. The U.S. current account deficit and Asian surplus will
shrink. American households will have to begin saving again. A lower dollar will enable the
U.S. to export more merchandise, in turn reconciling its balance of payments with the more
limited availability of foreign financial capital. All this is of a piece. The shame is that it took a
recession and credit crisis in the United States to bring about the inevitable adjustment.

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At a fundamental level, then, the crisis was made possible by policies of liberalization, domestic
and international, that however well intentioned allowed financial innovation in the form of new
products (notably complex derivative securities) and vehicles (such as conduits and structured
investment vehicles) to outpace supervision and regulation. Other innovations in the realm of
risk management worked in the same direction. Commercial banks, investment banks and hedge
funds were encouraged to use more leverage and their counterparties were encouraged to provide
it by the development of mathematical methods to quantify and hedge risk. These models
encouraged market participants to believe that the additional leverage was safe, since they now
possessed scientific techniques for managing it.

The problem was that these models were estimated on data from periods of low volatility
and, typically, relatively short intervals, since the instruments whose returns were being modeled
had existed for only a brief period of time.\(^10\) Rare events like a sharp drop in housing prices
were outside the sample period and not captured by the model. Institutional investors convinced
themselves on this basis that their practices were safe. They convinced their counterparties.
They convinced their regulators, who allowed them to use their proprietary models when
deciding how much capital to hold to provision against risk.\(^11\)

All the while, as my colleague Bob Anderson puts it, institutional investors were
incurred very large contingent liabilities that would come due in the event of that sharp fall in
housing prices or another similarly rare occurrence not included in the sample.\(^12\) A proper model

\(^8\) This is the explanation for global imbalances modeled by Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas (2008).
\(^10\) This created the temptation to use returns on other assets to model the behavior of new ones; for example, the
rating agencies used their accumulated data and modeling experience in rating corporate bond defaults to predict
defaults on complex derivative securities backed by mortgages. See Mason and Rosner (2007).
\(^11\) Here we academics have something to answer insofar as we trained our students and encouraged our consultancy
customers to take our models literally.
\(^12\) The problem was not merely the truncated and unrepresentative nature of the sample but also misspecification of
the model itself (specifically, the tendency to attach unrealistically low probabilities to extreme outcomes, also
known as “tail risk”). Why this was a problem is a topic for another day. One explanation would focus on the
limitations of the underlying theory. Another would emphasize incentive problems within the banks constructing
their models (specifically, the incentive for staff to understate tail risk in order to minimize the capital that had to be
put aside by management – higher capital requirements squeezing profits and bonuses).
would have forced these firms to book their contingent liabilities. Effective regulation would have required them to provision against them. Forcing firms to book and provision for those liabilities would have provided incentives to avoid excessive leverage.

The same story can be told about liquidity risk. To the extent that it was modeled—insofar as investors gauged the risks of relying on short-term funding and incurring maturity mismatches at all—this was done using data from normal times, not from those rare instances when liquidity dried up. As a result, institutions held inadequate liquidity to guard against disruptions to the supply of short-term funding, a problem that first hit Northern Rock, a British building society, in the late summer of 2007 but eventually infected the entire U.S. investment banking industry.

The other point at which financial engineering came into play, also emphasized by Anderson, was in fostering the neglect of counterparty risk. The rocket scientists designed credit default swaps and other complicated insurance contracts that reduced the perceived need to provision by fostering the impression, reflected in models of value at risk, that investors could relieve themselves of unwanted risks. But insurance is only as good as the insurer. It was eventually discovered that monoline insurance companies like MBIA and Ambac, which had appeared adequately capitalized in good times, possessed inadequate resources with which to make good on their insurance contracts when the housing market turned down. The models had not incorporated this counterparty risk. They therefore encouraged its neglect when institutional investors made their allocation decisions.

Moreover, the fact that the notional value of credit default swaps was a large multiple of the value of the underlying bonds created the danger of a domino effect if one large issuer of default swaps were to fail. This was why Treasury and the Federal Reserve were reluctant to allow Bear Stearns to fail in March 2008. It was part of what made Lehman Brothers’ failure in September 2008 so disruptive. In that case, it would appear, the authorities underestimated the threat from the CDS market. This was what then forced the U.S. government to step in and rescue American International Group (AIG).

The preceding is by no means a complete or comprehensive explanation for the crisis. Other authors would emphasize other factors. The selective emphasis here has the advantage of highlighting the deeper factors that gave rise to the imprudent practices highlighted by other commentators. By focusing on factors that have changed in recent years, it helps us understand why the crisis erupted when it did and took its particular form. And by emphasizing more fundamental problems, it leads directly to prescriptions for reform.

13 This was another instance where regulatory decisions taken in the past, under different circumstances, helped to set the stage for the crisis. The monoline insurance industry arose in the 1980s when defaults on municipal bonds caused the regulators to conclude that regular (“multiline”) companies writing mom-and-pop insurance policies should not be allowed to dabble in riskier activities like bond insurance. This decision led to the growth of monoline insurers to fill the gap. At the time no one had reason to anticipate the explosive growth of sub-investment-grade debt securities of all kinds, many of which had to be wrapped with bond insurance in order to be eligible for inclusion in the portfolios of pension funds and other institutional investors with restrictive covenants, or how the demand for such insurance would outstrip the capitalization of the monoclines—which would in turn make use of mechanical models of value at risk in order to gauge their own capital needs.

14 Not without justification. Some of my other writings do the same; see for example Eichengreen (2008).
What treatment regimen follows from this diagnosis? A first implication is the need to revisit the Basel II revision of capital adequacy standards for internationally active banks. Two pillars of Basel II are banks’ internal models of value at risk and commercial credit ratings for banks without internal models. Both of these have been revealed as fundamentally flawed by the crisis. Commercial credit ratings may be unreliable under the best of circumstances, but existing circumstances are decidedly suboptimal: the rating agencies suffer from, among other problems, significant conflicts of interest. Reliance on internal models was designed to capture the implications of the correlations between the returns on different assets for risks to the bank balance sheets. Basel I had placed different assets in different risk buckets and mechanically assigned capital requirements to each bucket, ignoring the correlations between them. It follows that going back to Basel I would throw the baby out with the bathwater. A better solution would be to compute capital requirements in two ways – an old-fashioned Basel I way where required capital was taken as a simple fraction of the value of assets (and thus not even distinguishing different risk buckets), and the new-fangled Basel II way where required capital was a fraction of value at risk as computed on the basis of complex models – and to make banks hold the higher of the two. The Swiss National Bank has proposed requiring the banks under its jurisdiction to hold capital amounting to a fraction of assets, pure and simple. The present proposal is a generalization of their idea.

A second implication is that capital requirements should reflect the liquidity of funding and the potential illiquidity of assets, and not just estimates of the volatility of asset returns. Even financial institutions with relatively conservative portfolios have experienced grave difficulties since the outbreak of the crisis as a result of their inability to renew short-term funding. This has given rise to discussion of the desirability of liquidity requirements to supplement capital requirements. A more straightforward response would be to generalize the Basel II capital adequacy ratios to incorporate a weight for liquidity risk.

Emphasizing counterparty risk as a factor in the crisis also suggests that capital requirements should be set not on the basis of the riskiness of a bank’s individual assets and liabilities but with the potential impact of its difficulties for the rest of the financial system in mind. Capital requirements should reflect implications for systemic stability, not just implications for the subject institution taken in isolation. This suggests that banks’ own internal models, which understandably focus on the actual and prospective stability of the individual institution, are not the best basis for this calibration. In particular the model that regulators develop and use may want to raise required capital ratios in periods when bank balance sheets are expanding rapidly and creating additional risks for systemic stability.16

15 Changes in their fee structure, as demanded by Andrew Cuomo, the Attorney General of New York State, where the agencies do much of their business, can go some way toward alleviating these conflicts. Similarly, freer entry into the industry can ratchet up competitive pressure and encourage the adoption of better practices. My views of the rating-agency problem are in Eichengreen (2008).

16 A specific proposal for countercyclical required capital ratios to restrain credit booms is Goodhart and Persaud (2008).
This diagnosis emphasizing counterparty risk also points to the desirability of clearinghouse arrangements as an alternative to the over-the-counter market. Transactions over the counter are only as reliable as the counterparty. In contrast, an organized exchange or clearinghouse can net transactions immediately and multilaterally, reducing the danger of cascading defaults owing to the default of a particular market participant. Authors like Cecchetti (2007) have been arguing the case for exchange-based trading for some time. Recent events support their case.

The question is then why exchange-based trading of derivative securities has developed so slowly. One explanation is path dependence: the over-the-counter market developed first and therefore remains more liquid and attractive. A second explanation is that market participants prefer variety over liquidity: exchange-traded derivatives would be more liquid, but exchange-based trading would encourage uniformity (it would be hard to organize liquid exchange-traded markets in a wide variety of purpose-tailored instruments). A third explanation is that the big broker dealers have a proprietary interest in the over-the-counter market. All three explanations are consistent with the view that a policy intervention to encourage exchange-based trading (the application of tax incentives, for example) would not be inappropriate.

Finally, this diagnosis of the crisis, emphasizing the removal of the Glass-Steagall Act, the tendency for commercial banks and insurance companies to encroach on the traditional preserves of investment banks and the tendency toward financial conglomeratization, points to the need for consolidated regulation. Having different agencies regulate different activities when those activities are undertaken by a single entity is an enticement for regulatory arbitrage. It may also prevent any single regulator from fully appreciating the risks to systemic stability (or even to the stability of the individual institution itself) of the entire range of activities in which the subject institution is engaged. Ironic as it may seem, this suggests that Henry Paulson, who tabled a proposal for consolidating regulation of the U.S. financial services industry in the winter of 2007/8, may have been pointing in the right direction.
REFERENCES


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