

Pass-Through and Market Power

Economics 121

Spring 2006

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Competitive Industry

- Recall supply-demand diagram showing:
 - Increase in all firms' MC schedule by \$1/unit is passed through to an extent $d/(d+s)$
 - d is (absolute value of) slope of demand curve
 - s is slope of supply curve
 - Exercise: could use elasticities interchangeably
 - In long run (maybe short run) expect $s \ll d$, so near 100% pass-through
- Cost change for just one price-taking firm is *not* passed through
- Change in fixed costs passed through in long run (as change in min AC), *not* in short run

Monopoly

- Last time showed:
 - If constant MC, linear demand, 50% pass-through of change in MC
 - If constant elasticity (>1), more than 100% pass-through
 - [Why the second calculation doesn't always give the answer...]
- General result?

Monopoly pass-through in general

$$(\varepsilon - 1)p = \varepsilon c$$

Elasticity of elasticity of demand

- Let E be $\frac{p}{\varepsilon} \frac{d\varepsilon}{dp}$

Then the answer is...

$$dp/dc = \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1 + E}$$

How can we check?

- Constant elasticity certainly implies $E=0$
- Formula is correct then
- Can you think of other checks?
 - Calculate [epsilon] and E for linear demand

What does that tell us?

- Little hope of knowing E in reality
 - whereas we can often estimate elasticity
 - From changes in quantity in response to price changes
 - Assuming price changes not correlated with demand shifts
 - From Lerner equation
 - Assuming the firm knows something about its elasticity
- So: monopoly pass-through *highly unpredictable*
 - Can easily be small
 - Can easily (yes!) be well over 100%
 - Never negative (exercise--don't use the E formula)
 - Monopoly may not obsess about getting p just right
 - Recall: monopoly profit hill is flat on top
 - Does the monopoly know its E?

Effect on firms

- Asked about effect on downstream buyers
- But how much do firms care about cost increases when there is pass-through?
- “Monopoly can just pass it through”

Effect on competitive firms

- Cost effect: lose $Q \, dc$
- Price effect: gain $Q \, dp$
- Why can we calculate as if firm keeps Q ?
- Consumers lose $Q^* \, dp$
- So firms plus consumers total lose $Q^* \, dc$

Effect on Monopoly

- Monopoly loses $Q^* dc$
- Why not a countervailing price effect?
 - Balanced by quantity effect—not chosen optimally
 - Monopoly could have changed price/output before, so that doesn't help much
- Consumers also lose!
- Total loss more than $Q^* dc$
 - Maybe much more... more than twice...
 - No simple adding-up as in competitive case

Who suffers from cost increase

FTC-Rambus and the rules of standards organizations

- Firms as agents for consumers in getting low input prices
- Private antitrust cases: rules on who can get damages
 - Illinois Brick rule: indirect buyers can't
 - Subject to "repeal" by states; some qualifications
 - Hanover Shoe rule
 - Direct buyers can, even if plausibly not harmed much
 - Is the Supreme Court stupid or smart?
 - Do such rules really aim to get money to the "true" victims?

Next Topic

- Cartels and collusion
- Read CP chapter 5, 122-150