“Losing the Inflation Anchor” by Ricardo Reis (LSE)

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The Great Inflation of the 1970s left many enduring marks on macroeconomic thinking and policy. For example, inflation expectations moved from relative obscurity to a key element for policy making. But what determines inflation expectations? How should we measure inflation expectations? Whose expectations are important? What is the effect of inflation expectations on the economy? How can central bankers use inflation expectations for policy? Although much progress has been made to shed light on these issues, many questions remain open. Historically, there has been strong demand from the central banking community to better understand the interplay between inflation and inflation expectations, but there is a new sense of urgency to get answers given the current developments in the US and other advanced economies. Indeed, with elevated inflation and inflation expectations, some observers and commentators are concerned that we are on a path to repeat the experience of the 1970s. Ricardo’s analysis is thus most timely and highly policy relevant.

His work makes several important contributions. First, after unearthing historical data on inflation expectations for various economic players, Ricardo documents that inflation expectations started to become unanchored circa 1967, which is well before the time suggested by other analyses. His timing suggests an important role of information rigidities and the credibility of the central bank. Intuitively, if we start in a low inflation environment and a credible central bank, the public pays little attention to inflation and inflation expectations are relatively insensitive to inflationary shocks. As a result, it takes time for the public to accumulate enough observations to become concerned about inflation and raise their inflation expectations. This also means that the central bank can “spend” its credibility/inattention capital on addressing problems in the economy

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1 The following quotes should provide a sense of what the central banking community thinks about inflation expectations. Greenspan (1994) asserted, “I am not saying what [inflation expectations] is a function of. We know it’s a very difficult issue, but that is the key variable. It’s important, but just because we can’t make a judgment as to what these driving forces are in an econometric sense doesn’t mean that it’s not real.” Bernanke (2007) observed, “How should we measure inflation expectations, and how should we use that information for forecasting and controlling inflation? I certainly do not have complete answers to those questions, but I believe that they are of great practical importance. … Information on the price expectations of businesses—-who are, after all, the price setters in the first instance—… is particularly scarce.” Yellen (2016) noted, “Perhaps most importantly, we need to know more about the manner in which inflation expectations are formed and how monetary policy influences them.”
without igniting inflation concerns but the credibility/inattention capital gives only a temporary space for policy maneuvers. This dynamic contrasts with the credible disinflations where economic players pay attention to inflation and thus revise their (unanchored) inflation expectation quickly in response to incoming data and policy announcements. Second, building on Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2004), Ricardo proposes a useful, real-time indicator for how (un)anchored inflation expectations are. Specifically, he shows that when the right tail of the cross-sectional distribution of inflation expectations starts to increase, one may have an early warning that inflation expectations could be getting unanchored. Because disagreement is largely driven by the right tail of the distribution, one can also use disagreement as an early warning indicator. Third, Ricardo provides a new perspective on why the Great Inflation happened. In particular, he argues that inflation expectations were poorly understood and measured. For example, inflation expectations were reduced to “ad factoring” (i.e., unexplained wedges) in macroeconomic models. In a similar spirit, policymakers talked about “inflation psychology” rather than relied on proper measurement of inflation expectations. These factors exacerbated other problems such as poor measurement of output gap (Orphanides 2001), perceived inability of the Fed to control inflation (Romer and Romer 2013), and energy price hikes (Hamilton 1983) that led to high inflation. Finally, Ricardo draws some worrying parallels between the 1970s and the current situation.

I find Ricardo’s insightful, detailed analysis convincing and helpful for thinking about the rise of the Great Inflation as well as current inflation developments. At the same time, I have a more positive outlook for future inflation, although obviously there is huge uncertainty in any forecast given COVID19 vagaries. There are several reasons for why we are unlikely to have a repeat of the 1970s and currently high inflation will likely turn out to be transitory.\(^2\)

First, it is true that households’ inflation expectations are high now and there is much disagreement about future inflation. This is a source of concern because the same constellation was characteristic of the Great Inflation. However, it is not unusual to have both high mean and high disagreement (Figure 1). For example, households’ inflation expectations and disagreement increased significantly during the inflation scare of the early 1990s. Yet, an increase in inflation during this episode turned out to be transitory. In a similar spirit, inflation expectations and

\(^2\)To keep this discussion related to Ricardo’s work, I will focus on inflation expectation but there are obviously many other factors to keep in mind. For example, cost of living (COLA) clauses are not as prevalent in labor contracts now as they used to be during the Great Inflation.
disagreement ran high in the years preceding the Great Recession but inflation did not become a chronic problem. We also observe that the inflation scare of 2011-2012 had elevated inflation expectations and disagreement but no systematically high inflation emerged. These episodes suggest that rising disagreement can be a useful leading indicator of unanchored inflation expectations and high future inflation but like any other leading indicator it can generate false alarms. Interestingly, in each of these episodes there was much talk about run-away inflation and debasing the dollar and so the inflation scares like the one we have today are rather familiar.

Second, the Fed raised interest rates in the 1990s and 2000s thus possibly averting problems with inflation—and thus the alarms could appear false because of the policy response—but the Fed did not raise interest rates in 2011-2012 and this later episode is likely more informative for understanding the current environment than the 1970s. Indeed, similar to 2011-2012, the Fed has interest rates at the zero lower bound, the economy is recovering after a major crisis, there is much underemployment, and energy prices are high. On the other hand, fiscal policy appears to be more expansionary now but, at the time of the writing, it remains to be seen whether fiscal support will be withdrawn quickly as was done after the Great Recession. Importantly, inflation expectations of households stayed high well after 2011—more on this shortly—but the hike in actual inflation was short-lived. In fact, the economy struggled afterwards with persistently low inflation which is consistent with disinflationary pressures due to massive, persistent underemployment after the Great Recession via the Phillips curve. In other words, although various shocks could raise inflation and inflation expectations in 2011, the systematic disinflation force dominated the longer-run dynamics. Given that current employment is well below the pre-pandemic level (at present, the employment to population ratio is roughly at the level that was observed at the trough of the Great Recession), one may project that the same systematic force will weigh down on inflation in the coming years.

Third, inflation expectations of households are remarkably sensitive to changes in energy prices. Panel A of Figure 2 shows that, since the early 1990s, households’ inflation expectations track the price of gasoline closely. Note that in this relationship it is the level of gasoline prices rather than the change in gasoline price that matters for what people think about future inflation. Panel B of the figure illustrates that, although potentially evolving over time, this relationship applies to recent pre-pandemic years as well when policymakers were concerned about a possibly
overheating economy. When oil prices collapsed in 2014, households revised down their inflation expectations. Panel C focuses on the COVID19 crisis and documents that again households’ inflation expectations and the price of gasoline comove strongly. On the other hand, professional forecasters have inflation expectations with weak sensitivity to energy prices and they see little chance of high inflation on the horizon. Why would households—and likely firms, although there is more uncertainty here given the dearth of high-quality surveys of business executives and managers—be so reactive to the price of gasoline? One may interpret this empirical pattern as a sign of success: by delivering low, stable inflation for many years, the Federal Reserve made inflation an uninteresting subject to the general public. Consistent with this view, surveys find that the public is largely unaware of monetary policy (e.g., Binder 2017, Lamla and Vinogradov 2019, Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Weber 2021). Instead, the public appears to use salient prices of frequently-purchased, relatively homogenous goods to have a shortcut for forming their inflation expectations (e.g., Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2015, Cavallo, Cruces, and Perez-Truglia 2017, D’Acunto et al. 2021). In this case, inflation expectations of households could not only depart materially from the predictions of rational and well-informed agents like professional forecasters, but also become more volatile and sensitive to short-term shocks that drive energy prices. For example, in 2008, energy prices shot up and household inflation expectations increased by 2 percentage points. This ignited a familiar talk about the return of the 1970s. But this increase in expectations reversed itself as soon as gasoline prices fell a few months later. Hence, to the extent energy markets experience transitory difficulties now, one may also predict that households’ inflation expectations will abate in the future.

Fourth, the mapping from inflation expectations to actions is likely to be more nuanced than posited by mainstream models. Specifically, the standard New Keynesian framework predicts that increased inflation expectations should stimulate current consumption as households substitute intertemporally. But if current consumption increases and hence raises the cost of producing goods, inflation expectations should rise further which in turn spurs another round of increased consumption. This spiral is particularly dangerous for an already overheated economy thus prompting the central bank to step on the brakes at the first signs of rising future inflation. According to this account, inflation should be associated with economic booms but households have a stagflationary view of the world (Kamdar 2018): they associate high inflation with high unemployment. Consistent with this stagflationary view, randomized controlled trials (e.g.,
Coibion et al. 2019, Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Weber 2021) find that exogenously raised inflation expectations of households lead to less frequent purchases of durable goods. As a result, while households act on their inflation expectations, the inflation-spending spiral appears to be a weaker propagation force than thought before. Furthermore, as the economy improves, one may predict that households will revise their inflation expectations down thus further alleviating concerns about run-away inflation.

Does this mean we can’t relive the 1970s? In the famous words of Yogi Berra, “it's tough to make predictions, especially about the future,” which is particularly relevant in light of COVID19 uncertainties. But we can learn from the past mistakes and the 1970s taught us a number of lessons. Few central bankers now believe that inflation is outside their control. Measurement of inflation expectations improved dramatically. Macroeconomic theory made great strides in incorporating and modelling inflation expectations. Of course, we do not have complete answers but we know enough to not step on the Great Inflation rake again. In my view, the main risk now is a premature withdrawal of fiscal/monetary support for the recovering economy, a mistake that inflicted unnecessary pain in the aftermath of the Great Recession (Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Koustas 2013).

References


Figure 1. Inflation expectations in the Michigan Survey of Consumers.

Notes: the figure plots time series of actual inflation (consumer price index, year-on-year), one-year-ahead mean expected inflation in the Michigan Survey of Consumers (MSC), and disagreement (standard deviation) for expected inflation in the MSC.
Figure 2. Inflation expectations and the price of gasoline.

Panel A. 1990-2014

Panel B: 2014-2019

Panel C: 2020-present

Notes: the figure plots time series of inflation expectations for households (Michigan Survey of Consumers), professional forecasters (Survey of Professional Forecasters), and the price of gasoline (US Regular All Formulations Gas Price, FRED: GASREGW).