F. Echenique
Talk slides
- Distributional preferences for market design.
- Decision theory and the "almost implies near" phenomenon.
- Social learning in lung transplant decision.
- Compromise by multimatum
- Utilitarian Social Choice and Distributional Welfare Analysis
- Learning preferences2
- Learning preferences
- Stable matching and optimal transport
- Recovering preferences and utilities [video]
- Individual and collective welfare in risk-sharing with many states
- Measuring deviations from theories of choice under risk and uncertainty
- Rationally inattentive statistical discriminatin: Arrow meets Phelps
- Multi-item discrete allocation problems
- Recovering preferences and utilities
- Closure operators: complexity and applications to classification and decision-making
- Efficiency and fairness in random allocation and social choice
- Empirical welfare economics [video]
- Decreasing Impatience
- Screening p-hackers: Dissemination noise as bait
- Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms (video presentation by Juba Ziani).
- Recovering preferences from finite data
- Constrained pseudo-market equilibrium
- "Incentive Compatible Active Learning" Talk by Siddharth Prasad.
- Edgeworth conjecture and testing for approximate Walrasian equilibrium
- Approximate EU
- Statistical discrimination and affirmative action
- Learnability of models of decisions under uncertainty
- Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with endowments [video]
- Preference identification
- A characterization of combinatorial demand
- Multiple discount factors
- Average choice
-
Testable Implications of Models of Intertemporal Choice:
Exponential Discounting and Its Generalizations - Savage in the market [video]
- How to control controlled school choice
- General Revealed Preference Theory
- Aggregate Matchings
- Aggregate and extremal matchings
- A Revealed Preference Approach to Computational Complexity in Economics
- On Behavioral Complementarity and its Implications
- You Won't Harm Me if You Fool Me
- Matching with preferences over colleagues
- What matchings can be stable.